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Propositions 
Carley Pennink 
 
1. Contrary to Williamson’s contention, risk and trust are not simple 
mirror images of each other. Not only may the perception of risk 
diminish as trust grows, but trust may also remain strong, even in 
situations of high risk. In fact, partners will be willing to take more risk, 
something a rational agent would normally not be willing to do 
(Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). 
 
2. There are limits to trust. Though partners may trust each other, there 
are times when external risks are unmanageable. Partners may choose 
to act opportunistically, breaking the moral code. This may destroy the 
trust that has been built and cause partners to exit the relationship 
(Chapter 5).  
 
3. Building trust outside of the partnership is essential. A lack of trust on 
the part of peripheral parties may give rise to political risk that can 
make or break a Public-Private Partnership (Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
4. Trust in consistently higher among partners that interact more 
frequently and intensely. These partners are dependent on each other 
for the outcome of the interaction and will invest additional resources 
in maintaining this trust relationship (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8).  
 
5. Decision making in Public-Private Partnerships is never ‘free and 
autonomous’. It is often hampered by the external influences of 
politics. If not managed well, political risk is potentially the most 
harmful risk to a Public-Private Partnership (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8).  
 
6. Fake news in social media has a negative impact on Public-Private 
Partnerships: partners need to expend resources on verifying the truth; 
fake news puts the transparency needed among partners at risk.  
 
7. Corruption is the norm in many African and Asian countries and affects 
investor confidence. Corruption is an additional risk and cost to a 
Public-Private Partnership. Trust building is impossible until these 
countries build a mature set of institutions. 
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8. A culture of ‘un-learning’ in local government is essential for and 
contributes to the performance of local government organizations.  
 
9. Boundary spanners, acting as a third party in and as the facilitator of a 
collaboration between two parties, can promote learning and improve 
performance in a partnership.  
 
10. A smart city is not only about technology, but about linking people, 
information and innovation to technology.  
 
11. Trump’s mind is subject to a conflict of interest. He should be 
protecting public interest, but his mind is absorbed with private 
interests. 
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English Summary  
ŚĂƉƚĞƌϭ͗/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ 
The central question in this research is: 
Is there evidence of a trust cycle in partnerships and does trust have an 
influence on risks and outcomes as perceived by the partners?  
 
Over the last 50 years, the complexity and interrelatedness of issues in cities 
have brought about the need for a shift in urban policy. Approaches to urban 
decline have become more strategic, such as urban regeneration, with 
Public-Private Partnerships as a dominant instrument. This research focuses 
on three long-term, urban regeneration partnerships, in Poland, the USA and 
the Netherlands, and the process of trust build-up (or breakdown) between 
partners. Trust is increasingly seen as important for long-term interactions of 
high interdependence, such as PPPs; trust can act as a governing mechanism 
in situations of high risk. The research analyses the interaction between 
partners and charts the changes of levels in trust between partners and other 
external actors over the length of the PPP, in the form of a ‘trust cycle’. It 
assesses whether trust can be linked to positive outcomes as perceived by 
the partners and the reduction in the perception of risk on the part of the 
partners. It also analyses whether partners are willing to take more risk in 
circumstances when trust is present and outcomes are positive. It explores 
the limits of trust, in cases in which trust was not sufficient to offset the 
perceptions of risk. It analyses the factors that contribute to trust build-up 
(or breakdown) and concludes on the key factors present in the cases and 
most prevalent in building strong and resilient trust.  
 
The research looks at the dynamics of trust in an international perspective. 
It studies trust in these different contexts to see if trust is the same notion. 
The research does not study the influence of context on trust, but instead 
develops a theoretical model and uses it to look at the interaction between 
partners, the growth or decline of trust, the factors that build (or breakdown 
trust) and the links of trust to risk and outcomes. 
 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌϮ͗ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨWƵďůŝĐ-WƌŝǀĂƚĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ 
The research defines Public-Private Partnerships as a more or less sustainable 
cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or 
services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared. The 
definition underlines the characteristics of PPPs, specifically the ‘jointness’ of 
partnerships: two or more partners collaborate; they combine and share 
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resources, risk and returns. In looking at the rationale for PPPs, the 
assumption is that a cooperation of an intense nature between public and 
private parties provides added value: greater outcomes, including greater 
efficiency, effectiveness and increased innovation, are argued to stem from 
the complementarity and synergies of the partners.  
 
Taking this to the urban context, this research studies a type of urban 
regeneration partnership classified by Bailey (1995), as a ‘development 
partnership’, namely a PPP that covers a single site or area (i.e. town centre), 
and includes partners such as the local government, a private developer 
and/or housing association. These partnerships typically promote 
commercial and non-profit development; and execution of activities that 
focus on mutual benefit. In the cases chosen, the core partners are the public 
and private sector, though members of the community (as external actors) 
play an important role. This positions the PPP in complex networks, subject 
to complex decision-making processes. The PPP then becomes the ‘vehicle’ 
used to highlight the interaction between partners, with the partners and 
other actors taking part as ‘players’ in a complex decision-making process. 
 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌϯ͗ŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
The importance of trust 
A growing amount of literature underscores the importance of trust in 
achieving outcomes. These outcomes include, for instance, the tendency to 
cooperate, coordination efficiencies and the realization of innovation. Trust 
is also argued to lead to an increase in exchange of information and sharing 
of resources between partners, as well as mutual learning. Trust facilitates 
negotiations and aids in the settling of conflicts. Trust is argued to contribute 
to organizational performance and in doing so to the productiveness and 
growth of the economy.  
 
It is argued that trust is fundamental in governing transactions, particularly 
in a situation in which a rational agent would not normally proceed with the 
transaction. Trust is crucial to situations with high risk, where the creation of 
trust makes actors that are incompletely protected by law willing to forgo 
policing of every interaction, and put great trust in transactions that they 
perceive as involving high risks.  
 
Economists take a negative view of trust, arguing that in economic exchange, 
agents are naturally opportunistic, and the decision to interact is based on 
an assessment of the risk of undertaking the transaction. In fact, trust is 
simply risk taking: calculating the costs and benefits of working together. 
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Some authors, however, argue that this rational, calculative and impersonal 
perspective is empirically incorrect and inefficient, as dependency on control 
mechanisms would be extensive and prohibitively expensive.  In the absence 
of controls, trust plays an important role as a governance mechanism. 
Sociologists, on the other hand, look at the social dimensions of the 
relationship as it evolves over time. Social exchange theory assumes that 
partners voluntarily provide benefits to each other, make themselves 
vulnerable to the other party, creating an obligation to reciprocate. Over 
time, partners develop a social bond, and trust develops as expectations are 
met. 
 
The definition of trust 
This research defines trust as: the perception of an actor that another actor 
will refrain from opportunistic behaviour should the opportunity arise and the 
perception of an actor that another actor will have the ability to perform 
according to agreements. This definition focuses on perception, and not on 
the behaviour that is a result of the decision to trust. This reflects an 
important distinction: behaviour is not trust; behaviour is a result of the 
decision to trust and act on this trust. The definition presumes a lack of 
opportunism on the part of the trustee, that the trustee has a sense of moral 
obligation and takes the trustor’s interests into account. It also presumes 
that, in addition to the goodwill or intention to fulfil obligations in the 
relationship that partners will also be capable to fulfil the tasks agreed upon. 
This definition is argued to be the most relevant for partnerships where not 
only intentions are important, but also the ability to perform. 
 
Trust building over time: building an analytic model 
Trust is not static over time, but develops, growing or declining (in a trust 
cycle). Trust can be argued as part of a process and trust growth as resulting 
from certain factors or actions. Trust is broken as a result of behaviour that 
breaks the code of the relationship. The research combines the Rounds 
Model developed by Teisman (2000), which allows for the study of an 
interaction to be broken into ‘rounds’, with a model developed by Lewicki 
and Bunker (1996) that looks at trust building over time. The analytic model 
assumes that trust is built in phases and that the nature of trust as well as its 
antecedents (factors that build trust) change over time as the relationship 
develops.  
 
In the first phase, trust is built based on pure calculus; on an assessment of a 
partner’s reputation, qualifications, and past performance. In addition, 
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penalties stipulated in the contract will have to be sufficient to ensure the 
compliance of the other party. In the second phase of the growth of trust, 
trust will be based on knowledge: parties know each other well enough to be 
able to predict behaviour, they will be willing to share information and 
resources with each other, and will come to know and respect each other’s 
capacities. In the third phase: trust is based on ‘identification’: parties come 
to speak the same ‘language’ and to share the same values and norms. 
 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌϰ͗ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚĞƐŝŐŶ 
The research takes an exploratory and explanatory approach, combining 
theories on partnerships and on risk and trust with an analysis of empirical 
evidence from three case studies. The research chooses a multiple case study 
strategy, where the validity of measures must rely on multiples sources of 
evidence, which come together in a triangulation fashion. The overall design 
of this research incorporates three case studies and uses embedded 
qualitative designs as instruments of analysis: document and archival 
analysis, semi-structured interviews, observations, and a questionnaire to 
confirm the information from the interviews and to quantify growth of trust 
and the perception of outcomes.  
 
This research studies the interaction process between partners at different 
moments in time in the PPPs, analysing the perceptions of, and decisions 
taken by two types of partners: key partners and peripheral partners. As the 
research analyses both the factors that build trust, as well its influence on 
risk and outcomes, this implies is that the research looks at trust both as a 
dependent variable and an independent variable. 
 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌϱ͕ϲĂŶĚϳ͗dŚĞdŚƌĞĞĂƐĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ 
These chapters chart the process of interaction in three PPPs: in Szczecin, 
Poland; New York City, USA; and Nijmegen, the Netherlands.  
 
The ase ^tudy of the ogusųawa ^treet Wartnership, ^ǌcǌecin, Woland 
dŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƌŬĞĚǁŝƚŚ ƚǁŽ ƐĞƚƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŽŶ ƚŚĞŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ
Street project. The first partner, Urban Renewal Group Norway (URGN), a 
Norwegian consortium, partnered with the city from October 1991 until the 
termination of the contract in November 1995, when the lack of secure funds 
for the project drove the local government to end the relationship. The 
second partner was an American investment company, American Retail 
Systems (ARS); it submitted a proposal in January 1997, signed a contract a 
year later, and bought shares in the newly established joint venture, local 
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renovation company Szczecin Renovation Association, Ltd (STR), in May 
1998. When political parties changed in 1999 and support for the partnership 
on the part of the city waned, the American partners bought out the city’s 
shares in the renovation company, and the partnership ended in November 
1999. The two partnerships were characterized by dynamic levels of trust, 
growing at the beginning and then lessening over time. The final divorce was 
conflictual and subject to low levels of trust between partners. 
 
The ase ^tudy of attery Wark ity, Eew zork ity, h^ 
In the face of intense political and economic risk, the partnership between a 
Canadian developer, Olympia and York (O & Y), and the public entity, the 
Battery Park City Authority, initiated in 1980, was instrumental in getting the 
Battery Park City project off the ground. The BPCA-O & Y concession 
partnership built the Commercial Center, the flagship project that provided 
the anchor tenants, and brought in the revenues to make the project viable 
and to repay the rising debt incurred by the BPCA. This financial achievement 
increased investor confidence and developers flocked to the site to build out 
the remainder of the site, making the project the success it is today. The 
relationship between the partners was characterized by high levels of trust, 
which grew over time 
 
The ase ^tudy of rabantse Woort, Eijmegen, the Eetherlands 
On 18 July 1989, the city released a tender document to 18 potential 
candidates. At the end of 1989, the Council and City of Nijmegen released 
the information that they had decided on a consortium comprised of three 
private parties, two developers (Heijmans and Hendriks) and the Dutch 
National Investment Bank (NIB). In March 1990, three months after the start 
of negotiations, the private partners attracted their first (anchor) tenant. 
Even prior to the completion of the negotiations on the partnership 
agreement, in October 1991, the partners landed three big clients and began 
working together on completing the first portions of the project. The 
partners have now been working together in a limited liability company for 
over 25 years and are completing the build-out of the project. This 
relationship is characterized by high levels of trust, which grew stronger over 
time.  
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ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ϴ ĂŶĚ ϵ͗ ŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ͗ ŬĞǇ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ 
Chapter 8 compares and analyses the data per case study and Chapter 9 
concludes with key findings of the research. The final chapter also discusses 
the value of the research and defines possible areas of future research.  
 
Empirically, there is evidence of a trust cycle in all three cases studies: in two 
cases, trust building over time, and in one case, trust dynamic, growing and 
declining, then growing and declining again. In two cases (Dutch and US 
cases), there is evidence that strategies employed and outcomes contributed 
to trust, and trust, in turn, contributed to the performance of the projects 
and the PPP. On the other hand, the research also identifies the key factors 
that led to the deterioration of trust, and ultimately to outcomes that were 
less than desired. In the Polish case, the deterioration of trust was slow, but 
once gone, it was gone. Trust can be good in mediating an interaction, in 
paving the way for cooperation and increasing the amount of investments. 
Trust breakdown, on the other hand, can hamper an interaction 
substantially, and cause defensive behaviour. 
 
The results of the analysis show that trust is consistently higher among 
partners that interact intensely, and are essential for the realization of the 
project (all cases studies). This shows that when interaction is frequent, and 
partners are dependent on each other for outcomes, building trust is 
important. If built, trust is highest in these types of partners. Partners, will in 
fact, expend additional resources to ensure that relationships are 
maintained. Trust has a focus. 
 
The US and Dutch cases (and initially the Polish case) reveal that in ‘high trust’ 
situations, partners revert to strategies that are more effective in coping with 
risks and in bringing about outcomes that benefit the partnership. Partners 
are also more willing to take greater risk, for instance to increase the 
intensity of the interaction and to invest additional resources to ensure that 
obstacles are overcome. The results reveal, contrary to Williamson’s 
contention, that risk and trust are not simple mirror images of each other. 
The cases reveal that even in situations of high risk, it is possible to build 
trust, or that trust will remain strong even in conditions of high risk. And 
again, partners are willing to take more risk than would normally be thought 
wise. Of note was that trust was perceived by some of the respondents as 
approaching ‘blind faith’. The research, however, reveals that this type of 
trust was necessary to deal with the urgency being faced by the partners. The 
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risks being faced by the partners (post-communist transitions, economic 
recessions), were so substantial that this type of trust was needed to take on 
the risks.  
 
The cases also demonstrate that outcomes and trust are not simple mirror 
images of each other (trust rising when positive outcomes are achieved, and 
falling when outcomes are negative). In other words, trust can remain strong 
in the face of negative outcomes. When trust is strong, partners give each 
other the ‘benefit of the doubt’; this occurred in all of the case studies. 
Partners must then resolve the issue, and outcomes have to improve for trust 
to be maintained over the longer term. The Polish case shows how trust 
deteriorates if outcomes do not improve. 
 
Trust does have its limits. The research reveals that there are circumstances 
in which risks are perceived as so extensive, particularly risks external to the 
project (political risks), that partners revert to opportunistic behaviour and 
exit the relationship. This is a rational decision, but breaks the moral code 
and causes a break in trust. This was the case in the URGN and the ARS phases 
of the Polish case.  
 
The analysis of urban regeneration partnerships positioned the interaction 
between the core partners in a complex network, and a complex decision-
making process. In fact, one could argue that decision making between core 
partners is never really ‘free and autonomous’, no matter the autonomy of 
the organization. Decisions were often hampered by the City Council (Poland 
and the Netherlands, at a certain point) or the community (Poland and the 
US). The cases demonstrate how important it is to engage the community 
and to build the trust of external parties, and how potentially damaging 
political risk, if not managed well, can be to a partnership.  
 
The research also demonstrates that trust building is dependent on certain 
key factors. Some factors appeared to be more relevant than others: 
respondents in all cases felt the knowledge basis of trust to be more relevant: 
the sharing of information and resources, in particular, but also predictability 
and respect for capacity. The research also revealed the factors that 
contributed to the decline in trust, such as the withholding of information or 
predictability (getting to know your partner and being able to predict 
negative behaviour). This brings one to conclude that while these factors are 
key to trust build-up, the opposite or negative form of these factors (partners 
withholding information, for instance), leads to the erosion of trust.  
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The findings of the research underline the fact that trust building is an 
‘iterative’ and cyclical process; this is true for both trust and for the 
perceptions of risk and outcomes. Strategies that result in positive outcomes 
result in trust build-up. As trust builds, so does the willingness to take risk. 
Willingness to take risk (the actual taking of risk) is a factor of trust. If the 
perception of outcomes is negative and does not improve, trust declines. As 
trust declines, so does the willingness to take risk. Trust building is not a 
linear process, but is affected by additional factors, such as risk taking and 
outcomes.  
 
This research also highlights relevant factors that certain authors have 
recently started to explore. For one, the type of organization chosen for the 
execution of the partnership influences trust (the organizational setup that 
also influences how decisions are made). A ‘truly’ autonomous organizational 
structure that provides partners with the opportunity to focus on project 
build-out, without political interference (to the extent that this is possible), 
is important to trust build-up. The cases also revealed the relevance of 
certain management strategies as being important for trust build-up. 
 
This research contributes to the development of empirical evidence on the 
growth of trust in partnerships through the in-depth analysis of a series of 
case studies. It has taken a step to further the theory on trust, as well as the 
theory on the relations between trust, risk and outcomes. A key value of this 
research is that it provides an in-depth analysis of trust over time, and has 
been able to chart the dynamics of trust in a trust cycle, over time. The 
research gained insight into trust in three cases in an international context, 
applied the theoretical model in different contexts, and the empirical 
evidence was able to demonstrate that trust was important in all three 
partnerships, in spite of the context.   
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Nederlandse Samenvatting  
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬϭ͗/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝĞ 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag is: 
Bestaat er bewijs voor het bestaan van een vertrouwenscyclus in 
samenwerkingsverbanden en beïnvloedt vertrouwen de risico’s en 
resultaten in de perceptie van de partners?  
 
In de afgelopen 50 jaar is een verschuiving in het stedelijk beleid door de 
toegenomen complexiteit en de onderlinge samenhang van problemen in 
steden. De aanpak van stedelijke problematiek is strategischer geworden, 
zoals stadsvernieuwing, waarbij de publiek-private samenwerking (PPS) vaak 
wordt ingezet als instrument. Dit onderzoek is gericht op drie lange termijn 
samenwerkingsverbanden voor stadsvernieuwing in Polen, de VS en 
Nederland, en op de totstandkoming (of teloorgang) van het vertrouwen 
tussen de partners. Vertrouwen wordt steeds meer gezien als een 
belangrijke factor voor lange termijn interacties waarbij sprake is van een 
sterke wederzijdse afhankelijkheid, zoals het geval is in een PPS; vertrouwen 
kan in zeer risicovolle situaties optreden als sturend mechanisme. In dit 
onderzoek wordt de interactie tussen partners geanalyseerd en worden 
veranderingen in de mate van vertrouwen die gedurende de PPS tussen 
partners en andere, externe actoren in kaart gebracht in de vorm van een 
‘vertrouwenscyclus’. Er is bepaald of vertrouwen in verband kan worden 
gebracht met de door partners waargenomen positieve resultaten en met 
een vermindering van het door de partners waargenomen risico. Ook is er 
onderzocht of partners bereid zijn meer risico te nemen wanneer er 
vertrouwen bestaat en de resultaten positief zijn. De grenzen van 
vertrouwen zijn verkend in gevallen waar er niet voldoende vertrouwen 
bestond om de waargenomen risico’s te compenseren. De factoren die 
bijdragen aan de totstandkoming (of teloorgang) van vertrouwen zijn 
geanalyseerd en er zijn conclusies geformuleerd over de meest belangrijke 
factoren die in de casussen zijn geobserveerd en die het sterkst naar voren 
komen in de totstandkoming van een sterke en veerkrachtige 
vertrouwensband.  
 
Het onderzoek kijkt naar de dynamiek van het vertrouwen in een 
internationaal perspectief. Vertrouwen is in verschillende contexten 
bestudeerd om te zien of het steeds om hetzelfde besef van dit vertrouwen 
ging. Het onderzoek heeft zich niet gericht op de invloed van de context op 
vertrouwen, maar heeft een theoretisch model ontwikkeld en dat gebruikt 
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om te kijken naar de interactie tussen partners, de groei of afname van 
vertrouwen, de factoren die bijdragen aan de totstandkoming (of teloorgang) 
van vertrouwen en het verband tussen vertrouwen en risico’s en resultaten. 
 
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬϮ͗ĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞƌŝŶŐǀĂŶĚĞƉƵďůŝĞŬ-ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĂŵĞŶǁĞƌŬŝŶŐ 
Ten behoeve van het onderzoek is de publiek-private samenwerking 
gedefinieerd als een min of meer duurǌame samenwerking tussen publieke 
en private actoren waarin geǌamenlijk producten en/of diensten worden 
ontwikkeld en waarin risico’s, baten en lasten worden gedeeld. De definitie 
benadrukt de kenmerken van de PPS en dan vooral de ‘gezamenlijkheid’ van 
de samenwerking: twee of meer partners werken samen; zij combineren en 
delen middelen, risico’s en opbrengsten. De redenen die worden opgevoerd 
om een PPS in te zetten is de aanname dat intensieve samenwerking tussen 
publieke en private partijen een toegevoegde waarde heeft: dat er meer 
resultaten - inclusief een toename van efficiëntie en effectiviteit en meer 
innovatie—uit voortvloeien vanwege de complementariteit van en synergie 
tussen de partners.  
 
Dit onderzoek is toegepast op een stedelijke context en het heeft het type 
stadsvernieuwingssamenwerking bestudeerd dat Bailey (1995) heeft 
geclassificeerd als een 'development partnership' (samenwerkingsverband 
voor ontwikkeling), dat wil zeggen een PPS die zich toelegt op een specifieke 
locatie of gebied (bijvoorbeeld het stadscentrum) en waarbij de partners 
kunnen bestaan uit onder andere de lokale overheid, een particuliere 
ontwikkelaar en/of een woningbouwvereniging. Zulke samenwerkingen 
ondernemen doorgaans bouwprojecten die hetzij commercieel, hetzij 
zonder winstbejag opereren en voeren activiteiten uit die zijn gericht op 
wederzijds voordeel. In de gekozen casussen zijn de publieke sector en de 
private sector de kernpartners, hoewel andere leden van de gemeenschap 
ook een belangrijke rol spelen (als externe actoren). Dit plaatst de PPS in een 
complex netwerk dat onderhevig is aan complexe besluitvormingsprocessen. 
De PPS wordt een ‘vehikel’ dat wordt ingezet om de interactie tussen 
partners te benadrukken en de partners en andere actoren worden ‘spelers’ 
die een rol vervullen in een ingewikkeld besluitvormingsproces.  
 
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬϯ͗ĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞƌŝŶŐǀĂŶǀĞƌƚƌŽƵǁĞŶ 
Het belang van vertrouwen 
Het belang van vertrouwen voor het bereiken van resultaten wordt in steeds 
meer literatuur onderschreven. Het gaat om resultaten zoals de geneigdheid 
en bereidheid om mee te werken, de efficiëntie van coördinatie en het 
realiseren van innovatie. Ook wordt betoogd dat vertrouwen ertoe leidt dat 
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partners meer informatie uitwisselen, meer hulpbronnen delen en meer van 
elkaar leren. Vertrouwen vergemakkelijkt onderhandelingen en helpt bij het 
oplossen van conflicten. Er wordt beargumenteerd dat vertrouwen bijdraagt 
aan de prestaties van een organisatie en daarmee aan de productiviteit en 
de groei van de economie.  
 
Er wordt tevens gesteld dat vertrouwen een fundamentele en bepalende rol 
speelt in transacties, vooral in situaties waarin ‘rationele personen’ (rational 
agents) normaal gesproken zouden afzien van de transactie. Vertrouwen is 
cruciaal in zeer risicovolle situaties. Het gewekte vertrouwen zorgt er dan 
voor dat actoren, die onvoldoende beschermd zijn door de wet, er 
desondanks niet toe overgaan elke interactie te controleren en wel 
vertrouwen stellen in transacties die zij nochtans als zeer risicovol ervaren.  
 
Economen zien vertrouwen als iets negatiefs en betogen dat de bij 
economische uitwisseling betrokken personen vanzelfsprekend 
opportunistisch zijn en dat de beslissing om te interageren is gebaseerd op 
een inschatting van het risico dat het afsluiten van de transactie met zich 
meebrengt. Iemand vertrouwen is in feite simpelweg het nemen van een 
risico: men berekent de lasten en de baten van het samenwerken. Sommige 
auteurs betogen echter dat dit rationele, berekenende en onpersoonlijke 
perspectief empirisch onjuist en inefficiënt is aangezien het een 
veelomvattende en onbetaalbare afhankelijkheid van controlemechanismen 
met zich mee zou brengen. Bij gebrek aan controlemechanismen speelt 
vertrouwen een belangrijke rol als bestuurmechanisme. Sociologen kijken 
echter naar de maatschappelijke dimensies van de relatie en over hoe die 
zich in de loop der tijd ontwikkelt. De sociale uitwisselingstheorie neemt aan 
dat partners elkaar op vrijwillige basis voordelen bieden en zich kwetsbaar 
opstellen tegenover de andere partij zodat er een verplichting tot 
wederkerigheid ontstaat. In de loop der tijd ontwikkelen partners een sociale 
band en vertrouwen ontwikkelt zich als aan de verwachtingen wordt 
voldaan. 
 
De definitie van vertrouwen 
Dit onderzoek definieert vertrouwen als: de perceptie van een actor dat een 
andere actor ǌich van opportunistisch gedrag ǌal onthouden indien de kans 
daarop ǌich voordoet en de perceptie van een actor dat een andere actor in 
staat ǌal ǌijn om volgens afspraken te presteren. Deze definitie richt zich op 
perceptie, en niet op het gedrag dat het gevolg is van de beslissing om 
iemand te vertrouwen. Dit weerspiegelt een belangrijk onderscheid: gedrag 
is niet gelijk aan vertrouwen, maar gedrag is het gevolg van de beslissing om 
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te vertrouwen en om op basis van dit vertrouwen te handelen. De definitie 
veronderstelt een gebrek aan opportunisme van de trustee (die vertrouwd 
wordt) en veronderstelt dat de trustee een morele verplichting ervaart en 
rekening houdt met de belangen van de trustor (die de ander vertrouwd). De 
definitie veronderstelt tevens dat de partners niet alleen welwillend zijn en 
het voornemen hebben om de verplichtingen die de relatie met zich 
meebrengt na te komen, maar ook in staat zullen zijn de overeengekomen 
taken te vervullen. We stellen dat deze definitie het meest relevant is voor 
samenwerkingen waarbinnen niet alleen intenties van belang zijn, maar ook 
het vermogen om te presteren. 
 
De totstandkoming van vertrouwen in de loop der tijd: het ontwikkelen van 
een analytisch model 
Vertrouwen is niet statisch in de loop der tijd, maar het ontwikkelt zich, het 
groeit of neemt af (in een vertrouwenscyclus). Vertrouwen kan worden 
opgevat als onderdeel van een proces en de groei van vertrouwen als iets dat 
voortvloeit uit bepaalde factoren of activiteiten. Vertrouwen wordt geschaad 
door gedrag dat niet in overeenstemming is met de code van een relatie. In 
dit onderzoek wordt het door Teisman ontwikkelde Rounds Model (2000), 
dat het mogelijk maakt onderzoek naar een interactie op te delen in 
zogenaamde ‘ronden’, gecombineerd met een door Lewicki en Bunker 
ontwikkeld model (1996) dat kijkt naar de totstandkoming van vertrouwen 
en hoe dit verloopt en verandert in de tijd. Het analytische model berust op 
de aanname dat vertrouwen gefaseerd tot stand komt en dat de aard van het 
vertrouwen en de antecedenten (de factoren die vertrouwen opbouwen) 
veranderen door de tijd en terwijl de relatie zich ontwikkelt.  
 
In de eerste fase vindt de totstandkoming van vertrouwen plaats puur op 
basis van berekening: op een inschatting van de reputatie, kwalificaties en 
eerdere prestaties van de partner. Daarnaast moeten de in het contract 
vastgelegde sancties voldoende zijn om de naleving van de andere partij te 
waarborgen. In de tweede fase vindt de groei van vertrouwen plaats op basis 
van kennis: de partijen kennen elkaar goed genoeg om toekomstig gedrag te 
kunnen voorspellen en zullen bereid zijn informatie en middelen met elkaar 
te delen en elkaars capaciteiten te leren kennen en respecteren. In de derde 
fase is het vertrouwen gebaseerd op ‘identificatie’: de partijen beginnen 
dezelfde ‘taal’ te spreken en dezelfde normen en waarden te delen. 
 
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬϰ͗ĞŽŶĚĞƌǌŽĞŬƐŽƉǌĞƚ 
Het onderzoek hanteert een verkennende en verklarende benadering 
waarbij theorieën over samenwerkingen, over risico’s en over vertrouwen 
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worden gecombineerd met een analyse van empirisch bewijs uit de drie 
praktijkvoorbeelden. Bij dit onderzoek is gekozen voor een strategie op basis 
van meerdere casussen, waarbij triangulatie is toegepast: de validiteit van de 
metingen berust op bewijsvoering die wordt gebaseerd op meerdere 
bronnen. De algemene opzet van het onderzoek omvat drie casussen en er 
wordt gebruik gemaakt van ‘embedded’ kwalitatief ontwerp om het 
materiaal te analyseren: document- en archiefanalyse, semigestructureerde 
interviews, observaties en een vragenlijst om de informatie uit de interviews 
te bevestigen en om de groei van vertrouwen en de perceptie van resultaten 
te kwantificeren. 
 
In dit onderzoek wordt de interactie tussen PPS-partners op verschillende 
momenten bestudeerd en worden de percepties en besluiten van twee 
soorten partners geanalyseerd: kernpartners en externe partijen. In het 
onderzoek worden zowel factoren die een rol spelen bij de totstandkoming 
van vertrouwen als de invloed van vertrouwen op risico's en resultaten 
geanalyseerd en dat impliceert dat het onderzoek vertrouwen opvat als een 
afhankelijke variabele én als een onafhankelijke variabele. 
 
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬϱ͕ϲĞŶϳ͗ĞĚƌŝĞĐĂƐƵƐƐĞŶ 
In deze hoofdstukken worden de interactieprocessen die een rol hebben 
gespeeld in drie PPS-en in kaart gebracht: Szczecin in Polen; New York City in 
de Verenigde Staten en Nijmegen in Nederland.  
 
De casus van ogusųawa ^treet, ^ǌcǌecin, Wolen 
/ŶŚĞƚŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚ-project werkte het stadsbestuur samen met twee 
groepen partners. De eerste partner, het Noorse concern Urban Renewal 
Group Norway (URGN), was een partner van oktober 1991 tot het contract 
in november 1995 afliep omdat het stadsbestuur de relatie moest 
beëindigen wegens een gebrek aan financiering voor het project. De tweede 
partner was een Amerikaanse investeringsmaatschappij, American Retail 
Systems (ARS). Deze diende in januari 1997 een voorstel in, tekende het 
contract een jaar later en kocht in mei 1998 aandelen in het nieuw opgerichte 
joint venture, het lokale renovatiebedrijf Szczecin Renovation Association, 
Ltd. (STR). Toen het politieke klimaat in 1999 veranderde en de steun van de 
stad voor de samenwerking afnam, kochten de Amerikaanse partners de 
aandelen van de stad in het renovatiebedrijf op en eindigde de 
samenwerking in november 1999. De mate van vertrouwen binnen de twee 
samenwerkingen was dynamisch: in het begin groeide het vertrouwen en in 
de loop der tijd nam het weer af. De laatste scheiding was een 
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vechtscheiding: het vertrouwen tussen de partners bereikte toen een 
dieptepunt. 
 
De casus van attery Wark ity, Eew zork ity, s^ 
De in 1980 geïnitieerde samenwerking tussen de Canadese ontwikkelaar 
Olympia & York (O & Y) en de openbare instantie Battery Park City Authority 
(BPCA) speelde een grote rol bij het van de grond komen van het Battery Park 
City-project in een periode van grote politieke en economische risico’s. Via 
de concessiesamenwerking van BPCA en O & Y kon er een Commercial Center 
worden ontwikkeld, een paradepaardje dat garant stond voor huuropbrengst 
en dat de inkomsten genereerde die het project levensvatbaar maakten en 
die nodig waren om de groeiende schulden van de BPCA terug te betalen. 
Deze financiële prestatie verhoogde het vertrouwen van beleggers en de 
ontwikkelaars stonden in de rij bij het bouwterrein om de rest van de locatie 
te bebouwen. Dit maakte dat het project het succes werd dat het vandaag 
de dag is. De relatie tussen de partners werd gekenmerkt door een hoge 
mate van vertrouwen, dat in de loop der tijd groeide. 
 
De casus van rabantse Woort, Eijmegen, Eederland 
Op 18 juli 1989 gaf de Gemeente Nijmegen een aanbestedingsdocument vrij 
aan 18 potentiële kandidaten. Eind 1989 maakten de Raad en de Gemeente 
bekend dat zij hadden gekozen voor een consortium bestaande uit drie 
private partijen: twee ontwikkelaars (Heijmans & Hendriks) en de 
Nederlandse Investeringsbank (NIB). In maart 1990, drie maanden na het 
begin van de onderhandelingen, vonden de particuliere partners hun eerste 
belangrijke huurder (‘anchor client’). Al vóór de afronding van de 
onderhandelingen over de samenwerkingsovereenkomst in oktober 1991 
hadden de partners drie grote klanten binnengehaald en begonnen ze samen 
te werken aan het voltooien van de eerste delen van het project. De partners 
werken nu al meer dan 25 jaar samen in een besloten vennootschap en zijn 
bezig met het afronden van de bouw van het project. Deze relatie wordt 
gekenmerkt door een hoge mate van vertrouwen, dat in de loop der tijd sterk 
is gegroeid. 
 
,ŽŽĨĚƐƚƵŬ ϴ ĞŶ ϵ͗ ĞŵƉŝƌŝƐĐŚĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝĞƐ͗ ďĞůĂŶŐƌŝũŬƐƚĞ ďĞǀŝŶĚŝŶŐĞŶ ĞŶ
ďŝũĚƌĂŐĞǀĂŶŚĞƚŽŶĚĞƌǌŽĞŬ 
Hoofdstuk 8 vergelijkt en analyseert de gegevens per casus en hoofdstuk 9 
eindigt met de belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek. In het laatste 
hoofdstuk worden ook de waarde van het onderzoek besproken en mogelijke 
gebieden van toekomstig onderzoek gedefinieerd. 
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Er is in alle drie de casussen is empirisch bewijs gevonden voor het bestaan 
van een vertrouwenscyclus: in twee gevallen komt vertrouwen in de loop der 
tijd tot stand en in één geval is het verloop dynamisch: het vertrouwen groeit 
en neemt af, groeit weer en neemt weer af. In twee casussen (de 
Nederlandse en de Amerikaanse) hebben de gebruikte strategieën en de 
resultaten bijgedragen aan het vertrouwen en heeft het vertrouwen op zijn 
beurt bijgedragen aan de prestatie van de projecten en van de PPS. 
Anderzijds zijn in het onderzoek ook de belangrijkste factoren geïdentificeerd 
die hebben geleid tot de teloorgang van vertrouwen en, uiteindelijk, tot 
resultaten die niet wenselijk waren. In het Poolse voorbeeld verliep de 
teloorgang van het vertrouwen langzaam, maar toen het eenmaal geschaad 
was, kwam het niet meer terug. Vertrouwen kan een interactie bemiddelen, 
de weg effenen voor samenwerking en het aantal investeringen doen 
toenemen. De teloorgang van vertrouwen kan anderzijds de interactie 
aanzienlijk belemmeren en defensief gedrag oproepen. 
 
De resultaten van de analyse laten zien dat er altijd meer vertrouwen is 
tussen partners die intensief interageren en die elkaar nodig hebben om een 
project te realiseren (in alle casussen). Dit laat zien dat de totstandkoming 
van vertrouwen van groot belang is wanneer er frequent interactie 
plaatsvindt en de partners afhankelijk van elkaar zijn om tot resultaten te 
komen. Als er eenmaal sprake is van vertrouwen dan is het vertrouwen 
tussen dit type partners het sterkst. Zulke partners zullen in feite bereid zijn 
extra middelen aan te spreken om ervoor te zorgen dat relaties behouden 
blijven. Vertrouwen heeft een focus. 
 
Uit de Amerikaanse en Nederlandse voorbeelden (en aanvankelijk uit het 
Poolse) blijkt dat de partners in situaties waarin veel vertrouwen bestaat 
effectievere strategieën hanteren om met risico’s om te gaan en dat ze meer 
positieve resultaten weten te bewerkstelligen, die de samenwerking ten 
goede komen. De partners zijn ook eerder bereid meer risico te nemen, 
bijvoorbeeld om de intensiteit van de interactie te vergroten of om extra 
middelen te investeren om ervoor te zorgen dat obstakels worden 
overwonnen. De voorbeelden onthullen, in tegenstelling tot wat Williamson 
beweert, dat risico en vertrouwen niet eenvoudigweg elkaars spiegelbeeld 
zijn. Uit de casussen blijkt dat het zelfs mogelijk is vertrouwen te creëren in 
situaties die een hoog risico met zich meebrengen en dat er in die situaties 
ook een hoge mate van vertrouwen kan blijven bestaan. En nogmaals: 
partners zijn dan bereid meer risico te nemen dan gewoonlijk als verstandig 
zou worden beschouwd. Opmerkelijk genoeg werd ‘vertrouwen’ door 
sommige van de respondenten bijna opgevat als ‘blind vertrouwen’. Het 
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onderzoek toont echter aan dat die partners dit type vertrouwen nodig 
hadden om de urgentie waarmee ze geconfronteerd werden tegemoet te 
treden. De risico’s waar deze partners voor stonden (postcommunistische 
transities, economische recessies) waren zo substantieel dat dit type 
vertrouwen nodig was om de risico’s te kunnen nemen.  
 
De casussen tonen ook aan dat resultaten en vertrouwen niet eenvoudigweg 
elkaars spiegelbeeld zijn (het vertrouwen stijgt wanneer er positieve 
resultaten worden behaald en daalt wanneer de resultaten negatief zijn). 
Met andere woorden, er kan een hoge mate van vertrouwen blijven bestaan 
in het licht van negatieve resultaten. Wanneer er veel vertrouwen is, geven 
partners elkaar het voordeel van de twijfel. Dit gebeurde in alle casussen. Wil 
het vertrouwen op de lange termijn in stand blijven dan moeten de partners 
het probleem oplossen en moeten de resultaten verbeteren. Het Poolse 
voorbeeld laat zien hoe vertrouwen afneemt als de resultaten niet 
verbeteren. 
 
Vertrouwen heeft zeker grenzen. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat er 
omstandigheden zijn waarin risico's worden gezien als zó groot - vooral als 
het gaat om externe risico's, buiten het project (politieke risico's)—dat de 
partners teruggrijpen op opportunistisch gedrag en de relatie beëindigen. Dit 
is een rationele beslissing, maar hij breekt de morele code en zorgt voor een 
vertrouwensbreuk. Dit was het geval in zowel de URGN-fase als de ARS-fase 
van het Poolse voorbeeld.  
 
In dit onderzoek zijn stadsvernieuwingssamenwerkingen bestudeerd en dit 
betekent dat de interactie tussen de kernpartners plaatsvindt in de context 
van een complex netwerk en complexe besluitvormingsprocessen. In feite 
zou je kunnen zeggen dat er nooit echt sprake is van 'vrije en autonome' 
besluitvorming tussen kernpartners, ongeacht de autonomie van de 
organisatie. De besluitvorming werd vaak belemmerd door gemeenteraden 
(in Polen en in Nederland, op een gegeven moment) of door de gemeenschap 
(in Polen en in de VS). De voorbeelden tonen aan hoe belangrijk het is om de 
gemeenschap bij zaken te betrekken en een vertrouwensrelatie op te 
bouwen met externe partijen, en hoezeer politieke risico’s die niet goed in 
de hand worden gehouden een samenwerking kunnen schaden. 
 
Uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat de totstandkoming van vertrouwen 
afhankelijk is van bepaalde sleutelfactoren. Sommige factoren bleken 
relevanter te zijn dan andere. De respondenten vonden de kennis op basis 
waarvan vertrouwen tot stand komt in alle gevallen het belangrijkst: het ging 
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daarbij vooral om het delen van informatie en middelen, maar ook om 
voorspelbaarheid en respect voor capaciteiten. Het onderzoek onthulde ook 
welke factoren hebben bijgedragen aan de afname van vertrouwen, 
bijvoorbeeld het achterhouden van informatie of een gebrek aan 
voorspelbaarheid (een partner leren kennen en negatief gedrag kunnen 
voorspellen). Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat deze factoren van groot belang zijn 
voor de totstandkoming van vertrouwen en dat het tegendeel of de 
negatieve vorm van deze factoren (bijvoorbeeld een partner die informatie 
achterhoudt) leidt tot de teloorgang van vertrouwen. 
De bevindingen van het onderzoek onderstrepen het feit dat vertrouwen tot 
stand komt tijdens een 'iteratief' en cyclisch proces. Dit geldt zowel voor 
vertrouwen als voor percepties van risico’s en resultaten. Strategieën die tot 
positieve resultaten leiden, resulteren in de totstandkoming van vertrouwen. 
Terwijl vertrouwen tot stand komt, neemt ook de bereidheid om risico’s te 
nemen toe. De bereidheid om risico's te nemen (het feitelijk nemen van een 
risico) is een factor die bijdraagt aan de opbouw van vertrouwen. Wanneer 
de perceptie van resultaten negatief is en er geen verbetering optreedt, 
neemt het vertrouwen af. Als het vertrouwen afneemt, neemt ook de 
bereidheid om risico te nemen af. Vertrouwen komt niet tot stand in een 
lineair proces, maar wordt beïnvloed door bijkomende factoren, zoals risico’s 
en resultaten.  
 
In het onderzoek worden daarnaast relevante factoren belicht die sinds kort 
ook onderwerp van studie door andere auteurs zijn. Zo heeft de 
organisatievorm die voor de uitvoering van de samenwerking wordt gekozen 
bijvoorbeeld invloed op het vertrouwen (de organisatorische opzet 
beïnvloedt hoe beslissingen worden genomen). Een ‘werkelijk’ autonome 
organisatiestructuur die partners de mogelijkheid biedt zich te concentreren 
op projectuitbouw, zonder politieke inmenging (voor zover mogelijk), is van 
belang voor de totstandkoming van vertrouwen. De voorbeelden hebben 
ook uitgewezen dat de relevantie van bepaalde managementstrategieën van 
belang is voor de totstandkoming van vertrouwen. 
 
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan de ontwikkeling van empirisch bewijs over de 
groei van vertrouwen in samenwerkingen door middel van de diepgaande 
analyse van een reeks casussen. Het onderzoek brengt de theorievorming 
over vertrouwen en over de relatie tussen vertrouwen, risico en resultaten 
een stap verder. Een kernbijdrage van dit onderzoek is de diepgaande 
analyse van de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen; het heeft de dynamiek van 
vertrouwen in een grafiek weergegeven als een trustcyclus die zich 
ontwikkeld over de tijd. Tijdens het onderzoek is inzicht verworven in de rol 
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van vertrouwen in drie casussen in een internationale context, is het 
theoretische model in verschillende contexten toegepast en is empirisch 
bewijs gevonden dat aantoont dat vertrouwen in alle drie de 
samenwerkingen belangrijk was, ondanks de context. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The challenges of building trust between partners 
Imagine that you are a government official sitting across the table from a 
recently chosen private partner in a large urban regeneration project that 
could last up to 20 years to implement. You know very little about each other 
(though you have done some checking on your partner’s past performance 
and there has been a bidding process), just that there are mutual interests to 
be involved in this project and to (potentially) collectively achieve something. 
It is clear that your and your partner’s interests may also be different, and 
this may cause some difficulties.  
 
What you also know, in the negotiations and decisions that will ensue, is that 
you will be walking a fine line. On the one hand, you need to negotiate your 
own interests to maximize the benefits of the project for your organization; 
on the other, you know that you have to build a solid and successful 
relationship with your partners to make the partnership work over the longer 
term. How can you get what your organization wants and needs, but still 
build the trust of your partners in you? 
 
Working in these long term, multiuse urban regeneration projects is very 
risky: multiple interests and coalitions are at work, there are uncertainties in 
the (future) market, you know a limited amount about what partners are able 
to do and are willing to input. Can you trust them? Or: 
 
 Will your partners take opportunities to protect their own interests at 
the expense of yours? Will they act opportunistically, thereby 
jeopardizing the project and the partnership? 
 Will your partners be competent and fulfil their obligations as promised 
over the different phases of the project?  
 
Your partner’s capacity to meet their obligations, as well as their choosing to 
avoid acting opportunistically (protecting your interests and the interest of 
the partnership, sometimes over their own) are fundamental to you being 
able to trust them. You have to do the same to have them trust you.  
 
If trust is built, you may perceive that the risks you face in this complex and 
long-term project are less daunting; after all, you are in this together. You 
might also be more willing to take additional risks and invest more (time and 
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resources) in the partnership. In fact, the more you perceive that your 
partner is acting according to expectations, and the outcomes are positive, 
the more willing you are to make yourself vulnerable to your partner: to be 
open, to share information, and to invest more (to take more risk). But time 
will tell; it will take time to build up the relationship and trust. 
1.2 Filling the gap 
Increasingly, trust is seen as key to long-term interactions of high 
interdependence, such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Trust is, 
however, an elusive concept. It is difficult to build, and takes time and effort 
to grow. Trust takes longer to build than it takes to break (Lewicki and Bunker 
1996). Though the amount of research on trust (interpersonal and 
interorganizational) is growing, little research looks at the dynamics of trust 
in public and private partners in a PPP.  
 
The concept and practice of partnerships have become popular. A growing 
body of literature looks closely at the reality of executing PPPs and the issues 
faced, noting the difficulties that public and private partners have dealing 
with issues such as conflicting interests and cultures, as well as the sharing 
and management of risk between partners. Trust is cited as fundamental to 
the relationship, but little research has been done to look at how partners 
can build trust during the collaboration and the importance of trust for the 
execution of the partnership.  
1.3 This research 
This research deals with two concepts that are receiving more attention: 
Public-Private Partnerships and trust. It focuses on three long-term, urban 
regeneration partnerships (case studies in Poland, the USA and the 
Netherlands) and the process of trust build-up (or breakdown) between 
partners. The research analyses the interaction between partners and charts 
the changes of levels in trust between partners and other external actors 
over the length of the PPP, in the form of a ‘trust cycle’. It assesses whether 
trust can be linked to positive outcomes and the reduction in the perception 
of risk on the part of the partners. It also analyses whether partners are 
willing to take more risk in circumstances when trust is present and 
outcomes are positive. It explores the limits of trust, in cases in which trust 
was not sufficient to offset the perceptions of risk. It analyses the factors that 
contribute to trust build-up (or breakdown) and concludes on the key factors 
present in the cases and most prevalent in building strong and resilient trust.  
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1.4 Changing forms of policy in the urban context: 
the shift to urban regeneration 
The PPPs studied in this research take place in an urban context. Cities are 
dynamic and complex; the centres of opportunities as well as problems. In 
the past five to six decades, many Western cities have been subject to a rate 
of change that has brought positive growth, but also problems of a complex 
nature. This has also brought about an evolution in urban policy and a shift 
to urban regeneration as an approach (Ball and Maginn 2007, Booth 2005, 
Roberts and Sykes 2000, Roberts et al 2016).  
 
In that period, there have been a number of visible and common 
phenomena. Coupled with population growth, many cities have seen intense 
growth in population from inward migration. This has put pressure on the 
housing, infrastructure and services of cities. There has also been a 
noticeable shift in the economic bases of cities. Cities have ceased to be the 
centres of manufacturing, instead transforming into centres for services and 
consumption (Couch et al 2003; Nijkamp et al 2007, Roberts and Sykes, 2000, 
Roberts et al 2016). There has been a clear shift in the relative importance of 
the functions in cities: each city has seen a shift in the demand for shelter, 
security, social and cultural actives, recreation, education and health 
services, as well as the exchange of goods and services (Booth 2005, Roberts 
and Sykes, 2000, Roberts et al 2016, Ysa 2007). This has brought about the 
need for a recycling of these functions and of physical facilities. 
 
Parallel to this, there has been a distinct change in the demographics of 
Western cities. Starting a number of decades ago, higher-income residents 
began to shift to the suburbs, leaving behind the lower-income population 
and an increasing number of migrants, all with reduced spending power. 
There has, since then, been an attempt to bring higher-income earners back 
to the city and to provide the housing and services to make this attractive. 
These changes have put new demands on cities for land and properties, 
infrastructure as well as the range of facilities needed to service the changing 
population. The issues faced in Western cities are complex and interrelated. 
Over the years, urban policies have sought to deal with these changes, taking 
on different approaches. Urban regeneration interventions have included 
the coexistence of physical regeneration projects, activities to restructure 
the economy and sustain social frameworks, with different elements 
dominating at different moments in time (Booth 2005, van Boxmeer and van 
Beckhoven 2005, Roberts and Sykes, 2000, Roberts el al 2016).  
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It is important to note that though Western cities face challenges, they are 
also perceived as the location of growth and opportunities. In the era of 
globalization, cities have grown into multicultural hubs and nodes in a 
broader network of cities (Castells 1996). They are often the centres of 
political power, innovation, education and the knowledge economy. Their 
physical fabric is an enormous source of wealth. Cites provide scale 
economies, and with the current advancements in technology and ITC, are 
attractive to existing and new businesses. They are players and compete in 
the regional and, often, international arena, attracting working-age and 
foreign-born residents, and generating jobs (Nijkamp et al 2007, Roberts et 
al 2016). Cities are complex and approaches to development have needed to 
achieve the correct balance in policy decisions and strategies.  
 
Roberts et al (2016: 17) cite six key trends and themes that act as a basis for 
and influence the need for a shift in policy approaches of time: 
 
1. The relationship between physical conditions and social response 
(deprivation). 
2. The continued need for the replacements of many elements of the 
urban fabric: how to respond when the relative importance of functions 
in cities change, become derelict and the physical fabric of the city 
requires upgrading. 
3. The importance of economic growth for prosperity and of quality of life 
in cities. 
4. The need to optimize the use of urban land and to avoid unnecessary 
sprawl. 
5. Growing environmental awareness; the need for regeneration to take 
on the goals of sustainable development. 
6. Understanding and recognizing that urban policy mirrors the dominant 
social conventions and political forces of the day. 
 
Ysa (2007) adds to this, stating that the need for change stemmed from two 
other common phenomenon in cities. One phenomenon involved the 
increasing blight in city centres, coupled with the competition faced by these 
centres from more attractive and modern areas with a wide range of 
services; another, the need to meet unmet demand for functions, and to find 
and direct public investment to particular strategic areas. 
 
As stated in point six above, policy responses have reflected the sociopolitical 
and economic values and structure of cities. The table below provides an 
overview of the changes in policies and approaches to urban problems, and 
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the shift to urban regeneration and to partnerships.1 Over the years, one 
notes a shift from publicly driven projects in the 1950s and 1960s (post-war 
reconstruction) to privately driven projects in the 1970s and 1980s. With 
greater decentralization and the realization that the local government could 
not do everything, the political ideology in the 1970s and 1980s was to favour 
the market, to lean towards property-led development and to leverage 
private funds and expertise (Van Boxmeer and Van Beckhoven 2005). In the 
UK, in particular, this approach also involved the setup of special-purpose 
agencies to work with the private sector; however, their activities had the 
tendency to circumvent the interests of the local government and the 
community in development (Ball and Maginn 2007).  
 
In the 1990s, one notes the acceptance on the part of policymakers that the 
interrelated nature of the problems in cities created the need for a strategic 
and integrated interventions; partnerships then also became the dominant 
approach (Ball and Maginn 2007, Booth 2005, Roberts and Sykes 2000, 
Roberts et al 2016). Urban regeneration was not predicated on market 
forces, and a clear step was taken away from property-led development. It 
was not based on national government planning directives and did not 
position the local government as major builder and landlord. There was more 
focus on involving the community in expressing its needs and in decision 
making, with a recognition of the social and environmental aspects of policy 
issues (Ball and Maginn 2007, Van Boxmeer and Van Beckhoven 2005). 
 
 
1 This table reflects the trends in urban policy in the UK. However, it is also, to a great 
degree, representative of trends in Western cities and therefore useful. Ball and Maginn 
(2007) state that trends in private sector development in urban regeneration have been 
broadly similar on an international level.  
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Urban regeneration is defined as “comprehensive vision and action which 
seeks to resolve urban problems and bring about a lasting improvement in 
the economic, physical, social and environmental conditions of an area that 
has been subject to change or offers opportunities for improvements.” 
(Roberts et al 2016: 18). This definition underlines certain key characteristics 
of the approach, which seeks to 
 understand and deal better with the processes of decline and complex 
nature of problems in cities, as well as the opportunities that exist in 
cities, 
 make interventions that go beyond physical interventions, tackling the 
diversity of issues experienced in an area, and 
 avoid an ad hoc approach to dealing with problems, taking on a more 
integrated approach embedded in a city-wide strategic framework 
(McQuaid 2000, Roberts and Sykes 2000, Roberts et al 2016).  
 
The case studies in this research were developed in the 1990s and were 
therefore affected by the ideology of that time.  
1.5 The importance of alternative forms of 
governance in times of complexity 
The changes in society of the past four decades have brought about the need 
for alternative forms of governance such as PPPs and relationships built on 
trust. A decrease in the popularity of hierarchical forms of governance and a 
search for new forms of governance began in the 1980s, when the pressures 
on governments to perform increased, requiring them to get things done 
better and with fewer resources (Klijn 2009). Governments faced the 
challenge of improving the management of public organizations as well as 
ensuring good, inclusive and transparent systems of governance. Increasing 
decentralization brought more authority for local governments, as well as 
more responsibility and accountability (Larbi 1999, Batley and Larbi 2004). 
Being closer to the people implied that citizens and the civil society had more 
to say about how things were done and how decisions were made. Public 
managers had to face the reality that they could not do everything and that 
they needed to work with others to get things done (Osborne and Gaebler 
1993). The new public management paradigm led to the increase in 
deregulation, privatization of services and outsourcing of public tasks (Hood 
1991, Savas 2000).  
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Negative views of performance of the public sector led to arguments that 
there were benefits to be realized from working with the private sector. The 
cumbersome nature of the government, and its ties to political objectives, 
often resulted in less than optimal ways of working and inefficiencies in the 
provision of services. Bad public management resulted in the waste of scarce 
government resources (World Bank 1994). All this led to criticism of the 
public sector and a search for alternative approaches to government tasks, 
including a move to less intervention by the government (‘letting the market 
work’), greater concentration on primary tasks and less bureaucracy. This 
implied more room for working with the private sector (Osborne and Gaebler 
1993, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Public-Private Partnerships were 
increasingly seen as a commonplace and instrumental tool for providing 
policies and services around the world (McQuaid 2000, Osborne 2000, 
Osborne 2010). 
 
In the 1990s, experiences with and a view that new public management 
delivered less than desirable results brought about a shift in thinking on 
governance (Kickert et al. 1997). Government, businesses and the civil 
society increasingly faced complex and persistent problems in society: called 
‘wicked problems’ (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, Rotmans and Loorbach 2009). 
As cities grew and development became more and more dynamic, 
uncertainty was an increasing characteristic of modern society, as well as 
growing individualism, specialization, fragmentation and pluralism (Ibid.). 
Governments encountered parties who disagreed not only on the problems 
being faced, but also on the solutions to those problems. In addition, actors 
were no longer, individually, in possession of sufficient information, 
knowledge and resources to deal with issues on their own. Organizations in 
modern society needed each other and were dependent on each other for 
finding a resolution to problems (Ibid). Decision making was complex and 
occurred in situations of dependency. 
 
This implied the need for changing forms of governance and rethinking the 
role of government. Governance involved a process of joint working between 
organizations (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008) as well as balancing a multitude 
of interests and mediating differences. Complexity gave rise to many 
different arenas of interaction, where actors interacted in complex networks 
to achieve their objectives and to take part in strategic games (Kickert et al. 
1997, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). No longer at the top of the strategic apex, 
the public sector began to use horizontal networks as a means to manage 
processes and relations. Trust became a fundamental element of these 
relations. Problems that crossed the boundaries of organizations and of the 
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public and private sectors created the need for new forms of institutional 
relations and ways of working (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004:6). Public-Private 
Partnerships was one of the forms of governance relations (McQuaid 2000, 
Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006, Osborne 2010).  
1.6 PPPs in urban regeneration 
Due to the diversity and complexity of issues, urban regeneration processes 
are characterized by a wide range of actors, including the central and local 
governments, the private sector, the local communities and other civil 
society actors that interact to deal with the problems faced. Partnerships, in 
various forms, are a dominant aspect of regeneration processes: 
“strategically designed, locally based, multi-sectoral and multi-agency” 
relations (Carter 2000: 37, Roberts and Sykes 2000, Robert et al 2016). They 
exist to ensure that interventions are not purely state- or market-led (and 
subject to the state or market failures of the past), and to mobilize the 
collective efforts of actors involved (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). They 
provide the basis for a collective discourse and negotiations of solutions (Ball 
and Maginn 2007, Booth 2005, Carter 2000, Roberts and Sykes 2000, Roberts 
et al 2016). The greater involvement of different actors in the decision-
making process also enhances the argument that PPPs are intrinsically a 
more efficient use of resources and an equitable way of using public funds 
(Carter 2000, 2016). 
 
Regeneration interventions are, by nature, multiuse and large scale, and 
subject to long implementation periods (McQuaid 2000). They are subject to 
the substantial risks over time related to shifts in market conditions. All this 
implies that no single actor can undertake these initiatives alone. The private 
sector considers undertaking regeneration projects alone far too risky, (local) 
governments have also experienced financial difficulties in dealing with 
projects of such a comprehensive nature (Codecasa and Ponzini 2011, 
Sagalyn 1997, van Boxmeer and van Beckhoven 2005). These uncertainties 
lead to a mutual dependency, and the need for relationships such as 
partnerships to deal with the level of complexity and to share risks.  
 
The type of arrangements chosen depends largely on the aims and objectives 
of the partnership, as well as the scale, size of the project, market 
circumstances, political relations and economic cycles (McQuaid 2000, 
Roberts and Sykes 2000). In the case of the United Kingdom, for instance, the 
government set up special purpose bodies such as urban regeneration 
companies, in fact a form of PPP, to execute regeneration projects (Kort and 
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Klijn 2013). There are diverse forms of partnerships. Key elements of 
regeneration partnerships are: long-term interactions, complex and 
characterized by high interdependence. 
1.7 Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships  
The concept of partnership has become popular with researchers and 
practitioners in the West and, increasingly, in developing and emerging 
economies. Klijn and Teisman (2003: 137) define partnerships as “a more or 
less sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joint 
products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits 
are shared”.  
 
The contention is that a PPP is an “ideal model for the design of inter-
organiǌational relationships in public sector management” (Friend 2006: 
261). The suggestion is that PPPs can act as an impetus for public sector 
reform and provide benefits, such as efficiency gains, better transfer and 
sharing of risk, alternative forms of accountability and, potentially, an 
increase in democratic legitimacy (McQuaid 2000, Plummer and Heymans 
2002, Hodge 2004, Yescombe 2007, Hodge et al. 2010, Kort and Klijn 2013). 
 
The assumption is that a cooperation of an intense nature between public 
and private parties provides added value by producing better and more 
efficient provision of services and outcomes (Savas 2000, Hodge and Greve 
2005, Hodge et al. 2010). Efficiency gains are often argued to be attributable 
to the private sector, which is able to deliver outcomes at a reduced cost. 
Given ease of entry to the market, the private sector is argued to perform 
more efficiently and to have greater access to market signals (Batley 1996). 
Proponents also argue that the private sector brings to the relationship 
specialized technology, funding and management expertise (Savas 2000, 
Grimsey and Lewis 2004). 
 
Added value is often argued to derive from the collaborative effort; greater 
outcomes, including increased innovation, are argued to stem from the 
“complementarity of the sectors, the fact that the work of each can improve 
the performance of the others, so that the whole is, indeed, much more than 
the sum of the individual parts” (Kloppenborg 1991: 164). Partners who are 
involved earlier on in the decision-making process are more ‘invested’ in the 
relationship than in a normal client-service provider relationship (principal-
agent) (Kort and Klijn 2013). In the process of collaborating, partners harness 
each other’s knowledge and skills, and synergies produce better and more 
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innovative solutions (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, Huxham and Vangen 
2005). Closer and more intense involvement allows the partnership to deliver 
better quality and, therefore, value for money (Kort and Klijn 2013). 
 
For the private sector there are also benefits from working with the 
government: partnerships are argued to open up new markets, enhance the 
negotiation of benefits to all parties and improve coordination of activities 
(Pennink 1997, McQuaid 2000). From the perspective of the private sector, 
working together, particularly in times of recession, attracts more business, 
helps in diversifying and creates better reputation and position in the market. 
Private parties are motivated by opportunities to gain greater access to 
public monies (grants and subsidies) and public powers, and in gaining 
certain concessions from the public authorities. By working together, private 
parties also hope for better co-ordination (horizontal and vertical 
integration) of components of projects (Klijn et al. 2010). 
1.8 The importance of trust in PPPs 
Trust is argued to be important in situations of uncertainty, complexity and 
increasing interdependence, and in situations of horizontal steering and 
cooperation. A growing amount of literature underscores the importance of 
trust for achieving cooperation and for improving results; it is also linked to 
the realization of innovative results. In partnerships as well, trust is argued 
to be an effective coordination mechanism, due to the ‘jointness’ of the 
relationship, and where hierarchical rules and direct supervision are no 
longer seen as effective in achieving coordination (Ring and Van De Ven 1992, 
Child 1998, Rousseau 1998, Nooteboom 2002, Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). 
 
Fukuyama argues that nations in which a high degree of trust prevails are 
suited for advancing economic relations and efficiency. In contrast, nations 
with a low degree of trust suffer the disadvantages of their economies and 
have to rely on authoritarian bureaucratic regulations (Fukuyama 1995). He 
believes that policing mechanisms such as property rights, contracts and law 
are indispensable institutions, but that substantial economies can be realized 
with the existence of trust. “Weople who trust each other and are good at 
working with one another can adapt easily to new conditions and create 
appropriate new organisational forms” (pp. 335-336). 
 
Gambetta (1988) argues that trust is a precondition for cooperation between 
organizations (such as in PPPs). In seeking ways to reduce risk, partners will 
be more likely to take part in a transaction if they believe that their partners 
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will not act opportunistically. This presumes a form of reliance on other 
people, “which involves beliefs about the likelihood of their behaving in a 
certain way” (Misztal 1996: 82). Cooperating firms make an assessment of 
each other’s ethical stance, organization culture and prior performance. If a 
person or organization judges that the probability of misbehaving is low, then 
cooperation is possible. In turn, successful transactions are embedded in 
relations between agents developed over time. Successful exchange builds 
trust, which then generates more lasting relations. The temporal quality, 
repetitiveness and frequency of the transactions are also crucial to the build-
up of trust, and the effectiveness of the intervention. 
 
Throughout the relationship, partners try to minimize risk and maximize 
utility through various means. Trust is built incrementally, but if the means 
used results in distrust and the need for coercive behaviour, this has more 
dramatic and catastrophic consequences, potentially the breakdown of 
relations. Ostrom furthers this idea by stating that if agents are 
interdependent, coercion is not necessary. The objective is then to develop 
a strategy for cooperation that obtains joint benefits (Ostrom 1990). 
 
Another perspective on trust underlines that in long processes (such as urban 
regeneration PPPs) the frequency of the transactions and human factors give 
rise to costs and risks that agents seek to reduce and for which they must 
develop policing mechanisms (negotiations, contracts and monitoring) and 
governance systems (i.e. alternative organization arrangements). However, 
in complex transactions involving high risk, not all policing mechanisms and 
governance structures can cover all contingencies, even in a society in which 
legal sanctions are enforceable. It is possible that the cost of policing is so 
great that it outweighs the benefit to be derived from the relationship 
(Lazerson 1988). It is argued that trust is fundamental as an “efficient 
lubricant to economic exchange or the most efficient mechanism for 
governing transactions” (Arrow 1974: 23), particularly in a situation in which 
a rational agent would not normally proceed with the transaction. Moore 
(1994: 819) states that trust is crucial to situations with high risk, and that 
the generation of trust makes agents, “incompletely protected by law willing 
to dispense with detailed personal policing of every transaction, and put 
great trust in exchanges involving large apparent risks” (see also Furlong 
1996). 
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1.9 Research questions 
The main research question of this research is:  
 
Is there evidence of a trust cycle in partnerships and does trust have an 
influence on risks and outcomes as perceived by the partners?  
 
More specific research questions are as follows: 
 
 What was the nature of the interaction between partners and other 
actors during the partnership processes, over the rounds, in the three 
cases? 
 What was the nature of outcomes and risk as perceived by the partners 
and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What were the dynamics of the growth of trust over time as perceived 
by the partners and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What important factors led to the growth of trust? 
 Did trust have an influence on risk and the outcomes achieved, and if so 
what kind? 
1.10  Significance of the study: trust in an international 
context 
This research aims to contribute to the development of empirical evidence 
on the growth of trust in partnerships through in-depth case study research 
and to further the theory on the relations between trust, risk and outcomes. 
 
This research looks at cases in three countries, in an international context. Of 
particular interest in this study is to look at the dynamics of trust in this 
international perspective. The intention is to study trust in these contexts to 
see if it is the same notion: trust, the mechanisms used to build trust and the 
influences of trust on the perceptions of risk and outcomes. It is not the 
intention to go into cultural differences and their effects on trust. Instead, 
the research has developed a theoretical model and has used this to look at 
the interaction between partners, the growth or decline of trust, the factors 
that build (or break down trust) and the links of trust to risk and outcomes, 
to see if there are similarities or differences in the cases. If, in spite of the 
context, trust is important and the factors to build trust are similar, as well 
as the perceptions of risks and outcomes, then one can argue that trust and 
the mechanisms to build trust are important in all contexts. This research 
contends that this is the case.  
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There is a body of work that looks at the influence of culture on trust (Doney 
et al. 1998, Ferrin and Gillespie 2010, Saunders et al. 2010). Ferrin and 
Gillespie (2010) argue that in many cases, instead of the results of research 
being induced from empirical cases, most of the work has been deduced 
from ‘logic and argumentation’ (p. 44). In addition, they argue that the 
models produced are set up to understand how trust is different across 
cultures, but do not consider that trust might be a universal concept (and 
that trust as a universal concept might be desirable). Additionally, some 
authors argue that, in a globalizing world, there are some paradigms that can 
and should be seen as universal across cultures. “Theories . . . that cannot be 
applied in more than one culture are increasingly irrelevant” (Tjosvold et al. 
2001: 171). They argue that, in joint ventures, partners use methods that are 
appropriate for their interaction and, in doing so, develop a ‘third culture’ all 
of their own. 
 
The value of this research is that it is a detailed analysis of the change in trust 
over time, and it follows in detail the trust cycle (the growth or break down 
of trust) through different rounds of partnerships. The aim is to gain a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of trust in three cases and in three contexts. 
It is also the first research to look at trust in detail in Public-Private 
Partnerships; it is practical relevance to the partnerships that are being 
promoted worldwide. 
1.11 Design of the research 
The research was set up in a particular manner. Based on an extensive 
literature review and the research questions, a model was designed that 
analysed trust development over time, and the factors of trust build-up (trust 
as a dependent variable). The model also analysed the perceptions of risk 
and of outcomes at key moments in the PPP interaction and the influences 
of trust and trust build-up on these perceptions (trust as an independent 
variable). The research used this ‘trust cycle’ model to guide the structuring 
of the work on the empirical case studies.  
 
The empirical chapters were set up to respond, one by one, to the research 
questions, but, in doing so, to be able to analyse the results and compare 
these to the theory on trust, and its influence on the perception of risk and 
outcomes. 
 
The empirical analysis chapter compares the cases, analysing the differences 
and similarities. The research, in effect, analyses if the partners in all three 
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case studies built trust and achieved positive outcomes, and how they did so. 
If not, why is this? If the trust built resulted in a reduced perception of risk, 
similar in all cases, why is this? How did trust contribute to these outcomes 
and influence perception of risk? Can the research generalize on this? The 
research assumes, as Yin (2003) stated, that if the results of two or more 
cases support the theory, one can claim replication, namely ‘analytic 
generalization’. The results are generalized to a broader theory.  
1.12 Limitations of the research 
There were certain limitations in conducting this research. For one, the 
choice was to focus on projects that were complete, so respondents could 
reflect on the interaction over the entire length of the project. In the 
identification of partners and other key actors, the research sometimes 
encountered difficulties in making contact with people of interest. In some 
cases, potential respondents had died or had moved away and were 
unreachable.  
 
In addition, as part of the triangulation process necessary for the qualitative 
design, the research executed a questionnaire to confirm the results of the 
interviews and information from the documentation. Though it was the 
intention to include both the ‘core’ actors (the contractual partners) and 
‘peripheral’ actors (players in the interaction, external to the contractual 
relationship) in the execution of the questionnaire, it soon became clear that 
core partners were more comfortable in scoring the trust they had in their 
other core partners than their trust in peripheral actors. In some cases, 
peripheral actors were unwilling to score the core partners, stating that this 
was difficult, as they did not have a core function. There were also instances 
where respondents did not feel comfortable assessing trust in their own 
organization, and so did not fill in this portion of the questionnaire. This 
reduced the number of respondents in some of the cases, but also led to 
some interesting conclusions in the research on trust and on whom a person 
chooses to focus trust. 
 
The research attempted to the best of its ability to be rigorous in its 
interpretation of the data. For instance, when triangulation of different data 
sources yielded conflicting interpretations, the research made note of this 
and made an explicit attempt to explain these differences. 
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1.13 Structure of this research 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapters 2 and 3 provide a literature 
review of the theories underpinning Public-Private Partnerships and 
trust/risk/outcomes. Chapter 4 focuses on the research design and 
methodology. Chapters 5 through 7 detail the three cases studies: the 
interaction in rounds, and an analysis of the perceptions of outcomes, risk 
and trust per round, as well as the factors that built (or broke) trust. Chapter 
8 provides the empirical conclusions, deriving these from a cross-case 
analysis and addressing the key research questions one by one. The final 
chapter concludes with key conclusions, relevance of the research and 
recommendations for further research. 
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2 Public-Private Partnerships  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the rationale for and key characteristics of Public-
Private Partnerships. It looks at the theories that underpin partnerships, 
discusses different perspectives on partnerships and determines that the 
network perspective of partnerships coupled with the strategic management 
theory provide a strong theoretical base for the research. Within the context 
of network theory, the actors and their interaction become a focal point of 
study. Their interaction is affected by the complexities and uncertainties of 
the problem and the strategies they choose are driven by their perceptions 
of the problem and solution. The final section introduces a model for 
analysing the process of interaction between partners as part of an 
interorganizational relationship – the partnership. 
 
Network governance theory argues that trust is becoming important in 
horizontal relationships such as PPPs, in mediating interests among actors, in 
reducing the risk as perceived by different actors and achieving improved 
outcomes (innovation, cooperation, sharing of information and resources) 
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, Klijn et al. 2010, Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). As 
there is often a lack of trust between the public and private sector when 
entering a PPP, the build-up and the study of that build-up of trust, is 
essential for PPPs.  
 
PPPs are argued to be beneficial as they provide an effective way of sharing 
risk. This sharing of risk and the bundling of skills and resources are seen as 
an improved manner of achieving outcomes. The research question of this 
study is therefore extremely relevant for PPPs, namely testing to see if there 
is evidence of trust build-up in the PPP interaction and whether this trust has 
an influence on risk and outcomes, as perceived by the partners and other 
actors.  
2.2 Understanding what Public-Private Partnerships 
are 
Partnerships as a phenomenon are difficult to define. There is clearly some 
disagreement in the literature on the precise meaning of the term. This stems 
from the fact that, in practice, there are numerous types of partnerships 
being implemented; these definitions try to reflect what partnerships are in 
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practice, in different contexts, and attempt to describe a wide range of 
relationships (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006: 25). 
 
This chapter looks at partnerships using a ‘urban regeneration lens’, meaning 
that the sections that follow will look more closely at the key aspects of 
partnerships in the context of complex, multifunctional, multi-actor urban 
regeneration projects. These are PPPs positioned in complex networks, 
subject to complex decision-making processes. The argument is that these 
types of projects are distinct from, for instance, infrastructure projects, and 
require a particular type of partnership relationship that reflects the specific 
nature of the project and what it is trying to achieve. Put another way: “If 
form does follow function, then the most significant dimension concerns the 
aim of the partnership” (McQuaid, 1998: 6).2 
 
Taking a look at definitions and literature on PPPs, one notes that they tend 
to focus on the characteristics of partnerships (i.e. a PPP exists when there 
is . . .) and on aspects that distinguish PPPs from other types of relations 
where actors work together (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006). In addition, 
definitions focus on the purpose of or rationale for setting up a partnership, 
in other words, the arguments concerning why a partnership is beneficial or 
preferable to another form of relationship in a certain context. The 
definitions dealing with the rationale behind partnerships focus on two 
dimensions: the justification in terms of what the partners gain from the 
relationship (i.e. for mutual benefit), and what, in broader terms, 
partnerships are argued to achieve (i.e. to achieve efficiencies and innovation 
or better outcomes).  
2.3 The rationale for partnerships 
Why partnerships? The literature on partnerships argues that PPPs provide 
benefits: cooperation of an intense nature between public and private 
parties provides added value by producing better and more efficient 
provision of services and outcomes (Savas 2000, Hodge and Greve 2005, 
Hodge et al. 2010). The Knowledge Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Finance 
underlines that: 
 
2 Version published in: McQuaid, R.W., “The Role of Partnerships in Urban Economic 
Regeneration”, IV International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships, Llubjana, 
Slovenia, 21-23 May 1998. Published in: L. Montanheiro, B. Haig, D. Morris and N. Hrovatin 
(eds) Public and Private Sector Partnerships: Fostering Enterprise. Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam 
University Press, pp. 315-330, 1998. 
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“The result of the collaboration is added value: a qualitatively better product 
for the same money, or the same quality for less money, or both. There are 
benefits for both sides: for the private sector there are not only new 
opportunities in a growing market, it can make its own contribution to a 
project that is also attractive from the commercial angle; to the government, 
the benefit is the prospect of enhanced quality and/or reduced project costs” 
(http://www.pps.minfin.nl). 
 
As stated before, the private sector is argued to be more efficient and able 
to deliver outcomes at a lower cost. The collaborative effort creates greater 
outcomes, including increased innovation. The ‘synergies’ from resource 
coordination and collaborative efforts result in added value, i.e. innovative 
policies or solutions (Hastings 1996, Adams and Hastings 2001). In the 
process of partnering, partners harness each other’s knowledge and skills 
and synergies produce better ideas and better (Lemstra 1996, Klijn and 
Teisman 2000) as well as more innovative solutions (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001, Huxham and Vangen 2005). 
 
“The result of collaboration is usually more than the sum of its parts – 
certainly where two sides work together with a win-win situation . . . . This is 
a goal that can be achieved if both government and private sector do what 
they are best at” (http://pps.minfin.nl).  
 
This text underlines that PPPs are set up to make maximum use of the 
characteristics and skills of the public and private sectors. 
 
As well, and as intimated above, Kloppenborg (1991: 1) emphasizes the 
possibility of using partnerships as a means to counteract social problems.  
 
“Through their high complexity and scale such (social) problems are of an 
extraordinary nature and require alternative devices for ordering interests apart 
from the effective mechanisms of market and state hierarchy.” McQuaid (2000: 
19) further develops this statement by stating that “partnerships can be argued 
as an effective way of overcoming market imperfections that are caused by 
externalities”. 
 
These two statements are of relevance to urban regeneration, characterized 
by complexity and scale. They establish the precedent for the assumption 
that there are benefits to be realized from the two sectors working together, 
the benefits from collaboration that normally would not be achieved if the 
two sectors worked separately, leaving development subject to simple 
market mechanisms or to hierarchical government approaches.  
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In addition, the two authors point to the justification for partnerships as 
‘alternative devices for ordering interests’ (Kloppenborg 1991). Partnerships 
are seen as being able to deal with extraordinary problems, characterized by 
multiple interests, where traditional approaches have failed to do so. 
Partnerships are also seen as an approach that focuses more on the broader 
concerns of citizens and community and on broader outcomes, and less on 
narrow performance goals and outputs that stem from partnerships driven 
by competition (Denhardt and Denhardt 2000, Teicher et al. 2006). 
 
From the literature above, the rationale for partnerships, with regard to 
urban regeneration, can be summarized as 
 adding value in terms of products, creating innovation and synergy; 
 improving coordination of outputs; 
 bringing complementary skills and resources together; 
 providing an alternative device for ordering interests to deal with 
complex problems; and 
 achieving commercial as well as social goals. 
 
The arguments for partnerships underline endogenous and well as 
exogenous outcomes, meaning that they focus, on the one hand, on the 
benefits for the partners and, on the other, on the wider benefits to the 
society at large.  
2.4 Characteristics and dimensions of partnerships 
What are the key characteristics of a partnership? This research uses Klijn 
and Teisman’s (2003: 134) definition of partnerships, namely: “ more or less 
sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joint 
products and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits 
are shared.” The characteristic upon which this definition focuses is the 
‘jointness’ of partnerships: at least two partners become involved and they 
combine and share resources, risk and returns. 
 
A scan of the literature further highlights the following characteristics of 
partnerships (in urban regeneration): 
 
 Partnerships involve people and organizations from two or more 
sectors: these include the public and private sectors, but also could 
include NGOs and the community (World Bank 1994). 
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 The interactions often involve multiple interests and allow the 
integration of those interests (Kloppenborg 1991, Bailey 1994:293, 
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
 The partners interact to achieve common and often complementary 
goals (McQuaid, 1998) (McQuaid 2000, Klijn and Teisman 2003). 
 In pursuit of these interests and goals, partners combine resources so 
that they can achieve their own goals as well as those of the 
partnership as a whole (Steijn et al. 2011). 
 Partners often enter into organizational arrangements to improve the 
coordination processes (Savas 2000, Hodge and Greve 2005). These 
arrangements are with an eye on simplifying work processes and 
coordination, and securing shared risk and profits. These arrangements 
can range from informal working groups to consortiums set up with 
partners as members (Kloppenborg 1991). There are other hybrid 
organizational forms (Faulkner, 1995; Waddock, 1991). 
 Partners retain their identity and have predetermined responsibilities. 
This implies that this is: (1) not a situation in which permanent change 
of ownership occurs (as in privatization), and (2) that as the partnership 
is executed as a project, it occurs over a finite period of time 
(http://www.pps.minfin.nl). 
 There is joint acceptance of risks and returns (Pennink 1997, Teisman 
and Klijn 2002, Klijn and Teisman 2003, Huxham and Vangen 2005, 
Koppenjan 2005, Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006). 
 
Taking this idea further, the Knowledge Centre of the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance distinguishes two typologies of PPPs; the table below demonstrates 
the differences (see also Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Hodge and Greve 2005). 
 
1. First is a PPP (i.e. a concession) in which vertical integration occurs over 
the project cycle (the design, build, finance and operation phases of a 
project, often found in infrastructure projects) and which is contracted 
to a private party. 
2. Second is a joint development PPP in which different projects or 
interventions are combined (i.e. multifunctional urban regeneration 
projects) and might involve the setup of a joint organizational form 
(joint venture partnerships).  
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dĂďůĞϮ-ϭ͗ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐversus :ŽŝŶƚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ 
 /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ :ŽŝŶƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ 
When should the private 
sector be involved? 
Construction Planning and construction 
Focus on: Contract (for construction) Process (arriving at a plan) 
Responsibility Public Shared 
Risks Risk allocation (transferring 
many risks to the private 
sector) 
Shared 
Which elements should be 
included? 
Vertical integration (design, 
construction, maintenance, 
operation) 
Horizontal integration 
(public and private 
investments are combined) 
Roles of parties Government is client, 
private sector is contractor 
Equality of parties 
Source: http://pps.minfin.nl (accessed 2002). 
 
This research argues that partnerships in urban regeneration belong to the 
second typology, a relationship where development is joint, in fact there is 
interdependence and equality between partners. In the case of joint 
development, the emphasis is placed on the horizontal nature of relations 
and on the process, in other words, the interaction of the partners. 
 
The literature on partnerships in the UK underline the argument above, 
stating that urban regeneration partnerships are distinct from the Public 
Finance Initiative (PFI) approach, which falls into the first typology, and is 
characterized by private sector involvement in public service delivery. Ball 
and Maginn (2007) state that urban regeneration partnerships distinguish 
themselves as they focus on a range of issues, and often involve the setup of 
special purpose organizations, the governance of which may involve a range 
of stakeholders.  
The typology of urban regeneration partnerships 
This section describes in greater detail the types of partnerships found in 
urban regeneration processes. In some countries, partnerships have been 
seen as the default mode to deal with urban regeneration. In the UK, for 
instance, the political agenda and funding streams have required the 
development of partnerships involving the public and private sectors, but in 
many cases, a three-way partnership also involving the community and 
voluntary sectors (Roberts 2000, Robert et al 2016). In the Netherlands, the 
national government has also encouraged PPPs in urban regeneration 
projects and national funding has been made available to stimulate the setup 
Ϯϰ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 57
of partnerships (Regeerakkoord 1986, Van Boxmeer and Van Beckhoven 
2005).  
 
In these countries, there are different ideologies behind governments giving 
priority to partnerships. For one, public funding is made available to 
strategically leverage funding from the private sector, and where possible 
the civil society (Booth 2005). In addition, involving all sectors in the decision-
making process, in essence, allows for different actors to have a ‘voice’ 
(challenging what is seen as the paternalism of the government) (Hastings 
1996, Ball and Maginn 2007). All interests are then represented when 
developing a strategic approach to the regeneration of an area. This may 
involve a platform for both the bottom-up and top-down expression and 
integration of interests. “Wartnerships should reflect shared ownership, 
shared interests, local diversity, common ambitions and joint understanding” 
(Roberts el al 2016: 65). Finally, partnerships reduce fragmentation and 
single agency or sector approaches to problems. They allow for coordination 
across traditional agency boundaries (Roberts et al 2016: 51). 
 
The types of partnerships have expanded over the decades, evolving to 
respond to changing policy issues. They involve an increasingly diverse mix 
of partners taken from the public, private, community and voluntary sectors, 
and assume the representation of the community in decision making (Ball 
and Maginn 2007, Carley et al 2000, Carter 2000); this implies more complex 
relationships and processes of decision making.  
 
This positions urban regeneration PPPs in a complex network. The success of 
the partnership is also dependant on the quality of these networks (Skelcher 
et al 1996). Networks combine the strengths of different agencies and 
individual local partners and offer the possibility of a shared perspective. 
 
Boyle (1993), Bailey (1995) and Bailey et al (2003) categorize urban 
regeneration partnerships as: 
 Development partnerships: this type covers a single site or area (i.e. 
town centre), and can include partners such as the local government, a 
housing association and a private developer. The objective can be to 
promote a mix of commercial and non-profit development; execution 
of activities that focus on mutual benefit. 
 Development trust: this type deals with a clearly defined area (a 
neighbourhood or estate), and is community based. The trust works 
independently of public bodies but may coordinate closely with 
representatives of the local authorities. The aim of this non-profit 
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venture is to achieve community-based regeneration, and to create 
benefits for the community; all ‘profits’ are recycled back into the trust. 
 Joint agreement: this type is executed locally in an area chosen for 
regeneration, but may occur as a result of national policy. The partners 
may be public, private and, in some cases, non-profit. The aim is to 
develop a strategy for the area together, and sometimes 
implementation is via third parties. 
 Promotional: This type is mobilized by a local party, for instance the 
Chamber of Commerce, and may have city-wide or district coverage. It 
is sponsored by the private sector or a development agency and the 
focus is on city marketing or promotion of economic growth. 
 Agency: this type focuses at the urban or regional levels of 
development, and involves funding from a sponsoring agency. The 
agency executes work via a development agency or funds the setup of a 
partnership (many times three-way). The aim is to achieve multiple 
tasks, and the partnership is for a limited time frame. 
 Strategic: this type is set up at the sub-regional or metropolitan levels, 
involves all sectors for the purpose of developing a city-wide strategy to 
guide development. The partnership is for the development of the 
strategy, while implementation often occurs via third parties. 
 
The cases in this research fall into the first category, of a development 
partnership. Of note is that the primary relationship is between the public 
and private sectors, though external actors will still play a role in the 
interaction.  
 
Ball and Maginn (2007: 24) mention that since various partners are involved 
in decision making, the governance structures of such partnerships are not 
“hierarchical with the client at the top”. Partnerships focus on more than just 
property development, on the more complex issues faced in an area. Projects 
are not driven by a single goal, but are multifaceted. Partnerships and 
decision making are subject to an “intensive debate” and “tend to be 
negotiated, not simply laid out before”.  
 
This implies that, in the governance of such partnerships, partners need to 
deal with the tensions between ensuring cooperation and building of 
consensus between ‘partners’, while also guaranteeing that structures and 
systems allow for the completion of a complex project on time and on 
budget, while also maximizing the synergies derived from working together. 
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A partnership is not privatization 
A partnership is not privatization! The term ‘privatization’ assumes that 
private economic agents take over what were public tasks; there is a shift 
from public to private production of goods and services as well as the risk. 
Awortwi (2004) states that privatization is related to handing over ownership 
to the private sector (‘selling off the state’). Other authors distinguish 
privatization as relationships bound by contracts; Linder (1999), in a 
comparison of concepts of privatization and partnerships, argues that the 
hallmark of privatization is competition, while cooperation is that of 
partnership.  
 
In contrast, in partnerships actors from the private and government sectors 
come together to create a good or service (Pennink 1997, Klijn and Teisman 
2000) and mutual dependence is an aspect of production of that service 
(Bovaird 2004). Partnerships are a relationship where ownership may remain 
with the public sector, and the private sector becomes involved in the 
provision of a service, which would normally remain in the public domain 
because of excludability or externality problems. 
 
Klijn and Teisman (2000) further argue that privatization is used in situations 
where output and performance can be measured and the principal can 
specify the service to be produced by the agent in a contract. This contrasts 
with partnerships, where more complex situations make output and 
performance more difficult to define, where governments have difficulty 
determining the products and the policies they want to produce. These 
situations can be characterized by uncertainty in goals and outputs, and, 
potentially, by a multitude of interests, such as is the case in urban 
regeneration. This view also stops trying to redefine the boundaries between 
the public and private (Linder 1999), to keep the principle and agents at arm’s 
length. Instead, partnerships blur the boundaries and argue for greater 
interdependence (Edelenbos et al. 2007). 
 
This points to the fact that researchers are increasingly diverging from the 
purely economic perspective of partnership (partnerships to achieve 
efficiency) to a governance perspective of partnerships: relations set up to 
deal with ‘wicked problems’ (Kickert et al. 1997, Bovaird 2004, Koppenjan 
and Klijn 2004).  
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2.5 The theoretical underpinnings for partnerships 
This section considers the conceptual frameworks that are used to look at 
and analyse partnerships. The section will look at a number of theories and 
their perspectives over the years. It focuses on the trend from the economic 
perspective of partnerships to a more governance, network perspective of 
partnership. Discussing the differences here is important to be able to judge 
the shortcomings of certain perspectives and argue why one perspective is 
more appropriate to determining the focus of this research than another. 
The section will analyse the relevance of the theory for partnerships in urban 
regeneration. 
 
Public choice theory, principal-agent theory, transaction cost analysis, new 
public management, strategic management and concepts of public 
governance and networks are often used to justify the role of partnerships in 
urban development (Kickert et al. 1997, Awortwi 2004, Bovaird 2004, 
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, Teicher et al. 2006). 
 
The first three come from different streams of economic theory. Much of 
their relevance for partnerships stems from the failures of governments to 
perform in the delivery of services and the arguments by economists that the 
resources can be mobilized more efficiently through the use of market 
mechanisms and the involvement of the private sector (Awortwi 2004, 
Bovaird 2004). 
 
Public choice theory stipulates that the introduction of competition is 
essential for lowering costs of services and bringing about greater efficiency 
(Awortwi 2004). The private sector provides more choice and minimizes 
monopolies that can occur under public provision (Teicher et al. 2006). The 
role of the government is minimized; authors argue for as little government 
intervention as possible and only in situations of market imperfections. In the 
provision of public services, the government takes a key role in ensuring the 
development of competition and in regulating and monitoring the delivery 
of services. These concepts are the basis of much of the trend to 
privatization, and to deregulation (World Bank 1994). 
 
Agency theory presumes a relationship between a principal and an agent, the 
former contracts with the latter for the delivery of a service for 
compensation. In exchange for this compensation, the agent agrees to take 
on the risk related to the execution of responsibilities. The principal takes the 
role of monitoring the activities of the agent. Monitoring is an essential 
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incentive for the agent to perform as agreed, as without it the chance of 
being caught is minimized, along with the pressure to fulfil obligations. 
Monitoring reduces the risk of opportunism by the agent (Batley 1996, Batley 
and Larbi 2004). Agency theory also implies that the separation of the roles 
of the principal and the agent is essential: the monitoring and enforcement 
of the contract is dependent on maintaining an arm’s-length relation 
between the two entities and avoiding the possibility of entering into a 
relationship, which could cause a conflict of interest (Awortwi, 2004). The 
independence of roles can be seen in the separation of the tasks in many 
partnership schemes: the government, as regulator and purchaser of 
services, is separated from the private entity, as suppliers and service 
providers (Osborne and Gaebler 1993, Batley 1996, Batley and Larbi 2004). 
Agency theory has been central to the management of contractual relations 
used in certain partnerships.  
 
Partnerships are also influenced by transaction cost analysis, a stream of 
economics which claims that transaction costs are an important element of 
market transactions (Williamson 1985). In transaction cost theory, 
transactions between agents are not costless, but involve substantial costs 
related to “obtaining information, bargaining, making decisions, policing and 
enforcing contracts” (Hodgson 1988: 180). Transaction cost theory has been 
applied to partnerships when looking at the nature of relations that can lead 
to the reduction of the costs of doing business and the role of public and 
private relations in doing this. 
 
Aspects of public choice theory, agency theory and transaction cost analysis 
have been essential to the tenets of New Public Management, which 
advocates the application of private sector skills and practices to the public 
sector (Bovaird 2004). Professionals in the public sector are informed by 
private sector management models. This results in explicitly set standards of 
performance, a focus on outputs and efficiency in use of resources, 
disaggregation of organizations and the decentralization of decision making 
to accountable public managers (Hood 1991). New Public Management also 
promotes outsourcing and contractual relations with the private sector. The 
application of this in practice has influenced the behaviour of public-sector 
professionals and their relationship with the private sector. 
 
These theories are important for partnerships, particularly in circumstances 
where greater competition is necessary and efficiency is one of the primary 
goals. However, even though efficiency may be a key concern in urban 
regeneration and a good justification for involving the private sector, one has 
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to wonder if it should be the primary criteria in situations of such complex 
problems and complex relations and in situations of dealing with social 
problems. 
 
In fact, critiques of these theories have come from agency and transaction 
costs theorists themselves, who maintain that the complexities of 
transactions and relationships are such that it is unlikely that (1) (public) 
principals can monitor and influence (private) agents so that they execute 
contracted activities in a socially efficient manner (Halachmi and Boorsma 
1998), and (2) that the costs of designing, negotiating, allocating, monitoring 
and enforcing contracts can be kept at an acceptable level to justify setting 
up partnerships on efficiency grounds. In complex transactions involving high 
risk, not all policing mechanisms and governance structures can cover all 
contingencies, even in a society in which legal sanctions are enforceable 
(Lazerson 1988). It is possible that the cost of policing is so great that it 
outweighs the benefit to be derived from the relationship. Bovaird (2004) 
contends that, in situations of such complexity, it is necessary to revert to 
relational contracting, which is based on trust. The criterion for moving to 
relational contracting is when the costs related to detailed, specification-
based contracting are so great that a partnership is not justified. He also 
argues that confrontational contracting, which assumes that rational actors 
act opportunistically and in fact seek to take advantage of each other (they 
act individually or collectively to maximize their own utility and to minimize 
costs), is misguided and should be replaced. This implies a new style of 
partnership, based on relational contracting, a situation in which parties 
involved make decisions together, look for ways to help each other, and 
negotiate outcomes. Bovaird (2004: 199) states that partnerships are 
characterized by “working arrangements that are based on mutual 
commitment” (over and above that implied in a contract). 
 
This trend is noted in strategic management literature, which underlines the 
importance of partnership and working in a collaborative as opposed to 
being purely in competition. Strategic management theory analyses the 
increasing interdependence between firms in the private sector, which has 
led to the wide-scale setup of strategic alliances (Bovaird, 2004). The benefits 
of such alliances are well documented in the literature. One example is seen 
in the partnerships that large multinationals build for competitive advantage 
with local firms in foreign countries in which they choose to invest (Bovaird 
2004, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Increasingly, private sector firms are finding 
themselves in situations of uncertainty, in markets where technology is 
changing at such a pace that firms are becoming dependent on other firms 
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with specialized knowledge to compete in the production of goods and 
services. The literature on the increasing trend to strategic alliances (Das and 
Teng 1998, Klijn and Teisman 2000, Das and Teng 2001) covers the need for 
greater interdependence between firms to spread risk and access knowledge 
and skills in certain market segments. Governments are finding themselves 
in the same boat; they find that they increasingly need the private sector for 
the production of complex services and in urban regeneration. 
 
Theories of strategic management also argue that long-term strategic 
alliances are typically based on trust, require joint decision making and 
cooperation, involve the sharing of assets and resources (including 
information and knowledge), and a commitment to mutual learning (Lorange 
and Roos 1993). Theorists contend that repeated interaction will help to 
create the ‘collaborative advantage’ that comes from knowing each other 
well; it is then that partnerships gain ‘competitive advantage’ over 
competitors (Huxham 1993, Moss Kanter 1994, Faulkner 1995). Aspects of 
the long-term relationship and relational contracting in complex situations 
contribute to improved outcomes (Bovaird 2004, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
 
The public governance paradigm, influenced by strategic management 
literature (Kooiman 1993, Rhodes 1997), gained importance in the 1990s. 
The advent of public governance marked a significant shift from the premises 
of New Public Management and efficiency as the major criteria for judging 
the performance of public organizations and public services. Though 
efficiency remained important, the focus shifted to the need to confront and 
solve the ‘wicked problems’ in society. Wicked problems are problems of 
such magnitude that the public sector cannot tackle them on its own and 
requires public agencies to work with a wide range of actors from other 
sectors (Stoker 1998, Pierre and Peters 2000, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
Interdependence among actors becomes an element of relations. The 
government is no longer in the position to impose control on actors, but is 
dependent on others for making decisions. This locates actors in partnerships 
and networks where no single strategic vision dominates but the perceptions 
and strategic choices of actors influence each other, and agreements are 
reached through negotiation (Bovaird 2004). 
 
Theories of networks are to be found in economic theory (the market, 
hierarchy and network school as part of transaction cost theory (Williamson 
1975, Ouchi 1980, Powell 1990) and in public administration and governance 
literature (Kickert et al. 1997, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Literature on the 
network approach also emphasizes the need for a shift in perspectives. From 
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the economic perspective, it argues that neither markets (associated with 
the private sector) nor hierarchical approaches (associated with a 
government that coordinates through bureaucratic procedures) solve 
problems in the face of complexity. This has led, as mentioned before, to 
dependency of firms on each other and the increasing operation of firms in 
‘industrial networks’ and strategic alliances (Klijn and Teisman 2000). From a 
more governance and policy process perspective, the government is no 
longer in the position to steer the policy process (the central rule model), and 
cannot depend on the bottom-up perspective that takes into account the 
values, interests and preferences of other actors (the multi-actor model). The 
network model, however, takes on the bottom-up aspect and incorporates 
the idea that public policymaking and governance take place in networks of 
actors (individuals, groups and organizations), none of which have the power 
to determine the outcome of a situation on their own (Hanf et al. 1978, Hufen 
and Ringeling 1990, Klijn et al. 1995, Kickert et al. 1997). The policy process 
is seen as “an interaction process in which actors exchange information about 
problems, preferences and means, and trade off goals and resources” (Kickert 
et al. 1997: 9).  Networks are characterized by interdependency among the 
public, private and civil sectors (Castells 1996), and cooperation (or the lack 
thereof) and the build-up of trust are crucial to the realization of collective 
action. The interaction between actors leads to complexity, as partners 
negotiate outcomes based on perceptions and interests, which sometime 
results in conflict (Klijn et al. 1995, Klijn and Teisman 2000). 
 
When an issue receives relevance on the policy agenda and interaction 
around an issue results in the formulation and execution of a concrete 
project, a portion of the network, called a ‘policy arena’, is ‘activated’ 
(Teisman 1998, Klijn and Teisman 2003). Targeted initiatives, such as 
projects, involve a more limited number of actors (not all relations are 
activated) (Friend et al. 1974, Kickert et al. 1997: 47). The policy arena 
organizes itself around the problem as perceived by a series of actors and 
can result in interaction among a number of organizations in the public, 
private and civil sectors. The way the interaction is organized can take a 
series of forms, one of which is a Public-Private Partnership. The government 
and other actors decide to involve themselves in concrete projects as a ‘party 
among other parties’ (Kickert et al. 1997: 59).  
 
Given the complexity of problems and society, the advent of the governance 
paradigm and network theory provides a strong theoretical foundation for 
the study of partnerships. Focal in the study of partnerships is then the actors 
and their interaction in the partnership. On one hand, as partnerships are 
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frameworks for coordinating interests, it is important to come to understand 
who the range of actors or partners are and their interests. On the other 
hand, the theories help to provide a way of analysing their position and input 
into the partnership. Finally, in contrast to analysing a rational contract 
relation (the concept of principle-agent) of the New Public Management and 
economic paradigms, the nature of interaction points to long-term 
interorganizational relationships in which joint decision making and 
relational contracting takes place, and trust is important.  
 
This implies the need to establish a clear framework of analysis for the 
process of interaction in which partners take part. The following sections look 
at the uncertainties actors face in situations of complexity and 
interdependence; how partnerships fit into network theory, the range of 
actors in urban regeneration partnerships, where conflicts can occur 
between partners and a model that can be applied to the process of 
interaction during a partnership. 
Complexity, uncertainties, the role of perceptions and their importance for 
relationships 
The complexity and the interaction in which actors find themselves produces 
uncertainty when they enter into partnerships and these uncertainties 
influence how they interact in the relationship. Koppenjan and Klijn (1994) 
argue that the uncertainties with which actors have to deal, revolve around 
three different themes. 
 
First, substantive uncertainty is related to actors and their perceptions of a 
situation. When individuals, groups of people or organizations attempt to 
make decisions, information is essential to assess issues and make informed 
decisions (Teisman 2000: 939). Partners have different interests and 
perceptions of problems, and view these using different frames of reference. 
As a result, their interpretation of the facts will also differ. Perceptions are 
used as a yardstick for judging the value of solutions.  
 
Perception is the lens through which people view and make sense of the 
world and influence how they create responses (Kickert et al. 1997) (see p. 
82 for authors), evaluate outcomes of strategies to be employed (Van Twist 
and Termeer 1991). Perceptions are the “images that actors have about their 
game situation and they use them to give meaning to and evaluate their 
actions and actions of others” (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004: 7). Perceptions are 
important to the outcome of a situation, as they are the basis upon which 
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actors evaluate the possible outcomes of (policy) processes, choose a 
strategy and make decisions. 
 
Strategic uncertainty relates to the choices that people make, the strategies 
they chose to solve problems (Crozier and Friedberg 1980, Ostrom 1990). 
Their strategies are founded on their own perceptions, which others may not 
understand, know of or acknowledge. This may result in a range of strategies 
being developed to deal with an issue. In addition, the problem-solving 
process may involve actors anticipating each other’s moves and reacting to 
them. This can lead to complex and unforeseen types of interactions. 
 
The uncertainty (and complexity) can be enhanced by the fact that actors 
take part in different patterns of interaction along the length of the process: 
some interact a lot, some stay on the periphery of a problem. One can 
encounter separate sets of interactions (games) along the way; different 
activities can be happening at different levels. Interactions are likened by 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) to a game with players who each have a stake in 
the game, a game that is governed by certain rules and in which strategies 
are important to the outcome.  
 
Institutional uncertainty stems from the fact that processes also involve 
actors who belong to different groups or organizations. Their interactions are 
influenced by the institutional setting from which they come (their 
‘membership’ in an organization or group): the tasks, opinions, rules and 
language of their social group or organization (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
This institutional ‘embeddedness’ is important for understanding the 
interaction between partners; it will drive perceptions and strategies. 
 
Complexity and the uncertainties that stem from it are important for the 
research in a number of ways. When looking at the choices that people, 
groups or organizations make, it is essential to understand the perceptions 
that are behind the positions that actors take and that drive the choices 
made. Different types of uncertainties will influence actors’ perceptions of 
risk. In addition, strategies are played out in different arenas, at different 
levels and are influenced by different institutional regimes. It is important to 
understand the different arenas and institutional regimes in which partners 
take part and the influences that these have on perceptions and choices. 
Understanding interests of partners and their membership in a particular 
institutional regime is important to understanding perceptions. For this it is 
also essential to understand the role partnerships play in networks. 
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Given an understanding of how partnerships are located in networks, the 
following section looks at the potential range of actors in urban regeneration 
partnerships. That is followed by a discussion on how the nature of the 
partners can create tensions and add to complexity. 
The range of actors in a partnership 
The range of actors is a key dimension in partnerships. Who could potentially 
be involved in partnerships in urban regeneration? There are a variety of 
actors that have to be taken into account: in a situation of interdependence, 
it is important to understand who has influence on and input into the 
process. 
 
Urban regeneration can be characterized by a range of key actors, and 
identifying them is influenced by the increasing blurring of boundaries 
between them (McQuaid 2000, Plummer and Heymans 2002) and by the 
complexity of some of the partnership arrangements (Huxham and Vangen 
2000). General categories include national and local government, the 
voluntary sector, the private sector and the community (groups and 
individuals) (McQuaid 2000). Within these groupings, there are many 
different types of actors; even within one organization, there may be 
different groups or actors (i.e. the military comprises the Army, Navy, the Air 
Force, etc., and the Navy also consists of different groups) (Ahlbrandt and 
Weaver 1987, McQuaid 2000). This extends the complexity of identifying 
interests and relevance of actors to the partnership. Still, McQuaid (2000) 
argues that the type of partnerships will provide a natural ordering for 
determining what actors are involved, i.e. the community will be important 
for a partnership that focuses on the improvement of the situation of 
vulnerable groups.  
 
The private sector as one grouping, for instance, includes a wide range of 
actors with different motives and resources to bring to the relationship. 
Related to urban regeneration, these could include firms whose business it is 
to deal with urban regeneration, such as developers, architects, financiers 
and bankers; and businesses that are affected by regeneration, including 
various size shops or businesses located in the areas (or in the surrounding 
areas). Businesses also vary along other dimensions: whether they are local 
or only branches of larger firms, how large they are, or whether they have 
strong ties to the community (i.e. for business and income) or not. All these 
dimensions influence interests, and whether goals are purely commercial or 
reflect some social elements (McQuaid 2000). 
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McQuaid (2000) argues that several other aspects influence the typology and 
range of actors involved in partnerships. For one, the structure of the 
partnerships, which is derived from legal frameworks, will influence who 
takes part and what kind of legal entity they are. If contracts are more 
formalistic because the transaction is a more commercial one, the number 
of partners may be very limited and specified in the contract. In more 
informal circumstances, however, the number of partners taking part in the 
process may be greater. Also, informal networks often play a very important 
role in partnerships: being conscious of the informal relations between 
parties, such as key community leaders and politicians, is essential for 
understanding the workings of a partnership. Informal structures can have 
large impacts on partnerships, on their operations and the process of 
decision making, so these actors must be taken into account. 
 
The description of these relations and roles refers back to the point that each 
of the actors comes from institutional regimes when entering into a 
partnership and has to be identified as such. In addition, the circumstances 
described resemble the construct introduced by Klijn and Teisman (2000) 
(see also Klijn and Teisman 2003), that using the game perspective, games 
take place in arenas, and several arenas at once. Arenas are made up of a 
range of actors, who find themselves in certain decision-making situations 
and organizational arrangements. What makes it complex is that actors can 
be located in one or more networks at once, and that some of the actors will 
not be involved in all of the networks. The relevance of this is that there are 
a number of factors influencing interests, perceptions and role, stemming 
from membership in and the decisions made in different arenas. The impact 
on the interaction is therefore difficult to trace (Klijn and Teisman 2003). Still, 
it is possible to distinguish, in a partnership, between key players and 
peripheral actors. Key players are those formally involved in the process, who 
interact “on the substance and process of the project” (Klijn and Teisman 
2003: 141); they will be bound by a signed agreement. Peripheral actors are 
those who may have an interest in the process, but are not included in the 
interaction on a consistent or systematic basis. This does not diminish their 
importance to the process, and the influence that their decisions and 
strategies (possibly in another arena) can have on the partnership. 
 
This implies that the research will have to make a scan of the actors, key and 
peripheral, and their role and involvement over time. Their role may change 
depending on the period in the partnership; actors may exit and enter the 
arena at different times.  
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What are the differences in the characteristics and interests of partners? 
Partners in a partnership have particular characteristics. Their interests, 
values and the institutional regime in which they find themselves will 
influence behaviour in a partnership. Jacobs (1992) and Simon (1990) in (Klijn 
and Teisman 2003), for instance, argue that differences in values are linked 
to the need for survival and so, by nature, may present problems when 
attempting to merge them in a partnership. This presents a challenge in 
manoeuvring a relationship. But where do these major differences lie and 
what are the consequences for the partnership?  
 
The table underlines some salient points on PPPs, it underlines the key 
difference between the sectors that need resolution for the PPP to work. 
First, the core business of the two sectors is different: the basic interest of 
the private sector to pursue profits and market share can constitute a tension 
when faced with the importance given by the public sector to public 
objectives that weigh social and political priorities. These differences imply 
that partners will experience and define problems in a different way. Second, 
partners work according to different criteria: the public sector intervenes at 
the policy and planning levels (using mid- to long-term criteria), whereas the 
private sector intervenes at the level of a project (using short- to mid-term 
criteria). This means that views on time frame, objectives and risk will differ. 
Third, the institutional contexts in which the public and private sectors find 
themselves, imply that they have to manage different kinds of expectations 
(that of the constituency/politicians versus that of the shareholders) and are 
subject to different incentives when weighing issues and priorities. These 
incentives, and the organizational settings in which they work, affect the 
speed with which issues find resolution: public partners are bound by 
procedures, private by ensuring quick outcomes that are as efficient as 
possible. This implies a difference in how solutions are perceived and 
strategies are formulated.  
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These differences in interests and values lead to key points of negotiations in 
many partnerships: partners will pursue their interests. The success of the 
interaction depends on resolving differences, but when conflicts become 
apparent, partners withdraw and resort to arm’s-length relationships 
governed by contracts (Klijn and Teisman 2003), and characterized by limited 
trust. These problems reinforce the need for care when designing processes 
and structures and taking interests that drive the partnership into account. 
In this research, these issues are taken into account when looking at the 
interactions between partners. 
2.5.1 Partnerships as a process of interaction between 
organizations 
One key dimension of a partnership is the time period or the phasing of the 
relationship, and the changing relations and activities that are a part of 
different phases (McQuaid 2000).  
 
Understanding the characteristics of these periods is important for setting 
the framework of analysis. How can one conceptualize the process of 
partnership so that it lends itself to analysis? Teisman (2000) provides an 
interesting comparison of theoretical models that helps to clarify how to 
conceptualize the process of interaction.  
 
Teisman (2000) presents three conceptual models to describe the chain of 
activities in decision making in policy processes. He outlines the 
characteristics of the Phase Model, the Stream Model and the Rounds 
Model, the development of the last is an attempt to compensate for some of 
the inconsistencies found in the first two. The Phase Model is common when 
looking at policy processes: decision making is broken down into distinct 
phases, from policy formulation to adoption and implementation. Each 
phase has its own specific characteristics and involves actors in different 
ways (Mintzberg et al. 1976). The government remains central to guiding the 
process. As mentioned in previous sections, the complexity of interactions in 
partnerships and the view on separate arenas puts this approach into 
question; one rejects the idea of being able to specify clear phases guided by 
government. In contrast, the Stream Model (Cohen 1972, Kingdon 1984) 
envisages decision-making as a combination of three streams: problems, 
policies/solutions and politics/ participants. It is when these three streams 
coincide that decisions are made. Each stream has its own characteristics, 
but the model is disassociated from a particular actor. The principles behind 
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the Stream Model are that there are problems looking for solutions 
(problems are discussed in the problem stream), there are actors with 
solutions looking for problems (the stream where solutions are discussed), 
and there are politicians who are interested in finding problems and 
solutions they can focus on. This model is hard to apply in this circumstance 
as it is not an actor-focused approach and does not take interests and 
perceptions into account. Teisman argues that the Rounds Model helps to do 
this. The Rounds Model takes actors as the focal point and many actors are 
involved in the decision-making process. Problems and solutions are complex 
and the focus is on those relevant to the actors in the process. The Rounds 
Model is based on an interactive process: polices or solutions are not 
formulated by the government as the central steering actor but are the result 
of a series of strategic decisions by multiple actors (Teisman 1998, 2000). In 
the Rounds Model, the focus is not on, as in the Phase Model, whether policy 
results match the goals established during policy formation, but more on 
whether policy responds to the objectives of the actors involved. This 
involves testing the satisfaction of participants at the time that the effects of 
policy or partnership can be distinguished. 
 
What is important in the Rounds Model and the reason for its applicability, 
is the manner in which the phases or ‘rounds’ are determined. The model 
recognizes that decisions are made over a period of time, and, in that period 
of time, there are a number of actors that interact around a theme and make 
decisions (jointly or separately). There are no prescribed phases such as in 
the Phase Model; a decision-making round is determined (in retrospect) by 
charting the incidence of crucial decisions and determining which define the 
start and finish of a certain period. This approach is crucial for understanding 
the actors that enter and exit the arena of decision-making and the impact 
of their decisions on policy and projects. A visual representation of the key 
elements of the process are given in the model below: 
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The figure underlines the fact that in the partnership, the process of 
interaction results in key decisions being made. These decisions mark the 
beginning of the next phase or round. The end of the round will potentially 
result in the setup of a new or different structure, different stakes, and a 
change in content and in actors (Teisman 2000). This model will be used to 
look at the interaction between partners in a partnership over time. 
 
It is important to note that, in this research, the PPP is the ‘vehicle’ used to 
highlight the interaction and allows the research to focus on complex 
decision making between core partners and external actors in the network. 
In effect, these partners and actors are the ‘players’ in the interaction, using 
strategies to achieve outcomes. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the trend towards partnership, a phenomenon 
that has evolved out of the need to deal with problems that cannot be solved 
through traditional approaches, left to pure market and hierarchy. The 
complexity of society and of urban regeneration projects has led to 
interdependence among actors: problems are such that they cannot be 
solved by one actor alone. Partnerships are regarded as beneficial in these 
circumstances as they are argued to bring together the unique qualities of 
the various actors and, in doing so, to bring about positive outcomes.  
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The chapter looked closely at how partnerships are defined, their 
characteristics and what they are argued to achieve. In partnerships, actors 
interact to represent their interests in a relation where skills, risks and 
returns are shared. Partnerships are thus relations of mutual dependence 
and, in this way, distinct from other forms, namely simple contractual, arms-
length relations. In analysing the theories that underpin partnerships, it is 
argued that theories of public governance and the network approach provide 
better foundations for partnerships. They provide a wider view than the 
purely economic view, and stress that partnerships are formed to deal with 
‘wicked problems’, societal problems that the public sector cannot tackle on 
its own but that require input from actors from the private and civil sectors 
for their resolution. These theories explain the complexity of development 
and the interdependence among actors.  
 
Within networks, a construct generally applied to policy processes, 
partnerships occur when there is selective activation of a policy arena. Actors 
organize themselves around an issue and form a temporary strategic alliance 
to achieve strategic goals. There is a large variety of actors taking part in 
these arenas, key players form a formal relationship based on a signed 
agreement, peripheral actors are involved less systematically, potentially 
entering and exiting arenas at different periods of the partnerships. The role 
and interests of these actors must be taken into account, as a way of 
providing a view of the relevance of their involvement in the build-up and 
outcome of relations. Also crucial to the analysis is coming to an 
understanding based on a determination of the key decision points in a 
process, the various rounds of the process and the involvement of the actors 
in these rounds, as shown in the model above. 
 
Network theory helps to understand the context of uncertainty in which 
actors interact. Central to how actors experience and deal with uncertainty 
is their perceptions of the problems, the strategies chosen to deal with these 
problems, and how games are played and decisions are made in the different 
institutional settings to which actors are linked. Complexity and uncertainty 
is also increased by the differences between partners in terms of 
characteristics, interests, and motivations and the tensions that these can 
produce. Perception as the lens through which actors view and make sense 
of the world and that influences how people respond, becomes central to the 
research, as it acts as an evaluation and the measure, by partners, of 
problems, strategies and outcomes. If theory argues that one person’s 
problem may be another’s solution and vice versa, and it becomes difficult 
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to come to ‘one truth’, then the research must depend on perception as the 
most relevant indication of a given situation. 
 
Finally, in complex urban regeneration PPPs, partners face different types of 
risk (uncertainties where probabilities are known and calculated), which they 
calculate in different ways, according to how they perceive them. In 
researching PPPs, it is essential to understand the perception of risks and 
how this drives the interaction of the partners. It is also important to analyse 
how the interaction has resulted in different outcomes. 
 
The next chapter will explore the theories underpinning trust. As has been 
mentioned, trust is important for interorganizational and horizontal 
relationships, particularly long-term and interdependent relationships such 
as PPPs, and is built over time. It is important to chart the change in trust, as 
a result of the interaction in the PPP. The following chapter will also look at 
the relation of trust to risk and outcomes. The assumption is that this is 
relevant for PPPs, where management of risk and creation of efficient and 
effective outcomes are important. The chapter will take the model 
introduced here and develop it further to incorporate the concept of trust 
growth, the factors that contribute to this and its influence on risk and 
outcomes.  
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3 Trust 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of partnerships in urban 
regeneration and discussed the fact that, not only are these types of 
partnerships complex by nature, they also take place in increasingly complex 
societies. Partners are faced with uncertainties and have different 
perceptions of the problem and the solution. They are also faced with the 
uncertainty of dealing with multiple actors from different institutional 
settings; the partnership game is played out in different arenas. From the 
perspectives of the partners, this makes the process of coming to terms with 
defining the problem and solutions much more complex and risky, but 
partners need each other, they are interdependent and cannot resolve issues 
without joint investment of resources. The previous chapter also argues that 
confrontational contracting is no longer effective, transactions have become 
so complex that no amount of policing and no governance mechanisms are 
sufficient to cover all contingencies. The arm’s-length nature of the principle-
agent relationship is being replaced with relations of strong interdependence 
based on what Bovaird (2004) terms as relational contracting or, in other 
words, agreements based on trust. It is argued that trust is fundamental as 
an “efficient lubricant to economic exchange or the most efficient mechanism 
for governing transactions” (Arrow 1974: 23, Misztal 1996: 79), particularly 
in a situation in which a rational agent would not normally proceed with the 
transaction. Moore (1994: 819) states that trust is crucial to situations with 
high risk, that the generation of trust makes agents, “incompletely protected 
by law willing to dispense with detailed personal policing of every transaction, 
and put great trust in exchanges involving large apparent risks”. Trust is 
essential in situations of complexity and high risk (see also Furlong 1996). 
 
This chapter looks at why trust is argued to be effective in complex 
transactions, discusses the definition and nature of trust, looks at how to 
conceptualize the build-up of trust over time, and discusses the factors that 
contribute to the creation of trust. It also explores what the literature has to 
say on the influences of trust on the perception of risk, and on the outcomes 
of an interaction. The chapter ends with the conceptual model used in the 
research to study trust build-up, as well as the influence of trust on the 
perception of risk and outcomes, over time, on the part of the partners. 
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3.2 The need for trust 
Literature from different disciplines cites numerous reasons why trust is 
important to complex and risky relationships such as partnerships. The 
conceptualization of trust is prevalent in philosophy, political science, social 
anthropology, but particularly in economics and sociology (Furlong 1996). 
Trust has also risen as a key issue in transaction cost economics (Williamson 
1993, Furlong 1996), game theory (Dasgupta 1988) and the social aspects 
(Blau 1967, Luhmann 1988) of the relationship between organizations or 
people in particular roles or agents in situations of exchange. 
 
It is argued that trust matters in economic development and is crucial to the 
relationship between economic agents (people and organizations). Even as 
far back as 1848, John Stuart Mill (Mill 1891: 68-69) stated that trust was a 
crucial factor to the productivity of and exchange between people. He stated 
that “trust can reduce the transaction costs of enforcing honest behaviour”. 
 
In today’s globalizing world, scholars now see trust as instrumental to 
achieving increased competitiveness. Trust is argued to contribute to 
organizational performance (Earley 1986, Ring and Van de Ven 1994, Sako 
and Helper 1998) and in doing so to the productiveness and growth of the 
economy. Trust is also seen as of great importance in the growing number of 
strategic alliances set up to achieve competitive advantage in a risky market 
place (Barney and Hansen 1994, Madhok 1995, Das and Teng 1999). The 
ability to effectively maintain strategic partnerships and alliances among 
competitors has gained critical importance (Lewicki et al. 1998). Trust is 
argued to contribute over time to the development of collaborative 
advantage that comes from strong relationships, which then helps to create 
that competitive edge over competitors (Bovaird 2004). 
 
Trust is argued to be crucial for cooperative relations (Blau 1964, Ring and 
Van De Ven 1992, Child 1998, Nooteboom 2002), thus in the setup and 
execution of strategic alliances and partnerships. It is argued to lessen fears 
concerning opportunistic behaviour, integrate partners and their interests, 
reduce the need for formal contracting, enable cooperative behaviour 
(Luhmann 1988), reduce transaction costs, promote flexible organization 
forms such as network relations (Miles and Snow 1992) and promote 
effective responses to crisis. 
 
Trust is also seen as important to social capital, social capital being “a 
resource available to individuals that emanates from group interaction 
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because of trust, reciprocity and cooperation” (Carpenter et al 2004: 855). 
Putnam et al (1994) argue that trust creates social capital which then can 
create economic dynamism and improved government performance. Similar 
to human and financial capital, social capital is argued to produce material 
benefits to actors that interact and are connected in a network via social 
interchange (Bordieu 1986, Coleman 1988, Putman et al 1994). The 
argument is that social capital grows particularly in communities that have 
fewer resources in comparison with others and will result in improved 
economic or political performance and quality of life. The creation of social 
capital is necessary for the creation of intellectual capital and innovation. 
Innovation is suggested to be the product of collective work, and problem 
solving that leads to the generation of new ideas (Nahapiet and Ghosal 1998). 
This collectiveness and willingness to invest in the creation of ideas is 
facilitated by the production of trust. 
 
Finally, trust is seen as important in governance. As governments increasingly 
come to realize that they can no longer resort to hierarchical, vertical forms 
of governing, they are moving to more horizontal forms of governance 
(Kickert et al. 1997, Castells 2000, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). This trend also 
implies an orientation towards working with multiple stakeholders and an 
interdependence among all the actors involved. The process of development 
and cooperation has come to be characterized by complexity and decision 
making that cannot be coordinated via traditional rational and hierarchical 
approaches. Theorists argue that trust acts as a coordination mechanism in 
these cases, lessening the need for formality in decision-making (Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997) and reducing the perception of uncertainty in a complex 
society (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, Klijn 2005). 
3.3 Trust, risk and interdependence 
Authors dealing with the sociological and economic conceptualization of 
trust agree that the existence of risk is essential for the creation of trust 
(Luhmann 1988, Boon and Holmes 1991, Das and Teng 2001). The suggestion 
is that trust does not exist except in risky situations; trust would not be 
needed if decisions could be made in conditions of absolute certainty 
(Deutsch 1958, Rotter 1980, Coleman 1990, Williamson 1993, Rousseau 
1998, Das and Teng 2004). In addition, the existence of risk creates the 
opportunity for trust, trusting can then lead to partners taking more risk. 
Furthermore, when risk-taking results in the behaviour or outcomes 
expected (for instance, the partner delivers as promised), this reinforces the 
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sense of trust (Coleman 1990, Das and Teng 1998). In effect, this results in a 
cycle of trust development or a ‘trust cycle’ (Vangen and Huxham 2000). 
 
Trust’s relationship to risk is, however, part of a controversial debate. 
Williamson (1996), in particular, argues that trust in unnecessary: actors in 
an interaction assess and decide upon the risk that they can and are willing 
to take, and act upon this. Trust is simply risk taking and this risk can be 
managed by means of a contract. Risk-taking is then pure calculus based on 
which rational actors make decisions (Nooteboom 2002). Please also refer to 
Section 3.1.1. below. 
 
The question then remains whether all risks can be calculated or policed via 
contracts? This research argues that as PPPs take place in extreme 
complexity and in the context of multiple stakeholders, it is impossible to be 
in possession of full information and to predict the activities of all 
stakeholders. It is impossible to calculate all risks and contingencies; it would 
also be a waste of precious resources. Trust has a significant role in reducing 
the perception of risks, as partners expect positive outcomes to result from 
the cooperation (Deakin and Wilkinson 1998, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
They no longer expend precious resources on calculating the probability of 
negative outcomes. In effect, trust helps partners make the decision to 
cooperate, and without it, partners would not be willing to make themselves 
vulnerable and exhibit risk-taking behaviour. 
 
Interdependence, such as is found in long term PPPs, is also argued to be 
necessary for trust to build between partners (Lewicki et al. 1998, Sheppard 
and Sherman 1998, Das and Teng 2000). Interdependence implies that the 
objectives or interests of one partner cannot be achieved without full 
reliance on the other(s), access to their resources (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, 
Edelenbos and Teisman 2008), and increased vulnerability to each other. The 
contention is also that, over time, with increasing degrees of 
interdependence, and thus potentially increasing levels of risk (and 
vulnerability), trust will grow and change (Lewicki and Bunker 1996, Child 
1998, Das and Teng 2000)  
 
Transactions are embedded in relationships among agents developed over 
time. Successful exchange builds trust, which then generates more lasting 
relationships. The temporal quality, repetitiveness and frequency of the 
transactions are crucial to the build-up of trust, and the effectiveness of the 
intervention (Eshuis 2006). 
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In addition, though risk and interdependence are essential for trust to 
emerge, the contention is that the nature of the risk and trust change as the 
nature of interdependence changes and increases. With increasing degrees 
of interdependence, and thus potentially increasing levels of risk (and 
vulnerability), trust will grow and change (Lewicki and Bunker 1996, Child 
1998, Das and Teng 2000). How and the extent to which this happens will be 
further developed in later sections of this chapter. 
 
Authors argue that trust is not static but develops over time, building, 
declining, or resurfacing (Rousseau et al. 1998). Trust can be argued to be 
part of a process; something that is formed as a result of certain factors or 
actions that exists under certain conditions, and declines as a result of 
behaviour which breaks the code of the relationship. This also implies that 
certain tools exist that can foster trust and maintain it. What are these 
factors? The literature explores these, but there is a need for further 
empirical research on the nature of these factors.   
 
The following sections look at the definitions and nature of trust and 
determine the definition used in this research. 
3.4 The theoretical frame for trust: the economic and 
social view 
Over the years, scholars have studied trust from several disciplinary 
perspectives. Personality theorists focus on the individual, and the 
propensity to trust, as well as the societal factors that influence that 
propensity. Social psychologists look at the interpersonal level and focus on 
trust as a phenomenon in the interaction between individuals or groups of 
individuals. Economists and sociologists analyse trust at the institutional level 
(Hosmer 1995). Trust exists in interactions on the personal, organizational, 
interorganizational and international levels; it is a multilevel phenomenon.  
 
For personality theorists, trust is seen as a belief or a feeling that originates 
from an individual’s personality and is formed during the individual’s early 
years of psychological development (Worchel 1979, Lewicki and Bunker 
1996). Social psychologists conceptualize trust as the expectation that one 
individual has of another in a transaction. Trust is linked to the risk that can 
arise when acting on such expectations. Context is also taken into account as 
well as its influence on the creation of trust. Economists and sociologists, on 
the other hand, view trust as a phenomenon that can develop at the 
organizational level, can exist within and between institutions, as well as at 
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the level of the individual acting on behalf of the institutions (Worchel 1979, 
Lewicki and Bunker 1996). 
 
The disciplinary approach of economists and sociologists are used in this 
research: the theories on trust that look at trust as part of relations between 
organizations and at how institutions create incentives to reduce the anxiety 
and uncertainty inherent to interactions (Goffman 1971, Zucker 1986, 
Bhattacharya et al. 1998).  
 
The following section will look at two theories: agency theory and social 
exchange theory and their application to trust. Both are used here because 
singly they do not fully describe the circumstances under which trust 
develops. All long-term, interorganizational relationships, even when they 
are economically driven, have social dimensions. 
3.4.1 The economists’ point of view: 
Economists that take a classical economic view of market transactions do not 
believe in trust. These economists believe that trust is irrelevant to economic 
exchange where rational actors buy and sell based on contracts or other 
safeguards against opportunism.  
 
Economists look at the existence of trust in the context of agency theory, 
which deals with the structuring of relationships between two rational 
parties for economic exchange (Whitener et al. 1998). A principal-agent 
relationship (as mentioned in the previous chapter) involves the contracting 
of one party (the agent) by another (the principal) to execute tasks set out in 
a formal agreement. The relationship is impersonal. Williamson (1975) uses 
the term ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ to refer to individuals, groups or firms. 
Individuals and firms in such relationships attempt to maximize their own 
utility and to minimize the risk resulting from the association. An agent will 
work for a principal and is required to bear risk, for which the agent is 
compensated. Risk increases if factors beyond the control of the agent 
influence outcomes, and compensation is dependent on these outcomes. 
Risk for the principal, on the other hand, stems from the potential 
opportunism or incompetence on the part of the agent and the inability to 
protect the relationship against these. Risk increases when the principal is in 
possession of insufficient information on the activities of the agent (there is 
information asymmetry) or when the goals or incentives set by the principal 
do not match those of the agent (there is goal incongruence). Risk also 
increases when the agent is motivated to undertake activities outside of the 
contractually specified tasks. The focus of agency theory is on the incentives 
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(monitoring and governance mechanisms) that are used to reduce the risks 
and the transaction costs of doing business. 
 
Williamson’s (1985: 47) discussion on transaction cost economics takes a 
very negative view of actors, arguing that the agent is not to be trusted and 
that the risk of opportunism is high. He conceptualizes opportunism as “self-
interest with guile”, which can include blatant forms of cheating as well as 
milder transgressions such as misleading a partner or withholding or 
distorting information (Hill 1990). Principals, therefore, manage agents using 
contracts and controls; these are termed as substitutes for trust (Hosmer 
1995: 5).  
 
As stated above, Williamson (1993) argues that trust blurs the debate. He 
argues that, as agents are naturally opportunistic, when considering 
engaging with another agent, they will calculate the potential risk of the 
exchange. Trust is justified when the benefit expected from being at risk to 
another is positive, but not otherwise. He sees trust simply as risk taking, 
which involves calculating the costs and benefits of working together (i.e., 
are the benefits of working together so great that I am willing to take the risk 
that my partner may act opportunistically?). This does not involve blind faith 
in each other. Risk-taking is then pure calculus based on which rational actors 
make decisions (Nooteboom 2002). Coleman reiterates this: “Situations 
involving trust constitute a subclass of those involving risk. They are situations 
in which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another actor” 
(Coleman 1990: 91). Luhmann (1988: 97) suggests that trust “presupposes a 
situation of risk”.  
 
The principal-agent relationship deals with contractual situations. But what 
about in the context of more complex and long term relationships, situations 
that are characterized by multiple interests and uncertainties and that are 
subject to joint decision-making? The previous chapter also questions the 
application of principal-agent to partnerships of such complexity.  
 
Authors are divided on this (Williamson 1975, Deakin and Wilkinson 1998, 
Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). Some economists argue that the risk is so great 
that no amount of governance mechanisms and controls could possibly take 
all contingencies into account, and this is when trust comes into play (Deakin 
and Wilkinson 1998). Partners, on the basis of trust, undertake relationships 
they normally would not. Even though a calculus of the cost and benefits still 
occurs, there is a willingness to take risks beyond what is considered 
reasonable (Moore 1994). Other economists still regard trust as insignificant 
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in such circumstances: even in conditions where asymmetric information and 
incomplete contracts exist. They argue that the answer lies in a combination 
of mechanisms: contractual safeguards, vertical integration (Lyons and 
Metha 1997), or the use of reputation or risk-taking.  
 
Barney and Hanson (1994) criticize the rational, calculative economic 
approach to trust, where actors in economic exchange seek only to maximize 
their own self-interest and are inherently untrustworthy or subject to 
opportunistic behaviour, and can only be controlled if there are sufficient 
governance mechanisms, i.e. legal and contractual protections, in place 
(Williamson 1975). The criticism comes from behaviourally oriented 
organizational scholars, who argue that this construct is empirically incorrect 
and (socially) inefficient (exchange partners are, in fact, trustworthy), as such 
a point of view leads to overly expensive and extensive control mechanisms. 
It is argued that partners can be trusted to act as “stewards over the 
resources they have under their control” (Barney and Hansen 1994: 175). 
 
In addition, the variations that exist in the discussions on trust in different 
types of relationships imply that there is some tension between acting out of 
self-interest (agency) and acting out of the interests of a broader collective 
(community). This difference is important to networks where relations are 
often argued to be based on trust (Kickert et al., 1997). Communities can 
reach a shared understanding through interaction and exchange of 
knowledge, which then binds individuals and firms together. Willingness to 
trust becomes a condition of membership to the community (Sabel 1993, 
Rousseau et al. 1998). 
 
This is also evident in the argument on partnerships, where goals and 
interests are not seen as purely economic, but as having social components 
as well. In addition, the rational economic point of view assumes an 
impersonal perspective, with little regard for long-term interaction. The kind 
of partnerships that are the focus of this research are not one-off, impersonal 
relations between the seller and the buyer, but more complex, longer-term 
relationships of substantial interdependence. Partners may come to the 
relationship interested in maximizing their own interest, but with time the 
importance of maintaining the relationship may take on equal importance. 
3.4.2 How sociologists see trust 
Sociologists, on the other hand, look at the social elements of a relationship 
as it evolves. Social exchange theory as described by Blau (1964) sees trust 
as developing when an individual or an institution voluntarily provides a 
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benefit to another. This, in turn, creates an obligation for the other party to 
reciprocate. Blau argues that as benefits are reciprocated, trust arises and 
will continue to grow as exchange is continued over time. 
 
Blau distinguishes the types of benefits derived from economic and social 
exchanges. Whereas economic agents specify the exchange to take place and 
the benefits to be derived, the benefits in social exchange are not anticipated 
or negotiated formally, but are purely voluntary. Benefits are personally 
chosen and not role-prescribed (McAllister 1995: 3). In addition, the very fact 
that the benefits provided in social exchange are voluntary implies that there 
is no assurance of their being reciprocated. This brings a level of uncertainty 
to the relationship: a risk of non-reciprocation (of opportunism). This also 
implies that relationships are built incrementally: benefits of limited value 
are exchanged at the outset of the relationship (keeping the risk of 
opportunism low); they increase in value over time as the relationship 
continues, benefits are reciprocated and trust is built (Whitener et al. 1998). 
 
Blau attaches values to these benefits and states that social exchange has 
value for economic exchange and vice versa. He argues, for instance, that in 
social exchange some benefits can be ‘extrinsic’ and can have an economic 
value, such as through the provisions of information and advice. On the other 
hand, there can be intrinsic benefits, with little economic value, such as social 
support.  
 
Thinking on social capital has some similarities. Social capital emerges when 
an agent makes use of a social structure to his or her benefit (Coleman 1990: 
305); trust is important for the creation of this social structure. For Coleman 
(1990: 302) social capital is relational, and is embedded in social structures. 
Trust is a key element of the relational aspects of social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghosal 1998). The social exchange between actors is purely voluntary, 
though as the structure of that relationship develops over time, it defines 
rules, norms and obligations of the interchange. Social capital creates 
expectations and obligations and can be used as basis for decisions and 
future action (Coleman 1988, 1990). Through exchange, trust is built and 
actors commit to further exchange based on this trust. With high levels of 
trust, people are willing to cooperate, then building social capital. In this 
situation, organizations are able to forgo formal monitoring and contractual 
relations (Nahapiet and Ghosal 1998). 
 
The two strands of theories look at new relationships and relationships that 
develop over time. Agency theory and transaction cost theory emphasizes 
ϱϱ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 88
the self-interest motive and the potential for opportunism, particularly in 
conditions of information asymmetry. Monitoring is seen as crucial to 
covering risk and trust as of limited importance, or just a subset of risk 
(Williamson 1975, Das and Teng 2004). Social exchange emphasizes that if a 
social bond has been developed as a result of successful exchange and 
exchange of benefits over time, that there will be a lower perception of risk, 
a greater propensity to trust, less need to resort to monitoring. What is 
important is that calculative aspects of the exchange may be pertinent to a 
new relationship; it is argued to be less pertinent in relationships of longer 
term. This does not imply that partners stop calculations of costs and benefits 
at certain points in the relationship, but that this tendency diminishes as 
times goes on and the relationship evolves. The emphasis on or relevance of 
calculative aspects and relational elements of trust are different in different 
phases of the relationship. 
3.5 The definition of trust 
3.5.1 Trust: dependent or independent variable 
Studies on trust have problems defining trust. There are problems with the 
definition of trust itself, in clarity in the relationship between risk and trust, 
confusion in the antecedents and outcomes of trust, and in the level of 
analysis (the individual or the firm) (Mayer et al. 1995, Das and Teng 2004). 
The literature demonstrates a variety of views on whether trust is the cause 
of something (independent variable), or the effect of something (dependent 
variable). In some cases, it is seen as an independent variable. In game 
theory, high trust is considered to bring about the tendency to cooperate and 
thereby to achieve economic gain (Axelrod 1984, Miller 1992). Transaction 
cost economists argue that trust causes a reduction of opportunistic 
behaviour, thereby reducing the transaction costs of the partnership (Sitkin 
and Stickel 1996, Klijn et al. 2010). This can be seen in long-term 
relationships, in which the ability to negotiate and settle conflicts are key; 
trust is seen as way of mediating responses of partners (Zaheer et al. 1998). 
These views support the idea that trust is effective in producing successful 
outcomes. 
 
In addition, trust is also conceptualized as a dependent variable, as the result 
of certain personality or situational factors (Das and Teng 2004). Trust is 
viewed as the result of the attributes of another party, i.e. of their 
competence, openness and reliability (Mishra 1996) or their reputation for 
trustworthy behaviour in previous interactions (Mayer et al. 1995). Some 
argue that trust is only possible given the appropriate social context. Social 
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norms shape behaviour, and the tendency to trust or be opportunistic, as 
well as their beliefs in the intentions of others (Sitkin and Stickel 1996). Social 
contexts produce institutions, which in turn promote or restrict trust 
relations (Fukuyama, 1995). These relations occur at the individual level 
between partners, or at the interfirm level.  
 
This discussion is valuable when looking at the definition of trust and the 
operationalization of the trust. This research contends that it is important to 
look at the factors or the bases of trust as well as what causes trust. 
3.5.2 What definitions of trust tell us 
Definitions of trust use such terms as ‘(positive) expectations’ or ‘perception’ 
of a person, group or organization(s). These definitions also state that the 
expectations or perception are dependent upon the motives, intentions and 
behaviour of the other person or organization. In effect, there is a party that 
does the trusting (the trustor) and the object of trust (the trustee). Hosmer 
(1995: 390) concludes that “trust is generally expressed as an optimistic 
expectation on the part of an individual about the outcome of an event or the 
behaviour of a person”.  
 
There are some important features of the definitions. First, they make a 
distinction between individual expectations and behaviour (Zand 1972), 
behaviour being related to the decision to trust and act on this trust (in 
situations of vulnerability, implying giving up control). Second, they often, 
though not always explicitly, refer to the connection between trust and risk. 
They often use terms such as fear, predictability, uncertainty, likelihood and 
vulnerability (related to exploitation and opportunism) (Das and Teng 2004). 
 
The argument is that behaviour is not trust, it is a result of the decision to 
trust and act on this trust. This implies that the definitions of trust focus on 
the expectations/perceptions of an individual or an organization relative to 
another individual or organization, and this perception relates to how the 
trustee might behave or what the outcome of an activity might be.  
 
In addition, the assumption is that trust is based on a set of factors (i.e. 
information concerning past performance, past experience), which have 
brought about this perception. This perception will influence the trustor in 
future activities and behaviour, in others words, there are outcomes related 
to the decision to trust, which are visible as a result of trust (increased 
cooperation, greater innovation, increased risk-taking).  
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The reason that the concept of trust is hard to pin down is because trust is 
built over time, and will be based on a variety of factors; this implies that 
perceptions also change as a result of the exchange process or aspects of 
behaviour of actors in the relationship. Trust is built and maintained through 
interaction (Eshuis 2006). Whereas many theorists focus purely on the 
rationalist, calculus-based form of trust, which is argued to be most relevant 
at the outset of the relationship, a different form of trust is built over time, 
based on the outcome of the personal relations formed. This theme is 
repeated over and over again in the literature. The emphasis is on the 
rational versus the emotional aspects of the trustor. 
 
The definition of trust must reflect certain other dimensions. It must 
distinguish between two clear aspects: on one hand, the trustee’s capacity 
or competence, on the other, the trustee’s integrity or goodwill. Both are 
necessary notions when discussing partners in economic exchange and 
partnerships. 
 
Nooteboom (1996: 990) makes an important distinction when it comes to 
trust. He states that “trust may concern a partner’s ability to perform 
according to agreements or his intentions to do so”. This is a crucial 
distinction, as it links to the discussion above. From the perspective of the 
trustor, trust will be based on a calculus of a partner’s competence, as well 
as a more personal assessment, which comes out of repeated contact, of the 
partner’s integrity and sense of obligation in a situation.  
 
The other theorists mentioned above support this view. In the terminology 
used by Ring (1996), ’fragile’ is more calculative, whereas ‘resilient’ is based 
on a perception of goodwill. McAllister’s (1995) framework makes a similar 
distinction, the calculative aspect of cognition-based trust, and the goodwill 
and responsibility that are aspects of affect-based trust (see later section on 
bases of trust).  
 
Barber (1983) contends that trust refers to an individual’s sense of 
‘responsibility’ and ‘competence’. Responsibility is more related to a sense 
of moral duty and the trustor’s belief in the intentions of the other. 
Competence refers more to the ability of an individual or a group to do what 
is expected of them. Creed and Miles (1996) assert that ability and 
dependability are important components of trust; Mayer et al. (1995) use 
concepts of ‘ability’ and ‘expertise’ to denote competence. 
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Competence and goodwill are key concepts in trust: competence as “the 
expectation of technically competent role performance” (Barber 1983: 14). 
‘Goodwill’ (term used by Ring and van de Ven, 1992) reflects “the expectation 
that some others in our social relationships have moral obligations and 
responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for other’s interests above 
their own” (Barber 1983: 14). These notions have led to the definition 
formulated in this research. 
 
In this research, trust is defined as the perception of an actor that another 
actor will refrain from opportunistic behaviour should the opportunity arise 
and the perception of an actor that another actor will have the ability to 
perform according to agreements. 
 
The definition used focuses on perception, and not on the behaviour that is 
a result of the decision to trust. It presumes a lack of opportunism on the 
part of the trustee, that the trustee has a sense of moral obligation and takes 
the trustor’s interests into account. It also presumes, in addition to the 
goodwill or intention to fulfil obligations in the relationships, that partners 
will also be capable of fulfilling the tasks agreed upon. This definition is 
argued to be the most relevant for partnerships in which not only intentions 
are important but also outcomes and performance.  
3.6 Trust and outcomes 
Again, trust matters in situations that are driven by the need to interact, 
coordinate and cooperate on a regular basis to achieve objectives, instances 
where there are “critical task interdependencies” (Gargiulo and Benassi 1999: 
299). Trust is argued to influence the outcomes of interaction in which there 
are such interdependencies, such as partnerships. 
 
What lies at the heart of trust is that with trust present, people feel less 
vulnerable and are more willing to take risks. Mayer et al. (1995) underline 
the notion that an individual’s belief or perception about another party 
(trust) affects their behaviour in an interaction. Partners will then act on this 
and take more risk (Barney and Hansen 1994). Here the literature makes a 
distinction between the willingness to take risk and risk-taking behaviour as 
an outcome of trust (Mayer et al. 1995, Ross and LaCroix 1996, Colquitt et al. 
2007). The willingness to take risk results in risk-taking behaviour, such as 
more open communication, greater effort, increased cooperation, reduced 
conflict, better negotiations. Without fear of reprisal, risk-taking can 
manifest in greater innovation, asking for help, seeking feedback, expressing 
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concern (Edmondson 2004, Cosner 2009). Risk-taking can also manifest itself 
in partners making more investment than would be normal, or sharing 
information that they might not normally share (Klijn et al. 2010). These are 
different types of behavioural outcomes resulting from trust in the 
interaction. 
 
Another type of outcome argued to result from trust relates to ‘performance’ 
(job, group, team), in this case of the partnership. Performance outcomes 
might simply relate to positive or negative client and partner satisfaction (as 
perceived by the community and the partners) with the project or PPP, and 
whether trust influenced this (Costa et al. 2001, Cosner 2009). Performance 
outcomes also relate to whether the trust has brought about a reduction in 
transaction costs and improvement in the performance of the project 
(measured, for instance, in efficiencies, effectiveness, productivity) (Cosner 
2009). The latter is outside of the scope of this research, other than at the 
perceptual level.  
 
The assumption made here is that the behavioural outcomes resulting from 
trust will lead to larger partnership performance outcomes. For this to occur, 
interaction over time is necessary.  
 
WĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ 
Trust is argued to contribute to performance. There are a number of studies 
on interpersonal and interorganizational trust and its influence on 
performance (Madhok 1995, Zaheer et al. 1998, Dirks and Ferrin 2001, 
Cosner 2009). One notion is that trust affects the way a trustor allocates 
(human, financial and other) resources when dealing with a partner (Dirks 
and Ferrin 2002, Colquitt et al. 2007). The trustor is willing to be vulnerable 
and forego extensive monitoring of the partner. Partners can then refrain 
from having to divert resources to monitor and control activities, but instead 
will focus on achieving mutual objectives, thereby improving the focus and 
effectiveness of activities, and performance. Over time, trust leads to the 
development of strong exchange relations, which are argued to be linked to 
improved behaviours on the job (Blau 1967, Colquitt et al. 2007). In addition, 
the literature argues that the trust built when working together helps to 
improve collective problem solving and decision making, and will contribute 
to productivity (Putnam et al. 1993, Cosner 2009). Other authors have looked 
at the effectiveness of teamwork and links to interorganizational 
performance. Trust built in teams working together has been found to be 
linked to task performance, the satisfaction of those working together and 
to commitment to the relationship (Costa et al. 2001). 
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One key aspect of performance is transaction costs. Trust is also argued to 
reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1993, Barney and Hansen 1994, Davis 
et al. 2000). Following from the argument above, on one hand, trust reduces 
risk in transactions and cooperative relations, and creates greater 
predictability. This is also important in situations, such as PPPs, where 
partners have divergent objectives (Madhok 1995). This occurs when an 
actor feels confident that the other has good intentions and will refrain from 
acts of opportunism (Sitkin and Stickel 1996, Klijn et al. 2010). The belief is, 
in situations of risk, that vulnerabilities will not be exploited and partners will 
not need to make additional investments in governance mechanisms, such 
as formal contracting, or hierarchical controls (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, 
Davis et al. 2000). This will reduce costs, as contracts require fewer details 
and specifications (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Hindmoor 1998, see also Sako 
in Lane and Bachmann 1998, Nooteboom and Jacobs 1998, Klijn et al. 2010). 
Effectively, trust reduces the costs attributed to opportunism.  
 
There are a number of more specific ways in which trust is claimed to reduce 
transaction costs and/or to improve performance, each of them outcomes in 
their own right.  
 
dĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ 
Trust makes partners predisposed to cooperate (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, 
McAllister 1995, Dirks and Ferrin 2002, Zand 2008, Cosner 2009). Partners 
who have the proclivity to cooperate, in fact, demonstrate higher levels of 
flexibility in relations, leading to better outcomes for the partnership 
(Madhok 1995). Again, the assumption is that by cooperating, partners 
improve on decision making and problem solving (Putnam et al. 1993, Cosner 
2009). Finally, over time, interactions based on cooperative relations tend to 
be institutionalized, and take on their own norms and procedures. The 
development of the relationship and the desire to participate reduces 
transaction costs (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Madhok 1995).  
 
ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ 
Another argument is that trust improves on the ways that partners 
coordinate activities, this is particularly the case in joint ventures and PPPs. 
One of the overall justifications for PPPs is the coordinating efficiencies that 
come from working together on tasks and being able to plan activities 
together (horizontal and vertical integration) (Klijn et al. 2010). However, 
trust is argued to take this further. Trust creates mutual expectations of the 
outcomes of working together, partners are oriented to each other and this 
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therefore leads to potential streamlining of working processes (Madhok 
1995, Zaheer et al. 1998). Trust acts as a coordinating mechanism by 
lessening the need for formal decision making (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997). 
 
ǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽĨĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ 
Trust brings about an exchange of information and improves access to the 
resources embedded in both organizations. One of the fundamental aspects 
of PPPs is the sharing of and tapping into each other’s resources 
(information, knowledge, investments, various assets) (Madhok 1995, Dirks 
and Ferrin 2001, Klijn et al. 2010). In situations in which parties feel less 
vulnerable and know that information will not be used against them, 
partners tend to be willing to disclose more accurate, relevant and complete 
data (Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2000). Partners may also be willing to invest 
more than expected to ensure the continuation of the cooperation and that 
the project and partnership remain stable. These investments are often 
unforeseen and not covered in the contract, but are investments that 
partners deem necessary to ensure meeting the objectives of the project 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Creed and Miles 1996, Nooteboom et al. 1997, 
Nooteboom and Jacobs 1998, Parker and Vaidya 2001, Klijn et al. 2010). 
 
DƵƚƵĂůůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ 
Another argument is that trust brings about mutual learning via knowledge 
transfer. In situation such as PPPs, where partners bring to the table different 
knowledge and skills, trust will facilitate the willingness of partners to 
transfer the knowledge so learning can occur. Partners can only acquire this 
knowledge through continued exchange and intensive cooperation (Madhok 
1995, Nooteboom and Jacobs 1998, Cosner 2009, Klijn et al. 2010). 
 
ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƐƚƐ͍ 
There is a concern in PPPs that working together, negotiating outputs and 
coming to mutually satisfactory agreements take more time and money than 
if parties work alone. Added to that, building trust also takes time and 
investment of resources – “financial, temporal and managerial” (Madhok 
1995: 122). Trust needs to evolve gradually over time and be nurtured during 
the interaction. Ultimately, building trust is a slow, lengthy and expensive 
process (Ouchi 1980, Ring and Van de Ven 1992) potentially adding to the 
costs of organizing a PPP. 
 
However, in a study of trust in joint ventures, Madhok (1995: 122) argues the 
contrary: “. . . :ss can be both a revenue enhancing and a more efficient mode 
of organiǌing (Beamish and Banks 1987). In this respect, mutual need for the 
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partner's resources makes shared ownership more conducive towards 
encouraging participation while the presence of commitment curbs the 
transaction costs arising from opportunism, small numbers bargaining and 
uncertainty, and also facilitates information sharing. hnder these conditions, 
the additional costs faced in the management of :ss can be contained at a 
level where benefits are greater than the costs. Development of the 
relationship over time leads to lower costs of transacting” (see also Jarillo 
1988, Ring and Van de Ven 1992). 
 
EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ 
Conflicts are based on perception of disagreements, influenced by 
viewpoints (Simons and Peterson 2000, Cosner 2009). Simons and Peterson 
(2000) state that in high trust relationships, these disagreements are less 
likely to results in conflicts. When people trust each other, conflict resolution 
is made “easier and more productive” (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000: 101). In 
situations of goal divergence and unforeseen contingencies, such as in PPPs, 
trust can smooth over conflicts, and partners tend to have the ability to deal 
with conflict; in fact they are more likely to confront conflict rather than 
avoiding it. They can disagree with each other intellectually, but there will be 
less of a tendency to take things personally (Zaheer et al. 1998, Cosner 2009). 
 
Negotiation is a key element of an interaction between partners. There are 
also costs related to partners reaching ‘mutually acceptable agreements’ 
(Zaheer et al. 1998). In situations of limited trust, partners may withhold 
information, there may be information asymmetries, and negotiations will 
be positional (Fisher et al. 1983). Literature claims that trust will help in 
overcoming these issues and will facilitate the process of negotiations (and 
will reduce costs associated with them). In addition, when partners must deal 
with unforeseen contingencies, trust helps to develop a common 
understanding of the issues faced and to resolve these (Zaheer et al. 1998). 
Partners are able to be more flexible in granting concessions, as, from the 
social exchange perspective, under situations of trust, the partner will 
assume concessions will be reciprocated in the future (Blau 1967). The 
assumption is that in these circumstances, partners who trust each other are 
able to execute negotiations based on common assumptions and are able to 
reach agreements more easily (Zaheer et al. 1998). Zaheer et al. (1998) argue 
that trust helps to achieve ‘integrative solutions’, solutions that are also 
mutually beneficial to each of the partners.  
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/ŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ 
Trust can lead to innovation among partners. The rationale behind PPPs is 
that partners enter into the relationship because of their mutual objectives 
and the complementary knowledge and skills they bring to the relationship. 
Under conditions of trust, when there is sharing of knowledge and limited 
uncertainty about opportunistic behaviour, partners will have a tendency to 
work closely to find the best and most innovative solutions, solutions that 
they might not have found working alone. (Miles and Snow 1986, Alter and 
Hage 1993, Lundvall 1993, Zaheer et al. 1998, Parker and Vaidya 2001).  
3.7 Trust and risk 
Starting in the 18th and 19th centuries, risks were related to predicable events 
(Beck 1992) and were attributable to human beings, and “in their conduct, in 
their liberty, in the relations between them, in the fact of their association, in 
society” (Ewald 1993: 226). Risk was linked to situations in which the 
estimation of the probability of a negative event was assumed to be known. 
This was in line with the transformation in the perception that society was 
controllable by rational man (Castel 1991, Reddy 1996). 
 
In the 20th and 21st centuries, but particularly in the last several decades, both 
lay people and ‘experts’ alike have begun to use the term ‘risk’ widely 
(Lupton 1999: 9). Risk is used to refer to personal circumstances 
(investments, health, etc.), to societal conditions (economic conditions, 
terrorism, climate change, etc.) as well as to business (project, corporate 
governance, political, etc.) in today’s vocabulary (Hillson and Murray-
Webster 2005). With the advent of globalization and complexity, and the 
access to information by more elements of society, “risks have been more 
globaliǌed, less identifiable, and more serious in their effects, and there less 
easily manageable and anxiety provoking” (Lupton 1999: 10). We live in a 
‘risk society’ (Beck and Ritter 1992).  
 
When looking at features of risk in contemporary society, Lupton (1999: 25), 
draws a series of conclusions on the common elements found on three major 
perspectives on risk (cultural, risk society and governmentality perspectives). 
Each of the perspectives see risk as having become a central cultural and 
political concept by which individuals, social groups and institutions are 
organized, monitored and regulated.  
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 Risk has become an increasingly pervasive concept of human existence 
in Western societies. 
 Risk is seen as something that can be managed through human 
intervention. 
 Risk is associated with notions of choice, responsibility and blame. 
 Risk is central aspect of human subjectivity. 
 
These conclusions introduce both notions of rationality and subjectivity to 
the concept of risk. 
 
dŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƌŝƐŬ 
The technical literature focuses on the rational assessment of risk. In a 
technical sense, risk is defined as “the calculated probability of an adverse 
consequence, such as a danger, harm or loss, arising because of a specific 
action, or process” (Allen et al. 2005: 166). This definition sees risk as 
quantifiable. Adams and Thompson (1995: 285) argue that for those that 
manage risk, “quantified risk assessments require that the probabilities 
associated with particular events be known or be capable of plausible 
estimation”. This definition also underlines the fact that the risk is a result of 
an action or process, namely the activity or strategy of another actor or the 
process of interaction between actors. The assumption, as in projects such 
as urban regeneration projects or in processes such as PPPs, is that a rational 
human being is able to identify and quantify the risk being faced as a result 
of the project and interaction between partners and other actors. 
 
Risk is in contrast to ‘uncertainty’, a term differentiated from risk to describe 
a condition in which probabilities cannot be known and calculated (Lupton 
1999: 7), and of which the consequences are therefore unsure (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster 2005). Hillson and Murray-Webster (2005: 5) put this in 
another way; risk is “uncertainty that affects one or more objectives . . . and 
that matters”. There may be uncertainties that have consequences that do 
not really ‘matter’, as they do not affect achieving an organization’s (or PPP’s) 
objectives. However, when uncertainties influence what an organization (or 
PPP) sets out to do, then they matter and are risks. 
 
ZĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇ 
Another important concept linked to risk is the idea of reflexivity: this refers 
to active responses that people have to risk in contemporary society (Lupton 
1999: 15), and underlines the idea that humans constantly monitor actions 
of others; this involves the weighing and assessment of the claims of other 
actors (Giddens 1990). With increasing sensitivity to risk in this complex 
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world, people are taking a more (re)active role when dealing with risk. People 
react to their perception of risk. 
 
Cognitive science theorists argue that human action is volitional and rational; 
when people perceive themselves as vulnerable to a threat that will have 
serious consequences; they will act on the risk. They act when they believe 
their actions will be effective and will produce benefits that will outweigh any 
costs incurred (Lupton 1999: 21).  
 
ZŝƐŬ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ 
Perception is an important construct in network theory in which actors are 
faced with complexity and uncertainties. Actors use their perceptions, the 
lens through which people views and make sense of the world, to assess 
problems, create responses and evaluate outcomes (Kickert et al. 1997). 
Perception is also important in the literature on risk. “Werception is a key 
driver of [risk] attitude, since this determines how a particular situation is 
seen, and hence the chosen response, which is considered to be appropriate” 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster 2007: 8).  
 
Some authors argue that risk perception is subjective, and that assessment 
of risk should be left up to the ‘experts’ (the more rational actors). However, 
the social constructionist perspective concurs that ‘scientific knowledge’ is 
never value free but rather the product of how people see the world (Lupton 
1999). Experts are never completely objective and unbiased, but are also 
affected, as much as the layperson, by values they carry with them and the 
interaction processes they undergo.  
 
Hillson and Murray-Webster (2005) also introduce the notion that 
perception and attitude can be influenced, and that this is essential to the 
understanding and management of responses. This point reinforces the idea 
that trust can influence the perception of risk (Giddens 1990) and the coping 
strategies employed by different actors. They also underline that risk 
perceptions and attitudes exist on a number of different levels: on those of 
the individual, the group, the corporation and the nation, reinforcing the fact 
that it is important to understand the perceptions of different actors involved 
in PPPs. Risk is not static and objective, but defined and refined as a result of 
the interaction between actors. This also brings time and change of 
perception into the idea of risk (Lupton: 1999).   
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tŚĂƚŬŝŶĚŽĨƌŝƐŬƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞǆƵƌďĂŶƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ͍ 
There are certain types of risks that are typical to PPPs and urban 
regeneration projects: political risks, market and demand risks, financial 
risks, construction risks, and so forth. A simple classification of risks in 
projects of this sort would be those that are external and those that are 
internal. External risks are risks that the project team cannot control, these 
include political risks, economic/market risks related to recessions and real 
estate crashes, and social-cultural risks. Internal risks are risks that are 
related to the project and the PPP. In assessing the risk in this research, the 
focus of risk assessment is on risk perception, risk from the perspective of 
the actors involved. Taking a rational perspective, the assumption is that the 
partners involved have the skills to assess risks and have a clear 
understanding of the risks in the project. In addition, the peripheral actors, 
while monitoring the actions of the partners, are also regularly assessing the 
status and severity of the risks.  
3.8 Trust building over time 
Authors describing the growth of trust and the sources of trust make several 
interesting distinctions. What comes out of the literature is that the nature 
of trust is different if, on the one hand, trust building occurs through direct 
contact between partners (Shapiro 1987, Lane and Bachmann 1998) as 
opposed to impersonal relations, and, on the other, occurs as a result of 
recurrent exchange over time versus short-term exchange. Both the 
proximity and repetitiveness of exchange are essential to the growth of trust, 
and the strength of trust (Barney and Hansen 1994).  
 
Trust building occurs as part of a gradual process, and during the exchange 
partners gradually test each other to see if the other party is trustworthy. 
There is therefore an incremental expansion of trust, and trust conferred also 
occurs in small steps. This implies a step-wise growth in trust; with repeated 
positive experience, the relationship between partners is also characterized 
by a gradual increase in willingness to take risk and to be vulnerable to each 
other. In time, the stakes are raised (Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Barney and 
Hansen 1994).  
 
These perspectives on trust building have led to studies on trust as a result 
of a process (Zucker 1986), a process with distinct stages of trust building 
(Shapiro et al. 1992, Lewicki and Bunker 1996) (see also Child 1998 and Sako 
1998 in Lane and Bachmann 1998), and a process that is characterized by 
rational, economic (some use the term ‘calculative’) and social (relational) 
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dimensions. Authors also argue, in these models of trust, that one form of 
trust is transformed into another and/or that to reach the next phase of trust 
one must have successfully achieved the previous stage (Lewicki and Bunker 
1996). In addition, the contention is that for the trust building to take place 
in the context of more social exchanges, there has to be a need for the 
partners to be interdependent and the experience during the more 
calculative period has to have been positive. In effect, the result of the stage-
wise approach to trust building is a hierarchy of trust: one cannot achieve a 
higher (or stronger) form of trust without passing through a lower (or 
weaker) form of trust (Barney and Hanson, 1994; and reference to ‘fragile’ 
and ‘resilient trust’ by Ring, 1996).  
3.8.1 The antecedents (or factors) of trust 
This chapter has already stated that trust is a result of different factors, and 
that these factors alter as the trust grows. To better understand these factors 
(or the antecedents or bases) of trust that will be examined in this research, 
this section makes a comparison of the views of different authors.  
 
Of note is the fact that they incorporate, in the typology of trust, the bases 
of the trust or the factors that contribute to trust build-up. For instance, what 
is termed ‘deterrence-based trust’ (a typology of trust) is formed through a 
process of deterrence. This is a bit confusing, but this research uses the 
antecedents, as described in the literature, as the key factors of trust build-
up or break down.  
 
The authors that focus on the antecedents of trust are listed below in the 
table. 
dĂďůĞϯ-ϭ͗ >ŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚƌƵƐƚĂŶƚĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐ 
 dǇƉĞƐͬĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐͬĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
Zucker, 1986 Process-based Characteristics-
based 
Institutional-based 
Barney and Hansen 
(1994) 
Weak form of trust Semi-strong form of 
trust 
Strong form of trust 
Rousseau (1998)  Institution-based / Calculus-
based 
Relational trust (has two 
components) 
McAllister (1995) Cognition-based Affect-based 
Lewicki and Bunker 
(1996)  
Calculus-based Knowledge-based Identification-based  
Sheppard and 
Tuchinsky (1996) 
Deterrence-based Knowledge-based Identification-based  
Child (1998)  Calculative Cognitive Normative 
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The discussion on elements of the phases takes the model of Lewicki and 
Bunker (1996) as a starting point, as these authors not only propose a 
stepwise evolution of trust, but also conclude that trust development also 
results in a type of trust hierarchy. 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) expand on the framework of Shapiro et al. (1992), 
who propose that three different types of trust (or trust with three different 
types of antecedents) exist in professional relations. Lewicki and Bunker 
further the theory by suggesting that these different types of trust are part 
of an iterative process and that trust development at one level enables the 
development of the next level or stronger forms of trust. Lewicki and Bunker 
also argue that understanding how trust changes and evolves is essential to 
understanding how professional relations develop.  
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996), using the theories of Boon and Holmes (1991), 
state that professional relationships go through phases, and are 
characterized by exchange of information and processes of evaluation. This 
element of evaluation is crucial to the development of healthy relationships, 
as the parties step back and analyse the pros and cons of the relationship. 
Boon and Holmes argue, in fact, that the dynamics and the nature of trust 
are different at these different stages and that only at later stages, as 
partners come to know each other’s imperfections, does ‘real trust’ take 
place. Their approach underlines the view that trust is not static, but 
something that will change, mature and become stronger (if not broken). 
3.8.2 The first phase: calculus-based trust 
Called calculus-based trust by some and deterrence-based trust by others, or 
trust based on calculus or deterrence. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Child 
(1998) argue that this form of trust is found in new relationships, in which 
partners are getting to know each other. This period in the relationship is also 
characterized by limited risk and interdependence. Child (1998) refers to this 
phase of trust building as the ‘formation’ stage: in an interaction process, this 
is an initial period in which parties learn about each other. 
 
Deterrence-based trust is based on the utilitarian assumption that someone 
can be believed to be trustworthy because there are sufficient sanctions in 
place to control against breach of trust, and that these outweigh the benefits 
of opportunistic behaviour (Sheppard and Tuchinsky 1996, Rousseau et al. 
1998). Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin 
(1992: 118) suggest that this form of trust involves ensuring ‘consistency of 
behaviour’. In a new relationship, partners will be intent on making sure that 
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they do what they said they were going to do because they fear the 
consequences if they do not. They also know that they are being checked for 
consistency. In this situation, there is a threat of punishment (for one, the 
relationship will end) if a partner’s behaviour is not consistent with what he 
or she has indicated will be done. Deterrence-based trust focuses on the 
availability of sufficient sanctions or controls in conditions of shirking as the 
basis for one party considering another capable of the appropriate 
behaviour. In this case, (the threat of) sanctions and controls act as a 
deterrent to opportunistic behaviour: trust is then based on there being 
sufficient deterrence and the fact that the deterrence is likely to be applied 
should trust be violated. The threat of punishment is central to the concept. 
Deterrence in the market can take the form of courts, in hierarchical 
situations it can take the form of controls (Sheppard and Tuchinsky 1996).  
 
In a situation where partners are considering entering into a cooperative 
relationship, the benefits of cooperation have to outweigh the benefits of 
opportunistic behaviour. As an example, the benefits of cheating in the short 
term may seem minimal when compared to the benefits to be derived from 
future exchange over the long term or building greater dependency (Axelrod 
and Hamilton 1981, Granovetter 1985). 
 
Some authors reject the premises of deterrence-based trust, arguing that 
trust based on deterrence is not trust at all, that controls such as sanctions 
are a sign of a lack of trust and a detriment to cooperation (Sitkin and Roth 
1993). For example, a detailed contract may be necessary in situations 
lacking trust and may actually be harmful in the build-up of exchange 
relationships. Partners do not build an effective and trusting relationship 
when their exchange is bureaucratic and highly monitored (Macaulay 1963). 
If sanctions then act as a deterrence to trust, then trust is based on other 
factors. 
 
Barney and Hanson (1994) concur that trust in the initial phases does not 
depend on legal or contractual sanctions to control the exchange. They 
contend that, in the initial phases of the relationship, there is limited 
vulnerability and, due to limited interdependence, there are few 
opportunities for partners to act opportunistically. With limited risk and no 
vulnerabilities, partners can gain benefit from the relationship without 
concern for shirking or without incurring substantial costs. Barney and 
Hanson maintain trust at this stage can only be a ‘weak’ form of trust. 
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Calculus-based trust (or trust based on calculus) derives from the rational 
choice approach to interactions in economic exchange. Trust is related to the 
perception of (and the calculation by) one person that another will act in a 
manner that is beneficial (Rousseau et al. 1998). Though deterrence still plays 
a role, calculus-based trust is argued to derive from the availability of 
sufficient and credible information regarding the intentions and competence 
of another (Barber 1983). Such information may come from a third party that 
can provide information on the reputation of a potential partner or from the 
existence of some professional certification (diploma) (Rousseau, 1998). 
McAllister (1995) takes a similar view, using the term, ‘cognition-based trust’ 
to describe a situation where partners use various amounts of knowledge 
about each other to assess trustworthiness. The decision to trust is based on 
knowledge available and ‘good reasons’ to do so (Lewis and Weigert 1985). 
Good reasons, which come from external factors or sources, refer to 
knowledge relating to the success of past interactions, social similarities and 
the competence and reliability of a partner, as well as evidence of 
‘trustworthy behaviour’ (Butler 1991). 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Child (1998) argue that calculus-based trust is 
based on calculations that weigh the costs and benefits of the relationship to 
the trustor and the trustee. There is assurance that partners will do as they 
have promised because the deterrence is greater than the gain from breaking 
trust, and the rewards for maintaining trust are greater than the gains from 
breaking it. Again, trust is based on the information available to make such a 
calculation. This is an economic calculation that attaches a value, on the one 
hand, to the costs of forming, investing in and maintaining the relationship 
and, on the other, to the cost of ending it (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996: 120) 
and weighs these against each other. 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996: 119) emphasize the differences between 
deterrence-based trust and calculus-based trust by stating that deterrence-
based trust is maintained to the extent that deterrence is ‘clear, possible and 
likely to occur if trust is violated’. Thus, the focus is more on the threat that 
derives from the punishment than on the promise of reward. They believe 
that calculus-based trust places emphasis on the partner’s assessment of 
potential outcomes: of positive aspects to be derived from preserving the 
relationship versus those relative to the cost of severing it. 
 
Rousseau (1998) takes a similar view on calculus-based trust but also argues 
that ‘institutional-based trust’ can pave the way for calculus-based trust. 
Trust is based on institutional factors (including deterrents and reputation; 
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she also cites legal forms, social networks, and societal norms regarding 
conflict management and cooperation) and can help to make way for the 
nascent relations to build in the first place (see also Childs, 1998). 
3.8.3 The second phase: knowledge-based trust 
The second phase of trust is called knowledge-based trust (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996) and refers to trust based on knowledge of each other. This is 
similar to cognitive-based trust (Child, 1998) and relational trust (Rousseau 
et al. 1998). At this point, partners have experienced a certain amount of 
interaction and, from knowing each other, can predict behaviour. 
Knowledge-based trust relies on information and not deterrence. Thus, 
knowledge-based trust involves the sharing of cognitions, including common 
ways of thinking, which provides the basis for understanding the thinking of 
the partner and being able to predict his/her actions (Child, 1998). 
Information, repeated interaction and understanding create predictability, 
which creates trust. The more behaviour (and therefore predictability) is 
confirmed through interaction, the more trust is developed. Knowledge-
based trust presumes that, as you can predict your partner’s behaviour, you 
can safely make plans, investments or decisions based on your expectations 
of that behaviour (Sheppard and Tuchinsky, 1996; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). 
The speed of decision making is increased; you have confidence in your 
partner’s response. Performance is improved, as actions taken will 
incorporate your partners’ preferences. Trust based on knowledge therefore 
presumes that you have an understanding of your partners’ preferences and 
can predict their reactions. Such understanding only comes from repeated 
contact, continued communication and information exchange, in other 
words, greater interdependence. Knowledge-based trust is a process of 
building the relationship and testing it (something like a courtship). In 
addition, on the basis of the interaction, partners come to know and respect 
each other’s capacities. 
 
Trust based on knowledge also presumes an emotional bond (see Rousseau 
and discussion on relational trust, 1998), which comes from repeated longer-
term interactions and the attachments that are formed. A trustor will come 
to believe in the positive intentions of the trustee as well as the lack of 
negative intentions (Lewicki et al. 1998). This emotional bond and belief in 
the good intentions of another will result in greater exchange of information 
and resources and in a greater amount of faith (Rousseau et al. 1998). With 
recurrent cycles of exchange and of risk taking, which meet expectations of 
those involved, partners will be more willing to be dependent on each other 
and to invest additional resources in the exchange. McAllister (1995) 
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proposes that this is when ‘affect-based trust’ exists: emotional bonds 
develop between individuals or partners (see also Lewis and Weigert 1985). 
People invest emotionally in the relationship, care about the welfare of their 
partners, believe in the value of the relationship and that feelings and 
perceptions are reciprocated. The emotional ties between individuals act as 
the basis of trust (Rempel et al. 1985). The assumption of rationality inherent 
to the more calculus-based view of trust is ‘relaxed’ a bit, the fact is that 
partners feel more secure, understood and as if they share key assumptions 
(Child, 1998). 
 
McAllister’s view underlines the more social exchange approach to trust. He 
argues that trust with affect foundations means that partners exchange 
benefits that are personally chosen and outside of the role-prescribed tasks. 
They exhibit personally chosen behaviour (not role-prescribed), care and 
concern (not self-interest) and altruism. This implies that they begin to help 
others and provide assistance that may not directly be rewarded (McAllister, 
1995). 
 
With repeated interaction and the building of (affect-based) trust, the 
importance of calculus-based (cognition-based) trust diminishes (McAllister, 
1995), and with it the use of sanctions. What is also key to knowledge-based 
trust is that behaviour that is inconsistent with expectations will not 
necessarily break trust. In this case, behaviour that does not benefit a partner 
may be ‘forgiven’, as experience has shown that this behaviour is unusual 
and may be adequately explained (see below). Partners will tolerate a 
temporary indiscretion (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Exchanges are less likely 
to be terminated, as is the case in calculus-based trust (Barney and Hansen 
1994, Rousseau et al. 1998) 
3.8.4 Phase three: identification-based trust 
Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996) and Lewicki and Bunker (1998) call 
identification-based trust the highest form of trust. Rousseau (1998: 7) 
contends that ‘identity-based trust is relational trust at its broadest’. Trust 
based on identification requires that partners internalize each other’s 
preferences and that partners see themselves as members of a group, and 
internalize the goals of the group (Lane and Bachmann 1996). Partners 
identify with each other’s desires and intentions and develop a mutual 
understanding to the point that partners can act on behalf of each other 
(Deutsch, 1949 in Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Emotional bonds allow one 
partner to feel and think as the other would. Partners develop a culture and 
language that is common and particular to the relationship. 
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Partners will place themselves in the power of the other, in effect, take 
greater risk and be susceptible to greater vulnerabilities (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996). Partners feel that other partners will protect their interests fully and 
that monitoring is not necessary (Sheppard and Tuchinsky 1996).  
 
A sense of common identity will be manifested in shared goals and strategies, 
common values, a shared legal identity (Coleman 1990). Partners come to 
share common goals, including common concepts of moral obligation (see 
Child’s view on normative trust). Trustworthy behaviour occurs as a response 
to and is guided by these sets of principles and is internalized by the exchange 
partners (Barney and Hansen 1994). The norms and values are developed 
over time and with much interaction. In a sense, partners reach a shared 
‘identity’ (seeing the relationship as ‘we’). 
 
Essentially, trust based on a common identity requires great investment, 
more time and greater interdependence, but the benefits derived are also 
greater than with the other two phases of trust build-up. If fully dependent 
partners can act for each other and objectives and identity are fully aligned, 
the agency problem is allayed (Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996). 
 
Exchanges are argued to be more resilient (Ring 1996), where mistakes and 
conflicts are dealt with over time and unmet expectations can be dealt with 
by actions to rectify a situation in good faith.  
3.8.5 Trust breakdown 
Trust does not only grow, but can also break down. In fact, trust is easier to 
destroy than to create (Slovic 2000). As argued above, trust is built slowly 
(Ouchi 1980, Madhok 1995). Lewicki and Bunker (1996) argue that the 
breakdown of trust can be immediate and severe after a violation, 
eliminating all trust. Alternatively, trust can also erode over time, more 
gradually.  
 
Lewicki and Bunker state that trust violation at the calculus-based trust phase 
may create a cognitive and emotional reaction, but may also be regarded as 
fairly inconsequential. The trustor calculates the risk of the actions of the 
violator to the project, before deciding on a course of action: to continue the 
relationship, renegotiate or abort. 
 
In the subsequent stages, however, the feeling of loss and anger may be 
more extreme. In the period when trust is based on knowledge: being able 
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to predict behaviour and coming to respect capacities, a violation of trust can 
result in bewilderment, a reaction such as ‘I do not know you anymore’ (p. 
127). The trustor will have to reassess his/her perception of the violator. 
Additionally, if the violation is by choice (versus, for instance, that the 
violator has been forced to take a particular action by a boss), then the 
trustor is more apt to experience trust erosion.  
 
In the final phase of trust growth, trust may be harder to break. A partner 
may be willing to give the violator the benefit of the doubt when he or she 
makes a mistake. Once someone has reached the identification level, it is 
harder to believe that a violation has occurred. On the other hand, as the 
violation goes against what is now the shared identity of the group, it also 
goes against the common interests of the group. This will cause a sense of 
moral violation.  
 
Finally, its influence on trust will depend a great deal on the magnitude of 
the violation or how many times the violation has occurred. Something large, 
such as syphoning large sums of money out of the accounts, may require time 
to identify, accept and prove, but once proven will break trust. On the other 
hand something smaller, such as a repetitive inability to submit reports on 
time, will not put trust in such jeopardy. If it is a competence issue, this will 
most probably effect the competence aspect of trust and not the goodwill 
dimension. 
3.8.6 Completing one stage to get to the next3 
Lewicki and Bunker (1998) propose that trust develops incrementally as 
partners move from one stage to the next. They also argue that certain 
elements are crucial to the evolution that takes place: 
 
First, trust evolves and changes as part of a long-term relationship. If the 
relationship develops to full maturity, then it moves from a relationship 
characterized by trust based on calculus, to one characterized by trust based 
on knowledge, and finally, by trust based on shared identity. Not all 
relationships develop to the third stage and trust may not develop beyond 
the first or second stage. 
 
Second, relationship building begins with the development of calculus types 
of activities. If these activities develop in a manner that confirms the validity 
of the trust (i.e. the other party is consistent, and deterrence is not 
3 This section is taken, to a great extent, directly from Lewicki and Bunker (1998: 124) 
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frequently required), the parties will begin to develop a knowledge of the 
other’s needs, preferences and priorities. This information creates the 
foundation for a transition to trust based on knowledge and occurs at point 
J1 in the figure below. Still, partners may not move to the next stage and 
beyond calculus-based trust if 
 
1. the relationship does not require continued interaction beyond an arm’s-
length relationship,  
2. the interdependence between parties is heavily bounded or regulated,  
3. the partners have gathered sufficient information on each other to know 
that additional information gathering is unnecessary or unproductive, 
and 
4. one or more violations of calculus-based trust has occurred. 
 
Figure ϯ-ϭ͗dŚĞƚƌƵƐƚĐǇĐůĞ 
 
Adapted from Teisman (2000) and Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
 
Third, for the move from trust based on knowledge to trust based on identity 
(at J2), partners have to further engage in activities that confirm behavioural 
predictability to ensure that parties come to identify strongly with other’s 
needs, preferences and priorities, to the point that they see them as their 
own. Shared identity leads to a search for more information, a deepening of 
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the relationship, which creates a broader foundation for trust based on 
knowledge and on a common identity. Lewicki and Bunker (1998) contend 
that some relationships make it to the second stage, though fewer reach the 
third stage. This might be for several reasons: for one, there may be no need 
or desire to continue the relationship or parties have limited energy or 
resources to invest in continuing. 
3.8.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, trust is dynamic: it needs time to grow and is a result of 
personal or situational factors. The theory calls these factors the ‘bases’ of 
trust or the ‘antecedents’ of trust. The factors that contribute to trust growth 
will change over time; theory categorizes them as (1) calculative bases of 
trust, (2) knowledge bases of trust, and (3) identification bases of trust. Trust 
is assumed to be ‘stronger’ as time goes on as a result of these factors, and 
in the face of increasing risk, will be more difficult to break! With time, trust 
will grow in the form of a trust cycle. The research will use the model above 
to analyse the growth of trust and the factors of trust in the three cases. 
 
Lewicki and Bunker’s model looks at trust as a dependent variable, at trust 
growth and the factors that contribute to this. It also incorporates the idea 
of time, for the partners to interact over the rounds of the partnership. 
However, this research also incorporates trust as an independent variable; it 
introduces the notion that trust influences the risk and outcomes as 
perceived by the partners and actors in the PPP. The model assumes that 
actors will develop perceptions of outcomes and levels of risks at important 
moments of change, such as at the end of rounds, when the stakes, the actors 
and the nature of the interaction change. 
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4 Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to operationalize the analytic framework that 
came out of the two literature review chapters on PPPs and trust. This 
chapter will describe the research design and questions, the participants in 
the research, as well as the approach used to data collection and analysis in 
the research. 
4.2 Research design 
The research analyses the interaction between partners and charts the 
process of trust build-up (or breakdown) between partners over the length 
of the PPP, in the form of a ‘trust cycle’. It assesses whether trust can be 
linked to positive outcomes and the reduction in the perception of risk on 
the part of the partners. It also analyses whether partners are willing to take 
more risk in circumstances when trust is present and outcomes are positive. 
It explores the limits of trust, in the cases in which trust was not sufficient to 
offset the perceptions of risk. It analyses the factors that contribute to trust 
build-up (or breakdown) and concludes on the key factors present in the 
cases and most prevalent in building strong and resilient trust. 
 
The research takes an exploratory and explanatory approach, combining 
theories on partnerships and risk and trust with information from a series of 
case studies. To be able to generalize results this research took care to make 
the research design valid and verifiable, and reliable.  
 
 Valid and verifiable: that what is concluded on the basis of findings is 
correct and can be verified by the researcher and by others (Kumar 
1999, Yin 2003). 
 Reliability: showing that the structuring and execution of the research 
could be repeated with the same results (Yin 2003). 
 
ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ involves establishing the right kind of measures for the 
concepts being studied. Yin (2003) argues that in a multiple case study 
strategy, which deals with a contemporary set of events over which the 
researcher has no control, the validity of measures must rely on multiple 
sources of evidence, which come together in a triangulation fashion and are 
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based on propositions to guide the research. The overall design of this 
research incorporated three case studies, from which analytic generalization 
could occur and which used embedded qualitative designs: document and 
archival analysis, semi-structured interviews, observations and a 
questionnaire to ‘quantify’ the values of the variables as instruments of 
analysis4.  
 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂů ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ involves establishing a causal relationship, i.e. certain 
conditions or factors lead to other conditions or outcomes, whereby it can 
be demonstrated that these are not the results of other variables (Yin 2003). 
In this research, internal validity was dealt with by using theoretical 
propositions to shape the data collection plan, and by addressing rival 
explanations. In addition, the research used a causal process tracing 
approach to trace the links between causes and perceived outcomes, to 
develop storylines and identify critical moments/turning points in the 
interaction (George and Bennett 2005, Blatter and Haverland 2012), using 
multiple sources of data. 
 
ǆƚĞƌŶĂůǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ involves establishing the domain where the results of the 
study can be generalized, i.e. can the results of one case study on 
partnerships be generalized to another? As stated in Yin (2003: 37) this 
research used ‘analytic generalization’ comparing theory to the empirical 
results, and when the results of two or more cases supported the theory 
were able to claim replication (33). The results were generalized to a broader 
theory.  
 
ZĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ: measures to ensure elimination of bias in the research. 
Procedures for the design of the research were described in a case study 
protocol and used during data collection. 
 
The ƵŶŝƚŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ was the interaction process between partners and other 
key actors. The study used the Rounds Model of Teisman (2000), and 
analysed the perceptions and decisions made in each round. 
4 WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞ: The questionnaire and its results were used to clarify and verify the 
results of interviews and information provided by respondents in each case on their 
perceptions. The response rate remained low. Though the graphs and table is this 
chapter provide a ‘quantification’ of trust levels (looking at the averages of 
responses), perception of risks, and outcomes, the analysis remains a qualitative 
assessment of the value of these variables.  
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In this research, being able to assess whether trust was built over time and if 
there was evidence of a trust cycle required looking at an interaction of 
different actors in the framework of a partnership over a period of time. The 
research chose to look at long-term projects in depth. The research selected 
projects in different international contexts to see if these contexts made a 
difference to the build-up of trust in a trust cycle. This was the premise of the 
research and important for the design of the research: this justifies the 
choice of case studies as a research methodology. 
 
Care had to be taken to be clear on time boundaries. The start and end date 
of the project and the partnership were in some cases different. Partners 
varied across rounds and had different perceptions of the actual timing of 
the partnership.  
 
Some authors argue that is important to look at the existence of trust at the 
individual, interpersonal as well as the organizational level, but this research 
assumed that individual perceptions of issues in the partnership were 
derived from the perspective of the organization, and that individuals act as 
representatives of their organizations in making choices. Das and Teng (2001) 
state that though trust relations occur at the interpersonal level, partners in 
an alliance are still role bound and trust is based on organizational norms, 
despite personal feelings. There are arguments to support this: Rousseau 
(1998) argues that interorganizational trust and interpersonal trust differ 
because the focal object differs. Therefore, this research presumed that the 
perception of the partners represented the norms of the organization for 
which they work. 
 
/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞ͗ the research ‘positions’ the PPP in a broader network 
of actors. Due to the complexity of urban regeneration partnerships, the 
research looked primarily at the interaction between contractual partners, 
but also between actors external to the PPP structure or organization, ĂƐŬĞǇ
͚ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ͛ŝŶ this interaction. These more ‘peripheral’ actors were actors that 
were involved in the project, the interaction and used strategies to produce 
outcomes (see section 4.5.2 below on participants). The PPP was, in fact, a 
͚ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ͛ used to highlight this interaction and allowed the research to focus 
on complex decision making in the network. The PPP is also a vehicle for 
analysing trust relations, as the research chose to look at trust building in 
long-term, durable and interdependent relationships.  
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4.3 Research questions 
The main research question of this research is:  
 
Is there evidence of a trust cycle in partnerships and does trust have an 
influence on risks and outcomes as perceived by the partners?  
 
More specific research questions are as follows: 
 
 What was the nature of the interaction between partners and other 
actors during the partnership processes, over the rounds, in the three 
cases? 
 What was the nature of outcomes and risk as perceived by the partners 
and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What were the dynamics of the growth of trust over time as perceived 
by the partners and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What important factors led to the growth of trust?  
 Did trust have an influence on risk and the outcomes achieved, and if 
so, what kind? 
4.4 Approach to data collection 
This section provides information on the instruments used and how data was 
collected. 
4.4.1 The instruments 
As stated above, the following instruments were used in this research: case 
study protocol, document and archival analysis, semi-structured interviews, 
observations, a questionnaire/survey as instruments of analysis. The 
following sections looks at how each instrument was designed and executed. 
Case study protocol and pilot case study 
The researcher designed a case study protocol for the case study work and 
undertook an initial pilot case study. This was done to enhance the validity 
and reliability of the research. This initial pilot case study protocol focused 
ŽŶĂĐĂƐĞ͕ŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͕ŝŶ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŶ͕WŽůĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůŽĐĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
explicitly started to pursue private sector participation in inner city projects 
in the early 1990s. Very forward thinking and enamoured with the idea of a 
Public-Private Partnership (new at that time in Poland), and convinced that 
partnership relations could bring a series of benefits to  the city, several local 
officials passed through different phases of looking for the right partner(s), 
ϴϮ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 115
finally ending up joining forces with a consortium of an American investment 
company (ARS) and a local developer, in a joint renovation company. 
 
The case study protocol was tested during the collection of data for the pilot 
case. Upon completion of the pilot case, adjustments were made and the 
protocol was used as a guide for the subsequent two cases. 
Document and archival analysis  
Information on the process of interaction, the role of the partners and other 
actors, as well as their strategies were important to the research. As a first 
step, it was important to gather information on the activities and events that 
took place in the partnership process. It was also of essence to try to pin 
down the time span of the process and the key decision points and rounds. 
The major sources of information were documents put together by the key 
partners as part of the formal partnership, as well as newspapers, other 
publications and the Internet, to cover the involvement of peripheral parties 
and to get an initial idea of their strategies and points of view. 
 
Document and archival analysis were essential to identify who the key 
players were and to verify their involvement over time. The document survey 
and analysis gave a view of the process, what transpired, what key events 
took place, and who was involved and when, what issues where faced and 
what the outcomes were, so that an initial write up of the process could 
occur, and was ready before the interviews began. This approach was taken 
to ensure that interviewing time could focus on key questions and the 
researcher was well informed prior to the start. 
Interviews 
Interviews were held with project partners and other key peripheral 
partners. Interviews were held with professionals from each of the partner 
organizations: i.e. politicians at various levels of government, members of 
the team on the public side, as well as members of the team on the private 
side, and from larger actor groups, such as the community. Determining who 
key individuals were and the precise time of their involvement occurred 
during the document analysis phase (see above) and during subsequent 
interviews. Interviews were semi-structured, with a mixture of questions to 
verify events that took place during the process and the strategies that 
partners used, and a set of open-ended questions to ascertain the 
perceptions of trust, the growth of trust, factors of trust, perception of risks 
and outcomes of the process. Care was taken to ascertain the sequencing of 
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events and strategies per round, so as to be able to link the growth of trust 
to strategies, risks and outcomes, as well as a variety of other factors.  
 
Note: interviews were recorded and are available, if necessary. 
Questionnaires 
As part of the triangulation process, the research verified the information 
from the interviews through the execution of a short questionnaire (see 
Annex 1: Example of a questionnaire). The questionnaire asked respondents 
(contractual partners and peripheral actors) in the case studies to ‘quantify’ 
the value of trust and to rate outcomes. The number of respondents was low 
and did not allow for a true quantitative assessment or the chance to look 
for hard correlations. The questionnaire used written statements to measure 
the value of trust ‘more rigorously’. Respondents were asked to provide a 
numerical assessment of the levels of trust in other parties and the change 
in trust levels over the rounds. Coupled with the information from the 
interviews, this served to better define the nature of trust and levels of trust 
at particular time in the interaction. The results of the questionnaire were 
also used to confirm the oral information on the outcomes mentioned during 
the interviews. This methodology remains a qualitative way to assess trust 
and outcomes as variables.  
 
In the different sections of the questionnaire (please refer to further 
operationalization in section 4.5.4 below), respondents were asked to: 
 
Questions  
YϭĂŶĚϮ Give general background information on the type of institution for which they 
worked and the nature of their involvement in the partnership. This was done 
to identify from which sector they came and to determine if they were a 
key/contractual partner or one of the more peripheral actors. 
Yϯ Score the different dimensions of trust in the different partners, using a 5-
point Likert scale.  
Yϰ Score their overall levels of trust in each of the partners (scale of 1 to 10, 10 
being the highest).  
Yϱ Indicate if trust grew or fell over time (on a 5-point Likert scale: Increased a 
great deal, increased, remained the same, decreased, decreased a great deal). 
Yϲ Score a series of trust-building factors and rate their importance on a 3-point 
Likert scale. 
Yϳ Indicate their perception of outcomes, rating eight different outcomes (on a 5-
point Likert scale). 
Yϴ Indicate the change in the level of trust (scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest) 
over time in the various rounds (they could insert a number or draw a line).  
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4.5 Setting, participants, and case study write up 
4.5.1 Setting 
The research chose three cases: one in Poland, one in the United States and 
one in the Netherlands. In selection of the cases, the criteria for choice were 
the following: 
 International perspective. This was done to be able analyse the 
dynamics of trust in an international perspective and to see if the 
concept was the same in spite of the context. 
 Three projects that started off in situations of high volatility (post-
communist and economic transition in the Polish case, and economic 
and real estate crises in the US and Dutch cases). 
 Three long-term, multifunctional urban regeneration partnerships. 
 Three projects where partners were extremely interested in executing a 
PPP and entering into a long-term interdependent relationship.  
 Three projects/partnerships that were complete and therefore for 
which the research could obtain a full description of the process, 
rounds and outcomes. 
 
In addition, in choosing the cases, the research looked specifically at projects 
that fit into the typology of ‘urban regeneration partnerships’ (third point 
above), namely a ‘development partnership’, as defined in section 2.4. The 
projects were selected, as: 
 They involved a wide range of stakeholders: though the public and 
private sector were the key partners, the community and other 
stakeholders (and their interests) also played a role. 
 The projects focused on multiple goals, involved the resolution of 
complex issues, and were multifaceted. The goal of the partnership was 
to promote a mix of commercial and non-profit development, for 
mutual benefit. 
 
The choice to research and analyse three cases was also explicit. For one, 
more than this number would be too much for in-depth analysis of the 
process and rounds. In addition, three cases were necessary to make cross-
case analyses from which to draw conclusions and to undertake ‘analytic 
generalization’ and claim replication (see above on design). 
4.5.2 Participants 
As stated before, the research identified core partners (the key players) and 
peripheral actors as important participants. Core partners are those formally 
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involved in the process, who interact ‘on the substance and process of the 
project’ (Klijn and Teisman, 2003: 141); they were bound by a signed 
agreement. These were the partners for which trust was the most important 
and in which the most investment was made in the build-up of trust. 
Peripheral actors are those who may have an interest in the process, are 
included in the interaction, but often not on a consistent or systematic basis. 
The research saw peripheral actors as important to the process, as they could 
exercise influence over decisions (for instance, the community over 
politicians, and therefore the public partners). Via this influence, the 
decisions and strategies of the public could influence the outcomes of the 
partnership and the growth of trust. This required looking at the context and 
actors in the wider network, and therefore the use of cases studies. 
 
The previous section on instruments describes the approach to identifying 
the partners and actors to be interviewed. Taking this a bit further, the 
research made a list of formal project partners, as well as groups or 
organizations with an interest in the process and/or the ability/capacity to 
influence the process. Initial results were recorded in a stakeholder analysis 
and grouped under the heading provided below. 
dĂďůĞϰ-ϭ͗ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ;ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĂďůĞͿ 
ĐƚŽƌŐƌŽƵƉ ǆĂŵƉůĞƐ 
People (not organized) People, families 
Non-governmental 
organizations 
Can be supportive to communities, providing professional services 
Tenants associations, associations of house owners, environmental 
pressure groups or other pressure groups 
Community-based 
organizations 
Neighbourhood committees 
Private sector  Formal and informal businesses 
Local government Local government departments, councils and political parties 
represented in the council 
Central /regional 
government  
Agencies from national or provincial level, agricultural 
development agency, inspectorates, environment agencies 
Others  Trade unions 
State-related of parastatal organizations like electricity companies, 
water supply companies 
The information was entered into a table that made note of the actors, their 
characteristics and interests, as well as the nature, intensity and the time of 
involvement. This information was used for the introductory sections of the 
case chapters. 
 
The section below gives some more information of the key aspects of the 
theory and how this was operationalized. 
ϴϲ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 119
4.5.3 Structuring the write up of the case studies 
The research used the Rounds Model (see section 2.5.1 and Figure 2-1) to 
structure the description of the interaction among and the strategies used 
by the key players in the three Public-Private Partnership case studies. The 
interaction was divided into rounds, the strategies of the players resulted in 
outcomes. In the description of the interaction, the ends of rounds came 
when a key decision was made and this caused a change in the content of 
the project, in the actors (contractual partners and peripheral actors) and in 
the stakes being faced. The nature of the decision, the changes and outcomes 
per round were described in each case chapter to highlight the evolution in 
the project and PPP.  
 
 
 
Using triangulation of information (semi-structured interviews, secondary 
documentation, observation and the questionnaire), it was possible to 
outline the activities and strategies of the partners (see also timeline at the 
beginning of each chapter for important moments). Respondents in the 
research themselves helped to define the ends of the Rounds: they were 
asked during the interviews to mention key moments of change. This was 
important to locate activities in time, and to be able to establish the 
relationship between strategies, outcomes and trust, as well as trust and risk. 
 
In each case study chapter, the description of the interaction was followed 
by an analysis of the partnership, structured and sequenced to follow the 
research questions. Each chapter analysed the perception of outcomes, risk, 
trust in each round, looking closely at the change. This was rounded off with 
an analysis of the factors leading to trust build-up and breakdown. The 
results of the questionnaire were used to confirm, from the perception of 
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the respondents, the information gleaned from the interviews and 
documents analysis, and to look for frequencies and causal patterns. 
 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1) for the 
research combined the Rounds Model (Teisman 2000) and the model of 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996). The figure underlines the importance of an 
interaction over time, with key points at the end of the Rounds when it is 
important to ascertain and analyse the perception of outcomes, risk and 
trust. Again, as the respondents themselves helped to define these 
moments, and they attached importance to these moments, it was also 
easier for them to remember key aspects of the interaction at these points 
in time.  
 
The model demonstrates that there are moments when trust grows (J1 and 
J2), becomes stronger and is based on a different set of factors. The model 
attempts to indicate that the shift in trust does not necessarily occur at the 
end of Rounds but might also occur in the middle of a Round. At the bottom, 
the model shows, in sequence, the three key bases of trust used in the 
research (see the next section for further operationalization of the model). 
These factors of trust may change over time, but may also not be aligned in 
time to the end of the Rounds.  
 
 
Adapted from Teisman (2000) and Lewicki and Bunker 1996 
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4.5.4 Theory and operationalization in the questionnaire 
Trust defined and operationalized 
The definition of trust used here distinguished between two clear aspects: 
on the one hand, the perception of the trustee’s capacity or competence, on 
the other, the perception of the trustee’s integrity or goodwill. Both were 
necessary notions when discussing partners in economic exchange and 
partnerships. 
 
Trust was defined as the perception of an actor that another actor will refrain 
from opportunistic behaviour should the opportunity arise and the perception 
of an actor that another actor will have the ability to perform according to 
agreements. 
 
This distinction was important when measuring the perception of 
respondents on the different dimensions of trust. Competence and goodwill 
are key concepts in trust: competence as ‘the expectation of technically 
competent role performance’ (Barber 1983: 14). ‘Goodwill’ (term used by 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) reflects “the expectation that some others in our 
social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate 
a special concern for other’s interests above their own” (Barber 1983: 14). 
These notions led to the definition formulated in this research. 
 
In addition, to open-ended questions in the interviews on the nature of trust 
of respondents in the partners, the research operationalized the theory on 
the dimensions of trust by asking in the questionnaire if the respondent 
perceived that his/her partner: 
dĂďůĞϰ-Ϯ͗ŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
ŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
. . . took the interests of the collaboration/project into account when making a decision? 
. . . would not have met their obligations if their activities had not been defined in the 
contract? 
. . . was capable of completing the project/their obligations according to agreements made? 
. . . committed more (time or personal resources) to the collaboration/project than was 
specified in the contract? 
. . . had, in general, good intentions? 
. . . sometimes did not meet their obligations, but we were willing to give them the benefit 
of the doubt? 
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The factors that contribute to the build-up of trust, how trust develops over 
time 
This research looked at factors that contribute to the build-up of trust and 
categorized them. The production of trust is a result of repeated interaction 
and exchange, and factors will change over time as trust changes and grows.  
 
Trust is dynamic: it needs time to grow and is a result of personal or 
situational factors. The theory calls these factors the ‘bases’ of trust or the 
‘antecedents’ of trust. The factors that contribute to trust growth will change 
over time; theory categorizes them as: (1) calculative bases of trust, (2) 
knowledge bases of trust, and (3) identification bases of trust. Trust is 
assumed to get ‘stronger’ as time goes on as a result of these factors, and in 
the face of increasing risk, will be more difficult to break! With time, trust will 
grow in the form of a trust cycle. 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) propose that trust develops incrementally as 
partners move from one stage to the next. One level of trust in the cycle has 
to be attained to achieve the next and stronger level of trust. 
 
Calculus-based trust 
In the beginning of a relationship, there may be limited information on the 
expertise and goodwill of a partner. The decision to cooperate may be based 
on limited knowledge of a partner’s reputation (i.e. past track record for 
meeting commitments), social similarity or professional credentials. Trust 
(often called calculus-based trust) is limited. Partners will monitor each 
other’s actions and will rely on control mechanisms to govern behaviour. 
Some argue that, in the beginning of a cooperation, trust will follow from the 
stability provided by initial contracts. 
 
Knowledge-based trust 
As the relationship continues, partners will start to have enough information 
to understand each other and to come to be able to predict behaviour. 
Repeated successful exchange will lead to a perception of reliability, and an 
ability to predict what a partner’s interests are and if he/she will act in a 
trustworthy manner. As trust grows, partners will be willing to take more risk, 
and will feel assured that others will support them. Trust is then termed as 
knowledge-based, as it relies on the presence of information about the real 
expertise and goodwill of the partners, which contributes to the build-up of 
trust. Many authors argue this is when emotional ties develop: behaviour will 
not be role prescribed but will be personally motivated by the care and 
ϵϬ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 123
concern for each other. Attention is given to each other’s needs, and help 
and assistance, not directly rewarded, will be given. Trust levels can be 
termed as medium to semi strong. 
 
Identification-based trust 
Relationships and trust can develop further, though authors argue that very 
few partnerships grow to be so close. This is when partners grow to have 
complete empathy with each other and take on each other’s goals and values 
(goal congruence). Partners act as agents for each other. Partners may go so 
far as to take on a collective identity, move to a location closer to each other, 
create joint products or services, or commit to shared values. Trust, called 
identification-based trust, is high. 
 
The table below provides an outline of factors of trust that are argued to 
contribute to the trust build-up (the trust cycle). 
dĂďůĞϰ-ϯ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ͕ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
 
EĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ 
>ĞǀĞůŽĨƌŝƐŬĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ 
ĂƐŝƐͬĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ 
ĂůĐƵůƵƐ-ďĂƐĞĚ
ƚƌƵƐƚ;ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů͕
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞͿ 
new relations  limited risk and 
interdependence  
 Sufficient information on 
other party’s reputation, 
qualifications and past 
performance 
 Penalties stipulated in the 
contract are sufficient to 
ensure the compliance of the 
other party  
<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚ
trust 
;ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů͕ƐŽĐŝĂů
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞͿ 
Increasing 
amount of 
interaction  
Increasing risk 
and 
interdependence  
 Know each other well enough, 
can predict behaviour 
 The other party is willing to 
share information and 
resources 
 Have come to know and 
respect capacities  
/ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ-
ďĂƐĞĚƚƌƵƐƚ 
Longer-term 
interaction  
Large amounts of 
risk and 
interdependence  
 Speak the same language 
 Share the same values and 
norms  
(based on Child 1998 in Lane and Bachmann 1998: 252) 
 
In the semi-structured interviews respondents were asked to identify and 
name the factors that led to trust build-up. In addition, the research asked 
respondents to score the relevance of each of these factors for trust build-
up (or breakdown) in the partnerships. 
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dĂďůĞϰ-ϰ͗KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
 &ĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
CalBase I have to have sufficient information on the other party’s reputation, 
qualifications and past performance record.  
CalBase I have to be confident that the penalties stipulated in the contract are 
sufficient to ensure the compliance of the other party 
KnBase The other party must be willing to share information and resources 
KnBase I must get to know them well enough that I am able to predict their 
behaviour 
KnBase On the basis of the interaction, I come to know and respect their capacities 
IdBase We must learn to ‘speak the same language’ 
IdBase We must come to share the same values and norms 
Determining outcomes 
During the interviews, respondents were asked to define and describe what 
they felt were the key outcomes of the project and partnership. The 
questionnaire further measured eight dimensions of outcomes in the 
partnerships. First, the research simply asked respondents to indicate if they 
were satisfied with the outcomes of the partnership (measured using a 3-
point Likert scale). In addition, as stated in Chapter 2, actors in partnerships 
will often have different goals and so will perceive outcomes in terms of 
whether their goals have been achieved. Measuring outcomes of the 
partnership not only looked at the official goals (‘on paper’) of the 
partnership, but also whether the goals of the organizations for which the 
respondents worked were achieved. 
 
The research also identified benefits argued as outcomes of partnerships and 
operationalized these in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to 
indicate their perceptions on 
 if the partnership resulted in key synergies, for instance better ideas 
and better products, or the decision to make additional investments; 
 if the partnership resulted in improved cooperation and coordination 
between parties and activities; and 
 if the partnership resulted in extra time dedicated to decision making or 
negotiations or in higher transaction costs/unmanageable costs. 
 
Finally, the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate if the partnership 
contributed to an overall positive outcome for the neighbourhood or area in 
which the project was being implemented.  
 
The questions used in the questionnaire are provided below: 
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dĂďůĞϰ-ϱ͗KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
KƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
I am satisfied with the results of the collaboration/project 
The goals of my organization were met by the partnership 
The partnership led to additional investments than would not have occurred if my 
organization had worked alone 
The collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, concepts and plans 
The partnership resulted in the implementation of a project that added to the quality of life 
of the neighbourhood and city 
Working closely together led to improved cooperation between partners 
Working closely together led to improved coordination of project elements 
Working in partnership led to long processes of decision making and additional costs 
Operationalizing risk perceptions 
During the interviews and the recounting of the interaction process, 
respondents were first asked, using open-ended questions, to identify key 
points in the interaction and then to describe their perception of the risks at 
these key points. The research coded these responses and used them to 
execute a frequency assessment of the perception of risks over the rounds 
of the partnerships.  
 
The research operationalized risks very simply, categorizing risk under the 
headings of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ risks. External risks were those that were 
external to the project (risks that the project team could not control, but that 
the government might be able to influence), which would be mostly political 
risks, and economic/market risks related to recessions and real estate 
crashes, and social-cultural factors. Internal risks were those risks that 
related to the project and the PPP.  
 
What was important was to ascertain the perceptions of the risks at different 
moments, meaning risk from the perspective of the actors involved. The 
assumption was that the partners involved would have the skills to assess 
risks and a clear understanding of the risks in the project. In addition, for 
peripheral actors, they would take the role of monitoring the actions of the 
partners, and would be regularly assessing the status and severity of the 
risks. Of interest was to see if there might also be some variance in the 
perceptions of risks across countries. 
 
To be able to ‘quantify’ risk for precisely, risk graphs were constructed using 
coding and a frequency assessment. 
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4.6 Data analysis 
This section describes the process of and approach to the analysis of data 
collected. 
 
As the first step of the data analysis, the research coded the information 
provided in the interviews, using the key variables: outcomes, risks, trust and 
factors of trust. The quotes made by respondents on each of these variables 
were ordered by rounds to ascertain when the perception related to each 
was formed. The research assessed the frequency with which perceptions of 
respondents coincided and differed. 
 
The research wrote up the final description of the rounds and then analysed 
(1) the perceptions of outcomes and influences on strategies per round, as 
portrayed in the interviews. This was done to be able to assess if strategies 
were influenced by the positive (or negative) perception of outcomes; (2) the 
perception of risks and influences on strategies per round, as portrayed in 
the interviews. This was done to be able to assess, under conditions of risk 
or increasing risk, the coping strategies that partners employed; (3) the 
perception of trust and trust growth per round, as portrayed in the 
interviews; and (4) the key factors that led to trust build-up per round, as 
portrayed in the interviews. This was done to assess whether the factors 
mentioned in interviews coincided with the factors described in the theory, 
or if these differed substantially. This was also done to assess if the types of 
factors changed over time (from more calculative to more knowledge-based 
and identification-based factors), as partners got to know each other better. 
 
The research analysed the results of the questionnaire. The results were 
entered in SPSS and coded, SPSS was used to calculate the mean, to cross-
tabulate the results and determine the standard deviation. In the write up of 
the cases, the research used these results to verify and support the results of 
the interviews.  
 
After coding the respondents’ responses concerning types of risks per round, 
the research executed a frequency analysis of the internal and external risks 
perceived and produced figures that portrayed the average change in risk 
perception over the rounds. This approach served to demonstrate change 
and volatility in risk perception over time. 
 
Respondents indicated in the questionnaire their overall assessment of trust 
in each partner/actor. In addition, they indicate their overall level of trust per 
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partner and other key parties over the length of the project, providing a 
rating of 1 to 10 per round. The researcher entered these results into SPSS 
and used them to create an average overall trust rating per partner/actor 
and a figure that portrayed the average change in trust per partner (the trust 
cycle) over the length of project and partnership. The research used these 
figures to analyse the dynamics of trust over time. 
 
Of note in the analysis were certain aspects that influenced results: 
 When assessing levels of trust, respondents were often shy to rate their 
own organizations5; this often skewed the results.  
 Peripheral actors were often unwilling to provide trust ratings, feeling 
that this was difficult to gauge. In addition, core partners were often 
unwilling to provide trust ratings for peripheral actors, stating that ‘they 
did not know them well enough’ to be able to assess levels of trust. This 
also affected the results of the analysis. This also implied, in particular 
related to trust, that the number of respondents were sometime lower 
than expected. Respondents were ultimately more comfortable scoring 
levels of trust in the partners with which they had most contact. 
 Actors and partners, as assumed in the research design, entered and 
exited the partnership at different times and in different rounds of the 
project. This affected the results of the analysis, in particular the trust 
cycles, when the averages altered depending on the number of people 
entering or exiting the interaction. For instance, in the Dutch case, one 
of the partners scored another very highly, but the average rating 
dipped when they exited the interaction.  
 
These conditions were of particular importance for assessment of variables 
over time, namely perceptions of risk and trust. 
 
Finally, the research analysed the influence of trust on outcomes, the 
influence of trust on the perception of risk and the willingness of the partners 
to take risk. This was done, by first creating a master overview, for each case, 
of the rounds, perception of outcomes, risks and trust, and factors of trust 
per round (and per partner/actor). These results were analysed to see if, for 
instance, when outcomes were positive, what strategies partners employed 
and whether trust rose. In addition, the research analysed the reverse: when 
outcomes were negative, what strategies partners employed and if trust 
levels dipped.  
 
5 This was done to ascertain if ‘membership’ in an organization influenced trust levels. 
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The same was done for the links between risk and trust. The research 
assessed if when trust rose, whether the perception of risk lowered. More 
importantly, in the presence of high and rising risk, if trust continued to grow, 
or, in conditions of high trust, if partners were willing to take on more risk. 
One key aspect of interest was the point at which trust had its limits and 
when it was not sufficient to offset the perception of risk and partners had 
to put a stop to the relationship. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methods used in designing and executing the 
research. It expanded on the theoretical trust cycle model of Lewicki and 
Bunker, operationalized factors that lead trust build-up (the antecedents, 
trust as dependent variable), as well as the outcomes and the changes in the 
perceptions of risk resulting from that trust (trust as an independent 
variable); linking these to the rounds of the interaction and the trust cycle.  
 
The next three chapters introduce and analyse the three case studies. The 
cases are structured in a manner to follow and respond to the research 
questions; each case then rounds off with conclusions that highlight, per 
research question, the key points that emerge. The empirical evidence 
provides the basis for the final chapter that compares and contrasts the 
results from the cases and, again, draws final conclusions for the research.  
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5 The ogusųawa Street Partnership, 
Szczecin, Poland 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on a case in Szczecin, Poland where the local 
government explicitly began to pursue private sector participation in inner-
city projects in the early 1990s. The city’s interest was to revitalize focal areas 
of the city after many years of communist rule, lack of investment and 
degradation of the real estate. To make this possible, they set about trying 
to attract foreign private investment to these areas. Over time they became 
interested in the idea of a Public-Private Partnership (new at that time in 
Poland), and convinced that partnership relations could bring a series of 
benefits to projects and to the city. Several local officials passed through 
different phases of looking for the right partner(s) for a key area of the city, 
ƚǁŽǁŚŽůĞĐŝƚǇďůŽĐŬƐ͕ĨĂĐŝŶŐŽŶƚŽŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͘ 
 
dŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƌŬĞĚǁŝƚŚ ƚǁŽ ƐĞƚƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŽŶ ƚŚĞŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ
Street project: the first key partner, Urban Renewal Group Norway (URGN), 
a Norwegian consortium, partnered with the city from October 1991 to the 
termination of the contract in November 1995, when the lack of secure funds 
for the project drove the local government to end the relationship. The 
second partner was an American investment company, American Retail 
Systems, Ltd. (ARS), who submitted a proposal in January 1997, signed a 
contract a year later, and bought shares in the newly established local 
renovation company, Szczecin Renovation Association, Ltd (STR), in May 
1998. When political parties changed in 1999 and the support for the project 
on the part of the city waned, the American partners bought out the city’s 
shares in the renovation company and the partnership ended in November 
1999. STR and the city, in its own renovation company, Szczecin Renovation 
Centre, Ltd (SRC), continued to work separately on the two blocks of the 
Bogusųawa Street project.6  
6 The initial description of the project and the interaction was put together by Z. Becker and 
A. Bongwa and was used as a basis for the description of the interaction in Section II. 
Extensive credit goes to Z. Becker who collected, put together and translated all of the 
documentation for the research. This description was supplemented by information from 
the archive/document research and the structured interviews with the key actors involved in 
the project and the partnership. 
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5.2 Structure of the chapter 
The first section looks at the actors involved in the decision-making process, 
and their interests relative to the partnership and to the project (see Table 
5-1 and Table 5-2). These actors were linked to the project in different ways, 
over different periods. Some had a more central, key role (partners in the 
partnership), others more peripheral, but are still important to the outcome 
of the project. Knowing their roles in the project and their interests is 
important to getting perspective on and background to their perception of 
the risk and trust in the project. The second section describes the process of 
project development, the issues faced and the nature of the interaction 
between partners. The depiction of the project is divided into rounds, each 
of which ends with a key decision point. These important decision points in 
time are moments when key changes occur: namely in the actors, nature of 
interactions, the project content (the programming of the project changes) 
or stakes in the game. At the end of the description of the interaction 
between partners, the results of the research are analysed: the perception 
of outcomes, the perception of the risks per round and the influences of 
these on strategies, the perception of the trust, and the factors that 
contributed to these, ending with the perception of the outcomes of the 
round. 
5.3 Actors on the scene7 
The actors on the scene changed over the different periods of the project. In 
an attempt to capture these changes, the actors are divided into those that 
remained involved over the long term and those whose involvement was 
shorter and in different phases. The table below lists the different actors, 
gives information on the nature of each, and outlines their primary interests 
as related to the project. 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϭ͗ĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ;ϭͿ 
ĐƚŽƌ EĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ 
Those actors present in the 
process over the longer 
term 
  
The City of Szczecin   
The city government of 
Szczecin: the politicians and 
administrators 
The Mayor and Vice Mayor, 
the City Council and the 
City Board. Also 
Better quality of life for the 
citizens, a revitalized 
7 For the sake of anonymity, there is no reference made to the names of respondents in the 
text. 
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departments and sub-
departments of the 
municipality that were 
dedicated to policy 
formulation or planning 
and programming activities 
related to renovation 
centre, attracting investors, 
staying in power 
The Representatives of the 
City in the Negotiation 
Team (Both URGN and ARS 
periods) 
Representatives of the City 
Board, independent 
consultants, city legal 
counsel 
Negotiating the best deal 
for the city 
The Municipal Renovation 
Team (set up in 1992, 
dissolved in 1999) 
Special task force set up to 
coordinate renovation 
issues, help with 
communication with the 
inhabitants of the area 
Put together project 
proposals for approval by 
council 
Stimulating the setup and 
execution of renovation 
projects, improving 
communication between 
the government and 
inhabitants, help to reduce 
resistance, coordination of 
departmental inputs in 
projects 
Tenants of the communal 
flats occupying substandard 
flats facing on the back 
courtyard annexes 
Private households, 
destined to be relocated as 
part of the project 
Better housing and living 
conditions. 
Tenants of the communal 
flats occupying the prime 
flats in front buildings 
Private households , 
destined to be relocated as 
part of the project 
Good living conditions and 
remaining in a key location 
in the inner city 
Private owners of flats Private households, not 
immediately threatened by 
removal 
Good living conditions and, 
a good price for the sale of 
their flats 
Tenant’s Association Organization coordinating 
interests of the tenants 
Improving the living 
conditions of flats for the 
tenants 
Small Businesses (renting 
from the city), represented 
by Secesja 
Shop owners in the two 
blocks who rented their 
spaces from the city at very 
low, favourable rate, their 
rental agreements were 
signed with a municipal 
department 
Stopping imminent 
removal, having the 
opportunity to buy if 
provided, but not at market 
rates, having their interests 
heard 
Private (owners) businesses Private shop owners, with 
significant security, on the 
ground floor 
Minimizing interruption of 
business activity during the 
renovations 
Business associations, i.e. 
Secesja 
Private associations, 
economic activities 
Protecting the interests of 
local businesses and 
stimulating economic 
growth 
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Local consultants Local university staff, 
architects, etc. 
Providing services to the 
project at a fee, building a 
reputation 
The media Local newspapers, Local TV Making the latest 
information on the project 
available, interests varied; 
there were a variety of 
agendas stimulated by 
post-communist ideological 
perspectives. 
 
The actors mentioned above were involved consistently, but with different 
levels of intensity over the length of the project. The City Board and the city 
representatives in the Negotiating Team were the professionals with whom 
private partners had the most contact, in both the URGN and ARS 
partnerships. To a great extent, the composition of these two bodies 
remained the same; effectively implying a nine-year commitment to the 
project and a working relationship built around attempting to get the 
partnership off the ground. The MRT and different groups of tenants were 
also involved over the same period of time. Though they did not participate 
in decision making, the tenants lobbied the city (and the MRT) on issues they 
felt were important and the MRT worked to provide information and support 
services to the tenants. Their involvement was fundamental to the 
partnership(s). 
 
The table below shows actors and partners whose involvement was more 
short-term or sporadic. 
dĂďůĞϱ-Ϯ͗ĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ;ϮͿ 
ĐƚŽƌ EĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ 
WƌĞhZ'E   
World Bank Housing 
Finance Component (Int’l.) 
International donor Receiving bankable 
proposals, aiding cities with 
development issues, with 
construction and mortgage 
loans, encouraging private 
sector involvement  
URGN period   
Urban Renewal Group 
Norway (URGN) 
Private investor, Norway’s 
second largest 
construction company, 
Veidekke A/S and a 
Norwegian consulting 
firm, OPUS Bergen A/S 
that specialized in housing 
Providing development 
support, revitalizing the city 
centre, developing a 
bankable project, 
‘combining commercial 
viability with social 
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policy and project 
development. 
responsibility’,8 satisfying 
the priorities of their 
investors 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
International donor Supporting large-scale 
projects and local 
governments doing 
development projects 
Polish Ministry for Planning 
and Physical Construction 
National ministry Funding national housing 
programmes 
^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝĞ
WƌǌĞĚƐŝħďŝŽƌƐƚǁŽ
Budownictwa 
WƌǌĞŵǇƐųŽǁĞŐŽ;^WWͿ 
a large, domestic 
construction company 
Developing a bankable 
project, cornering the 
market for construction in 
renewal, short-term profit 
PBKS  Polish commercial bank 
with Headquarters in 
Szczecin 
Making a profit, growing 
ARS period   
CivilEng  a local consulting 
company, linked to local 
banks 
Being selected by the city to 
develop the project, making 
a profit 
American Retail Systems 
(ARS),  
an American Investor, 
linked to a local contractor 
Being selected by the city to 
develop the project, making 
a profit 
City representatives in the 
Supervisory Board of STR 
(two public members) 
Renovation company, 
deputy director was 
representative of the local 
government in the 
partnership 
Representing the point of 
view of the City Council in 
negotiations with ARS, 
protecting the interests of 
the city, maintaining status 
quo in relations with 
politicians. 
ARS representatives in the 
Management Board and 
Supervisory Board of 
^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝĞdŽǁĂƌǌǇƐƚǁŽ
Renowacyjne or Szczecin 
Renovation Association 
(STR) 
Renovation company, ARS 
represented the private 
interests in the MB and 
the SB 
Creating a ‘new heart in the 
city’, building up a vibrant 
neighbourhood that would 
attract investment and 
would be competitive in a 
growing market, running an 
efficient company, 
minimizing risk, making a 
profit, pleasing their 
investors 
Assorted banks Local and national banks Financing viable projects 
 
Of the private actors, URGN and ARS played the most central roles in two 
phases of a partnership with the City of Szczecin (CoS). The remainder are 
mostly potential investors, who played a role for a short time and, for the 
8 URGN Basic assumption and cashflow analysis, May 1994 
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most part, left the scene when the project was perceived as being too risky. 
Still their involvement was important, as their funds were crucial to the 
viability and feasibility of the project. The actors as part of STR (the 
partnership company set up for the purpose of executing the project) are 
mentioned separately as they are regarded as a separate entity, with 
potentially separate interests. 
 
Besides these actors, various experts, sociologists and research organizations 
participated by providing opinions that contributed to decisions made in the 
renewal process. In terms of the partnership, they are considered to have 
been essential in helping both the public and private partners in forming their 
opinions, but to have had minimal impact on the outcomes of the project. 
 
The two tables give a snapshot view of the interests of different actor groups. 
Clearly, the interests of each group are more complex than what is provided 
in the table and also changed over time. For one, many of the respondents 
interviewed belonged to more than one group, and ‘wore more than one 
hat’. They were often challenged, when it came to the project, with trying to 
differentiate between their personal, political and professional interests. In 
addition, public sector actors were often accountable to different groups and 
therefore had different and conflicting interests to take into account. For 
instance, when interviewing respondents, there was often an evident conflict 
between the desire to promote better quality of life for the citizens and the 
need to placate political interests within lobby groups with more specific 
interests. 
 
This complexity of interests implies that it was very difficult to categorize 
groups, as within one group there might be different interests. One good 
example is the tenants of the ŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͕ǁŚŽĂƚĨŝƌƐƚƐŝŐŚƚƐĞĞŵĞĚ
one group, but on second sight had clearly diverging interests and so had to 
be placed in separate groups. Distinguishing additional groups was not 
possible or realistic; for instance, within the small merchants, though there 
were two factions that disagreed on how to approach their concerns, there 
was one clear overriding concern that held them together. 
5.3.1 Conclusion 
The interests as portrayed begin to give an idea about what motivated 
different actors to employ particular strategies during the partnership(s). 
However, the tables do not give an impression of the change in these 
interests (or stakes) over time, as well as the intensity and nature of 
interaction between actors over the length of the project, as a basis for 
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understanding how actors perceived the levels of risk and trust in the 
partnerships. The next section portrays these aspects of the partnerships, 
first in a table and then in a description of the interaction and the unfolding 
of events. 
5.4 The process 
5.4.1 Overview of project URGN period: key decisions 
points, change in actors, stakes and content 
(URGN) 
Before starting with a description of the interaction, the table below provides 
a snapshot view of the City-URGN partnership and identifies moments when 
key decisions were made that brought about a change in actors, the stakes 
or the content of the project. It highlights per round, the key and peripheral 
actors, the intensity and nature of their interaction, crucial decisions taken, 
as well the evolution of the stakes. 
 
The URGN partnership period is divided into four decision-making rounds. 
The first, the Opening Game (1990-1992), is the period when the city of 
Szczecin explores attracting investors for the project, is approached by URGN 
and finally decides to go with and begin intensive negotiations with the 
Norwegian consortium. This round is characterized by regular and intense 
discussions of the partners on mutual interests and potentially financially, 
technically and socially acceptable solutions. This round is also characterized 
by interaction between the local government and the 
commercial/residential tenants of the flats on the topic of relocation: the 
interaction is highly acrimonious. The second period (1992-1993) is 
characterized by the partners working out solutions in detail and is concluded 
with both parties deciding to sign a contract, which requires URGN to build 
the project in five years. Interaction with the tenants is intense, as is the 
continued conflict regarding what is to happen with their premises. The 
following round (1993-1995) is a period of waiting in expectation (the 
tenants are also quiet, as they wait) while URGN searches for funding and the 
project start is delayed. When the EBRD funding finally falls through, the 
partners take stock and the city decides to sever relations with URGN. During 
the final period, ESPEBEPE is the only key player interacting with the 
government: when the contractor is not able to make headway with the 
project, the city decides to put an end to the relationship, and to consider 
different models for development of the project, one of which is attracting 
another partner. dĂďůĞϱ-ϯ provides an overview of the four rounds and their 
key features.  
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The following sections describe the nature of interaction between the parties 
in the partnership(s) and the strategies employed, beginning with the 
interaction between the local government of Szczecin, URGN and other local 
actors. For clarity, the interaction is broken down into the separate rounds. 
At the completion of the description of each of the rounds, the research 
highlights the key decisions taken that result in a change in actors, stakes and 
project content. 
5.4.2 Background9 
As far back as the 1960s, revitalization of the historical areas of the City of 
Szczecin was seen as an issue by the then communist city government. In 
1987, the local government decided to organize an international 
architectural competition to generate concepts concerning the renovation of 
the city’s central area. The choice of the site was somewhat arbitrary, as the 
competition was intended to provide a general concept of an approach to be 
taken on a wider scale in the city. Before the city could put the competition 
to use, the revolution of 1989 brought a new era to Poland. National level 
economic reforms, price liberalization and public sector reform, such as the 
transfer of decentralized functions to the local level of government, began 
immediately. In 1990, a new democratically elected local government 
assumed office in Szczecin. With these changes came an influx of 
international donor agencies offering different facilities and services. 
5.4.3 Round 1: The Opening Game (June 1990 – January 
1992) 
The city decided to write a proposal for funding from a donor agency and 
focussed its attention on two blocks (21 and 22) located in the 52 historical 
blocks of Szczecin. The communist legacy had left the area badly in need of 
upgrading and investment. Armed with the results of an architectural 
competition from 1987, the City’s Chief Architect, supported by the 
municipal planning office, applied in June 1990 to the World Bank Housing 
Finance Program (WBHFP)10 for a loan to finance the renovation of the two 
street blocks (5.5 ha of land, historical residential and commercial properties 
in a prime location). Located at the intersection of major roads in the city 
9 The text refers to the ‘city’, meaning the city government, including the city council, the 
local government departments dealing with renovation, the City Board and the City 
Negotiation Team. In many cases, city government officials sat on a number of these bodies. 
Where necessary and pertinent, the text refers to these bodies individually. 
10 The WBHFP is a programme that offers construction and mortgage loans to cities with 
development proposals. 
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centre, these blocks were considered particularly attractive for business and 
housing. Renovation efforts were to be carried out block-by-block and the 
progress of works would be stimulated by the income from the completed 
sections (i.e. a revolving fund). 
 
The city proposed two distinct aspects to the renovation process: 
 Relocating the sitting inhabitants and businesses of the two blocks to 
other flats and locations. This would be done in phases; the vacated 
portions would then be ready for renovation. Initially, 50 flats for 
relocated tenants were to be found in the existing stock, 60 more were 
to be built over two years. As a start, this number of replacement flats 
would provide for relocation of the tenants from three buildings in 
Block 21. 
 Renovation and redevelopment of the two blocks, and the subsequent 
sale or lease of the properties. The construction would entail some 
demolition, mostly in the interior courtyards, upgrading and redesign of 
the residential and commercial areas. 
 
The city proposed accessing existing and new replacement housing (RH) by 
using swaps: (1) tenants could contribute flats to the city as payment for the 
purchase of land or ground-floor commercial spaces; (2) new residential 
developments could acquire additional land from the city in exchange for 
making units in the developments available for relocated tenants. In 
addition, the city also planned to finance the construction of additional new 
replacement housing. Resources to kick off the project were to come from 
sale of a portion of the inner city housing stock as well as the sale of 
development sites not destined for multifamily housing.11 
 
The proposal to the WBHFP was the municipality’s first attempt to put 
together a development and financial model for the area. It contained the 
general project idea, schedule for the project implementation, the technical 
requirements, detailed cost estimations, proposed sources of funding, 
potential problems in implementing the project and technical assistance 
requirements.  
 
The World Bank rejected the application for a variety of reasons, though it 
gave the municipality the option to resubmit. For one, the proposal was not 
in harmony with the usual project cycle and requirements of the World Bank; 
the Bank did not consider renovation as a priority area at that time. Other 
11Those not up to residential code: inappropriate size/dimensions and accessibility. 
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reasons were that the Bank felt that a risk assessment was missing and that 
the resale prices for the flats was too high given the market for flats. The 
proposal came with one ‘best alternative’; it did not compare different 
scenarios, nor did it provide a risk analysis to assess short-, medium- and 
long-term commercially acceptable returns and market stability. In addition, 
the Bank indicated that it would encourage proposals in which the 
municipality partnered with a private partner to apply for a construction 
loan. The construction loans from the World Bank Housing Finance Program 
could be allocated to private investors, joint ventures etc. (the 100% foreign 
companies excluded). The municipality had not, up to that point, seriously 
investigated this possibility. 
 
While considering the option to resubmit their proposal to the WBHFP, the 
municipality began to explore options for attracting private investors for the 
project. The first interested partner came in the form of the Urban Renewal 
Group Norway (URGN), a Norwegian consortium.12 URGN, in addition to the 
backing of its partner members, came to Poland with financial support of the 
Norwegian government, in the form of the State Guarantee Fund (private 
respondent). In August 1991, URGN commissioned a local consultant, Eureka 
Invest, to perform a feasibility study for the two blocks (private respondent) 
and approached the Mayor of Szczecin, Wladyslaw Lisewski, in October with 
a project proposal (private respondent). The URGN proposed to rehabilitate 
the existing buildings and extend the properties through new construction.  
 
The blocks contained, at that point, retail space on the ground floor and 
approximately 700 flats on the upper floors (the total area of the two blocks 
amounted to 60,000 m2 of floor space). As blocks in central Szczecin had few 
high-end commercial spaces and offices, the project proposed a change in 
the ratio of residential to commercial space, focusing on bringing in more 
revenues from commercial space to increase the viability of the project. The 
project would renovate the existing buildings, provide 275 high-end flats, 
each approximately 100 m2, and 30,000 m2 of commercial space. The 
schematics proposed a mixture of restaurants, shops and offices. The site 
was to be serviced with 250 parking places. To the renovation of the existing 
buildings, new construction would add 750 m2 of new commercial area and 
75 new flats to the two blocks. The project would build 800 new replacement 
12 URGN was comprised of Norway’s second largest construction company, Veidekke A/S 
(with an annual turnover of US$ 570 Million) and a Norwegian consulting firm, OPUS Bergen 
A/S that specialized in housing policy and project development. 
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flats outside the central area to house most of the resident population 
(URGN, Henry Butcher 1994). 
 
Information on the plans of the city was being reported in the local media; 
the local newspapers, in particular, were making a lot of noise about the 
proposed renovation project. The inhabitants of the area became angry to 
find that serious plans were being made concerning their neighbourhood 
(and involving their relocation!) without consultation and their participation. 
There was a growing suspicion on the part of the community of the motives 
of the municipality (residents accused the municipality of being interested to 
sell off the inner city to foreigners), and the press fanned the flames (SL, PMY, 
HVS, newspapers).  
 
In response to public opinion, in October 1991, the Vice Mayor, Piotr Mync, 
established a special team to formulate a policy and strategy to guide the 
renovation process. The Municipal Renovation Team (MRT) was set up to 
develop a comprehensive urban renewal strategy, and to coordinate the 
activities of the municipal department for planning and architecture, the 
investment department, the land and geodesy department, the communal 
housing department and the municipal conservation office – all the 
departments dealing with renewal in the city. The MRT began to draft a 
renovation strategy and to organize activities to communicate with the 
community. A Dutch volunteer from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) joined to support the activities of the Municipal 
Renovation Team. The MRT completed the ‘Renovation Strategy for Szczecin 
Inner City Area’ by the end of the year, which was widely discussed by the 
government and the community in the coming months (Henry Butcher 
Report 1994: 37). 
 
At the same time, as preparation for the project, the city issued a letter to 
the merchants leasing spaces in the blocks, stating that leases would not be 
renewed and that they had three months to vacate the premises. This move 
created such opposition to the city and to the project that the small 
merchants mobilized themselves to set up an NGO, the Social and Economic 
Association Secesja. Secesja was made up of a diverse groups of lawyers, 
accountants, architects, etc. who began to prepare themselves to fight the 
city (tenant). 
 
The Vice Mayor began to engage the new MRT in gathering information and 
consulted often with them on issues the city was facing. The MRT set as its 
priority involving all parties concerned and proposed providing residents and 
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businesses with full information. They also prioritized consulting with parties 
involved in all important decisions during the project design process (for both 
renovation and new replacement housing), and allowing for individual 
households and businesses to personally consult with the MRT on the 
proposed resettlement schemes and other questions (public respondent). 
They also helped the City Board (CB) with preparation for discussions with 
URGN. 
 
Initial negotiations between the city and URGN took place. After a period, 
both parties decided that there were enough complementary interests and 
mutual benefits to warrant formalizing the relationship further. On 28 
January 1992, the City Council approved the preliminary agreement and the 
city and URGN signed a letter of intent (LoI).  
5.4.4 Round 2: Negotiating an acceptable project 
(January 1992 – November 1993) 
The decision to go forward was crucial as it implied that the city decided to 
forego submitting a follow-up proposal to the World Bank or (for now) 
working with any other potential partners on development of the site. The 
stakes and the actors changed as each partner introduced more people into 
their mutual teams and committed substantially more time, investment and 
resources to hammering out the details of the project. The partners began 
negotiations in earnest. The risks began to take on greater importance to 
both sides. 
Change in content 
The content of the project began to take form; the partners began the round 
with the following agreements: 
x URGN agreed to construct 932 replacement flats to house relocated 
inhabitants. The number of flats required was higher than originally 
planned, as it appeared that families were doubling up in flats in the 
blocks and the law required allocating each family a flat as part of 
relocation. 
x The city agreed to take the responsibility to relocate the tenants of 
residential housing in phases, as the RH was completed and as URGN 
was about to start renovation of portions of the blocks.  
x URGN agreed to prepare detailed designs of the properties to be 
renewed.  
x URGN agreed to take on the role of negotiating with the private owners 
of the residential or commercial premises regarding what they might 
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have to face during the renovation process and what they might have 
to contribute if they were to remain; this was necessary, as the city’s 
survey had revealed an unwillingness of private owners to vacate their 
premises. The position of URGN and the city was, however, that for the 
project to be a success, the residential owners in particular would have 
to be vacated; though the retailers could have first right of refusal to 
return to their renovated premises. 
Change in actors 
The intense negotiations to come required both sides to put together a 
working team. The city formed a negotiation team comprised of the Vice 
Mayor, two members of the City Board, the city’s legal counsel and two 
independent consultants (two public respondents). URGN hired Eureka 
Invest to act as its representative, mediator and translator in all matters 
pertaining to the negotiations and development of the project (public and 
private respondents). URGN commissioned a local architect to work with its 
Norwegian architects on working out the details of the design. URGN flew 
the Polish professionals working with the organization to Norway for sessions 
to work out different aspects of the project (private respondent). URGN 
arranged visits with the tenants, commercial and residential, to talk through 
their plans and to gauge support for the venture. URGN came to Szczecin on 
a monthly basis to discuss the progress of project development and the 
negotiations (private respondent). 
 
Two main groups of tenants were actively involved in discussions with the 
city. In addition to Secesja, the Tenants Association for residents of the 
communal flats maintained a consistent dialogue with the city and the MRT 
(tenant). The private owners were less vocal, as they felt their positions were 
more secure.  
The interaction 
Most of the tenants of communal flats seemed willing to move if the city 
could ensure them that the replacement housing was of better quality than 
the conditions in which they currently lived (in cramped quarters and forced 
to use communal toilets) (Henry Butcher Report 1994). The small merchants 
were, on the other hand, a different story. They continued to lobby. Secesja 
was, in fact, able to attract a great deal of attention to their cause and 
ensured that they were interviewed after every public hearing or TV 
interview organized concerning the progress of the renovation (tenant).  
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The volatility of the tenants had an impact. In April 1992, the Vice Mayor 
commissioned a survey of the opinions of the inhabitants of the blocks 
relative to renovation and relocation (Henry Butcher Report 1994). 
Questionnaires were sent out by a sociologist to measure the inhabitants’ 
approval of the undertaking and to define acceptable locations for 
replacement housing. In addition, in the first year of negotiations and after 
experiencing the wrath of the tenants, the Norwegian construction giant and 
50% shareholder in URGN, Veidekke, began to have second thoughts about 
investing in the project and discussions began to take place internally in 
URGN regarding alternative sources of finance. They did not formally 
withdraw until later (see letter 12/94, next round). 
 
The potential loss of funds was a real concern for URGN. In addition, it was 
clear from negotiations that the project had substantial social concerns that 
would have to be resolved to make sure that the project could be a 
commercial success. Thinking that a donor might see this project as an 
interesting test case for urban renewal in Central Europe and a pioneering 
attempt to set up a public private partnership (Henry Butcher report 1994), 
URGN contacted the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) in late 1993 to explore the possibility of obtaining a loan. EBRD sent 
a consultant to perform an analysis of the project; URGN funded the 
execution of the feasibility study (project correspondence, 1994). EBRD 
indicated that they would come to a final decision by June 1994. URGN also 
approached the Polish Ministry for Planning and Physical Construction, and 
the World Bank Housing Finance Program Office in Warsaw to explore the 
possibility of securing mortgage credit for the residential part of the renewal 
project. 
 
URGN also set about attracting a local partner to the project and approached 
a large, domestic construction firm, ESPEBEPE. ESPEBEPE appeared to be a 
sound, potential partner, large enough to be able to manage a project of this 
scale, and listed on the stock exchange. In parallel to its negotiations with the 
city, URGN began negotiating with the Managing Director of ESPEBEPE. The 
Managing Director seemed to share the same vision as URGN and the city, 
and in the early fall of 1993, signed a LoI to take over the construction of the 
RH (private respondent). The construction costs they would bear were to 
constitute their investment to the project; the RH was to be an in-kind 
contribution to the project.  
 
The negotiations with the city lasted just more than two years, when both 
the city and URGN decided that all points and differences had been ironed 
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out to the satisfaction of both partners, and that they should sign the 
contract. On 10 November 1993, the City of Szczecin, represented by Mayor 
Lisewski and Vice Mayor Mync, signed a contract with URGN, represented by 
Mr G. Gunderson, for the renewal of what, at that point, was called ‘the 
Norwegian Blocks’. 
5.4.5 Round 3: Delays during the search for funding 
(November 1993 – December 1995) 
This decision to sign the contract was crucial as the stakes changed for all 
parties. The time for discussion was now over, the project was a reality, and 
it was time for action on the ground. The anticipation on the part of the 
tenants turned into the realization that the project was actually going to take 
place, and that they would have to prepare for relocation. The pressure on 
URGN to deliver increased, also particularly as the finance for the project was 
not yet entirely secured. The content of the project changed as final decisions 
were made about the programme and the phasing of the project. The actors 
and the nature of the interaction changed as those negotiating the deal took 
less of a role, and were replaced by those who would take over the day-to-
day management of the execution of the project. 
Change in content and in stakes 
With the signing of the contract, the final programme agreed upon was: 
Existing usage 
 51,000 m2 flats 
 6,000 m2 commercial space 
After renovation, total 
 26,000 m2 flats  
 34,000 m2 commercial space 
Of which, first phase 
 10,000 m2 flats 
 18,000 m2 commercial space 
 932 replacement flats 
 250 parking places underground 
 PedestrianizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚ;ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚhZ'E - CoS, 1993) 
 
All this was to be financed by URGN and its investors. The project was to last 
five years with a deadline for completion of 31 December 1998. The 
renovated buildings were to remain the property of the city and were to be 
leased to URGN for 18 years, up to 2011. In the meantime, URGN was entitled 
to sell the renovated spaces, and negotiate the terms of the contracts and 
sales (Contract CoS – URGN 1993, Henry Butcher 1994).  
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The renovated properties were to be sold on the market. Whatever the 
market could not bear, i.e. the properties that remained unsold, would be 
rented. The contract contained a proviso that right of first refusal should go 
to the previous tenants of commercial spaces after renovation. However, 
when accepting bids for commercial properties, URGN would not be forced 
to sell below market rates (Contract CoS – URGN 1993).  
 
The contract stipulated that the city was to arrange mortgages as security for 
loans up to 6 million US$ to be taken by URGN to fund replacement housing 
or buildings to be renovated in future stages. In other words, the city agreed 
to act as guarantor and to use the land and buildings as collateral. Should 
URGN default, the city was to have first right of refusal to pay off the loans 
taken out by URGN, prior to the bank taking possession (Contract CoS – 
URGN 1993).  
 
The formula for calculating the city’s share of revenue from rents and sale of 
renovated spaces for the 1st phase was as follows: for the first 70% of the m2, 
the city could claim 5% in rents or from sales proceeds, from the remaining 
30%, 15%. For the entire project, the profit sharing for the CoS was 5% of the 
total assumed sale income: 1 million US$ (Contract CoS – URGN 1993: para 
41, Henry Butcher 1994). 
 
The contract included an addendum, containing a clause stating that both 
parties “. . . understand and accept that the start and implementation of the 
contract depends on hZ'E obtaining a loan from BZD or additional 
financing institutions on terms acceptable for hZ'E” (Supplementary 
statement: clause 4). Both parties signed this joint statement.  
The interaction 
With the signing of the contract, the tenants began to realize that the project 
would in fact take place, and the efforts of Secesja began to wane. The results 
of the study commissioned by the city revealed that 85% of the tenants were 
willing to vacate (Henry Butcher 1994). In December 1993, the MRT opened 
an information centre and began producing quarterly newsletters to 
facilitate communications with the tenants of the project blocks. 
 
In August 1994, the consultants working for the EBRD produced a report to 
assist the EBRD in making a decision on the request for funding. The 
executive summary of the report outlined the conditions for loan finance and 
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concluded by “commending the project and its exponents as a solution with 
both social and financial merits” (Henry Butcher 1994: 5). 
 
The report recommended that “BZD sanction loan finance in respect of this 
project subject to satisfactory finance terms and subject to confirmation as 
to the legal limitations imposed by the agreement vis-à-vis the actual 
proposal made by hZ'E . . . . Wrior to any drawdown of funds, the BZD must 
be satisfied that vacant possession has been obtained at each successive 
Whase/Stage.13 The costs and revenues should be re-analysed for each 
Whase/Stage and, in respect to the retail element a reasonable portion should 
be pre-sold with deposits clearly held in separate accounts from the 
development” (Henry Butcher 1994: 5).  
 
URGN sent an official letter to the CoS on 1 December 1994 summarizing the 
changes in the project structure and finance, and requesting formal changes 
to the contract. The letter confirmed information already communicated 
verbally and, in some cases, in written form to the city. Changes and updates 
of importance are as follows: 
x Confirmation of the fact that Veidekke A/S had decided to sell its shares 
in URGN in the third quarter of 1994. 
x Formal confirmation of the cooperation with ESPEBEPE on the project, 
as a result of a meeting on 28 October 1994, and in the setup of a joint 
company, Center Renowacji Miasto Sp z.o.o (CEREMI), registered 
locally. The date of registration was to be 1 January 1995, 70% of the 
shares to be owned by URGN and 30% by ESPEBEPE (URGN letter 1994: 
3). This alteration in organization structure also implied a change in the 
contract. All contractual rights and obligations were to be transferred 
from URGN to CEREMI. The letter also offered the CoS the opportunity 
to participate as a shareholder in CEREMI. 
x Negotiations with EBRD were still underway. URGN and its partners 
expected a final decision by the Board of the Bank in February or March 
1995. 
x The changes in partners and investors within URGN and the delays that 
this caused in the project required adjustments to the timing of 
construction and in project deadlines. These modifications required the 
formal approval of the city and changes to the contract. 
 
When the New Year arrived, URGN had been preparing for two years to start 
construction and had made little progress. ESPEBEPE had only just started 
13 The project was to have three major stages, each of which was broken down into phases. 
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foundation works for the new replacement flats. The delays developed into 
a political crisis within the City Council (Councillors demanded explanations 
from the Mayor, and there was even a call for a no-confidence vote). The 
Mayor and Vice Mayor survived the crisis but the City Council imposed a strict 
time schedule for the project. 
 
The final agreement with the EBRD came in and the Bank agreed to commit 
24 million US$ to the project. The contract contained a special clause 
stipulating that all major decisions concerning the project had to be 
sanctioned by the Bank. In addition, EBRD made loan finance conditional on 
CEREMI coming up with a capital share of 1 million PLN (approximately 
US$ 200,000 at the time). 
 
During a CEREMI shareholders meeting, at which EBRD was present, it 
became clear that CEREMI could not find the capital injection required by 
EBRD. ESPEBEPE was not willing to invest further in the project. It became 
clear from the meeting that ESPEBEPE’s reticence stemmed from the fact 
that its management, the Management Team and the Managing Director, 
were in complete disagreement on how much to commit to the project. In 
fact, the local contractor had not taken the RH any further and the 
construction was at a complete standstill. In May 1995, CEREMI was 
disbanded (private respondents). By October 1995, it was clear to EBRD that 
the partners were not going to be able to find the additional capital required 
and the Bank decided to withdraw its support.  
 
By the end of 1995, still not much progress had been made, the Mayor and 
the City Council were again faced with another political crisis with tenants, 
the community and the media insisting on explanations and applying 
pressure. In January 1996, the city government was in a precarious position, 
with frustrated tenants, its reputation at risk in the media and a city council 
sensitive to criticism. Given all the problems encountered by the municipality 
in its cooperation with URGN, the city decided to withdraw from the contract 
with URGN and to look for new solutions. 
5.4.6 Round 4: Reconnoitring (January 1996 – December 
1996) 
This decision was a big one. The political pressures had become so great that 
that the city could no longer justify waiting for the URGN consortium, now 
CEREMI, to obtain the funding. The stakes, to subdue political unrest now 
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outweighed the need to find a way to get the project going. It now became 
necessary for the city to plan an exit strategy to be able to save face.  
Change in actors and in content 
As URGN withdrew from project, only ESPEBEPE was left behind. Before 
deciding what to do next, the municipality took a step back, assessed what it 
had learned, and reconsidered its options. In the face of such opposition and 
distrust in the community, the City Board of the CoS looked at a variety of 
scenarios.  
 
 Give up on the project. 
 Develop the project with city funding alone. 
 Try to set up another Public-Private Partnership to carry out the 
development.  
 Fund the construction of replacement housing and sell the vacant flats 
to the highest bidder for renovation. 
Interaction 
The city commissioned a local architecture firm to study the different 
options. The firm proposed opting for option 4: they suggested the city build 
the RH, relocate the tenants in phases, and sell the empty buildings off bit by 
bit to investors.  
 
In the meantime, ESBEPEPE was still interested in cooperating with the 
municipality. It had already made substantial investment in the project that 
it did not want to forgo, i.e. investment in materials and labour on the 
foundation works: This was to be its in-kind contribution to the failed 
consortium with the Norwegians. ESBEPEPE demonstrated its commitment 
by producing for the municipality a stock of prefabricated elements stored 
on site. Although the municipality owned the land for replacement housing, 
ESPEBEPE had a relatively strong negotiating position. It owned the materials 
on site; it could claim already having started the work and seemed ready to 
continue.  
 
Against the suggestion of the local architectural consultant, the city decided 
to develop the project with local partners. The City Board chose to continue 
with ESPEBEPE and PBKS, a local bank. This decision was short lived; in the 
next six months, the local partners had little to show on the ground. The 
tenants of the blocks had completely lost their patience. The partners 
seemed to be spending much of their time in meetings but there was no 
visible construction being done. ESPEBEPE was clearly in too weak a financial 
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position to continue and withdrew from the project (GųŽƐ ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ and 
Kurier ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ 16 October 1996). 
 
In considering how to progress, the city decided to consider the alternative 
of setting up its own renovation company. In addition, the city also decided 
to look at incorporating a newly created Housing Association (‘TBS’ possible 
from June 1996) in construction of the RH and in the development of this 
renovation project, as well as the possibility for attracting another private 
partner for the project. Officials decided to pursue all three options or some 
mixture of the three. This was a key turning point of the city, as it realized 
that there was more than one strategy available, going for a partnership was 
not the only option. Having different alternatives to fall back on seemed to 
be a way to deal with the high political stakes at that moment.  
5.5 Analysis of URGN partnership 
The following sections analyse the interaction between the city, URGN and 
the tenants. The first section looks at the perception of the respondents of 
the outcomes of the rounds of the project and traces the links between these 
perceptions and the strategies chosen. Perceptions of outcomes are also 
presumed to influence perception of risk and trust levels. The section that 
follows analyses the perception of risk over the first four rounds, and its 
influence on strategies. Finally, the last section looks at the levels of trust and 
the factors that led to the build-up and breakdown of trust.  
5.5.1 Perception of outcomes  
Perceptions of outcomes per round 
Round 1 resulted in an initial flush of enthusiasm on the part of the partners. 
Public respondents indicated that they were excited by the analysis of the 
real estate market performed by URGN and by the rosy picture painted in the 
proposal. The city representatives began to realize that the project had 
potential, also as a PPP, and that they had found a partner that seemed to 
share the same ideals and objectives (public respondent). 
It was an important moment when hZ'E came with the idea to do the 
project; and then the realiǌation that we could do the project as a WWW. te 
had a partner with whom we could work . . . and we were optimistic about 
the calculations of the economic effectiveness of the project. (public sector 
respondent) 
URGN was, on the other hand, also enthusiastic to have found a potentially 
feasible project and a local government with whom discussions went well. 
‘then hZ'E finally chose Sǌcǌecin; the project looked like an excellent 
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opportunity. . . hZ'E was enthusiastic to change the character of the area’ 
(private sector respondent MW 241106). Both parties decided to continue 
the relationship. 
 
Perceptions of the tenants were different, as they were angry (in this new 
democratic system) at being faced with removal. This led to resistance to the 
city and to the project. 
In the fall of ’91, we [the tenants renting retail space] received the 
message from the city that we had three months to vacate. Though 
the scale of the project looked interesting, there was no room in the 
vision of the city for small shops on the premises. This approach 
created strong opposition. There was an eruption of emotion at that 
point and a strong tendency to self-organiǌation: the tendency to try 
to do something . . . the feeling was ‘then came democracy and now 
they are kicking us out’. (tenant) 
By the end of the second round, city representatives felt that the prospects 
for the project looked extremely sound. Their sense was that after a fruitful 
period of negotiations, they had signed a well-conceived contract. They had 
found a partner that not only came up with innovative ideas, but also was 
willing to share and allow the city to access its skills and resources.  
There were no bad moments during this phase. te spent the 
negotiations looking for alternatives and solutions and incorporated 
these into the project. . . . hZ'E understood what we wanted and 
persuaded us that the project was realistic . . . [the representative] 
came up with innovative ideas. For instance, he focused a great deal 
on parking as a way of stimulating commercial activities and we 
began to see the economic benefit of parking on the site. (two public 
sector respondents, similar private sector respondent)  
The perception on the private side was that negotiations had taken quite a 
long time (two years), but that issues had been worked out in negotiations, 
also to the satisfaction of the city. There was some concern that financing 
was still uncertain but the private partner was optimistic, looking forward to 
the opportunity of working with ESPEBEPE and the support that EBRD could 
provide, and feeling that a sound partnership had been built with the city 
(public respondents). This feeling of optimism on both sides led to the 
decision to sign the contract. 
 
For the small merchants, there were mixed feelings. They were satisfied that 
they had exercised a certain amount of power through lobbying and getting 
attention in the media. They not only had had success in blocking the city but 
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also in getting officials to listen to their (constructive) proposals. Still, by the 
end of the round, there was frustration with the fact that their resistance lost 
its purpose when the contract was signed and their fate seemed to be sealed. 
te were successful in getting the attention of the media. fter public 
meetings you would always see members of the association involved 
in the interviews. So when politicians came out to the studio, we 
always managed to have discussions with the mayor(s) . . . but it was 
not only protesting and working against them, we also looked for 
forms of involvement . . . te began to feel that the city was giving 
way, first from the pressure of the media, second because the city 
began to see that discussions with us was a good way of channelling 
ideas; this was confirmed by the vice mayor. . . . The city became 
open to our ideas; we signed a letter of intent with the city. If we 
could find an investor, they were open to working with us . . . 
However, when it became clear that the hZ'E project would take 
place, the desire to do something waned. Secesja was dead by the 
end of 1993. (tenant) 
By the end of the third round, however, perceptions of the outcomes were 
quite negative: the results did not meet the expectations created. For both 
public and private respondents there was clear disappointment with the fact 
that there were still no concrete developments on the ground; the realization 
that the project was not going to happen was slow to come.  
Eot much happened after the contract was signed, most of the 
momentum was during the negotiations. then SWBW came there 
was more support for the project, its presence strengthened the 
argumentation for the project. te thought the company would bring 
jobs to Sǌcǌecin. Then when it appeared that CZDI had no money, 
its representatives did not come to the city; they could have had 
access to funds and contacts. They could have renegotiated the 
contract, but nothing happened. The city set a deadline and the 
nothing happened, hZ'E did not try to save the project. The default 
on the contract by the private partner was a bad moment. It was a 
long peaceful agony until the project collapsed. (public respondent) 
This perception led to the city’s decision to sever relations with URGN and its 
partners in CEREMI. 
 
In the final round of the URGN period, ESPEBEPE and the Polish Bank PBKS’s 
failed attempt to resurrect the project resulted in minor additional 
disappointment for the city. The city was already busy considering other 
options.  
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then our partner(s) defaulted on the contract it was an instinctive 
reaction to think of it as a small thing, your focus is more on what will 
happen with the big problem [the project and the political risks]. I 
evaluated this with the mayor and we decided to look at this 
[situation] as a small thing. (public respondent) . . . then it 
collapsed, it was pretty mild. te felt that what we had done was a 
success. There was already an atmosphere of looking for another 
partner. (public respondent) 
Perceptions of outcomes overall 
From the public side, their perspective of the overall outcome of the City-
URGN relationship was surprisingly positive. 
te (the partnership) may not have produced any results, but we (the 
city) did not waste time. te learned a great deal. The relationship 
with hZ'E contributed to the transformation within local 
government of how things were done. The project and what we 
learned contributed to changing the ingrained and traditional 
approach to renovation. (public sector respondent) 
The hZ'E period was a test trial for the following period. During the 
hZ'E period all possible mistakes were made. The project was a test 
field for the city and hZ'E. (public sector respondent) 
The overall positive perception clearly led to the city’s decision to try again. 
Public respondents admitted to feeling wiser in their dealings with ARS and 
to being able to apply the lessons learned. (two public sector respondents) 
 
The reaction from the private side was not so positive . . .  
The project failed on commercial terms. CZDI was too weak, hZ'E 
was too weak, and when CZDI failed the contract with the city was 
void . . . The project failed because of the commercial failure of 
SWBW. hZ'E did not assess SWBW well, but there were really 
no other partners at the time. They were hard to find, though now it 
would not be problem . . . It was a very quick failure when the Bank 
foreclosed . . . hZ'E had vision, to change the city; at the end the city 
had less vision, all it wanted was to renovate houses. hltimately, the 
process was a big failure; the city lost a real chance. (private sector 
respondent) 
From the perspective of the tenants . . .  
Secesja came with good proposal but also contributed to the 
breakdown of the project. The prevailing attitude in Secesja was to 
protect individual interests. Weople became so tied to the location 
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that they did not see the opportunity that change would provide . . . 
[because of the failure of the project] ul. Jagiellonska [street in the 
project] no longer has a competitive position . . . and to give you an 
idea of the level of disagreement and resentment that came out of 
the whole experience, I have only begun to shake hands with some of 
the people in the past two years. On a personal level, I had friends 
that had to move and I lost something in my [political] career. Secesja 
also failed and this has left bad memories. (tenant/city councillor) 
Outcomes: analysis of the results of the questionnaire14 
Perceptions of outcomes were also measured and verified in the 
questionnaire. The results back up the negative perceptions of the project 
and the partnership from the interviews. In the questionnaire the 
respondents were asked to rate the statements made concerning the 
outcomes of the project and the partnership (see Table below) on a scale of 
1 to 5 (1= strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). With regard to the results 
provided below, several respondents felt that as the project never got off the 
ground, it was inappropriate to rate statements regarding the 
implementation of the project. This made it difficult to rate the final three 
statements.  
dĂďůĞϱ-ϰ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ͛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕hZ'EƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
 
  
N Mean 
Valid Missing   
I am satisfied with the results of the collaboration/project 8 0 4.38 
The goals of my organization were met by the partnership 8 0 4.00 
The partnership led to additional investments than would 
not have occurred if my organization had worked alone 
8 0 4.13 
The collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, 
concepts and plans 
8 0 3.13 
The partnership resulted in the implementation of a project 
that added to the quality of life of the neighbourhood and 
city 
4 4 4.00 
Working closely together led to improved coordination of 
project elements 
4 4 3.25 
14 WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞ: The questionnaire and its results were used to clarify and verify the 
results of interviews and information provided by respondents on their perceptions. 
The response rate remained low. Though the graphs and tables in this chapter 
provide a ‘quantification’ of trust levels (looking at the averages of responses), 
perception of risks, and outcomes, the analysis remains a qualitative assessment of 
the value of these variables.  
 
ϭϮϰ | P a g e  
                                                          
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 157
Working in partnership led to long processes of decision 
making and additional costs 
4 4 2.50 
dŽƚĂů   ϯ͘ϳϯ 
N= 8, respondents: 4 public, 2 private, and 2 tenants 
 
The results in the table confirm the overall disappointment with the 
outcomes of the URGN period. Most respondents were not satisfied with the 
results of the collaboration and the project; and they felt that the goals of 
their organizations were not met through the partnership. One of the private 
partners did, however, agree that ‘the goals of my organiǌation were met by 
the partnership’. The reason for this was his perception that the 
project/partnership was on its way to being a success had it not failed on 
commercial terms (see interview above). This type of reaction was common 
in the interviews with the public and private partners: satisfaction (with some 
reservations) with the development of the partnership (relationship) overall, 
but frustration when the project failed to get off the ground. Four (three 
public and one private) out of the eight respondents agreed with the 
statement that ‘the collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, 
concepts and plans’. The responses in the questionnaire are consistent with 
the comments during interviews. The other half disagreed and strongly 
disagreed with the statement (one public, one private and two tenants). Two 
respondents (one public and one private) agreed that that the ‘partnership 
contributed to improving coordination’, though both private sector 
respondents agreed and strongly agreed that the ‘partnership led to long 
processes of decision making and additional costs’. This is also consistent 
with the interviews (see section on risks). 
5.5.2 Perception of the risks and influence on strategies  
The perception of the risks was limited at the beginning but increased over 
time. It is interesting to note when the perception of risk got to be so great 
that (no matter the level of trust) parties were ‘forced’ to end the 
relationship. The perceptions of the outcomes of the project already give 
some indication of the perception of the risk: the analysis of the outcomes 
indicates that risks became too great at the end of the third round for both 
partners to continue. The following section takes a closer look at the trends 
in the perception of the risks during the four rounds of the URGN period. 
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Figure ϱ-ϭ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϭ-ϰ 
 
 
In the first round, the city and URGN perceived few risks, as not much had 
been negotiated or committed. The partners were busy testing out common 
grounds for cooperation. What started as limited interdependence, changed 
as the expectations of the partners started to grow over the rounds. The 
figures below provide a view of the frequency with which certain external 
(political and market) risks (Figure 5-1) and internal (project) risks ( 
Figure 5-2) were mentioned by respondents. The results in the figure indicate 
the moments at which risks were perceived as reflected in the interviews (N 
=9). 
 
Figure ϱ-Ϯ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů;ƉƌŽũĞĐƚͿƌŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϭ-ϰ 
 
 
The first figure emphasizes the political risk from the media and tenants in 
the first two rounds (mentioned by most respondents), risk from insufficient 
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regulations was more a concern of the public sector; the figure also reflects 
the perception of market risk which came later, in the third round (most 
respondents). In the second figure, which refers to project related risks, the 
perception of risk related to potentially having a contract that did not cover 
all contingencies came from the public respondents, the perception of the 
risks related to a faulty project design (creating a feasible and viable project) 
was more of a private concern. Both private (two over the middle two 
rounds) and public sector (two over the middle two rounds) mentioned risks 
of delays (lengthy negotiations, delays in getting the project off the ground). 
These perceptions of risk are reflected in the information below from the 
interviews. 
 
The public partners realized from the start that some political risks were 
present. First, there was the political risk that came with taking on a venture 
of this sort, particularly with a foreign partner, in a nascent democratic 
system. The local government, just coming out of a communist regime, was 
taking steps in uncharted territory: respondents commented that in the 
unstable political and economic climate that existed at that point, the 
potential risks to the local government and the careers of the local politicians 
from the citizens were severe (two public sector respondents). A local 
partnership with a ‘foreigner’ was a first step away from the traditional (safe) 
command and control approach to development (public sector respondent).  
The risk from public opinion at that time was huge. There was 
apprehension among the inhabitants of the sale or transfer of 
property to foreigners. s a matter of fact, in a later mayoral 
election, the candidate used the fear and distrust of foreigners as a 
public platform. He fanned the flames with slogans. te had just 
come from an era of ‘us and them’, the mentality was ingrained . . . 
also at the time the media was still in the hands of the left. te 
received adverse press coverage; this coverage was based on the 
media’s ideological beliefs. (public sector respondent) 
This perception of risk was offset by the interest of the government to 
stimulate Western investment in important projects, resulting in its strategy 
to go for this project. 
 
Though the risk from the opposition of the tenants to the project was 
growing and became substantial by the end of the round (see Figure 5-1), 
respondents admit to a ‘lag’ time in perceiving it as such. The need to develop 
strategies to deal with the risk took on real importance in the next round 
(two public respondents, tenant). 
ϭϮϳ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 160
 
In the second round, the political risk to the city from the resistance of the 
business tenants under rental contracts started to take form. The tenants 
employed a clear strategy because of their perception of the outcomes of the 
previous round; they demonstrated at public functions and undertook 
lobbying. In the early months of 1992, they attempted to set up a referendum 
to call off the city government and were successful in obtaining 20,000 of the 
27,000 signatures required (tenant). This risk to the city was enhanced by the 
visibility of and the reporting on the project in the media.  
 
Respondents described the strategies employed by the city and URGN as a 
reaction to their perception of political risk from the tenants and the attacks 
in the media. The fact that the tenants were organized around the issue of 
relocation, meant that the city was obliged to see them as a worthy 
opponent. The city reacted to the risk by organizing public hearings, the 
survey of public opinion on the project and the setup of the MRT as 
intermediary. URGN, also aware of the political risk, decided it was good 
business and went to talk to the tenants. 
 
Public officials admitted that the city had limited experience with managing 
political risk and that they made mistakes in their choice of strategies. They 
unanimously admitted to responding too slowly and inappropriately, and to 
underestimating the power of the tenants and their strategies (following 
quoted confirmed by multiple sources).  
I feel that at the time we were completely unprepared. te came 
from different disciplines and were not public managers. te were 
administrators, not professionals in public relations; these did not 
exist at the time. te now know that good WZ is more effective than 
meeting with each of the tenants. There was a lack of WZ to support 
the personal meetings (that took place) . . . then we received 
feedback from the opinion survey, we decided to meet with the 
tenants of Blocks 21 and 22. The invitation was sent out by mistake 
to all of the tenants in the city, we almost did not survive the public 
meeting. te then decided to hire in the sociologist. te lost a lot of 
time making up for this mistake. It took months to make up. (public 
sector respondent) 
URGN recognized the political risk, but its primary focus was on the 
‘economic’ risks of the project. This was visible in the organization’s 
negotiation strategy on project design (see Figure 5.2), and the focus of 
discussions on the contract. 
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There were two types of risks. The first was the economic risks:15 was 
the project financially viable? The second types of risks were the 
political/social aspects. Both were amplified by the lack of experience 
of the city and trying to do such a project so soon after transition. To 
try to reduce these risks, we spent more time on the contractual and 
economic aspects than any other aspects. te tried to cover our asses 
in the contract to minimiǌe future risk. (private respondent) 
The Norwegian funders of the URGN venture felt that the political and social 
aspects of the project threatened the viability of the project, and insisted that 
URGN protect itself against this. URGN felt the tension of managing different 
interests (the city’s and the funders) and, in response to the criticism, 
undertook the strategy to approach EBRD for help, an organization that 
representatives felt was better able to manage the risk inherent in the 
project. 
The commercial advisors to hZ'E felt that, in the design of the 
project, we underplayed the economic aspects of the project, and 
overplayed the social aspects. They felt that hZ'E was 
accommodating too great a portion of the social issues in the project. 
They were very critical. Our big challenge was to take the interest of 
the funders into account, while keeping minimum support for the 
project on the part of the city. (private respondent, Henry Butcher 
report 1994) 
URGN’s investors reacted to the political risk by withdrawing early in the 
project. 
The project was often attacked in the press. In a meeting with 
Secesja, the investors got scared; the tenants were doing a lot of 
shouting. This caused siedekke and Eavimar to pull out . . . also, 
outside investors saw the political risk as so great that they were not 
interested in investing in the city. (private respondent) 
There were other types of political risk mentioned, the most relevant to most 
respondents being the legal and regulatory framework for renovation 
projects and PPPs.  This perception of risk resulted in the strategies on the 
part of the city, as mentioned before, to focus on the letter of the law in the 
contract. This excessive concern with the details of the contract implied for 
the members of the URGN team an overly lengthy negotiation that put the 
viability of the project at risk (consistent with the responses in Table 5-4 on 
outcomes and long process of decision making). 
15 Economic risks are seen here as a combination of project design and financial risks. 
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The behaviour of the local government (the Eegotiation Team) during 
the process was to push for and negotiate every small point in the 
contract . . . for hZ'E, the substantial time (a total of two years in 
negotiation) and cost of input made in this period constituted a key 
risk. . . . the City’s Eegotiating Team was also being fed continuous 
demands from within the City Council (and their lobby groups), it 
brought the project closer to collapse. (private respondent, tenant)  
The perception of risks grew in the third round. For one, it became clear over 
time to all parties that there was substantial financial risk in the project, 
funds for construction were not secured and while URGN searched for 
investors, partners waited. All financial risk was placed on URGN.  
ccess to funds was uncertain and the viability of the project was 
therefore in question . . . There was uncertainty if BZD would 
finance the project, and their slow decision-making processes kept 
the city and hZ'E waiting and hoping for a long time . . . SWBW 
looked like they were a good partner; unfortunately they were 
financially unstable . . . their failures in a project elsewhere finally 
brought about their insolvency. (private respondent) 
EBRD perceived the political risks (resistance from the tenants) as substantial 
enough to affect the viability of the project, and EBRD’s interest to invest. It 
went so far as the make the point central in its report. The following is an 
excerpt taken from the EBRD report; several points outline what the bank 
distinguished as key risks to the project. 
“Woint 11: Clearly the delivery of vacant possession of the units is a 
critical first step in the creation of the development opportunity. This 
responsibility lies fairly and squarely with the City of Sǌcǌecin. 
Woint 12: In order to establish the feasibility of clearing out the 
tenants the City has gone through considerable lengths to canvas 
opinions and have involved the residents from an early stage. 
Woint 13: Zesponses to the questionnaires sent out have been 
encouraging under normal statistical circumstances – approximately 
85% – but there has been some limited opposition and there is no 
margin for error. It is critical that the early phases carry guarantees 
of vacant possession and generate profits to be carried as a 
safeguard against failures to deliver later buildings. 
Woint 1ϰ: The legal situation regarding obtaining vacant possession of 
the units should be investigated further prior to commitment to the 
development. 
Woint 15: This should be viewed, perhaps against a lack of 
participation in the risk by the City and adequate safeguards need to 
be obtained. te expect it to be possible to obtain these upon 
confirmation of funding and a fixed timescale for the commencement 
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and delivery of the replacement housing. 
Woint 1ϲ: Owing to the progressive delivery of vacant possession and 
in order to minimiǌe risk, the most profitable sections should be 
undertaken first.” (Henry Butcher 1994: 3) 
These points make reference to a series of risks: those related to the 
feasibility of obtaining vacant possession of the units, the legal framework 
related to ensuring vacancy and to the links between viability and the project 
design/phasing. In addition, reference was made in the report to the 
insufficient participation by the city in the risk related to the tenants, and the 
fact that the private tenants would “be looking for considerable 
compensation for displacement” (Henry Butcher 1994: 102). The strategy 
was to suggest sequencing the project in a manner that would create 
revenues upfront. 
 
The inability of CEREMI to come forward with its financial commitment, 
linked to the political risk, was substantial enough for EBRD to decide to 
withdraw from the project. Though the City’s perception of the financial risk 
was great; the perception of political risk was greater and finally led the 
public team to terminate the partnership (public respondent).  
 
At the end of the third round, the risk to the city became too great, despite 
the positive nature of the relations (see next section on trust), and the 
relationship ended. The perception of the outcomes at that moment 
(nothing concrete on the ground and no funds) was another factor that led 
the city to sever relations. One public official identified the moment at the 
end of the round that the city became clear on the nature of the risk related 
to the function of the contract as a binding document and as the tool for 
providing incentives for performance. 
The contract did not help us to make decisions or to set criteria to 
make decisions (‘. . . if there is no finance in six months, then . . .). te 
looked in this case at how to set up the collaboration and not at how 
to escape if something went wrong. There were insufficient incentives 
to ensure that things were delivered. For instance, the city did not 
require bank guarantees to cover risk. In addition, the contract did 
not define deliverables (critical moments when they had to have bank 
finance). For instance we did not have a commitment from siedekke 
that it would invest in the project or a guarantee from the mother 
company. lso, the >oI gave the developers exclusivity. Eowhere did 
the contract require the developer to pay for exclusivity to do this 
project without competition. In effect we guaranteed them a 
monopoly. Internally we did not have the knowledge required to be 
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able to do this and we could not hire a lawyer from the outside; we 
could not afford the rates for such a consultant. In fact, there were no 
incentives for non-performance at all: i.e. there were no penalty 
clauses in the contract in the case of withdrawal. The presence of the 
(secret)1ϲ clause which stated that the project was dependent on 
parties being able to secure finance, and that both parties entered ‘at 
own risk’ (without assurance of solid finance) now appeared to be an 
ill-conceived agreement. (public sector respondent) 
Respondents indicated that the perception of risk was later translated into a 
different approach to negotiations with ARS (three public sector 
respondents).  
 
In the fourth round, the perception of certain risks still remained: the 
financial risk was still high (now a risk transferred to the city) and the political 
risk related to a failing project as well. This is evident in the strategies of the 
city representatives who continued to communicate with the tenants on the 
status of the project, largely through the MRT.  
 
This was the time as well that there was a growing realization that the market 
for such a large project was perhaps limited, and the market risk high:  
There was huge commercial risk. There was absolutely no proof that 
a retail project would be realistic, would make sense or would repay 
itself. te had absolutely no track record (to prove this). Our basic 
assumptions were very optimistic and there was very, very high risk. 
(public respondent) 
Still most respondents believed the ‘project could have worked if we could 
have just gotten it off the ground . . . we just were not fast enough . . .’ 
(Multiple respondents). This perception was clearly behind the commitment 
on both sides to the project. Later, the perception of market risk influenced 
municipal strategies ‘. . . we started to work with other projects broken down 
into manageable pieces. te gave a chance to smaller local contractors’ 
(public sector respondent).  
 
In conclusion, the perception of the risk of the project was not too great to 
keep the city from pursuing other partnership opportunities; they regarded 
16 One respondent indicated that the clause in the contract indicating that the project was 
dependent on partners finding secure funds was not made known beyond the inner circle in 
the partnership, implying that expectations outside of this circle were that funding was 
secure at the time of signing. The risk of the project seemed minimal, given these 
expectations, whereas it was, in fact, quite high (public sector respondent). 
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these as manageable. In fact, the positive trust relations built with URGN, as 
described in the following section, contributed to the desire to continue the 
project, again in a partnership. 
5.5.3 Perceptions of levels of trust and factors that 
contributed to these  
There is indication from the interviews and the questionnaire that trust was 
strong enough to give the public and private parties good reason to continue 
the relationship in the face of the risk mentioned above, before finally giving 
up. The period between the signing of the contract and the separation was 
two years, a long time to wait and to trust. Both sides concur that, though 
trust was eroding, it was not the lack of trust that brought the partnership to 
an end. Instead, public respondents attribute the breakdown to: (1) the 
political situation that was too volatile to continue, and (2) the fact that the 
private partners were no longer committed to the search for funding. Private 
partners admit to commercial failure being the cause and the results of the 
interviews and questionnaires seem to support this.  
Changes in trust over time 
The following section on trust looks first at the results of the assessment of 
the changes in the levels of trust over the first four rounds; Figure 5-3 shows 
the results from the questionnaires.  
 
The figure provides a view of the average levels of trust in each of the actors 
over rounds 1-4. The trust in the CB/NT and in URGN rose to the end of the 
third round, at which time it dipped. The assumption here is that that trust 
levels in URGN would have been higher had the private respondents been 
willing to rate themselves. The trust in the CC fell consistently over time; the 
trust in the tenants changed little but fell at the end. This is consistent with 
the information provided in the interviews. 
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Figure ϱ-ϯ͗ ŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůs ŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ͕hZ'EƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
 
N = 8: 4 public, 2 private and 2 non-profit. EŽƚĞ͗ Both URGN respondents declined to rate the 
change in trust ‘in themselves’ over time. One public respondent, in line with her responses 
in all other areas of the questionnaire, declined to measure the change in trust in the tenants. 
Overall ratings 
The survey also asked respondents to provide an overall rating of their trust 
in the main actors, on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the highest. Table 5-5 
below provides the average rating per actor. Below that, Table 5-6 also 
provides the average trust ratings, cross tabulated by category of 
respondent. 
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϱ͗dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ;ϭ to ϭϬ͕ ϭϬ ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚͿ͕hZ'EƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
>ĞǀĞůŽĨ
dƌƵƐƚin 
ŝƚǇ
ŽƵŶĐŝů 
ŝƚǇŽĂƌĚͬ
EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ
dĞĂŵ 
hZ'E dŚĞƐŵĂůů
ŵĞƌĐŚĂŶƚ
s 
dŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů
tenants 
dŚĞ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
tenants 
N Valid 8 8 7 7 6 5 
  Missing 0 0 1 1 2 3 
Mean 6.38 7.38 6.71 5.43 5.83 4.40 
N=8: 4 public, 2 private and 2 non-profit 
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Table 5-5 reveals that on average the highest level of trust, during the URGN 
period, was in the city representatives of the City Board/Negotiation Team 
(7.38). There was marginally less trust in URGN (6.71), influenced by the 
marginally lowers numbers from the four public respondents, and the fact 
that, this time, one private respondent abstained (the expectation being that 
the average would have been higher had this respondent assessed his 
organization). The responses pictured in Figure 5-3 and Table 5-5 appear to 
be somewhat consistent, though slightly lower in the figure above. The small 
merchants and other tenants were not subject to high levels of trust, but 
scored moderate ratings, from 4.4 (the private owners) to 5.83 (the 
communal owners).  
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϲ͗ƌŽƐƐƚĂďƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚǇƉĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ͕hZ'E
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
>ĞǀĞůŽĨdƌƵƐƚŝŶ ŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝů 
ŝƚǇŽĂƌĚͬ
EĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ
dĞĂŵ 
hZ'E dŚĞƐŵĂůůŵĞƌĐŚĂŶƚƐ 
dŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů
tenants 
dŚĞ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
tenants 
N Valid 8 8 7 7 6 5 
  Missing 0 0 1 1 2 3 
Public 
respondents 7.5 8.75 7.25 6.33 7.33 6.0 
Private 
respondents 4.5 7.5 10.0 2.0 4.5 2.0 
Non-profit 
respondents 
(Secesja/ 
tenants) 
6.0 4.5 4.0 7.5 4.0 6.0 
 
Public respondents demonstrated high levels of trust in the CC (7.5) and the 
CB (8.75), but also in URGN (7.25), second only to trust in ‘their own kind’. Of 
note is the high trust built in the communal tenants (7.33). Both private 
respondents trusted the CB/NT (7.5) most overall, other than the one private 
respondent’s very high trust in his organization (10). For the rest, private 
respondents demonstrated low to moderate trust in the other actors 
involved in the project. The tenants also trusted ‘their own kind’ the most 
(7.5). 
 
The results indicate that membership in an organization is an important 
factor when measuring trust. The assumption is also that frequency of 
interaction between partners, aspects such as getting to know each other, 
are also factors influencing the trust between the two main partners. The 
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next section looks more closely at the assessment of the bases for trust as 
indicated by the respondents. 
Factors of trust 
Respondents were asked to rate each item from 1 to 3 (1 = very important, 2 
= relevant, 3 = not so important). From the URGN period the average results 
were as follows: 
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϳ͗&ĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ͕hZ'EƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ 
 N Mean 
  Valid Missing   
I must have sufficient information on the other party's 
reputation, qualifications and past performance record. 8 0 1.38 
I have to be confident that the penalties stipulated in the 
contract are sufficient to ensure the compliance of the 
other party 
8 0 2.00 
The other party must be willing to share information and 
resources 8 0 1.25 
I must get to know them well enough that I am able to 
predict their behaviour 8 0 2.00 
On the basis of the interaction, I come to know and respect 
their capacities 8 0 1.75 
We must learn to 'speak the same language’ 8 0 1.25 
We must come to share the same values and norms 8 0 1.88 
dŽƚĂů   ϭ͘ϲϬ 
N = 8: 4 public, 2 private and 2 non-profit 
 
For the respondents, the statements that rated highest related to ‘learning 
to speak the same language’ (1.25, 75% rated as very important, four public, 
one private and one tenant) and to the ‘willingness to share information and 
resources’ (1.25, 75% rated as very important, two public, two private and 
two tenants); the first an interesting response in a partnership where 
communication with translators was an integral part of and of importance to 
overcoming cultural disparities; the second interesting considering the 
difficulties finding funding (see section below for development of this point). 
The next most important was the other party’s reputation, qualifications and 
past performance record (1.38, three public, two tenants rated very 
important). Interviews indicated that in the first round, information was 
provided on the URGN’s credentials and they were perceived to be good. 
Further, there were assurances that the funds would be made available. 
‘seidekke came with letters of interest, indicating an interest to make capital 
investments, [the private consortium] came with proof that built trust. The 
city verified the materials’ (two public respondents).  
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Interesting to note that ‘penalties in the contract’ were, by most, not given a 
high rating (50% rated ‘relevant’, one public, one private and two tenants), 
given the comments in the importance of contractual incentives above. 
Factors that contributed to the build-up of trust  
This section refers to the interviews and the comments made by the 
respondents on the factors that contributed to trust build-up in the first four 
rounds. The information gathered is important in identifying different types 
of factors, confirming the responses in Table 5-7 above and in determining 
how these factors might have contributed to the trust cycle over time.  
Trust between public sector officials and in the public sector partners over the 
rounds 
The figure and tables above indicate that, in the first round, initial trust in the 
public sector was quite high. At the outset of the project, according to both 
public and private respondents, factors that contributed to the build-up of 
trust were the (mutual) openness and frankness with which issues and the 
project were discussed, the attempt made to canvas opinions and the 
respect with which these opinions were treated.  
 
Within the public sector, references were made to the qualities of the CC and 
the CB/NT. A representative of the MRT perceived the CC was as discussing 
‘ideas openly, with integrity and without any other major agendas’ (public 
respondent). Referring to the CB, he also commented: 
t that time, [the sice Dayor] would drop a lot of things in our laps, 
and ask for reactions and opinions on certain things. This is how I 
became involved in many aspects of the project. This is also an 
example of the type of relationship that the DZT had with him. The 
DZT had a straight line to [the sice Dayor], we went directly to him 
and the City Board with issues that had to be brought before the city 
council . . . te had trust in him and he in us. He was very much 
behind what we were doing. [The sice Dayor] was a leader in those 
times in getting things done. that this also implied is that we never 
went behind him with anything, but always went straight to him with 
problems. There was a code of behaviour that developed out of 
working together; going behind him would have broken that code. 
te trusted him with information and what he would do with that 
information. Eowadays there is so little trust in the political 
machinery that I never go to the sice Dayor but lobby directly with 
the City Council for changes. Staff members are much more 
aggressive about getting their own way. (public respondent) 
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Figure 5-3 shows a dip in trust in the public officials and the CB/NT at the end 
of the round, this stems from the tenants’ responses. This dip can be linked 
to the strategies of the city, namely the move to send out the letter to the 
tenants indicating the need to vacate. This fall in trust also caused the 
development of reactive strategies on the part of the small merchants, this 
can be seen in the following round, during which the tenants continued to 
organize activities to resist the project and removal from the premises. The 
tenants indicated: 
Our trust went down when we got that letter, the approach of the 
city created real distrust. Wrobably, now looking back, the city’s 
approach ‘out in three months!!’ was so confrontational that we 
could only have one reaction. There could be no mention of trust. 
(tenant) 
In Round 2, trust grew between the different public players, based on the 
experience of working together. Factors mentioned by members of the 
public team were the leadership and level of professionalism:  
I came to have trust in the city’s team. [The sice Dayor] was a leader 
and we [the CB/ET] worked well together. I had the feeling that we 
were really a team. [The sice Dayor] was very precise and good at 
‘selling’ ideas. (public respondent) 
Another public respondent reinforced the professionalism of the CB. 
[The sice Dayor] was very savvy in getting things done, he was 
always totally prepared before he went to the CC to get approval, 
essentially he had done enough canvassing beforehand to know what 
the answer was going to be . . . The relationship and trust developed 
over time and also resulted in trust among the city officials and the 
politicians. (public respondent)  
On the private side, trust of the URGN in the city grew as well. Interestingly, 
a representative of URGN noticed the trust growing between public 
colleagues and admitted that this influenced his trust in the CB/NT. Private 
respondents also underlined the straightforwardness of the city 
representative, the fact that he did not colour information and the fact that 
he clearly defined the limits of the city. 
te began to trust [the sice Dayor] because we saw that he had 
worked himself into a position of trust with his colleagues, people 
listened to him (and believed him). Dany people were committed to 
him . . . I trusted [the sice Dayor] implicitly, he told us his concerns; 
he was open, he treated us decently and had no hidden agenda. I felt 
that we really spoke the same language. (private respondent) 
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In Round 3, trust began to erode. With regard to the drop in trust in the CC 
shown in the figure, respondents attributed this to the increase in conflicting 
interests, hidden agendas and opportunistic behaviour within the council. 
One councillor stated: 
I could see that additional demands coming from the CC during 
negotiations, each time these brought the project closer to 
collapse . . . I could see that there were other councillors with vested 
interests to kill the project, this attitude (was transferred) to the CB, 
the extra demands that would kill the project. Their attitude was: 
‘They are capitalists; we will just make them pay more’ . . . I began to 
see hZ'E as a victim. (councillor) 
The minor increase in trust on the part of the tenants in the CB came from 
the attempt of the CB to canvas their opinions, and looked for joint solutions.  
 
In Round 4, trust in the CB began to dip slightly, more in the CC. Within the 
public arena, trust within institutions and between institutions (CC/CB) 
dipped when unexpected elements of the contract were uncovered.  
. . . the project had been simmering and nothing was happening . . . 
trust decreased when we found out about the secret article or clause 
in the contract. The CB should have been upfront with the CC about 
this and also the reason why they were still working with hZ'E 
(while nothing had happened). . . (public respondent) 
Members of the CC perceived that the CB/NT was withholding information, 
and trust fell. 
Factors that contribute to trust in (and within) the hZ'E team 
Within the private sector team, working together and getting to know each 
other was the basis for building trust. From the beginning of the project, 
URGN spent time getting to know the key professionals involved in the 
project. Staff of URGN committed themselves to learning how things were 
done in Poland, understanding the nature of cultural barriers, developing the 
best approach to communicating with partners. In effect, they gave priority 
to ‘speaking the same language’. Members of the URGN team also provided 
support, were open to ideas and displayed key professional qualities. 
I (Wolish architect) went to Eorway to help create the project. hZ'E 
wanted to know how things were done in Woland – law, design – the 
concept layout was done in Eorway . . . we got loads of technical 
support from the Eorwegians. [The hZ'E representative] did his job; 
he fulfilled expectations and had a strong personality. He wanted to 
get to know us; he was open to someone else’s ideas. He gave us a 
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chance to build trust . . . hZ'E had a very complicated task to 
convince the local government. They (the staff) were pioneers. [The 
hZ'E representative] was an interesting personality; he was able to 
lead conferences, he was a very strong person, and he was very 
convincing. (private respondent) 
Another public respondent also underlined URGN’s wisdom in hiring a local 
representative to intermediate with the local government and to aid in 
communication.  
The city’s perception of hZ'E was good. hZ'E hired ureka to 
smooth the way. This made things simpler because they (the city and 
ureka) spoke the same language; ureka was able to explain and 
mediate. Then [the hZ'E representative] came every month to 
confirm the steps that had been taken and the agreements made. 
(public respondent) 
Trust of the city in URGN grew during negotiations in Round 2, based on the 
openness with which issues were discussed and resolved, the optimism 
displayed, the professionalism and the level of fairness or mutual respect 
demonstrated. 
 [The representative from hZ'E] was trustworthy. During 
negotiations, he was open with information. He induced confidence, 
and did not try to avoid issues. Trust in the group was based on trust 
in the individual. He never negotiated something for which there was 
no support by those behind him. (public respondent) 
Another member of the NT concurred. 
I felt that that there was a high level of trust. [The representative 
from hZ'E] was open and solid and dependable. fter a point was 
agreed, he never came back to it. One knew that there would never 
be an attempt to revisit an issue . . . during negotiations; the partners 
treated each other fairly. te did not take advantage of each other. 
(public respondent) 
What is important to note is that through Round 2 and into Round 3, the 
perception of positive outcomes, the promises of access to solid finance, and 
belief in the potential success of the common venture contributed to the 
growth in trust. The perception on the part of the public team of the 
outcomes of the interactions/strategies up to this point, as well as the 
expectations built by URGN (i.e. finance, potentials of the project), 
contributed to the growth in trust in URGN. 
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Figure 5-3 indicates a fall in trust in URGN in Round 3. This occurred towards 
the end of the round, when the realization came that the project was not 
going to go forward. Respondents focused on the perception of the 
tendency, at this point, of URGN to keep information back concerning the 
financial status of the project, and therefore the difference between what 
was being communicated and the reality on the ground (consistent with the 
responses in Table 5-7). Of note is that public respondents admit that rather 
than a purposeful attempt to withhold information, URGN tendency was to 
remain overly optimistic at all times. This served to translate, in the long run, 
into a perception on the part of the public respondents of (1) an attempt to 
cover up, or (2) a lack of professionalism.  This consistent optimism had 
created expectations that ultimately could not be met. Public respondents 
indicated: 
t the beginning there was an idea that there would be no problem 
with the money, hZ'E was very optimistic, then there were attempts 
to find money and it became clear that hZ'E had a good idea but 
nothing to back it up . . .there seemed to be decisions but no follow 
through. The situation was exacerbated when SWBW finally joined 
the project, and troubles seemed to have been solved. They also were 
not upfront when their solvency problems occurred. thile it was 
clear that the project was being delayed due to lack of finance, hZ'E 
continued to be (overly) optimistic about the potential sources of 
finance . . . hZ'E was not clear, claimed that the project would repay 
itself in five years, perhaps they were naive or did not have the 
experience . . . the drop in trust was gradual, it started when 
SWBW had problems  . . . when it was all over and you looked at 
the situation, hZ'E had not invested anything in the site, SWBW 
was the only one who really spent money on the construction. (public 
respondent) 
Another public respondent confirmed this perspective: 
fter the contract was signed hZ'E held back information . . . The 
other partner was less sincere than expected. During the negotiation, 
they were open with information, or that was our perception, in 
reality they were holding back. They were also colouring the truth 
about contacts with the tenants, about the finance. They made 
promises. The fact that they coloured things became clear when 
things did not materialiǌe . . . t some point SWBW also brought 
unrealistic expectations . . . when I look back, we had the perception 
that a private partner knew how to calculate risk and to let us know 
that being burdened with accommodating all families in ZH was too 
risky. It would have been hard to persuade the CC, but I could have. I 
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just did not want to tell a private partner what to do. (public 
respondent) 
Internally, in CEREMI, trust was also at risk. A private respondent commented 
on the trust between URGN and ESPEBEPE. 
The Danaging Director (DD) of SWBW supported the project. But 
the success of the project ended up being dependent on the DD, as 
there was a strong difference of opinion between the DD and the 
Danagement Team (DT). The DT was more concerned about saving 
SWBW. The company did not have deep pockets . . . it focused on 
turnover only . . . then things went bad, the DT voted against the 
project . . . t a certain point, we (hZ'E team) started to doubt 
SWBW’s viability. This happened gradually as we were finaliǌing 
the contract. te found no strategic vision in the Danagement Team. 
The Danaging Director had vision, but the staff and the 
Danagement Team did not . . . Trust between SWBW and hZ'E 
turned out to be limited and weak. It was a contractual relation; trust 
was sufficient from a commercial point of view. Still with the 
Danaging Director, I had strong trust, out of the relationship that we 
built. (private respondent) 
In correspondence, the URGN representative stated: ‘t a critical stage of the 
project, during the final preparations for securing BZD financing, there were 
clear signs of internal problems in SWBW. It quickly became clear that the 
company had no sustainable economic base.  complete change in company 
leadership was introduced. From this point, the project was doomed. Trust 
evaporated overnight. greements entered into proved not to be worth the 
paper they were written on’ (correspondence April 2007). 
Trust in the tenants 
Public and private respondents declined for the most part to comment on 
trust on the tenants. However, respondents from the tenants discussed the 
trust they had in each other. One respondent who was a tenant and became 
a councillor describes the build-up of relations around the issues of 
relocation and the substantial drop in trust between the tenants towards the 
latter part of the relationship. He admitted that a divergence in 
interests/goals and internal bickering among the tenants caused the final 
breakdown of trust and relations. This is visible in the figure. 
Wost revolution, it was easy to get help and to get people involved. 
Secesja was made up of lawyers, accountant, all kinds of people. te 
were not homogenous. One approach was ‘>et’s attack with 
bayonets’. The other was more conciliatory: ‘>et’s carve a voice for 
ourselves.’ Over time, the internal atmosphere was horrible; 
ϭϰϮ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 175
members of Secesja were accusing the leaders of getting things from 
the city . . . the people who were more conciliatory got more tired of 
the negative types and stepped out. (tenant) 
5.5.4 Conclusion 
The information taken from the interviews portrayed the changes in trust 
levels over the rounds as well as the factors that made trust rise or dip; this 
portrayal is consistent with the results in Figure 5-3, Table 5-5 and Table 5-7. 
Respondents described the behaviour and strategies of the players and 
perceptions of outcomes that contributed to the build-up of trust over time 
and ultimately to the erosion of trust.  
 
In the following sections, the research looks at the interaction between the 
city and its new partner, ARS. The following sections look at the nature of this 
interaction, and the perceptions of the respondents of outcome, risk and 
trust. 
5.6 The process, 2nd period 
5.6.1 Overview of project and rounds during the ARS 
period: key decisions points, change in actors, 
stakes and content 
The following sections continue with a description of the interaction 
between the City of Szczecin and a new private partner. The table below 
provides a snapshot view of the City-ARS partnership and identifies moments 
when key decisions were made that brought about a change in actors, the 
stakes or the content of the project. It highlights per round, the key and 
peripheral actors, the intensity and nature of their interaction, crucial 
decisions made, as well the evolution of the stakes. 
5.6.2 End of URGN partnership, start of the ARS 
partnership 
The following period dealt with in the research is the interaction between 
the City of Szczecin and ARS. This period has also been divided into four 
rounds. The first round, the Initial Proposal (six months in 1997), involved 
initial discussions between the city and the developer; the parties discussed 
interests relative to the project. The interaction was somewhat influenced 
(sped up) by the fact that ARS (and the city) were using the URGN proposal 
as a starting point, the contents of the project were familiar to the city, if less 
so to ARS. The second round (June 1997 – February 1998) was characterized 
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by intensive negotiations of the project details and the contract, ending with 
the city’s decision to give ARS an ultimatum ‘sign or walk’. ARS decided to 
sign. In the third round, the interaction revolved around managing the 
project together within the renovation company set up by the city, and 
working out the details of the project and the relationship. The round ended 
when the new city council decided to set into motion divorce proceedings, 
abruptly ending the relationship. The interaction, from that moment 
(December 1998 – November 1999), was characterized by acrimonious 
relations that were never to be mended. Table 5-8 below outlines the rounds 
and their most striking features. 
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The new partnership spanned a period of just under three years. The 
interaction moved at a much swifter pace than the previous partnership. The 
negotiations were completed in one year and the partners set to work to 
build the project. The nature of the interaction and the issues were different 
because the partners were actually involved in and working through 
decisions on implementation. The next section describes the nature of the 
interaction in greater detail. 
5.6.3 Round 5: The Initial Proposal(s) (January 1997 – 
June 1997) 
Change in actors and content 
In the last quarter of 1996, the city continued to look for interested partners 
and began to encourage proposals through informal channels. In January 
1997, two consortiums, American Retail Systems (ARS) and CivilEng, 
submitted bids.17 ARS proposed certain changes to the URGN project 
formulation: it offered to set up a joint company with the city, which would 
renovate Blocks 21 and 22, complete the RHs and, as well, develop a 
Greenfield site in an adjacent area, named Pazim. Sequencing was such that 
the renovation would come first, and Pazim second. ARS proposed to invest 
US$ 2.5 million equity in the project up ĨƌŽŶƚ;ϲ͘ϯŵůųͿ͕ŝŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌa 
51% share of the ownership in the joint company. It requested that the city 
match this capital investment with in kind contributions, made up of 
x land for the replacement housing and investments made there, 
x perpetual usufruct of land and ownership of the buildings to be 
renovated, and  
x perpetual usufruct of the Pazim land. 
 
The amount of the investment to be made by ARS was to depend on values 
set for the land and buildings contributed to the joint company by the city 
and the need to keep the shares in proportion (51-49%). The proposal gave 
some background information on the amount of ARS’s own capital and fixed 
assets (Pomeranian (ARS) proposal, January 1997). 
 
ARS accepted the phasing of the project as set out by URGN, and proposed 
underground parking: 362 spaces under Block 21; 424 under 22. The ARS 
17 American Retail System (ARS) an American investment company joined in a 
consortium with a local developer/builder. CivilEng was a loose partnership 
between small Polish consulting firms and local/national banks. 
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consortium appeared to be a strong potential partner and it lobbied 
aggressively for the project in the media and with the councillors.  
 
CivilEng’s proposal was based on the URGN programming, and suggested no 
major changes. The proposal made an analysis of the market for the sale of 
communal flats and performed a cash flow up to 1998. CivilEng also 
suggested the setup of a development company, ownership to be split 30% 
for the city, 35% for the banks and 35% for the developer. CivilEng provided 
a preliminary expression of interest from local and national banks (Austrian 
credit bank, Polish bank and a leasing society) willing to negotiate debt 
finance for the project should the consortium be awarded the contract, but 
no direct investment. The developer’s approach was simple and 
straightforward, but its lobby was weak (CivilEng proposal, January 1997). 
Interaction 
In the assessment of the two proposals for the City Council, dated 25 March 
1997, the City Board (CB) analysed the budgetary implications of deciding to 
go with one of the two proposals (Plan A). The CB also indicated a Plan B, 
namely the option of continuing without partners and completing the RH and 
the renovation of the blocks in phases (project documentation). 
 
The CB hired a panel of local experts to assess the proposals further: tax and 
financial advisors, a local university professor acting as local government 
consultant, and a real estate broker. In view of the previous experience with 
a private partner, the City Board argued for taking a careful approach (project 
correspondence 1997). The reports came out in March and April: the 
opinions varied on what was considered to be the best proposal, but all 
suggested that the city continue to pursue the two options. Based on the 
information given, comments underlined the fact that doing a project of such 
a scale (using URGN’s assumptions and programme) with sitting tenants was 
risky, and that a phased approach might be better. In addition, the real estate 
expert argued that the ARS’s proposal was more realistic for three reasons: 
(1) the analysis of current trends in real estate, (2) access to dependable 
sources of finance, and (3) the proposal was designed to guarantee the 
commercial success of the project: the better use of the space and increase 
in the number of offices and commercial spaces would ensure the 
commercial viability of the project (report real estate expert 1997).  
 
All experts agreed that the city had too little information to make a decision; 
the city followed up in the end of April 1997 and sent a set of detailed 
questions to both candidates. The questions revolved around clarifying 
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information in the proposals and gaining more information on the vision of 
the potential partners, on cash flow assumptions, sources and structuring of 
finances, use of presale, share of capital in the joint company, preliminary 
design, approaches deal with conflict between partners, business planning, 
and phasing and timing of the project (project documentation 1997).  
 
Communication continued between the city and the potential partners, 
though the CivilEng proposal quickly became less of an option, as the 
financing was less stable. Communication with ARS focused on two issues: 
the scope of renovation proposed by ARS in the start-up phase and the fact 
that ARS did not wish to invest in the two blocks without being assured of 
development rights to Pazim. The city did not see the scale of the investment 
proposed by ARS in Phase 1 as substantial enough and insisted that Phase 1 
should include more buildings. In addition, the city was inclined to postpone 
Pazim until the completion of the first four buildings by ARS, i.e. completion 
of a certain portion of the project was seen as a condition for obtaining the 
development rights for the Pazim land. On 10 June 1997, ARS formally 
concurred with the city’s conditions and proposed, as its investors were 
coming to Szczecin, that, if the city was ready, a Letter of Intent be signed 
(project correspondence 1997).  
 
The City Board moved quickly to write a motion that presented both 
proposals to the City Council, but which suggested going with ARS. The 
motion indicated that though, in the initial round, CivilEng seemed better 
prepared, ARS had more funds to invest. The motion also reiterated that the 
City Board was in the process of setting up a renovation company, in which 
ARS could buy shares (project correspondence 1997).  
 
The motion proposed that the city sign a LoI with ARS, which would define 
the roles, the split of shares in the renovation company, and the amount of 
investment by both parties in the renovation of Blocks 21 and 22. 
Contribution of land for commercial development on Pazim land would not 
be taken into account in the LoI, but ARS would be kept informed if the city 
were to decide to do something with Pazim (as partner or part of an auction). 
Successful completion of the first nine buildings would have to occur before 
the city would be willing to sign a LoI with ARS for Pazim (project 
correspondence 1997). The City Council approved the motion and decided to 
accept ARS’s offer. The letter of intent was signed on 19 June 1997, during 
the visit of ARS’s shareholders to Szczecin. 
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5.6.4 Round 6: Negotiating acceptable solutions (June 
1997 – February 1998) 
With this decision of the city to accept ARS’s proposal to sign the LoI and to 
go forward for now, the stakes became more explicit for both parties: the 
city tried to get the project going with another partner, in the face of political 
pressure to perform; ARS made a preliminary agreement to sink money into 
a risky economy. The actors and the nature of interaction began to change, 
as teams from both sides were again formed, and time and resources were 
made available. 
Change in content 
The LoI was valid for six months; it stated that ARS would draft a contract 
within one month and that the parties would agree on the contracts within 
three months. The parties agreed that the agreement was not binding and 
that all costs related to negotiations and preparation of the project would be 
borne by the individual parties (LoI). The LoI also indicated that the city would 
inform ARS should a Request for Proposal be issued on Pazim or allow ARS to 
bid on the land should the occasion arise. In negotiations, ARS agreed to join 
the city in the renovation company. The city committed to contribute land 
and buildings, ARS cash with which to purchase shares in the company. 
Change in actors 
A limited liability company – The Renovation Society of Szczecin (STR), fully 
owned by the city – was established on 4 July 1997 with a capital of 3 million 
PLN (US$ 0.75 million). The activities of the company were specifically limited 
to the renovation of two blocks and the pedestrianization of the street down 
ƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚĞ͕ ŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͘ dŚĞ city contributed to STR the 
ownership rights of the first six buildings in the two blocks (with values set 
by evaluators hired by the municipality) and the right of perpetual lease of 
land. The city offered to make a 1.25 million PLN (about US$ 0.31 million at 
the time) available for STR for the modernization and pedestrianization of 
ŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͘ ^dZ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞnts with TBS to resume and 
continue the construction of the replacement housing. 
 
For negotiations, the city established a city negotiating team comprised of 
the Vice Mayor, the city’s legal counsel, and a local university professor 
acting as local consultant for the city (all of whom had also been involved 
during URGN). On the ARS side, the ARS President was joined by a Polish 
representative; a private lawyer soon joined the team.  
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Interaction 
Within one month, ARS produced a draft contract; the city insisted on 
breaking this version down into three separate contracts. Within three 
months, in September 1997, ARS had drafted contracts (1) between the city 
and ARS regulating capital contributions, (2) governing the association of ARS 
and the city in the renovation company STR, and (3) between the city and the 
new STR. 
 
The two parties continued for months discussing their different positions. Six 
months later, during a negotiation meeting on 9 December 1997, it appeared 
that the parties were not in agreement, ARS’s counterproposal was, on a 
majority of points, in conflict with the points of the city and on 11 December 
1997, the City Board informed the City Council that negotiations with ARS 
had been aborted. On 18 December, ARS sent a letter to the Mayor 
requesting the opportunity to restart negotiations. Within two days, the Vice 
Mayor reopened negotiations with ARS, with specific instructions to ARS on 
the concessions the city expected and a detailed series of points to which 
ARS was expected to respond. The city also asked ARS to provide all the 
necessary documents confirming its practical and technical experience with 
renovation, namely  
 
 the concept of renovation, including realistic phasing with time table 
attached;  
 an economic and financial analysis, and proof of sources of finance; 
 marketing assumptions; and 
 information on partners and staff with qualification and experience 
(project correspondence, 1997). 
 
In the first week of the New Year, ARS responded with three new draft 
contracts, with most of the information and concessions required. It held out 
on points related to the value at which ARS could acquire the completed 
properties after renovation and on the structure of the Supervisory Board. 
The financial calculations and a draft concept of renovation were omitted as 
these were not yet ready. On 17 January, the City Board convened a special 
meeting to adopt the contracts and indicated to ARS that no further 
negotiations would be possible. ARS was given two days to accept the offer; 
if they chose not to, the City Board indicated that they would present Plan B 
(STR taking on the entire renovation without a partner) at the next City 
Council meeting (in ten days) for approval. The next morning ARS sent a letter 
confirming its participation in the partnership, and stating that it would join 
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STR within seven days of obtaining approval from the Ministry of the Interior 
(a three-month process).18  
 
The decision was made on both sides to enter into a more formal 
relationship, and to sign the contract. The final City Council approval came 
on 26 January 1998. The new partners signed the contract on 20 February 
1998, in front of the press ;'ĂǌĞƚƚĂ tǇďŽƌĐǌĂ͕ 'ųŽƐ ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ͕ <ƵƌŝĞƌ
^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ Ϯϭ &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇϭϵϵϴͿ. ARS’s investment of US$ 2.5 million in the 
project was immediately deposited in the Polish bank account.  
5.6.5 Round 7: Building a project together (February 1998 
– December 1998) 
The decision resulted in a commitment on both sides to work together in a 
renovation company; the actors and the interaction were about to change 
significantly, as were the stakes. A substantial investment was made, and the 
challenge for ARS was to make the project viable, for the city the challenge 
was to show some action (finally) on the ground. 
Change of Actors 
With the contract signed, ARS had to wait for approval from the Ministry of 
the Interior (MoI) before joining STR, which was at that point staffed with 
public employees. Quickly, however, the private partner moved to put 
together its own team, the first move was to hire the private professional 
who was to act as the President of STR. 
 
The Board of Directors of STR (called the Supervisory Board, SB) was to 
include three people nominated by ARS and two – including the Chairman – 
by the city. The city had three representatives sitting on the shareholders’ 
General Assembly, ARS two, with 51% voting power. The Management Board 
consisted of a President nominated by ARS and a Vice President nominated 
by the city. Each member of the Management Board could act on behalf of 
the company within the confines of the tasks allocated to them, but crucial 
decisions implying a significant outlay of funds required agreement by both 
(project documentation July 1998). 
Interaction 
On 20 April 1998, ARS (not yet part of STR) and the public representatives at 
STR, the President and Vice President, submitted their Master Plan to the 
City Board. The document was signed by the soon to be installed President 
18 ARS required approval from the MoI to participate in a Polish renovation company. 
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of STR and provided a space for a signature by the city. This first design was 
a grand scheme, which included an interior atrium and required a massive 
renovation of Block 21. The concept proposed a very high percentage of 
commercial space, construction of a cinema in the middle of one of the 
blocks and the delay of the pedestrianizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚƚŽĂůĂƚĞƌ
phase of the project. This programming and phasing of construction were 
designed to ensure a secure revenue stream up front from the profitable 
components of the project, and to offset market risk to the project. The 
proposed phasing reversed assumptions included in the contracts, which still 
specified divisions and deadlines inherited from the negotiations with URGN 
and which were already difficult to meet (project correspondence 1998).  
 
The CB, as opposed to signing the document, responded with criticism and 
detailed questions, stating that the Master Plan (MP) did not fulfil the 
obligations of the contract. Not pleased with the proposed changes, coupled 
with delays and the potential political tensions they implied, the city rejected 
the alterations (project correspondence 1998). The city indicated that no 
changes were possible until after the elections. ARS continued to negotiate 
but was ultimately forced to accept the city’s position, and decided to scale 
down the project. This implied calling off many of the retail investors the 
organization had tried to attract to the new project. 
 
ARS officially bought shares in and joined STR on 6 May 1998. The capital of 
the company increased, ARS holding 51% of the shares, investing cash 
(US$ 2.5 million equity), and the city 49%, investing cash, and the buildings 
and land as assets (deed of association, project documents).19  
 
The work on the first four out of six buildings began in May 1998; there was 
a delay in the work on the pedestrianizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
deadline for the start of construction elapsed. The partners continued to 
meet and discuss the progress of the project over the next few months. The 
partners still focused on issues related to how decisions would be made in 
STR, ironing out positions and responsibilities. STR continued to negotiate 
with the private tenants, and attempted to establish acceptable prices for 
the acquisition of the flats. There was resistance from the tenants and these 
negotiations did not go well. The project suffered from more delays and 
19 The capital of the company amounted to 17,750,000 PLN (just over US$ 5 million), divided 
in the following manner: ARS – 181,050 shares valued at 50 PLN each, total 9,052,500 PLN 
(51 %), contributed with cash; STR (city) – 173,950 shares valued at 50PLN each, total 
8,697.500 PLN (49%), contributed partly in cash, partly in buildings/land. 
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resulted in conflicts with the city, which wanted to see construction on the 
ground.  
 
In November 1998, after local elections, a new – more left-wing – political 
structure took control of the City Council and the members of the City Board 
coordinating with STR were replaced by new City Councillors. Vice Mayor 
Mync, long the lead player in setting up the partnerships with URGN and ARS, 
took leave of the City Board and the Supervisory Board of STR.  In preparation 
for the upcoming Supervisory Board meeting, during which the new 
members would be present, ARS prepared a programme to sell their ideas to 
the city representatives. They proposed changes to the contract signed in 
February 1998 and to the deadlines in the project.  
 
ARS undertook a series of renegotiations and attempts to change the 
contract, lobbying hard to persuade the new public officials of the benefit of 
their ideas. While this was happening, STR continued with business as usual 
on the project. The new City Board made several statements in the press 
condemning the (commercial) standing and performance of STR (private 
sector respondent) and then responded to ARS proposals, stating that they 
saw no need to alter the contracts, and, as they were dissatisfied with the 
renovations, they proposed to buy out ARS’s shares in STR. 
 
The growing conflict between the partners finally led to the city’s decision to 
end the relationship and to set in motion the negotiation of a separation 
formula. The new City Council decided to consider buying out ARS’s shares in 
STR or all allowing ARS to buy out the city’s shares in STR.  
5.6.6 Round 8: Negotiating the divorce (December 1998 – 
November 1999) 
This decision put an abrupt end to ARS’s expectations of being able to ‘do 
something’ in the area, and brought about substantial changes to the project. 
It implied a substantial scaling down of the scope of work, and a change in 
the roles of ARS and the city, and in the nature of the interaction. 
Interaction 
ARS contested the appraisal of land and buildings by valuators employed by 
the municipality, stating that the prices were too high (given the current 
market for real estate in Szczecin), and came up with an alternative formula 
for the appraisal. Finally, the parties agreed on the terms of separation. As 
part of the terms, the city allocated additional funding (above the sum 
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already invested) for the pedestrianizĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ ^ƚƌĞĞƚ (project 
documentation 1998). 
 
In November 1999 ARS bought out the city’s interest in STR (the city was 
persuaded to do this by a consultant), becoming the sole owner of six 
buildings and plots of land, paid for partly in cash and partly in kind.20 The 
deal also required ARS to contribute financially to the completion of the 
pedestrianizĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŐƵƐųĂǁĂ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͘ 
 
Parallel to the final divorce negotiations with ARS, the city created another 
project company – (Plan B: the Renovation Centre of Szczecin – SCR). This 
100% city-owned company received, as capital contribution, the balance of 
land and buildings in the two blocks. SCR took over management of the 
communal flats and buildings allotted to the company, as well as the design 
and construction of the new replacement housing for future stages of 
renovation. An outline of strategy of SCR entailed vacating buildings, putting 
them up for sale for renovation, using the income from sales to finance 
replacement housing, and repeating this process using a revolving fund 
formula.  
5.6.7 Further strategies after the separation 
The municipality reclaimed the direct supervision and financing of the 
completion of the pedestrianization of BogƵƐųĂǁĂ ^ƚƌĞĞƚ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŝŶĂůůǇ
opened in the middle of the year 2000. The city put up for sale the 
contentious Pazim development site on which ARS had originally requested 
priority. As the area was in principle a greenfield development – without 
sitting residential and business tenants, and hence free of the political risk 
that comes with plans to relocate them – it was possible to sell it with relative 
ease. The developer (a development company quoted on Warsaw Stock 
Exchange) that won the auction included some elements of the functional 
programme previously anticipated by ARS in the development, namely the 
multiplex cinema.  
 
STR completed the renovation of four buildings. Sale of flats in the renovated 
buildings were a success, offices, on the other hand, were not. Interestingly 
enough, the lack of accessibility and adequate parking seem to have been the 
cause. Shops on the ground floor experienced mixed success. After 
unsuccessfully trying to buy out the private owners in the fifth building, STR 
20 Surplus new replacement housing procured before the split took place and a number of 
individual flats acquired from private owners outside of the project. 
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decided to abandon the idea of renovating this building and to put its own 
minority share in the building up for sale. The interior of the sixth building 
was to be cleaned up and the spaces kept in temporary use as cheap 
accommodation, while development scenarios were developed and tested 
on the market. 
5.7 Analysis of ARS partnership 
The following sections analyse the interaction between the city, ARS and the 
tenants. The first section looks at the perception of the respondents of the 
outcomes of the second four rounds of the project and traces the links 
between these perceptions and the strategies chosen. Perceptions of 
outcomes are also presumed to influence trust levels. The following section 
analyses the perception of risk over the rounds, and its influence on 
strategies. Finally, the last section looks at the levels of trust and the factors 
that led to the build-up and breakdown of trust.   
5.7.1 Perception of outcomes  
Perception of the outcomes per round 
The city representatives’ perceptions of the outcomes at the end of Round 5 
could be described as ‘cautious optimism’. On one hand they were excited at 
the potential of a partnership with a partner who promised hard cash and 
with investors that were prepared to come and sign a LoI; on the other hand, 
their feelings were somewhat tempered by having been burned before (PMY, 
LD). They felt better prepared to take on and deal with a new partner and to 
put the lessons learned from the previous partnership to work. This 
perception was evident in their approach to discussions with ARS: their 
negotiation style was much ‘harder’ (public respondent).  
t the beginning, we (the city representatives) really did not know 
how to negotiate. It was not something we had learned how to do. 
(tith hZ'E) we only had good faith and the letter of the law. It was 
important for the city to be able to negotiate well (with potential 
partners). te had to keep ZS on its toes; it was hard to do. (public 
respondent) 
ARS felt that it was in a situation where it was well placed to be able to do 
something big (two private respondents), and to put down roots in the city 
(public respondents). It underlined its interest to ‘bring a new centre to 
Scǌcǌecin’ in communications with the city (two private respondents), 
stating:  
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The Bogusųawa Investment Wroject will create a multiuse area 
including retail, a cultural-amusement centre, apartments and 
offices. It will be a world-class project, attracting tourists from Woland 
and abroad. It will increase the value of property in downtown 
Sǌcǌecin. ZS intends to ‘own’ the Bogusųawa project. This will not be 
a short-term investment. (project documentation January 1997) 
At the end of the sixth round, city representatives had mixed views on the 
outcomes of the project. On one hand, there was frustration with the nature 
of negotiations. This frustration resulted in the city deciding to abort 
negotiations when interests and positions diverged (public respondent). The 
abruptness with which this was done stemmed from the sensitivity to issues 
faced in the past, the political atmosphere of the time, and the fact that the 
city had other options to fall back on (private and public respondent). They 
were busy exploring these. 
The negotiations with ZS began to get complicated. The city started 
to lose patience. City representatives felt that if ZS was going to be 
too rigid, they could and would go out on their own and do the 
renovation. The city decided to use STZ to renovate, even if the 
negotiations did not work out. The Eational Housing Fund was also 
another option; it opened up new possibilities. [The sice Dayor] 
checked to see if [the city] could access these funds. (public 
respondent) 
On the other hand, there was some satisfaction when ARS finally conceded 
to the demands of the city. By the end of the round, a contract was signed, 
the private partner had committed to joining STR and money was in the bank. 
Some public respondents even went so far as to say that they perceived the 
partnership with ARS to be a better option than the previous deal with URGN 
(public respondent). 
The second stage with ZS was development for real; they came with 
better calculations, and they had real funds. hS$ 2.5 million was laid 
out at the beginning and this made a difference. te had the idea of 
setting up a joint company and having the city contribute land and 
buildings to the company. Once we had approval from the Dinistry of 
the Interior, ZS became a shareholder (in STZ). This allowed the 
partners to pass the initial phase and to get started more quickly . . . 
it was a real partnership. (public respondent) 
ARS’s perception of outcomes was also mixed. The organization was happy 
to have signed the contract and to be making a quick start. Negotiations had, 
however, not been easy and the management had been ‘manoeuvred into’ 
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joining the partnership with certain aspects in limbo (three private 
respondents). The company lawyer admitted: 
The city created STZ, the land and buildings were the city’s in kind 
contribution. te had to step into the company that they created. The 
options for ZS were limited at that point . . . for instance, STZ was 
already set up, the Deed of ssociation was signed before the 
contract, and it was more difficult to change. te needed to have a 
chance to influence the process and the outcomes from the 
beginning. If ZS had been there from the beginning, we could have 
influenced things more. (private respondent) 
These concerns were evident in ARS’s continued attempts to make changes 
to the project design and to the structure and management of the company 
(see below). 
 
In Round 7, the perceptions of outcome from the public side were that the 
interaction was not always easy, management styles differed. In addition, 
certain deadlines had not been met and time was waning. From the city’s 
perspective, the most pressing priority was getting something built and 
demonstrating that the project was actually going to happen. This was 
evident in the decision of the city to reject ARS’s Grand Scheme proposal out 
of hand and to insist on the phasing defined in the contract. The SB 
underlined this perspective consistently in meetings (public respondent).  
However, public respondents from the SB still had the perception that they 
were working with a viable venture and on ironing out differences. 
It’s true; there were growing pains when ZS introduced a new way 
of managing STZ. The arrival of the Wresident as a manager was not 
easy. He brought with him a new way of doing things. Still we had a 
management system that worked, two presidents that 
countersigned; one public, one private. There were normal problems 
being solved by the management. (public respondent) 
Private partners, on the other hand were frustrated about their inability to 
persuade the city of their good intentions and the benefits of the Grand 
Scheme for the city. ‘It was clear that the city had vision but that it was 
different to what ZS wanted. The city’s position was already froǌen’ (private 
respondent). The difference in visions also implied for ARS a complete 
rethinking of the project and the financial returns expected. 
 
Towards the end of the round, with the election of a new City Council, the 
perception on the part of ARS/STR’s staff was that there would be an 
opportunity to sell their ideas to the new political regime. They undertook 
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the strategy to mount a campaign to persuade the CC of the benefits of their 
ideas. This perception was short-lived. Perceptions of outcomes of the final 
round were extremely negative, from all perspectives. One private 
respondent describes the intensity of the ARS/STR feelings regarding and 
reactions to the outcome of this round: 
fter the division of STZ/SCZ, ZS had a bad reaction. [The Wresident 
of STZ] enclosed himself behind a big fence. It was his reaction to 
broken possibilities. very time I see the project, I also get angry. This 
was not the idea at the beginning. [This anger] was the worst effect 
of the divorce. The project failed as a concept, it is a broken project. 
(private respondent) 
This sentiment was common for most respondents. There was widespread 
disappointment with the turn of events and sudden finish to years of work 
(public and private respondents). 
Perception of the outcomes overall 
It is important to note that there were mixed perceptions of the overall 
outcomes of the project. With reference to the project and partnership 
overall, one private respondent from ARS put his feelings bluntly: 
Eow the project is just a beautification of a block, not a new 
economic centre . . . the whole thing was always political. Dany 
people did not want to do this project. Eo one was really behind the 
idea . . . I was perhaps naive about being able to overcome the stance 
of the city. te thought what we were doing was in the best interest 
of the city. te were not naive about the economic situation, but 
more about our ability to convince the bureaucracy . . . from my point 
of view this project was never a partnership. I have had other 
experiences in Woland where people try anything to get people to 
invest. (private respondent) 
Another private respondent commented on the feasibility of the venture: 
It was all too complicated in such a short time. Eo one could predict 
the problems and the expectations were too optimistic. . . . The four 
buildings are a success; not so quickly as intended. I feel that we could 
have done so much more if we had had a chance. (private respondent)  
On the public side sentiments were mixed, one respondent was somewhat 
positive:  
Bogusųawa is still rolling, paying back revenues, like a turtle. This is not 
what was expected in the beginning . . . but I feel the project is 
successful. The city realiǌed its objective, got its investment back and 
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gained experience with renovation and partnerships. (public 
respondent)  
Another expressed regret: 
The project was better prepared. The risks were lower thanks to the 
lessons learned (from hZ'E). The risks were better managed.  Still, 
even though [we] were a stronger partner, we did not manage to 
make our interests known . . . I feel that the project was realistic. I do 
not know if it could have worked, but I feel that it could have. From 
my perspective, this project is an unfinished issue. It was stopped by 
political issues. ZS decided to scale down the project as a reaction to 
politics. t that moment, the SB could not get approval (for the grand 
scheme) . . . There was not enough time to work through issues. It is 
too bad that this didn’t happen at a different point in time . . . (public 
respondent) 
 
One tenant expressed regret and a sense of failure:  
The time to do something big, to pursue the big vision (as opposed to 
doing the project building by building) is lost. The city lost its chance . . . 
ZS finally did only six buildings, it did almost nothing. . .  It almost 
seems like the issue was how quickly things occurred. ZS was just too 
late . . . The project was not a success. Weople were willing, it was a 
good location, but still it did not get off the ground. (tenant/city 
councillor) 
Another’s reactions were more extreme. 
The project was a disaster, a big disappointment. Dy disappointment 
had less to do with the project, but more with the fact that local 
politicians spent the whole time pursuing their own interests. [They 
spent] four years for private purposes . . . I see what SCZ is doing now 
as very bad . . . It is a joke what they have achieved. They vacated five 
buildings and have only finished two. I also now see 'alaxy (Waǌim 
greenfield development) as a huge threat. t. Wolskiego cannot 
compete on location, accessibility and price. 'alaxy took over all of 
the ideas, the multiplex, etc. (from Bogusųawa). The project would 
have livened up the downtown; the 'alaxy is now killing the project. 
There are lots of empty shops for rent in the area. (tenant) 
Outcomes: assessment of the results of the questionnaire 
Perceptions of outcomes were also measured and verified in the 
questionnaire. The results back up the negative perceptions of the project 
and the partnership from the interviews. In the questionnaire the 
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respondents were asked to rate the statements made concerning the 
outcomes of the project and the partnership (see Table below) on a scale of 
1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϵ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ͛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕Z^ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
  
  
N Mean 
Valid Missing   
I am satisfied with the results of the collaboration/project 10 0 3.60 
The goals of my organization were met by the partnership 10 0 3.50 
The partnership led to additional investments than would 
not have occurred if my organization had worked alone 9 1 2.78 
The collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, 
concepts and plans 10 0 2.60 
The partnership resulted in the implementation of a project 
that added to the quality of life of the neighbourhood and 
city 
9 1 2.33 
Working closely together led to improved cooperation 
between partners 9 1 3.00 
Working closely together led to improved coordination of 
project elements 9 1 2.89 
Working in partnership led to long processes of decision 
making and additional costs 9 1 2.67 
dŽƚĂů   Ϯ͘ϵϮ 
 
The results in the table above are negative but marginally less than those 
from the URGN period. The breakdown of responses reveals, for instance, six 
respondents (60%, two public and four private) that agreed with the 
statement that the collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, 
concepts and plans, five respondents (50%, two public and three private) that 
agreed and one private respondent that strongly agreed with the partnership 
resulted in the implementation of a project which added to the quality of life 
of the neighbourhood and city. Four respondents (one public and three 
private) agreed with the idea that the partnership contributed to improved 
cooperation (statements 6), while three respondents (one public and two 
private agreed with the statement that the partnership contributed to 
improved coordination (statements 7). On a negative note, one private 
respondent strongly agreed that the partnership led to long processes of 
decision making and additional costs. The results vary a great deal overall, 
but are consistent with the mixed feelings that came out of the interviews. 
On the whole, the public sector respondents appeared to be less positive 
(disagreeing with the statements) than the private sector respondents, 
whose ratings seem to vary more.  
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5.7.2 Perception of risk and influences on strategies  
The interviews and document survey reveal a similar perspective on the risks, 
but a different emphasis. The risks were at this point well known and very 
real for the public sector; and the city was more experienced in defining 
strategies to deal with these risks in its interactions with a potential partner. 
ARS entered into a project that was already defined (it accepted, to a large 
extent, the project as defined by URGN), and a project company that was 
already set up. Making city representatives understand ARS’s perspective on 
the risks or strategies to deal with these was a challenge: therefore the focus 
of the developer was on risk related to project design (the feasibility and 
viability of the project, as seen in the figure on internal risk below).  
 
The perceptions of external (political) risks peaked in Rounds 6 and 7. Market 
risks were the key focus in the Round 5 (three out of four responses were 
private); this perception rose in Round 6 (five of the seven responses were 
private). In Round 7, the political risks related to resistance from the tenants 
and changes in the composition of the council became a priority. With regard 
to internal (project) risks, the perceptions of risk rose in Round 6, during 
negotiations, when the stakes for both parties were on the line. When 
looking at the breakdown of responses in  
Figure 5-5, the majority of the responses come from private respondents, 
who perceived contractual, financial and project design risk as key (100%, 
70% and 80% respectively in the first round). There was increased public 
awareness in the second round. 
 
It is clear from the beginning of Round 5 that risk for the new partner, ARS, 
stemmed from potential competition in the market from another 
development (240597). This perception was evident in its strategy to 
negotiate for two options: (1) the freezing of Pazim, and (2) first right of 
refusal on the future development of the site.  
 
The perception of the risk was acute for city representatives, largely risks that 
they had inherited from the previous period. The Vice Mayor wrote a letter 
to ARS, in which he expressed his pleasure in having the opportunity to work 
with the organization, but also his concerns concerning the political situation 
of the moment and the way it limited his powers, ‘. . . the history of hZ'E 
limits how we (the city) can operate, also with reference to the Waǌim land. 
However, if the partnership is successful, it will open up possibilities for 
[further] cooperation and investment’ (public respondent, project 
correspondence 1997). This last portion of the sentence gave the impression 
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that ARS might in fact get an option on the Pazim land. An ARS representative 
concurred that this letter gave them some level of assurance of positive 
outcomes to come, and good reason to continue the relationship (private 
respondent).  
 
Figure ϱ-ϰ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϱ-ϴ 
 
 
Figure ϱ-ϱ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ;ƉƌŽũĞĐƚͿƌŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϱ-ϴ 
 
 
The perception of risk on the part of the city was evident in strategies to 
prepare for this phase. (1) The city kept its options open, and considered a 
number of different alternatives. The CC and CB developed a fall-back 
position, that of opting for going forward on their own, should a newly 
developed partnership not pan out. (2) The use of experts and the itemized 
questions to potential candidates demonstrated greater awareness of the 
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types of information needed to judge potential risks and the potential 
trustworthiness of candidates. (3) Financial stability was clearly a priority in 
making a choice of a partner (two public respondents, project 
correspondence).  
 
The negotiation period during Round 6 made explicit the range of risks 
perceived by the partners. On the part of the private partners, 
market/project design/financial risks were a key issue, evident in the 
continued discussion on the valuation of the properties to be contributed by 
the city to the project. The value of properties set was to be linked to the 
value of investment expected from ARS. ARS’s position in this discussion was 
that the values set by the city were too high, forcing the cost of construction 
up and the end price of the properties above what that market could bear. 
In fact, the discussion on the amount of financial contribution by ARS to STR 
was exacerbated by a proposal by the city that ARS should also match, in its 
contribution, the past investment made by the city in RH. This additional cost 
to ARS was perceived as adding to the risk (private respondent, project 
documents 10 and 20 October 1997). The perception of risk was evident in 
the consistent and constant emphasis by ARS during negotiations on keeping 
the values down.  
 
The city’s negotiation team refused to give credence to ARS’s perception of 
risk, but saw it simply as ARS’s attempt to reduce costs (and maximize its own 
self-interest) (two public respondents). The city insisted on keeping the value 
levels their expert had set.  
 
The issue of valuation of land was made worse for ARS by the fact that the 
city would not ensure unencumbered access to the land, an issue URGN’s 
consultant to EBRD insisted should be settled by the city. ARS perceived this 
risk from the outset (project correspondence).  
 
Project correspondence reveals the debate on whose role it was to settle 
outstanding tenant issues, the city’s or STR’s (parties jointly). The discussion 
revolved around to whom the risk should be allocated. A transcript of a 
negotiation meeting (Point 3 on the agenda: whose responsibility is it to 
vacate the buildings?) reads as follows:  
ZS: we suggest that it is the city’s responsibility.  
The city: we contend that it is a joint responsibility, even more 
important as STZ will be administering the coordination of removals. 
If relocation is preceded by appropriate legal steps, then the risk is 
minimal. Dost tenants are expecting to be relocated. They need 
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however, by the civil code, to have tenants sign agreements to 
relocate. Tenants who refuse to sign such a declaration will be given 
formal notice to vacate. Six months have been provided to deal with 
possible court cases. (minutes of meeting 10 October 1997) 
The city representative is referring here to the communal tenants; a greater 
concern for ARS was the private tenants. The city’s position was rigid; ARS 
was unable to induce the city to exert influence over the private tenants.  
 
In response to the negotiations on land/building values and the removal of 
the tenants, the municipal strategy was to link both issues in the 
negotiations, and offer ARS two options: (1) the city would contribute the 
land and buildings at a lower value without sitting tenants, or (2) at a higher 
value, with sitting tenants. The amount ARS would be asked to compensate 
for past expenditure on RH was dependent on which option they felt was 
preferable. In choosing which option to go for, ARS had to measure the risk 
of accepting the sitting tenants against the cost up front of matching the 
higher value of vacated properties. In addition, the city excluded the Pazim 
land from the negotiations, and opted for delaying a decision regarding 
development in the area. The city perceived such a freezing in development 
or exclusivity for one developer as unwise or, potentially, politically sensitive 
(public respondent). 
 
The differences in positions and the risks related to these clearly became too 
much as some point in the partnership, at the time that the city decided to 
abort negotiations. ‘There was an official decision to terminate 
negotiations . . . Talks were difficult and seemed to be diverging’ (public 
respondent). The decision to go forward together and the perception that 
risk had been dealt with came largely from the fact that ARS agreed to most 
of the concessions required by the city. 
 
With the signing of the contract in Round 7, the expectation on the part of 
the city was that the project would move forward. The proposal for the 
Grand Scheme by the ARS constituted for the CB changes to the phasing and 
delays to the start of construction that would not be saleable to the CC and 
the tenants. The city, which badly needed to see action on the ground, saw 
delays as a potential source of unacceptable political risk. The CB rejected 
the proposal out of hand, stating that it did not meet the stipulations in the 
contract (two public respondents). The fact that the city was sensitive to 
delays and to political risk was confirmed in interviews with respondents who 
indicated that the city appealed to STR to put the scaffoldings up as soon as 
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possible to show the inhabitants that something was being done (public 
respondent, two private respondents).  
 
With the rejection of this proposal, ARS’s expectations of high return on 
investment from ‘the Grand Scheme’ was placed in serious jeopardy, as were 
the funds that they had already invested (architects, marketing); the financial 
risk grew. The revenue stream projections were also put into question. The 
risk was also enhanced by the city insisting that the project start and meet 
the deadlines set. ‘. . . the deadlines were set by the city, and there was not 
room for negotiations. ZS was forced to accept and meet them’ (private 
respondent). 
 
In this round, the management structure decided upon during negotiations 
began to hamper the efficiency of ARS’s decision making. From ARS’s 
perspective, there were a number of factors that acted as constraints. For 
one, there were too many levels of decision making, creating excessive 
bureaucracy (private respondent). Second, the public representative (the 
Vice President) sitting on the MB was unable or unwilling to take initiative. 
The perception of the VP as a constraint was so extreme that the (ARS) 
President of STR sent formal correspondence to the Chair of SB enumerating 
his issues and suggesting that the VP was badly delaying the project. Third, 
decision making was held back by the external influence of the CC and the 
CB. The Supervisory Board had strict instructions from the City Board on the 
decisions they could make and had to wait for the CC meetings to be able to 
get approval for decisions; this bureaucracy caused delays. This created ‘risk 
for ZS, particularly in the face of city pressure to meet deadlines’ (private 
respondent). The management of ARS pushed for exclusive decision-making 
power for the President of STR. However, from the city’s perspective, the 
desire of ARS to allow the new President of STR, a professional hired by ARS, 
free rein and unchecked power was clearly unwise (project documentation 
July 1997). The city rejected this idea. 
 
Finally, towards the end of Round 7, political risk from the resistance from 
private tenants began to take form, as the STR President began to take steps 
to buy them out. The private tenants were organized and holding out for 
outrageously high sale prices. One public respondent admitted: 
STZ needed 1ϬϬ% ownership to get the project going. [The Wresident] 
took over the negotiations with the tenants and ran into problems. 
Once they saw the rich developer coming, the tenants upped all of 
their prices and asked for prices that [STZ] was not willing to pay. In 
fact, this is something that [the STZ/ZS Wresident] should not have 
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been doing himself, but should have left it to the city to complete the 
negotiations. The tenants caused delays and rising costs for STZ/ZS. 
(public respondent) 
In Round 8, both public and private respondents mentioned that political risk, 
after the elections, was insurmountable. This came from two sources, the 
continued resistance of the private tenants and the apparent lack of support 
from the new CC. 
. . . the problems with ownership and the fact that some people held 
out, made the project impossible to execute. The risk was too high for 
ZS; they were forced to scale down as a reaction to politics. The new 
mayor was xenophobic. (public respondent) 
In the final round, ARS began to focus on cutting costs, to make ends meet. 
The political and financial risks had grown and efficiency measures were 
necessary.  
ZS saw the need to cut costs; . . . they were so focussed on efficiency 
measures. There was not enough room for two presidents, and the 
accountant could only work part-time. The pressures were too high, 
as well as the expectation placed on staff. It was too much to expect 
a public partner to participate. hltimately, the city decided that they 
could not do the project in a public and private company, so that they 
had to pull out . . . They perceived that it was too risky to do the 
project, that they needed too many guarantees. (public respondent) 
In retrospect, all respondents now agree with ARS and point to the market 
and the scale of investment as key risks. Commercially there was not enough 
guarantee of success. ‘The situation was different then. It was an 
experimental period. If this was normal development, no-one would have 
invested. But ZS was interested to do something, and willing to take more 
risk. This was a reason to have some respect’ (public respondent). Given the 
risk in the market, one public official admitted that the design of the project 
was perhaps ill conceived: ‘It was too big a scheme . . . and the replacement 
housing was the main burden, the costs were more than that of the 
renovation’ (public respondent). Private sector respondents also pointed to 
faulty project design and the risk related to replacement housing (two private 
respondents). 
5.7.3 Perception of levels of trust and the factors that 
contributed to these 
The interviews and project documents refer to a relationship where trust 
between the public and private sector was difficult to build. Again, the city 
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was working with a clearly defined project and clear strategies, as well as 
preconceptions built in its relationship with URGN, and greater impatience 
in the face of the restrictions that came from the political risks. ARS was faced 
with the challenge of negotiating its own interests, carving out its own role, 
and trying to sell its vision to the city. The relationship was more adversarial, 
the negotiations harder. The sections below look at the overall levels of trust, 
how these changed and the factors that contributed to these trust levels.  
Changes in trust over time 
The following section on trust looks first at the results of the assessment of 
the changes in the levels of trust over the second four rounds; the results 
from the questionnaires are shown in Figure 5-6 below.  
Figure ϱ-ϲ͗ ǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůs ŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĨŽƵƌ ƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨZ^ 
 
N = 11: 6 public and 5 private 
 
The figure shows a small but steady increase in the average trust in the SB 
and the CC up until the final round. Trust in ARS, though surprisingly high at 
the outset (caused by members of the private team), declined steadily over 
time. Trust in the tenants declined marginally. 
Overall ratings 
The questionnaire also asked respondents to provide an overall rating of 
their trust in the main actors, on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the highest. 
Table 5-10 below provides the average rating per actor. Below that, Table 
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5-11 also provides the average trust ratings, cross tabulated by category of 
respondent. 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϬ͗dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ;ϭto ϭϬ͕ϭϬďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚͿ͕Z^ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
Level of Trust 
in 
City 
Council 
Supervisory 
Board 
ARS The small 
merchants 
The 
communal 
tenants 
The 
private 
tenants 
N Valid 9 10 10 8 8 8 
  Missing 1 0 0 2 2 2 
Mean 6.56 7.10 7.20 5.38 6.50 5.88 
N = 10: 5 public and 5 private. NB: One private sector respondent was unwilling to comment on anyone 
other than the SB and ARS, one public sector employee was unwilling to comment on the tenants.  
 
The results reveal a relatively high average level of trust in the two core 
partners in the project, but when looking at the table, which splits the results 
over the public and private respondents, the moderate trust of the city in 
ARS is offset by the very high trust of ARS staff members in ARS. The reverse 
is also true, public respondents have a much higher average level of trust in 
the SB than the private sector respondents, implying a relationship between 
membership and high levels of trust. In addition, the fact of being a central 
actor in a partnership is relevant for the measurement of trust, those that 
are most essential to the interaction and to decision making become the 
main focus of trust. 
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϭ͗ƌŽƐƐƚĂďƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚǇƉĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ͕Z^
ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
Level of Trust 
in 
City 
Council 
Supervisory 
Board 
ARS The small 
merchants 
The 
communal 
tenants 
The 
private 
tenants 
N Valid 9 10 10 8 8 8 
  Missing 1 0 0 2 2 2 
Public 
respondents 
7.6 8.0 4.8 5.25 5.75 6.25 
Private 
respondents 
5.25 6.2 9.6 5.5 7.25 5.5 
N = 10: 5 public and 5 private 
Factors of trust 
Respondents were asked to rate each item from 1 to 3 (1 = very important, 2 
= relevant, 3 = not so important). For the ARS period, the average results 
were as follows: 
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dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϮ͗&ĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚďƵŝůĚ;ŽƌďƌĞĂŬͿƚƌƵƐƚ 
     N Mean 
     Valid Missing  
1 CalBase I have to have sufficient information on the 
other party’s reputation, qualifications and 
past performance record. 
10 0 1.20 
2 CalBase I have to be confident that the penalties 
stipulated in the contract are sufficient to 
ensure the compliance of the other party 
10 0 2.00 
3 KnBase The other party must be willing to share 
information and resources 10 0 1.70 
4 KnBase I must get to know them well enough that I am 
able to predict their behaviour 10 0 2.00 
5 KnBase On the basis of the interaction, I come to know 
and respect their capacities 10 0 1.70 
6 IdBase We must learn to ‘speak the same language’ 10 0 1.50 
7 IdBase We must come to share the same values and 
norms 10 0 1.90 
  Total   1.71 
N = 10: 5 public and 5 private 
 
On average, respondents felt that the other party’s reputation and 
qualifications were the most important (1.2). After that, speaking the same 
language appeared to be relevant (1.5). These are somewhat consistent with 
the results of the assessment of the URGN period, though the first statement 
was rated higher than the second. In this case, the sharing of information and 
resources was not identified as being important (see factors section below). 
Factors that contributed to the build-up of trust  
This section refers to the interviews and the comments made by the 
respondents on the factors that contributed to trust build-up in the second 
four rounds. The information gathered is important in identifying different 
types of factors and in determining how these factors might have contributed 
to the trust cycle over time.  
Trust in (and within) ZS 
Promise of a sound injection of funds not only helped to reduce the 
perception of risk, but also built initial trust. However, while optimistic, the 
city took steps to verify its levels of trust by checking ARS credentials and 
solvency with Dunn and Bradstreet (public respondent). The importance of 
this is confirmed in the table above. In Round 6, with regard to ARS, one 
public official reported a perception of trust based on the level of 
professionalism demonstrated by ARS and the fact that, true to word, the 
finances for the project were deposited in the bank. ‘. . . the risk analysis was 
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competent, not over done . . . having the money up front demonstrated that 
this was not a quick fix’ (public respondent). The trust in ARS was tempered 
by the results of the Dunn and Bradstreet report, which gave ARS a ‘B’ rating, 
stating that the organization had limited capital and assets in Poland (January 
1998). The report did not, however, influence the strategy of the city, as it 
still decided to go forward with ARS (public respondent).  
 
As Figure 5-6 reflects, the drop in trust in ARS was, for the public sector, 
attributable to first impressions during discussions with the developer and 
the manner in which ARS dealt with the city during negotiations. ARS’s 
negotiation style was perceived as substantively different to what the city 
was used to (with URGN). Public respondents admitted to taking a more 
cautious approach. 
ZS came with money and a godlike attitude . . . I don’t know, the 
mood was just different, discussions were more chaotic . . . we never 
knew quite where we stood and how to deal with ZS . . . just when 
we though points were settled, the [ZS representative] kept coming 
back to points over again. He also dealt with us (the city’s negotiation 
team) with arrogance; he made some off colour remarks about 
renovating slums. (two public respondents) 
One member of the NT was never really able to build sound trust. ‘It really 
was a relationship of suspicion, ZS was always very nonchalant, the city 
could never get past its suspicion’ (public respondent). This respondent 
argued that this led to the strategy on the part of the city to check all the 
details on the contract, and keep to the letter of the law (a problem in the 
eyes of ARS).  
 
As time passed, however, some public respondents argued that trust was 
being built over time, through working together, even given the problems 
with alignment of interests.  
‘Trust was growing in phases; . . . the management set-up [was 
working]. te had two presidents, one private and one public, each of 
which were required to countersign major decisions . . . we had 
normal problems that were being solved by the management. The 
discussions were difficult but consistent. There were clear cut, with 
no room for misunderstanding. Things were well prepared, there 
were translations. tith ZS, the Wresident did not hide at all. He was 
completely open and did not hide that they were a commercial 
enterprise. This was not a problem. There was no courtesy but 
concrete things happened. It was not like hZ'E where discussions 
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were warm and fuǌǌy and nothing happened. (public sector 
respondent) 
Trust of the city in STR/ARS began to drop at the end of Round 7 when little 
was happening on the ground. Again, what was promised was not 
materializing, and expectations built were not being fulfilled. ‘For a long time 
nothing happened . . . I looked at the contract and saw a discrepancy 
(between the schedule and actual construction). They were a year behind. I 
began to wonder, they were also not working on things to prepare for Whase 
2’ (public sector respondent).  
 
In the end, the public sector felt differences were too great. Interestingly, 
ultimately the public sector also saw ARS as inflexible. 
. . . ZS was much less willing (than hZ'E) to accept that the public 
sector had objectives. There are things that the public partner has to 
comply with. . . . it is no problem if you can negotiate differences. The 
problem is that they (ZS staff) were not willing to fully understand 
issues from the public side and to resolve these together. (public 
sector respondent) 
n example of problems with negotiating differences and aligning interests 
The (in)ability over time of the partners to negotiate differences put trust at 
risk. In Round 7, the positions relative to the management structure provided 
an almost insurmountable hurdle. The transcripts of SB meetings revealed 
discussions that dealt directly with the difference in interests, and the mutual 
perception that both partners were not taking interests into account and not 
attempting to understand positions.  
 
One particular discussion took place during the SB meeting concerning the 
perception of the private representatives that the VP (public sector) of STR 
was intentionally hampering decision making. ARS proposed a change in how 
decision making was to take place in the MB, but the city felt that the changes 
did not allow for the checks and balances necessary to protect public 
interests. ARS argued that its powers should allow the President the 
opportunity to make decisions without interference. ARS also argued to be 
allowed to choose staff that had trustworthy qualities. A transcript of the 
meeting reads as follows: 
Since becoming president, I have come to rely on [a STZ senior public 
staff member] and though we disagree on many issues, it is a healthy 
relationship . . . I want to be able to create a team that can 
effectively realiǌe the goal that has been given to STZ. I need to be 
able to decide who will be able to stand next to me when making 
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decisions . . . There is high risk in this enterprise and you have to be in 
agreement with the person who is managing it. (private sector 
respondent) 
The city representative responded, defining the limits of his trust:  
ZS proposes a DW that violates the contract on 3Ϭ points. These 
facts lead to limited trust and we need to find mechanisms to allow 
for the company to function and operate. I understand that the 
Wresident wants to be captain in making final decisions, and it is not 
my role to inform the Wresident what his role is . . . Wlease do not 
think that as a representative of the city, I trust in our mutual 
goodwill and that this is enough for me to entrust the entire control 
of the project and the management of municipal assets of 1Ϭs of 
millions of ųotys to the hands of someone appointed by the 
stakeholders without some conditions. Wlease understand that your 
actions, such as limiting the power of the sW to spend money, 
without agreeing such things first with the shareholders, are not 
building trust. then there is no trust, rules will have to decide. 
(public sector respondent) 
The public representative was indicating that ARS was overstepping certain 
boundaries, and trying to bulldoze its public partner into a position where 
public interests were not represented. The public representative, in the 
absence of ‘trust’ reverted to ‘rules’ to govern behaviour. ARS responded: 
 If we are talking about trust . . . the way the company has been 
managed so far has not been healthy [reference to conflict between 
the sW and Wresident] . . . How do we know if the Wresident’s 
intentions are honourable or honest? I do not think it is a priority to 
stick to points of the contract, but to successfully execute the 
contract. te need to make sure that the company is led effectively. 
Trust in (and within) the city 
Private respondents pinpointed certain behaviour on the part of the CB and 
CC that affected trust. This was evident over time in the drop in trust in the 
last two rounds. Perceptions were that the city did little to listen to the ideas 
being put forward by ARS (private respondent) and that the private partner 
had little opportunity to influence decision making (1) on the structure of the 
company, and (2) on the content of the project. The fact that the city 
effectively gave ARS an ultimatum at the end of Round 6, which the 
organization was obliged to accept, or lose the project, also contributed to 
the erosion in trust (private respondent).  
The city had a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude . . . the city had already set 
up STZ with their own byelaws. then we joined, there were few 
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options to change it. If ZS had been there from the beginning, the 
management could have influenced things more. zou need to have a 
chance to influence the process and the outcomes when there are 
only two shareholders involved. (private respondent) 
From ARS’s perspective, the relationship was too rule-bound and too 
constraining to manoeuvre effectively. It continued to make cuts in costs 
elsewhere to make the venture more efficient. Overtime, given all of the 
unanticipated problems and risks in the project, the deadlines set by the city 
in the contract quickly became impractical. ARS negotiated hard to introduce 
changes. When these were not forthcoming, ARS complained bitterly of the 
city’s inflexibility (two private sector respondents). ‘[The chair of the SB] stuck 
only to the letter of the contract and did not think about what was best for 
the project’ (private respondent). 
 
Private partners felt a lack of real support where necessary. This resulted in 
the feeling on the part of ARS that the venture was never really a partnership.  
s the negotiations went on, things always seemed to go in the city’s 
favour . . . they kept adding things to the deal, and requiring more 
money. te were promised guarantees on budget allocation and 
ways to ease the process . . . The city did not help with [problems 
getting the land] even if it was their responsibility. I do not know 
what the reason was but I never trusted their intentions . . . This was 
always political; no one [from the city] was behind the idea. (private 
sector respondent) 
One private respondent reflects on the differences in expectations and 
interests as a constraint to the build-up of trust. 
The whole thing was done with great optimism. ZS felt powerful: 
they had lots of money, political power with (their Wolish 
representative). They did not understand that the city could say no. 
ZS thought, like in the Third torld, that they could bribe and they 
would get what they wanted . . . ZS expected the city to help them 
out, but the city had become more revenue oriented, more money 
seeking and opportunistic. (private respondent) 
The reaction to broken trust is evident in the actions of ARS. After the division 
of STR and SCR, the President of STR locked himself behind a wall. 
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5.8 Overall assessment of the results of the 
questionnaire 
Responses to the questionnaires were merged21 to derive an overall 
assessment of the levels of trust and dimensions of that trust, over Rounds 
1-8. The sections below provide and analyse the results.22 
5.8.1 Measuring trust over the length of the project 
Table 5-13 below provides a composite view of the average trust rating per 
actor on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest. The results portray the 
average trust of respondents in the actors who participated in all rounds, as 
well as those, such a URGN and ARS, who participated over a shorter period. 
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϯ ǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ͕ĨŽƌĞŶƚŝƌĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ 
N City Council CB/NT URGN ARS 
Small 
merchants 
Communal 
tenants 
Private 
Tenants 
Valid 13 14 7 10 12 11 11 
Missing 1 0 1 0 2 3 3 
Mean 6.04 6.79 6.71 7.20 5.38 6.23 5.18 
N = 14: 6 public, 6 private and 2 non-profit. NB: One URGN respondent abstained from measuring trust 
in his own organization.  
 
The results indicate the highest average level of trust in the core partners: 
ARS (7.20), the CB/NT (6.79) and URGN (6.71). The results are not 
exceedingly high, falling within the ‘moderate’ trust category for URGN and 
the CB/NT and the low end of the ‘high’ category for ARS (reflecting the high 
21 The respondents who took part in both the URGN and ARS periods (the members of the CB/NT and one 
respondent from the MRT), and filled in questionnaires for both periods, were treated as one respondent 
and results were averaged. With regard to the responses concerning URGN and ARS, N = 8 for the URGN 
period and 10 for the ARS period.  
22 Interviews and responses given in the questionnaires revealed a consistently different position on the 
part of the respondents on the relevance of measuring trust in those in the inner circle of the partnership 
versus those peripherally involved. Interviews with representatives of the tenants revealed a willingness 
to measure trust in city officials, URGN/ARS and their peers, but city officials and private sector 
respondents were less willing to measure trust in the tenants, seeing them as less important as the object 
of trust. Those more intimately involved with the tenants in negotiations were more willing to give input 
on the level of trust in the tenants (i.e. respondents from the MRT). The unwillingness to measure trust in 
the tenants is evident in the number of missing responses, and in some cases in the responses from the 
respondents that indicated that they were neutral in their opinions. 
For the URGN questionnaire, there were four public respondents, two private and two small merchants. 
One of the small merchants became a city councillor at the tail end of the URGN period. His responses 
were made from the perspective of the small merchants. For the ARS period, the number of respondents 
on the public (five) and private side (five) is more balanced. Two respondents chose to abstain from 
responding, stating that, in the case of the City Council and the tenants, they did not have enough 
knowledge to make a judgement (one public and one private respondent). There were, as for the URGN 
period, a number of missing responses, with regard to the tenants.  
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trust within STR). It is interesting to note that overall, the average trust in the 
communal tenants is higher than the trust in the CC. The ratings for the small 
merchants and the private tenants (5.38 and 5.18) also reflect the problems 
encountered with these two actors in the project. These moderate ratings 
perhaps reflect the fact that trust is not constant but it tempered by various 
factors over the length of the project.  
 
Previous sections have argued a relationship between membership and high 
levels of trust. Public respondents consistently rate peers higher, private 
respondents consistently rate their peers higher. However, it is interesting to 
note that the responses for the URGN period also demonstrate relatively high 
ratings from non-members (average rating of 7.5 on the part of private 
respondents for the CB/NT; 7.25 on the part of public respondents for 
URGN).  
 
In addition to asking respondents to rate the degree of trust in other actors 
(the focus of trust) in the partnership, the questionnaire measured levels of 
trust of one party in another using different dimensions of trust to measure 
trust, and asking respondents to assess each of these items related to the 
other parties in the partnership on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree to 5 = 
strongly disagree). The different dimensions used, and as discussed in the 
theoretical chapters were: 
 
dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϰ͗dŚĞĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
The other party took the interests of the collaboration/project into account when making 
a decision 
The other party would not have met their obligations if their activities had not been 
defined in the contract (negative correlation with trust) 
The other party was capable of completing the project/their obligations according to 
agreements made 
The other party committed more (time or personal resources) to the 
collaboration/project than was specified in the contract 
The other party had, in general, good intentions 
The other party sometimes did not meet their obligations, but we were willing to give 
them the benefit of the doubt 
 
Table 5-15 shows the average ratings given by the respondents when asked 
about the different actors involved in the partnership.  
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dĂďůĞϱ-ϭϱ͗ dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶĞĂĐŚŬĞǇĂĐƚŽƌ͕ŽǀĞƌ
ƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ 
 
  
City 
Council  CB / NT URGN ARS 
Small 
merchants 
Communal 
tenants 
Private 
tenants 
Took the interests of the collaboration/project into account when making a decision 
N Valid 11 12 7 10 12 10 10 
 Missing 3 2 1 0 2 4 4 
 Mean 2.68 2.25 1.86 2.50 3.54 2.85 3.25 
Would not have met their obligations if their activities had not been defined in the contract 
N Valid 10 12 7 9 10 8 9 
 Missing 4 2 1 1 4 6 5 
 Mean 2.90 2.83 2.86 3.56 3.45 3.31 3.17 
Was capable of completing the project/ their obligations according to agreements made 
N Valid 11 13 6 10 10 9 9 
 Missing 3 1 2 0 4 5 5 
 Mean 2.27 2.12 2.17 2.50 3.00 2.56 2.56 
Committed more (time or personal resources) to the collaboration/project than was specified in the 
contract 
N Valid 11 13 7 8 10 9 9 
 Missing 3 1 1 2 4 5 5 
 Mean 3.41 2.85 3.00 2.25 3.00 3.17 3.22 
Had, in general, good intentions 
N Valid 11 13 7 10 12 11 11 
 Missing 3 1 1 0 2 3 3 
 Mean 2.05 1.92 1.71 1.90 2.88 2.45 3.05 
Sometimes did not meet their obligations, but we were willing to give them the benefit of the doubt23 
N Valid 11 13 7 10 10 9 9 
 Missing 3 1 1 0 4 5 5 
 Mean 2.91 2.88 3.00 2.80 2.75 2.83 2.94 
 Total 2.70 2.48 2.43 2.58 3.10 2.86 3.03 
N = 14 (1 = Strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree, in the case of , 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree) 
 
The totals, as an aggregate of the dimensions of trust, reveal (marginally) 
higher average levels of trust in the three parties playing a central negotiating 
role in the partnership, and those contractually bound, namely the city 
representatives in the CB/NT and URGN/ARS. This is also mirrored in the 
responses on the individual dimensions of trust; the central partners are for 
the most part rated higher than the other actors. 
 
URGN scored highest (1.86) on one dimension, namely took the interests of 
the collaboration/project into account when making a decision. This is 
reflected in the comments made during the interviews, related perception of 
23 Note: There is a serious question as to whether the responses to the last question are 
correct, as ‘giving the benefit of the doubt’ did not translate well in Polish and caused some 
confusion. It appeared during some checking that perhaps only one respondent really 
understood the question. 
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the private partner’s ability, in the first two rounds, to understand the public 
perspective on development, and to demonstrate respect for public interests 
during negotiations (four public respondents). Evidence of this dimension 
can also be seen in the steps taken on the part of URGN to canvas the 
opinions of the tenants and to work with them to find mutual solutions 
(private, public respondent, tenant). The result of the CB/NT and ARS are 
slightly less positive (2.25 and 2.50 respectively), reflecting the perception of 
both public and private respondents: on one hand, the inflexibility of the 
CB/NT (two private respondents, one public respondent) and on the other, 
the inability or unwillingness of ARS to sympathize with the constraints that 
the public sector faces (two public respondents).  
 
Respondents were clear on one dimension of trust, that partners had, in 
general, good intentions: the city representatives on the City Board/ 
Negotiation Team (1.71), as well as URGN (1.71) and ARS (1.91) were 
assessed highest in this regard, the CC slightly lower (2.05) the tenants to a 
lesser degree (2.88, 2.45, 3.05 respectively). This is consistent with the 
findings from the interviews, during which respondents underlined the 
sincerity with which all partners attempted to make this project work (all 
respondents). The rating for the private tenants (3.50) reflects the 
perception of ARS respondents in STR of the intentional moves of the private 
tenants to kill the project (two private respondents, one public respondent). 
 
Of note is the results for ARS (3.54) for the dimension would not have met 
obligations had these not been specified in the contract. This demonstrates 
the consternation felt by the public partners when ARS proposed a Master 
Plan that diverged from the contract, as well as the concern they felt in the 
months that followed that ARS would not meet the deadlines agreed upon 
(three public respondents). 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at a PPP case in two key phases, the URGN and the ARS 
phases. The chapter and the analysis of results were structured to respond 
to the research questions one by one: 
 
 What was the nature of the interaction (strategies) between partners 
and other actors during the partnership processes, over the rounds, in 
the three cases? 
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 What were the dynamics of the growth (or decline) of trust over time as 
perceived by the partners and other actors over the rounds of the 
partnership? 
 What was the nature of outcomes and risk as perceived by the partners 
and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What important factors led to the growth of trust? 
 Did trust have an influence on risk and the outcomes achieved, and if so 
what kind? 
 
What type of conclusions can be drawn from the information and analysis 
provided in this chapter? 
5.9.1 General comment on the interaction in both phases 
of the case study 
The ‘styles’ of strategies used in the two periods of interaction were 
significantly different, from the start of both phases. The strategies employed 
by both sectors during the URGN phase (termed ‘warm and fuzzy’ by one 
public respondent) contrasted greatly from the strategies used by the city 
and ARS (more positional and adversarial). In fact, one can conclude that the 
URGN interaction was both a ‘calculative’ and a ‘relational’ interaction (the 
partners had and took the chance to develop a relationship), whereas ARS’s 
was only calculative. 
 
Also of note is the length of each interaction: the URGN partnership lasted 
four and a half years, while the ARS partnership, not even a full two years. 
With the knowledge that trust takes time to build, one would assume that it 
was difficult to build trust in the ARS relationship, as it was short.  
 
With regard to ARS, the historical aspects of this project influenced the 
partnership. ARS entered into a relationship with ‘a past’ and the 
government brought with it some preconditions. It needed to move quickly 
and with some urgency. The government knew it had alternatives, and it was 
less patient with a new partner. The city was looking for an injection of funds, 
but there is a question as to whether it really needed ARS all that much. Was 
there the interdependence that one looks for in a partnership and is a 
condition for trust, or was the city always prepared to walk away if things did 
not go its way? Was this the right setting for trust?  
 
The manner in which the city dealt with obstacles with ARS was characterized 
by a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude. The reaction to each obstacle was to give 
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ARS an ultimatum. This did not work. Again, one could argue that this was 
very ‘deterrence’-based behaviour on the part of the city and, as theorists 
argue, not conducive to the building of trust. 
 
This case study is special, as there are two different interactions, and it is 
possible to compare these interactions taking place in the same context and 
draw additional conclusions from that comparison. 
5.9.2 The dynamics of trust 
In both phases, the figures charting levels of trust showed changes in trust 
over time, a trust cycle, but a dynamic one. They indicated an initial growth 
in trust, and then the erosion of trust. For both periods, the partners were 
not able to maintain the initial trust built, and trust did not reach stronger 
and more resilient levels.  
 
There are some inconsistencies between the figures showing changes in 
average levels of trust and the overall assessment of trust: the overall 
average level of trust in all actors was higher than in the trust cycle figures. 
This seems to indicate that though trust declined over time and was low at a 
particular point in time, in retrospect, trust levels overall were higher 
 
Of note in this case, and in both phases, was the importance of membership 
as a determinant of trust. This implies, for instance, that members of the 
public team indicated higher levels of the trust in their own team than in the 
private sector partners. Individuals from the same sector, working together 
negotiating for their own interests, built trust over time. Also, for instance, 
when looking at the cross tabulations, while the public sector ratings of ARS 
were quite low, the scores given by the ARS ‘people’ were extremely high. 
This leads one to conclude that, though partners may be building trust in 
each other, members of an organization, when working in a partnership, 
have a tendency to trust their own kind more. Trust in another sector takes 
time to build. 
 
In addition, the overall assessments of trust indicated the highest levels of 
trust in the core partners (the CB/NT: 7.38 and URGN: 6.71; the SB: 7.10 and 
ARS: 7.2) over the other types of actors. Of interest, however, when looking 
at the overall assessments of the core partners, is that public respondents 
gave URGN a relatively high average rating overall (7.25) and ARS somewhat 
lower (4.8). Private respondents gave an average rating of 7.5 to the core 
public partner (CB/NT) during the URGN phase, and 6.2 to the SB during the 
ARS phase. The public sector still demonstrated trust in URGN overall, and 
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URGN in the public sector. However, in the ARS phase partners were more 
negative about the other core party. Trust was still present in the URGN 
phase. 
5.9.3 Perception of outcomes 
Of note is that, in the end, the partners in the URGN partnership had different 
perceptions of the outcomes of the partnership. On the one hand, 
participants from the public sector had the tendency to think of the failure 
of the project ‘as a small thing’: they were focused on the big picture, the 
political risk they were facing, and the different options for the future. They 
did mention that they learned a lot from URGN, which they would put to use 
in the future (in fact, they had at their disposal an entire concept and project, 
wholly worked out). 
 
On the other hand, the project was a commercial failure for URGN and there 
was no future for it but to exit and leave. The organization realized that it 
was too weak financially to take on the project. In addition, the perception 
of private respondents was that they had invested four and a half years of 
time and money in this project and the relationship, with little return. This 
loss was more than financial; they also perceived that they had invested 
more into making the project work than the city.  
 
These differences in perceptions reflect the fact that when times were 
‘good’, goals seemed to be in alignment, but when the project failed, the 
different interests of each of the parties and the implication of the project 
failure became apparent. The public partner began to act opportunistically.  
 
In the ARS phase, the initial outcomes were positive, the city chose ARS and 
the developer had funds. ARS felt confident that it could make a difference 
in the area. Over time, however, perceptions of outcomes on both sides were 
negative but, in a way, similar: both sides perceived the relationship was 
difficult and frustrating, taking too much time. The public sector was 
concerned that there were delays in delivery; the private sector was chafing 
over the bureaucracy in decision making. Ultimately, after the divorce and 
years after completion of the project, perceptions of the respondents were 
mixed, ranging from serious disappointment on the private side to grudging 
appreciation on the public side that the project had delivered something of 
value, however slowly.  
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5.9.4 Perception of risks 
The risks as perceived by the partners again reflect sectoral interests. URGN 
and ARS both perceived commercial risks (market and demand risks, project 
design risks, competition from Pazim). Clearly, the difference was that URGN 
perceived financial risks with which ARS was not faced.  
 
Risk for the public sector revolved more around political risks: the tenants, 
the media and pressures from the city council. A public sector respondent 
admitted totally underestimating the importance of these perceived risks for 
the PPP; in fact, these risks were so great that they became critical for the 
private sector partners. During the URGN period, the resistance of the 
tenants caused Veidekke to pull out mid-way; this was also a major cause for 
concern for the EBRD. The tenants also became a burden for ARS, the risk 
perception was very prominent towards the end of the relationship. The 
political risk related to the tenants contributed to the commercial failure of 
the project.  
 
Of interest is how the coping strategies changed in the two phases, in the 
first, discussions were reasonable, in the second, coping strategies in both 
camps were to negotiate hard. When faced with risk, the city continued to 
look at other options and used tactics such as aborting negotiations.  
5.9.5 Factors of trust 
In both the URGN and ARS phases, there are discrepancies between the 
results from the questionnaire and the results of the interviews. The results 
of the questionnaire indicate the need for more information on reputation 
and past performance as factors, as well as the ability to ‘speak the same 
language’, the latter points to a need to overcome the differences in framing. 
The results of the questionnaire also underline the willingness to share 
information and resources as a factor of trust. During the ARS phase, the 
results of the questionnaire also focused on the need for more information 
on reputation and past performance as factors, as well as the ability to ‘speak 
the same language’, but less on the willingness to share information and 
resources as a factor of trust. 
 
The interviews, on the other hand, reveal that the respondents from the 
URGN period focused mostly on the willingness to share information and 
resources, as well as respect for capacity as factors of trust, both knowledge 
factors of trust. Interestingly, it was the reverse, it was URGN’s withholding 
ϭϴϮ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 215
of information and the lack of capacity (they overestimated the probability 
of gaining funding) that led to the public sector’s decline in trust.  
 
Related to the ARS period, respondents focused mostly on negative factors 
of trust, such as the behaviour of the partners (the city was rule bound and 
inflexible, ARS was arrogant and unable to understand public interest). They 
underlined the predictability of this behaviour, also a knowledge factor of 
trust. In addition, there was reference to the delays on the part of STR (but 
attributed to ARS) in delivering, not meeting expectations and achieving the 
outcomes promised, as a negative factor of trust.  
 
Of interest is the fact that for neither phase did the respondents focus, in the 
results of the questionnaire, on the need for penalties in the contract as a 
factor of trust. In the quotes above, one public sector respondent refers to 
ARS as violating the contract on 30 points. There was also substantial 
reference to the need for the city to use the contract to guide the 
relationship, in both phases. Again, one can conclude that the contract is a 
negative factor of trust. Having to resort to it only serves to underline the 
fragility of the relationship and undermines trust development. This confirms 
arguments to this effect in the literature (Bovaird 2004). 
5.9.6 Influence of trust on perceptions of outcomes and 
risk 
Influence of trust on outcomes 
Looking at the figure below, which traces the strategies of the partners, 
outcomes and trust build-up or breakdown, one can argue that there was a 
link between trust (build-up or breakdown) and outcomes. When looking at 
the figure, one sees that something had to happen first to build trust (trust 
as the dependant variable); the strategies during the interaction of the 
partners had to achieve an outcome to build trust. There was then a link 
between trust build-up/breakdown and outcomes, or more precisely 
between trust build-up and strategies employed which then produce the 
outcomes. The success of the negotiations brought about trust build-up, the 
partners continued to interact to make the project work, over time the lack 
of funds led to the final erosion of trust. 
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Figure ϱ-ϳ͗>ŝŶŬƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚƚŽŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕hZ'EƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
 
 
With regard to the ARS period, looking at the sequence of strategies, 
outcomes and trust, one comes to a similar conclusion. Achieving an initial 
outcome was important for the initial build-up of trust, subsequent negative 
outcomes eroded trust. It was then clear that trust or lack thereof had an 
effect on the coping strategies used; partners used mostly defensive 
strategies, leading then to negative outcomes. The lack of trust had a 
negative influence on strategies and outcomes. 
 
Figure ϱ-ϴ͗>ŝŶŬƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚƚŽŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕Z^ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
 
 
This case study and the sequencing in the figure underline an interest point: 
both the strategies (the behaviour of the partners) and the outcomes 
influenced trust, and looking at causal relations in the other way, trust build-
up (or breakdown) influenced both behaviours and outcomes. As an 
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example, the style of negotiation of both partners led to the success in 
reaching an agreement, and then, trusting in the outcomes, partners 
continued to work together in the same manner, leading to a well-conceived 
and detailed project. What one can conclude is that both behaviours and 
outcomes are a factor of trust and that trust can influence both behaviour 
and outcomes.  
Influence of trust on perception of risk 
Looking at the influence of trust on the perception of risk, one can argue that 
trust was sufficient to offset the perception of risk, particularly political and 
financial risk, for URGN and the city to continue to take risks up to the end of 
Round 3. At that point, however, the partners were faced with the limits of 
trust, and the city decided to sever the relationship. In fact, reaching the 
limits of trust implied that the city began to act opportunistically, looking for 
other options. At a certain point, trust was not sufficient to overcome the 
perception of risk.  
 
The most important trust relationship in this partnership, and the 
relationship in which most resources were invested, was the trust between 
URGN and the CB/NT. However, it is important to note that URGN was fully 
dependent on funding from external partiers, first its investors and then, 
when this fell through, a combination of EBRD and ESPEBEPE. In turn, the 
CB/NT was also dependent on URGN to finance the project, and at a point in 
time, was faced with not being able to wait in the face of the political risk. In 
the long run, the trust between the two main actors was affected by the 
activities and requirements of external parties. The perception of risks was 
just too great to continue the relationship, no matter the trust between the 
two central actors. This case shows that external parties may be the cause of 
the perception of risk and exert an important influence on the project, the 
relationship and on trust.  
 
One has to wonder, however, for the URGN partners, if trust kept the 
partners together longer than ‘was advisable’, past a period that was 
rational. Interviews seem (in retrospect) to indicate this. On commercial 
terms, waiting two years after the signing of the contract for the funds to 
come through was perhaps foolish, but one could conclude that the partners 
were willing to continue to take risks (delays, pressures from the tenants and 
the media) due to the initial trust built. 
 
This brings one to the conclusion that perhaps trust bordering on blind faith 
keeps partners together longer than is advisable. Still, there is a point, when 
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risks become too great, that though trust may still be present, there are limits 
to the influence of trust on the perception of risk. Partners will revert to 
rational behaviour, to protecting their own interests, will decide to break 
relations, and exit the project. 
 
With regard to the ARS period, with the erosion of trust, the perception of 
risks was high. Relations were adversarial, with the city feeling that ARS was 
inflexible, pursuing its own interests, and not understanding the risks the city 
was facing. ARS’s perspective was that the city did not understand the risk 
that ARS was running and the attempt to build a viable project, to cut costs 
and bring efficiency into decision making. The results show a battle of 
interests and unfulfilled expectations, and no effective mechanism to 
negotiate or mediate these interests. In effect, without trust, the interaction 
was characterized by defensive coping strategies that revolved solely around 
the discussion and the negotiation of risks. In fact, in this situation, the 
partners resorted to the letter of the law. This is a circumstance when control 
replaces trust, in situations of lack of trust. The inability to negotiate 
differences was seen, at some point, as a key risk and this changed 
behaviour; trust was not able to influence the perception of risk. 
 
  
ϭϴϲ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 219
 
ϭϴϳ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 220
 
ϭϴϴ | P a g e  
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 221
6 Battery Park City, New York City, United 
States 
6.1 Introduction 
Too many cooks spoil the broth, a battle of interests and serious delays. This 
was the nature of the interaction in the development of the Battery Park City 
site from 1958 to 1979. The 92-acre Battery Park City (BPC) project, located 
on the south-west corner of Manhattan and occupying a key waterfront 
position, suffered through years of political squabbling and differences, 
extreme delays and money problems. It is now, however, considered to be 
one of the most well thought out, well developed and successful projects in 
New York City (NYC), to a great extent due to the initial partnership between 
a Canadian developer: Olympia and York (O & Y) and the public entity, the 
Battery Park City Authority (the BPCA).  
 
A substantial amount of development has occurred on the site since the 
BPCA-O & Y partnership. All this development has contributed to the overall 
success and attractiveness of the area. Still, this chapter argues that the 
project would not have achieved its current success without the ‘kick start’ 
provided by the partnership: the BPCA-O & Y partnership built the 
commercial centre, the flagship project that provided the anchor tenants, 
and brought in the revenues to make the project viable and to repay the 
rising debt incurred by the BPCA. This financial success also provided a 
reduced perception of risk so that other developers felt confident enough to 
invest in building out the remainder of the site, making the project what it is 
today. 
 
The area is now populated by 12,543 residents (2013 figures), and offers 
amenities on the site which attract a great number of visitors every day. The 
project has added a new, safe neighbourhood to the city and has aided the 
city government in regaining much of the tax revenue lost with the shift of 
the higher-income population to the suburbs.  
6.2 Structure of the chapter 
The following section looks at the actors involved in the decision-making 
process and their interests relative to the partnership and to the project. 
These actors were linked to the project in different ways, over different 
periods. The following section describes the process of project development, 
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the issues faced and the nature of the interaction between partners. Again, 
the interaction is divided into rounds, each of which ends with a key decision 
point.  
 
This chapter first describes the first three rounds: the interaction was 
dominated by public actors, and no partnership was established. The chapter 
looks at the events that took place during these rounds as they act as the 
backdrop and are relevant to the relationship that was established between 
the BPCA and O & Y in the later rounds. The chapter then goes on to outline 
the interaction in Rounds 4 to 6 and the nature of the partnership. 
 
At the end of the description of the interaction between partners, both the 
results of the research are analysed: the perceptions of outcomes, risk and 
trust per round and how these influenced strategies and the factors that 
contributed to the build-up or breakdown of trust. This analysis will highlight 
the factors and perceptions that led to a build-up of trust in the partnership, 
and will conclude with the major points that come out of the analysis.  
6.3 Actors on the scene 
The actors on the scene changed over the different periods of the project. 
Due to the high number of actors that took part in the project over the past 
40+ years, this chapter lists only the organizations that were highly involved 
or connected to the ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ, had the most influence over the ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐand 
were the most connected to the ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ. The table below lists the 
different actors, gives information on the nature of each, and outlines their 
primary interests as related to the project. 
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As stated above, there were many actors with an interest in the development 
of the area. Clearly, the table does not portray the complexity of the 
interaction ‘surrounding’ the project. This complexity was particularly 
apparent during the first period of the project (Rounds 1-3). Each of the 
public (state and city level) agencies involved hired their own architects and 
consultants, and there were lobby groups taking a stand on the 
development; the media published widely on the design and the progress (or 
lack thereof) of the project. The context in which the project found itself, 
particularly in such a large and culturally diverse city as NYC, was highly 
complex and politically sensitive. 
 
Of note is that, at the outset of the project and well into the partnership, the 
Wall Street area, where the project was being built, had no residential areas, 
so the community did not play a role. The community is not listed as a key 
actor, with a stake in the project and partnership. This implies that the 
partnership interaction was not influenced by what is typically a strong 
pressure group with divergent interests. 
 
In the first three rounds, the most important lobby group, representing 
private interests, was therefore the DLMA. This organization played an 
important role in communicating private interests and supporting the 
development of the project. 
 
In effect, the first three rounds were dominated by public agencies, led by 
strong individuals. Nelson Rockefeller, for instance, was the Governor of the 
State of NY and was highly and personally involved in the beginning of the 
process. In Rounds 4-6, as the partnership took off, the number of public 
actors with a central role diminished to only those with a decision-making 
role, and the process simplified. The progress made in the project revolved 
around the two key actors: the Battery Park City Authority and its private 
partner, Olympia and York. 
6.4 The process 
6.4.1 Overview of project rounds 1-3: key decisions 
points, change in actors, stakes and content24 
Before starting with a description of the interaction, the table below provides 
a quick view of the key actors in Rounds 1-3, (mostly political figures played 
24 This chapter makes use of two major sources; first. D. L. A. Gordon’s Battery Wark City: 
Wolitics and Wlanning on the Eew zork taterfront; second, C. J. Urstadt’s Battery Wark City. 
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key and decisive roles) and identifies moments when key decisions were 
made that brought about a change in actors, the stakes or the content of the 
project. It highlights per round, the key and peripheral actors, the intensity 
and nature of their interaction, crucial decisions made, as well the evolution 
of the stakes. This table also includes the political figures at the State and City 
Government levels and the date of their (re)elections. These dates are 
significant as they often coincide with when important decisions were made 
on the public side concerning the project. 
 
As mentioned before, Rounds 1-3 were predominantly characterized by 
interactions between public parties jockeying for position relative to the 
development of the site. The private sector was involved in the form of the 
Downtown Lower-Manhattan Association (the DLMA). Other private actors 
were the consultants hired by the public bodies.25 This next section of the 
chapter describes these interactions, and then briefly outlines the 
perceptions of outcomes, risk and trust between PUBLIC parties only. There 
is no in-depth analysis of these perceptions as the Public-Private Partnership 
was formed in Round 4. The description does, however, give an image of the 
perceptions of the key public players at the time of the forming of the 
partnership: understanding these perceptions is essential to sketching the 
context in which the partnership was formed and to understanding the 
position of the public sector in the negotiations with Olympia and York (O & 
Y). Round 4 was the round during which the perceptions of risk and trust 
became an issue between the public and private sector.  
 
The initial descriptions of Rounds 1-3 in this chapter highlight the political 
fights and lack of trust in the political arena and the high level of political risk 
that was present when the public sector began to build a relationship with 
the private partner.  
  
Both publications provide a clear description of how events unfolded and interactions 
occurred. My sincere thanks to both for allowing me to use the information provided. 
25 Interestingly, the community was not a key actor, as there were limited residential areas 
in Lower Manhattan at that time. 
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 j26 
26 This chapter will refer to ‘the State’ and ‘the City’: ‘The State’ refers to State of NY 
government organizations in general and ‘the City’ to City government organizations in 
general. 
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6.4.2 Background of the project 
In the 1950s, the New York City harbour ceased to function as a key harbour. 
The restructuring of the local economy and the evolution of the city from a 
strong industrial and manufacturing to a financial, information and service 
centre left much of the land for the former activities barren and unused. This 
included all the piers along the edges of Manhattan. The southern tip of 
Manhattan had real potential as it was also the historical area of Manhattan, 
the location of Wall Street, and was close to some key tourist sites (Ellis 
Island, Statue of Liberty), as well as the buildings of government.  
 
In the mid-1960s the harbour area and the southern tip of Manhattan 
continued to decline: the economic and technological changes were making 
the historical buildings and the Wall Street area obsolete. Competition was 
coming from the midtown area where real estate was more attractive, 
buildings were more suitable to the needs of the major companies, there was 
better access to transport, and more variety in and choice of service facilities. 
Many large firms decided to relocate and land values in the area were 
plummeting.  
 
The City Government and the private sector prominent in the Wall Street 
area were interested to lure firms back to the area. The Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey (PA)27 decided to invest in the office market and 
build the World Trade Center (WTC). As construction began, the PA faced the 
problem of trying to dispose of the excavation materials from the WTC site, 
and the City saw the opportunity to use the materials for landfill off the 
southern tip of Manhattan. The City offered up the pier area as a land 
reclamation site. This land reclamation site was to become the Battery Park 
City Project. 
6.4.3 Round 1: Proposals for the Lower Hudson 
Waterfront: duelling plan (1958-1966) 
In the early 1960s, many agencies were conscious of the need to do 
something with the derelict waterfront of southern Manhattan and were 
investigating how to make better use of the resources provided in the area. 
The prevailing idea was that there should be a greater mix of functions and 
that the area should be used for homes and offices (Gordon 1997: 3). At the 
same time, there was much community pressure in the city and political 
27 The two states (New York and New Jersey) used one agency to coordinate their mutual 
interests related to harbour activities. 
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support for a project that would provide additional housing, for a mix of 
income classes, and other uses (Urstadt and Brown 2005, public sector 
interview, 2007). 
 
The inception of the Battery Park City Project was characterized by the 
political jockeying with schemes for the area between different parties from 
the New York State and City Governments, as well as a series of other interest 
groups in the area. There were five key groups with interests in the area who 
developed ideas for the project. They put together project proposals in the 
years 1963 to 1966. 
 
The first proposal was developed by the New York City Department of Marine 
and Aviation (the DMA) in April 1963. Opposing the ideas of the DMA were 
(1) the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA), (2) the Downtown-
Lower Manhattan Association28 (DLMA), a powerful private planning 
organization headed by David Rockefeller, and (3) the City Planning 
Commission (CPC) of the City of New York. The final party involved was the 
Governor of the State of New York, Nelson Rockefeller29 (brother of David). 
 
As the City owned the piers and the land, and regulated all development in 
Manhattan, the expectation on the part of the City was that it would guide 
the redevelopment of the area. The DMA’s consultants30 and architects31 
proposed a complex programme, released on 15 April 1963, mixing six 
commercial pier slips, eight office buildings, 4,500 dwelling units in 18 high-
rise buildings, and a 40-storey hotel. The plan also included a landfill, 
stretching from Battery Park to Chambers Street, to make more land 
available for the project. Their plan broached the idea of the landfill for the 
first time. The plan was still wedded to the idea of keeping marine passenger 
traffic in the area (Gordon 1997: 8). The plan received little support from 
other bodies and in the press. 
 
The interests of the DLMA (Gordon 1997: 8) in a site on the southern tip of 
Manhattan stemmed from the fact that the organization had been involved 
28 A group organized by David Rockefeller in the early 1960s to work on the revitalization of 
the Wall Street area. Most real estate people were predicting at that time that business 
interests would be moving to the more suitable midtown area. The group had been urging for 
the development of the World Trade Center (Gill, 1990). 
29 A liberal republican. 
30 Ebacsco Management Consultants. 
31 Eggers and Higgins Architects. 
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in lobbying for the development of the World Trade Center32 and was 
interested to have residential uses to complement the commercial 
development there (eliminating additional commercial and industrial uses 
would also ensure that there would be no competition to the WTC). The 
organization commissioned architects33 to come up with a design, which was 
released on 21 November 1963. 
 
The growing interests in the area stimulated the City Planning Commission 
(CPC) of the City of New York to sit up and take notice. In February 1965, 
under Mayor Robert Wagner, the CPC commissioned a consortium of 
planning firms34 to create a comprehensive plan of lower Manhattan. Their 
plan was delayed by the local elections and swearing in of the new Mayor, 
John Lindsay.35  
 
In the meantime, the New York State Governor, Nelson Rockefeller, 
concerned about the quality and quantity of middle-income housing, was 
busy proposing residential developments in the City and around the State, 
one of which was on the city’s waterfront (Gordon 1997). He was also 
supportive of the Port Authority building the World Trade Center Towers, 
and their design team’s idea to use the excavation materials to create the 
landfill in lower Manhattan. In late 1965, he requested his long-term 
architect36 to produce his own scheme for the redevelopment of the area. 
The architect’s plan entailed a programme of 13,982 housing units, a hotel 
of 2,200 rooms, two office buildings, recreational areas, shopping centres, 
light industrial areas and parks (Harrison, 1966: 7 in Gordon 1997). The report 
that accompanied the plans, titled, Battery Wark City, Eew Housing Space for 
Eew zork was the first document that gave a name to the area of the city. 
The name reflected the planning ideology of the day: to create a ‘city within 
the city’. The Governor’s plan was presented at a press conference on 12 May 
1966, before the CPC was able to reveal its own ideas for the site. Mayor 
Lindsay and the Governor’s brother had not been forewarned about the 
proposal. This created friction between the parties involved (Gordon 1997: 
14) and the press criticized the Governor for not coordinating efforts with 
the City. 
32 The DLMA had done a study of potential development in lower Manhattan (released 14 
October 1958) and had proposed that the Port Authority build the WTC (DLMA, 1958 in DG: 
8). 
33 Skidmore Owings and Merrill (SOM). 
34 Headed by Conklin and Rossant. 
35 On the republican ticket. 
36 Wallace Harrison (with partner Abromovitz). 
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The next move made was by the CPC, which came out on 22 June 1996 with 
its policy document, The >ower Danhattan Wlan, just a month after the 
Governor’s unveiling of his proposal. The CPC’s plan studied the area in a 
more comprehensive manner, looking at all neighbourhoods in the area, as 
well as transport and access conditions (Gordon 1997). The proposal also 
incorporated the idea of landfill and provided for the expansion of financial 
and residential areas. The plan, again based on the design principles of the 
time, called for a state-of-the-art ‘superblock’ layout, a town within a town. 
The DLMA supported the scheme and the press praised the design 
(Progressive Architecture 1966: 132). 
 
There were now clear but contrasting interests in developing the site. The 
City and the State decided to take up negotiations for real and became the 
two primary players in the faceoff.  
6.4.4 Round 2: The City and State negotiate (1966-1968) 
This decision was important as the City and State both invested in the idea of 
doing something with the area (it evolved from an ‘idea’ into a solid ‘plan’) 
and the political figures at both levels made manpower and resources 
available to take the project further.  
Change in actors 
The decision to go ahead with the project implied that the number of major 
actors reduced to two: the City (Mayor’s office and the CPC) and the State 
(the Governor’s Office and the State Legislature). The other players also 
played a role, but took sides, supporting either the City or the State.  
 
Mayor Lindsay set up the Office of Lower Manhattan Development in January 
of 1968 to implement the Lower Manhattan Plan and to negotiate with the 
State. The powerful private interest of the DLMA supported the City. David 
Rockefeller was still smarting from not being consulted by his brother on an 
area to which he had been committed for ten years (Gordon 1997: 24). The 
DLMA executed a market study in November 1968 recommending luxury and 
middle-income housing on the BPC site. 
Change in stakes 
The stakes intensified as the battle for power and negotiations of interests 
intensified. The State and City held different powers. New York City, under 
Mayor Lindsay, owned the land, had regulatory and approval authority over 
any project proposal, and had come out with the plan that had received the 
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greatest support to date from action groups and the press. The State 
authorities, under Nelson Rockefeller, had funds, the legislative authority, 
and the interest to build such a project (Gordon 1997: 21, Urstadt and Brown 
2005: 55). Though the two authorities agreed in principle, they entered into 
a fight on how the project should be developed and executed. Serious 
negotiations on Battery Park City began in 1966. During the negotiations, the 
City remained aggravated about the possibility of the State taking over the 
redevelopment of the project, to be located on city-owned land (Gordon 
1997). 
Change in content 
For three years, the negotiation revolved around certain issues: 
x The returns from the project that would go to the City. 
x The spread of residential units over income classes and the proportion 
to be allocated to the lower income units. 
x The design concept and programming of the project. 
x Agreements on the role of the City in the implementation of the project 
(Gordon 1997: 24). 
Interaction 
After three years of negotiations, the two authorities finally came to an 
agreement, signing a Memorandum of Understanding on 25 April 1968 
(Gordon 1997, Urstadt and Brown 2005: 69). They agreed that the State 
would develop the Battery Park site, while the city would manage other 
initiatives on the eastern side of the island (Elliot interview 1992 in Gordon 
1997: 25). The State agreed to set up an implementation authority, which 
would pay ground rent to the city, as well as any profits from the project. 
There was a final sticking point: the type of housing to be built. The city 
argued for market housing in the area, arguing that higher-income residents 
would bring tax revenues for the City and would be more suitable adjacent 
to the Wall Street area and the World Trade Center; the State preferred more 
of mix of income classes, mirroring the concerns of the Governor. 
6.4.5 Round 3: Getting started and stalling out during a 
market crisis (1968-1979) 
These decisions were important as it appeared that problems and differences 
had been resolved and responsibilities allocated. The State was free to take 
the content of the project further, to work on accessing financing for the 
project, and to set up a team. The City agreed to focus its interests elsewhere 
and to retain an approval function on the project.  
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Change in actors and stakes 
With the signing of the MoU, the State took over the responsibility for 
developing the site. The stakes shifted as roles were delegated to the various 
State parties and tasks were allocated to those working on the setup of the 
project. As Gordon (1997) mentions: to get the project off the ground the 
Governor had to “modify Harrison’s plan, set up an implementation 
organisation, arrange funding and obtain the necessary approvals for 
building” (Gordon 1997: 23). 
 
On 31 May 1968, the State established the Battery Park City Authority 
(BPCA),37 “a public benefit corporation, an autonomous organiǌation that 
could issue its own bonds. The BWC consisted of three members appointed 
by the 'overnor for a term of ϲ years” (Gordon 1997: 29, Urstadt 2005: 70). 
The BPCA was tasked with the redevelopment “. . . in cooperation with the 
city of Eew zork and the private sector of a mixed commercial and residential 
community, with adequate utilities systems and civic and public facilities such 
as schools, open public spaces, recreational and cultural facilities necessary 
for the prosperity and welfare of the people of the city of Eew zork and the 
state as a whole” (NYS General Laws 1968, c. 343). Rockefeller selected 
Charles Urstadt to be the chairman of the BPCA; he was elected to the 
position on 5 August 1968. 
Interaction 
Charles Urstadt managed to secure a substantial amount of funding for the 
start-up of the BPCA. He first obtained two loans totalling $600,000 from the 
Chase Manhattan Bank and Morgan Guarantee Trust Company. He obtained 
a $15 million line of credit from the State of NY in July 1969. These funds 
were used for start-up costs, including the setup of the BPCA office, 
consultants’ fees, and expenditures entailed in keeping the Authority going 
for three years. The BPCA used only $5 million of the State’s line of credit by 
the end of 1971 (Gordon 1997: 43, Urstadt and Brown 2005, public sector 
interview 2007). 
 
The BPCA hired architect Philip Johnson to help mediate between the State 
and City architects and to design a Master Development Plan that would 
satisfy the interests of both the City and the Governor. The plan produced by 
the team and released 16 April 1969 received critical and positive coverage 
in the press (Gordon 1997).  
 
37 Initially a corporation called the Battery Park City Corporation Authority (Urstadt 2005: 70). 
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The 1969 Master Development Plan38 was based on the planning approaches 
of the time. It proposed a single building complex, linked via a seven-storey 
spine that ran the entire length of the site. Functions were located 
horizontally at different levels of the spine, commercial and retail activities 
were located at different levels than parking. Seven ‘development pods’ 
were located in different areas of the megastructure, the commercial pod 
was located at the south end of the site, with grand views of the harbour, 
what Governor Rockefeller called ‘the best spot in town’ (Interview Douglass 
2008, Gordon 1997: 34). The residential pods were to be located along the 
spine. 
 
This approach employed the stacking of uses to allow for higher density on 
the site, and layered, horizontal circulation separating pedestrian traffic and 
vehicular traffic through the use of pedestrian bridges. The layering of uses 
and the ‘raising’ of the pedestrians was conceived as a way of dealing with 
the perceived safety issues in the city at the time (public sector interview 
2007, Urstadt and Brown 2005).  
 
It (the proposed design) was huge, in a Corbusian way. It would separate 
pedestrians from traffic, it would have big plaǌas. Weople would live in open 
spaces and would get (both) the country and the city, and life would be 
good. t the end of that period, that’s how it was planned . . . They 
envisioned that everything would exist at this (upper) level. Traffic would go 
beneath. Wedestrians and traffic would never meet. (public sector 
respondent 2009) 
 
The architects finalized the Master Development Plan in an election year, and 
the mix of housing was the subject of much discussion by different lobby 
groups. Mayor Lindsay finally reversed his stand on the housing mix in August 
1969 and agreed to support a housing mix of one third low, middle and high 
income respectively. The CPC and the Board of Estimates (B of E)39 approved 
the Master Plan in August 1969 and the Special Battery District Zoning in 
October 1969. The B of E also approved the Master Lease in October 1969; it 
was set for a term of 99 years, to start in 1970. The BPCA signed the Master 
Lease with the City, incorporating the Master Development Plan in 
38 The term Master Plan is used to represent a different type of document than the typical 
planning drawings. In this circumstance, the documents for the project included strategic 
guidelines, quality standards and feasibility studies. Location and use are governed by zoning 
plans.  
39 See table at the beginning of the chapter describing the role of these two institutions in 
public decision making in NYC. 
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November 1969. With these approvals and the signing of the Master Lease, 
the BPCA turned its attention to executing the landfill, building the 
infrastructure and attracting private sector investment in the properties 
proposed for the site (Gordon 1997; Urstadt and Brown 2005). 
 
The economic recession began in the fall of 1969. 
 
Demolition of the piers began in July 1970; fill from the excavation from the 
World Trade Center was used to start the landfill on the site. The remainder 
of the site was created with sand dredged from the Lower New York Bay. A 
complex platform had to be built on the site to straddle the PATH tubes from 
NJ to the World Trade Center. The landfill was completed in 1976. 
 
The BPCA set out to attract commercial tenants by placing advertisements 
for office leases from September to December 1970. There was limited 
response to the organization’s initial efforts, supply from alternative sites 
was creating competition, i.e. the first tower of the World Trade Center was 
completed and occupied in 1971, absorbing much of the downtown office 
market, and locations in Midtown and on the Lower East Side were popular. 
The BPCA then opted for another approach and moved to attract bids from 
large private developers for the commercial pod; in early 1972, Harry 
Helmsley was chosen to build the property (Gordon 1997; Urstadt and Brown 
2005). 
 
The market for housing looked marginally better, there were State and 
Federal programmes supporting the construction of low- and middle-income 
housing; James Felt and Co., the Authority’s market analyst, forecast a 
market for 6,000 luxury rental units in lower Manhattan (Gordon 1997: 43), 
and that BPC might attract 4,700, if there was little competition in the area 
(Gordon 1997: 43).40 In April 1971, the BPCA advertised for bids from 
residential developers; interviewed 20, and entered into negotiations with 
three. The Authority signed a Letter of Intent with Lefrak Organization and 
Fisher Brothers, one of New York’s largest residential builders, in 1972 
(Gordon 1997; Urstadt and Brown 2005). 
 
In 1972, Urstadt went to bond market, and managed to market and secure 
$200,000 million in bonds ($45.2 million in serial and $154.8 in term bonds). 
$58.2 million of the bond issue was set aside for capitalized interest, reserves 
40 Lower Manhattan had very few residential areas at the time, properties were mainly 
occupied by the financial and service sectors (source: public sector interview 2007). 
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and the cost of the bond issue. The remaining funds were for use by the 
BPCA, covering the costs of repaying the $5 million credit from the State and 
$45 million for the landfill. The remaining amount, $90 million, did not, 
however, cover the expenses needed to build the seven-storey spine. These 
funds were kept in the bank while the BPCA pursued private investment. 
Urstadt further received approval from New York State to borrow $400 
million in mortgage-backed bonds under the Mitchell-Lama housing 
programme (Gordon 1997: 44). 
 
The development schedule called for the completion and occupancy of 6 
million square feet (557,418 m2) in offices between 1976 and 1979, and the 
lease of 14,000 apartments between 1975 and 1981. The estimated cash flow 
from leases necessary to repay the loan ranged from $8 million in 1976 to 
over $32 million annually by 1980. This schedule required a rapid build out 
of the project (Gordon 1997: 44).  
 
Progress on the project was minimal. The project faced three major 
problems. For one, several factors made it difficult for the BPCA to 
implement the Master Development Plan. The plan comprised very complex 
regulations and standards; to it were attached 20 pages of detailed 
performance specifications. The Master Plan and its specifications were part 
of the Master Lease between the City and the State. The review process was 
also extensive, requiring submission to and approval by three different 
bodies. Implementation constraints were exacerbated by that the fact the 
City and the State continued to skirmish over a number of issues related to 
the project and relations were deteriorating. The BPCA wanted to eliminate 
the restrictive and detailed planning and implementation regulations in the 
Master Lease. The City was critical of the spine and dismayed at Lefrak’s 
residential design. The City had developed new urban design objectives and 
planning criteria, and was pressuring the State to accommodate these.41 The 
spine appeared to be highly risky; BPCA’s engineers performed a first cost 
estimate of the construction of the spine and came to the conclusion that it 
would be extremely costly, upwards of $240 million. The BPCA would have 
to complete the spine before any construction by the private sector could 
take place. Efforts were made to devise ways to build it in phases. Overall, 
the project faced major delays and constraints (Gordon 1997: 52-53). 
 
41 One issue was that the spine created a visual barrier, and the city wanted the design to 
introduce ‘view corridors’ to the waterfront. 
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Additionally, the financial crisis of 1974-1979 brought about a stalling in real 
estate investment. Both the office and residential markets collapsed, and 
there was a glut of office space on Wall Street.42 Other than Lefrak and 
Helmsley, no developers were interested in investing in the site. There was a 
dramatic rise in interest rates, and the return on the bond reserve fund was 
not enough to cover the debt service on the bond of $19.5 million per year 
(Gordon 1997: 44).  
 
Finally, both New York State and the City faced a fiscal crisis; spending far 
outstripped revenues and, in addition to the national recession of the 1970s, 
the underlying structure of the city’s economy was changing, manufacturing 
was moving out. NYC lost 500,000 jobs from 1970 to 1977. The State’s fiscal 
situation was also in trouble, when the Urban Development Corporation 
(UDC) defaulted on its bond obligation in January 1975, the bond market was 
“closed to the state and its agencies” (Gordon 1997: 55).  
 
In 1974, Nelson Rockefeller resigned and the BPCA lost its most important 
ally. In January 1975, Hugh Carey took office as the new democratic Governor 
of NY. He placed severe restrictions on borrowing and expenditures. This 
included restrictions on the activities of the BPCA. 
 
There was absolutely no income stream from the project, the BPCA had only 
spent money on the site, and the $200 million bonds were coming due. In 
1976, the State Controller called for an audit of the BPCA and its activities. 
By late 1978, no construction had taken place; the site was referred to 
derogatorily as ‘the beach’. The press remarked on the lack of development 
and brought attention to the fact that the bonds might not be repaid. Hugh 
Carey was re-elected in November 1978, and during a recess of the State 
Senate, his administration replaced Charlie Urstadt as Chairman of the BPCA. 
Though Urstadt contested his removal, he left the office in early 1979 after 
the Senate Majority Leader withdrew support.  
 
The State Assembly recommended serious changes to the role of the BPCA 
as development agency. The offices closed and most of the employees were 
discharged. These decisions were important: the project came to a halt and 
its future was unclear (Gordon 1997: 54). 
42 Up to 30 million f2 in 1973.  
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6.5 Perception of outcomes, risks and levels of trust 
per round (1-3) 
The following three sections reflect on the perceptions of the outcomes, the 
risk and levels of trust, with a focus on the perceptions of the City and the 
State, the two main players on the public side. The next section describes the 
unilateral negative perception of the outcome of the project and the 
influence of these on strategies. 
6.5.1 Perceptions of outcomes 
Gordon (1997: 100) reflects on the outcomes of these rounds in his book, in 
a section called Wolitical Danagement. He remarks first on the inability of the 
politicians and officials of the State and the City to manage relations and the 
antagonistic nature of the interaction. 
“The early years of Battery Wark City are almost a textbook example 
of how to bungle the political start-up of a redevelopment project. In 
a ‘strong mayor’ city like Eew zork, good relations with the political 
administration at City Hall are a high priority for a redevelopment 
authority. Eelson Zockefeller and John >indsay shared the same 
patrician background, party affiliations and activist bent, but 
unfortunately Eew zork City wasn’t big enough to contain their 
ambitions. They competed over everything from waterfront 
redevelopment to the hS Wresidential nomination. hnilateral action 
by an upper level of government is a redevelopment tactic that rarely 
works and the 'overnor’s 19ϲϲ press conference created both 
resentment and a resistance along every step of the start-up 
process.” 
The negative nature of the political interaction influenced the perception of 
outcomes, leaving both sides with a perception that the project was not 
turning out as desired (or they were not getting what they wanted). The 
quote underlines the fact that the behaviour on the part of the State led to a 
strategy on the part of the City: to drag its feet all along the way. Gordon 
goes farther to describe this strategy. 
“ waterfront redevelopment agency must manage its relationship 
with the local government, which typically has ownership or control 
over most utilities, street access, education, community services, 
police and fire protection. n intransigent municipal government can 
delay and frustrate implementation, even if the agency owns its own 
land and has absolute planning authority. The BWC had neither 
ownership nor authority, so the city planners could inflict the ‘death 
of thousand cuts’ by red tape and delay. ven though the 'overnor 
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and Dayor eventually signed the agreement in 19ϲ9, a 
redevelopment project with multiple sites requires a more 
cooperative local approvals strategy than the typical private real 
estate deal, since the agency must return to the well repeatedly over 
the years, rather than simply focusing all its political resources on a 
single vote. It took two complete changes of regime in office of the 
governor and the mayor to erase the bad relationship between the 
City and the State.” 
Conclusion 
At the end of Round 3, a number of factors, including the machinations on 
both sides, the divergent and conflicting goals, and the resistance and delays, 
produced an empty beach and significant debt, and the perception of failure. 
The interaction was also key in creating a perception of high risk; this 
perception of political risk was strong enough to have the State put an end 
to the project in Round 3. 
6.5.2 Perceptions of risks and influences on interactions 
This section tracks the change and growth in the perception of risk in Rounds 
1-3. The main risks in these rounds were external, i.e. political: related to 
State and City conflicts, planning and regulatory risk, from the negative press, 
and from the market. At the end of Round 3, the perceptions of political risks 
intensified and to these were added internal risks (related to the project): i.e. 
the perception of financial risk, as the bonds came due and could not be 
repaid. 
 
Over Rounds 1 and 2, political risk increased as the interest in the project 
increased and the project became more important to the State and the City. 
The perception of risk on both sides stemmed from the conflicts at the 
political level. The key politicians vied for power and battled with rancour 
over the project. Their interaction and skirmishes caused a lengthened 
process of decision making: 
E. Zockefeller and John >indsay, competing for their own new towns 
in lower Danhattan . . . There is always tension between the Dayor 
and 'overnor because the Dayor is the mayor of this very important 
city. But in reality he has very little power when it comes to broader 
issues . . . ll this is controlled by the 'overnor out of lbany. (public 
sector interview 2009) 
In Rounds 2 and 3, the perception of risk on the part of the private sector 
related to the market for real estate increased. Several megaprojects were 
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built that flooded the market and provided competition (Chase Manhattan 
and WTC).  
The tTC certainly depressed the market for 2Ϭ years. It put 12 million 
f2 on the market, on an uneconomic basis, which meant that they (the 
tTC) would take any tenant . . . This really depressed the downtown 
market. (public sector interview 2009) 
The only two designated developers on the project, Lefrak and Helmsley, 
perceived the market risk; their coping strategy was to avoid getting the 
project underway. One respondent remarked that Lefrak spent a lot of time 
pushing sand around (Graham 2009). Gordon also mentions a remark Kahan 
made: that “the designation of Helmsley was little more than tying up the site 
for no significant outlay, while waiting for the market conditions to improve” 
(Gordon 1997: 42). This implied that: 
Eo one could conceive of development as possible, the old plan was 
too ambitious. The BWC had spent chunks of investment on the 
infrastructure, had spent money getting people in (private sector 
developers) and nothing had happened, the project had gone 
bankrupt. The projects were huge; it was a different project at a 
different time. (public sector interview 2008) 
This quote refers to the growing perception of the part of the private sector 
of the planning and regulatory risks embedded in the 1969 Master Plan. It 
also refers to the substantial perceptions of financial risks. 
 
All the perceptions of these risks caused the Governor and the State 
Legislature to intervene in the activities of the BPCA and ended the tenure of 
Charles Urstadt.  
Conclusion 
The unconstructive nature of the interaction and the perception of failure 
did nothing to reduce the perception of risks. In addition, as is highlighted in 
the next section, the lack of trust between the parties also did not reduce the 
perception of risk. On the contrary, the lack of trust made (1) the interaction 
almost untenable, and (2) the perception of the risk intolerable. There was 
in particular evidence of the lack of trust between political parties.  
6.5.3 Perceptions of trust (or the lack thereof) and the 
factors that contributed to these 
Though the research did not measure the (changes in the) levels of trust in 
this initial period, respondents made it clear that there was limited trust in 
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the interaction between the State and the City. This section analyses briefly 
the lack of trust between parties. It does so by indicating the key dimensions 
of trust defined in the theory and as mentioned by respondents during 
interviews. This section also looks at the factors contributing to the 
breakdown of trust as mentioned by the respondents. 
 
In Round 1 and as the interaction between actors and the stakes increased 
in Round 2, the trust between the City and the State, and their two key 
political figures, the Mayor and the Governor, was minimal. One city official 
commented on the relationship and levels of trust: 
On Eew zear’s ve (19ϲϲ), (Dayor John) >indsay called me at home 
and says ‘There is a vacancy at the City Planning Commission. I want 
you to take that seat and make sure those guys (the State agencies 
and the Governor’s office) don’t fuck up the city’ . . . John’s 
relationship to Eelson’s (Zockefeller) got pretty tough; they did not 
trust each other at times. They did not like each other and it played 
itself out in a whole lot of ways in the political arena . . . Eelson was 
jealous of John . . . and John was enough of a patrician to not ‘kiss 
the ring’. Zockefeller hated >indsay for that, because he did not pay 
homage to Eelson, as he was expected to behave . . . (private sector 
interview 2008) 
Respondents indicated that their behaviour during interactions 
demonstrated that, in making decisions, they were not sure of the intentions 
of the other, and they did not take each other’s interests into account when 
making a decision. These are key dimensions of (the lack of) trust (private 
sector interview 2008, public sector interview 2007, public sector interview 
2008). 
 
After the setup of the BPCA, the city agency interacting most with the BPCA 
was the City Planning Commission (CPC). The interaction was perceived as 
characterized by limited trust and this did not improve over Round 3.  
The CWC, at this time, hated the BWC project and the stuff that they 
were putting up. In point of fact, we ended up voting for it, because 
there was no point in not voting for it. Had we overridden it, we 
would have just looked stupid. te did not want to create war in the 
CWC. So the attitude in the CWC was: ‘It’s a State thing. Let them do it, 
let them fuck it up’. . . hrstadt was very arrogant; he took all of the 
authority of the State. He did not talk to anyone in the City, at least in 
my time. ‘I know what is right and I am the sole authority on this.’ 
Daybe he was doing exactly what the governor wanted him to do, I 
don’t know. (private sector respondent 2008) 
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From the perspective of the State, the feelings were similar. One respondent 
commented: 
“The City agreed that the State could run the entire project without 
any interference from the City. But, did you ever come to an 
agreement on something only to wonder, as time went on, whether 
the other side was truly serious about carrying out the 
understanding?” (Urstadt and Brown 2005: 67) 
The perception of both was that neither was taking the interests of the other 
into account when making a decision and neither was willing to invest any 
more time of resources than necessary to ensure that the relationship would 
work. Again, these are key dimensions of trust mentioned in the research. 
One respondent even went so far as to question the capacity of the BPCA to 
meet its obligations according to the agreement (private sector respondent 
2008). 
Factors contributing to the lack of trust 
Interviews revealed that certain factors, as outlined in the theory, 
contributed to the lack of and breakdown of trust. Respondents indicated 
that some of the State and City parties knew each other professionally before 
Round I, at least by reputation and from the political arena. The interaction, 
however, turned over time into a turf war, a war ignited by the key political 
figures in the arena. The parties grew to know each other over the rounds 
well enough to be able to predict behaviour. The respondents indicated that 
the expectations were that this behaviour would be negative. The parties 
were at odds and unwilling to share information and resources. On the basis 
of the interaction, they were critical of the other’s capacities. The parties 
certainly did not ‘speak the same language’ or come to share values and 
norms. These factors contributed to a lack of trust. 
Tom 'alvinϰ3 thought he could override the city . . . Tom would come 
in with the staff that he had, asking for something. Stupid, 
outrageous things. Trying to implement a scheme that everyone 
knew was torturous and a disaster. But Tom’s charge was to build 
this thing; to design open spaces around concrete walls. He had 
money to spend, so he spent it on this horrible design . . . The CWC 
had to approve street mapping and parks. So, (Tom) came with a 
plan that had no streets. te said, ‘Tom, this is not going to work, this 
is not accessible.’ te had a lot of arguments about these things. 
(private sector respondent 2008)  
43 the general manager and assistant to the Chairman of the BPCA 
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Conclusion 
By the end of Round 3, there was no build-up of trust at all and therefore no 
trust present to minimize the perception of risk. All perception of the factors 
of trust reinforced the negative aspects and perceptions of the relationship 
between actors. The interaction and the project reached the point where the 
perception of outcomes and risk, combined with the lack of trust between 
parties, required a halt to the interaction. This point was a key decision point, 
it was a breaking point. 
6.6 The process: the second phase of development 
and the development of the Public-Private 
Partnership 
6.6.1 Overview of project and Rounds 4-6: key decision 
points, changes in actors, stakes and content44 
In Rounds 4-6, the BPCA set up a seminal partnership with Canadian 
developers Olympia and York (O & Y). Though multiple private developers 
worked on the site over the 1979-1988 period and thereafter, the following 
part of the chapter deals specifically with the partnership with O & Y, the 
partnership considered to be the strongest and the most important in getting 
the project off the ground and, ultimately, bringing about positive outcomes. 
The table below provides a snapshot view of the partnership and identifies 
moments when key decisions were made that brought about a change in 
actors, the stakes or the content of the project. It highlights per round, the 
key and peripheral actors, the intensity and nature of their interaction, 
crucial decisions made, as well the evolution of the stakes. Again, the table 
also highlights the key political figures at the State and City levels, and the 
dates of their re-election. These dates often coincided with key decisions 
being made.  
  
44 Again, this chapter makes use of two major sources; first. D. L. A. Gordon’s Battery Wark 
City: Wolitics and Wlanning on the Eew zork taterfront; second, C. J. Urstadt’s Battery Wark 
City. Both publications provide a clear description of how events unfolded and interactions 
occurred. My thanks to both for allowing me to use the information provided. 
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The following three subsections describe the interaction between the actors 
above, and the setup of the partnership. The partnership spanned three 
rounds, though the public actors continued to develop the project for a long 
period thereafter. The partnership, at its most intense, lasted seven years: 
the time it took to build and occupy the Commercial Center. 
6.6.2 Round 4: Recharging Battery Park City (1979-1982) 
At the end of Round 3 and the beginning of Round 4, the project looked to 
be a complete failure. Political support from both the State and the City was 
gone. Hugh Carey made some important decisions, deciding to remove C. 
Urstadt and to disband the BPCA. The stakes were very high but unsure, the 
content of the project was in question and the actors with key roles and 
decision-making power changed, almost completely.  
Change in actors 
In January 1979, the Governor’s office transferred the control of the BPCA to 
the Urban Development Corporation (UDC). On 10 February, Governor Carey 
named Richard Kahan, a professional with experience in both the public and 
the private sector, as the new President of both the UDC and the BPCA.  
Change in content 
David Rockefeller and the DLMA commissioned a consultant to review the 
BPC Plan and to assess the financial prospects of the project. The DLMA 
wrote to both Mayor Koch and Governor Carey in April 1979 (right after the 
dismantling of the BPCA) to lobby for saving the project. The consultant’s 
report suggested modifying the plan, streamlining the approval process to 
make it more accessible to private developers. It also suggested moving the 
office properties to mid-site, close to the WTC, and making the necessary 
investment in infrastructure on the site to create investor confidence 
(Gordon 1997: 58). The report calculated that, with some bridge financing 
from the State, the bond could be repaid if the BPCA managed to lease half 
of its office space and one third of the residential units within a decade. 
Finally, it reminded the State of the potential of the site (location, waterfront, 
etc.) and the relative inexpensiveness of the property relative to other 
locations in NYC (Vollmer 1979 in Gordon 1997: 58). 
 
Richard Kahan also moved quickly to assess the State’s options. He 
assembled a ‘work-out’ team of lawyers and consultants to assess the 
(financial and social) consequences of various scenarios (public sector 
interview 1995, 2007). He interviewed urban design firms to support the 
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work-out teams and hired the firm of Cooper and Eckstut to do an 
assessment of the site. In the summer of 1979, he asked the two principles 
of the urban design firm to examine the problems of the former plan, 
focusing on the planning, market and design issues (Gordon 1997: 60). 
 
Kahan had the work-out teams look at different options: 
x Option A: continue the project as is. 
x Option B: continue the project but change the planning approach (risky 
given the economy).  
x Option C: sell the land to the highest bidder, pay back as many of the 
losses as possible (two public sector interviews, project documentation, 
and Gordon 1997). 
 
Option A was clearly not an alternative. With regard to Option C, the work 
out teams discovered that it would cost the State $130 million (in 1979) to 
“get out of the bonds immediately” (Gordon 1997: 60) and it would still be 
saddled with a 95-acre sandy site that would be hard to sell given the current 
market (NYS Budget office in Gordon 1997: 60). The sale of the land would 
also not compensate for the loss made to date on the project. 
 
Re Option B, to get the project (in another form) off the ground, the State 
would still have to undertake certain crucial tasks, namely producing a new 
master plan and a new environmental impact statement, obtaining approval 
from the legislature, getting out of the lease with the city, and setting up 
financial incentives that would attract the private sector (Gordon 1997 and 
public sector respondent).  
 
Cooper and Eckstut reported that the market conditions for offices were 
beginning to improve and that the market for housing was still slow. Funding 
for social housing had come to a halt (Cooper in Gordon 1997: 60). Their 
report, released 31 October 1979 and named the 1979 Master Plan, made a 
variety of suggestions, including moving the commercial activities to the 
middle of the site, close to the WTC, and starting with commercial 
development first. The design team also suggested replacing the previous 
planning approach with a simple mapping of streets and a set of guidelines 
for each block on the building site. Their concept broke development down 
into manageable bits and was more flexible (Gordon 1997, two private sector 
respondents). 
 
Option B seemed increasingly the most viable and attractive. As one public 
sector respondent commented, ‘given how much money had been spent, 
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spending more was just a drop in the bucket’. Of particular issue for Kahan 
was the lease with the city; the conditions of the lease were too restrictive 
to allow for the flexibility he and his team were looking for. The UDC hired 
two top appraisal firms to assess the value of the site, under the conditions 
of the current lease with the city. One consultant valued the site at zero; the 
other returned a negative evaluation (public sector respondent, Kahan in 
Gordon 1997: 61).  
Interaction 
Kahan moved to begin negotiations with the City on the conditions of Option 
B. He received limited response at first, but with the aid of David Rockefeller 
of the DLMA began discussions at a high level meeting organized at the 
Mayor’s office in September 1979.45 The negotiations focused on two issues: 
financial issues and design issues. They were quick and intense discussions 
and resulted in a MoU between the City, the State, BPCA and the UDC on 8 
November 1979 (BPCA 1979). 
 
It appeared that the City was also generally in line with the proposals of 
Cooper and Eckstut on the design issues, making negotiations on the design 
issues straightforward. The principles behind the new plan for the area (See 
Annex II) were much different to that of the Master Development Plan of 
1969. Cooper and Eckstut assessed that there were two fundamental reasons 
why the previous master plan did not work: (1) its ‘excessively rigid large-
scale format’, which prevented the gradual development of the site, and (2) 
the unduly complicated controls over every detail of the project (Master Plan 
1979).  
The plan had a couple of components, from a planning point of view. 
One was that they got rid of the mega blocks. By the late ’7Ϭs, the 
basic thrust of urban planning was away from the Corbusian 
dimension, to much more Jane Jacobs: ‘>et’s create neighbourhoods.’ 
So, it essentially extended the street grid in some former fashion, into 
BWC. nd it moved the Commercial Center, which had been in the 
south, to the middle of BWC, next to the Trade Center. So, it tried to 
create a locational synergy. Thirdly, it tried to create an environment 
that was recogniǌable to Eew zork developers. So you put the streets 
in, you put the sidewalks in; you put the light fixtures in. zou do all of 
that and then you invite people to bid on pieces of it. That was a lot 
45 Players: City Team: Deputy Mayor for Policy and former Chairman of the CPC, Bobby 
Wagner Jr., their lawyer, the Budget Director and the Planner, the Deputy Mayor for 
Economic Development (also tax issues). The State: R. Kahan, their lawyer, Alex Cooper and 
Stan Eckstut (Gordon 1997: 62).  
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easier because Eew zork developers knew how to bid on an hpper 
ast Side site . . . Cooper and ckstut looked at all the successful 
neighbourhoods in Eew zork and said ‘thy was the hpper test Side 
very successful? thy is Carl Schulǌ Wark such a nice park? thy do 
people like these pieces of Eew zork?’ . . . They tried to create 
neighbourhoods that were very familiar to Eew zork developers. 
(public sector respondent 2009) 
The negotiations resulted in the following agreements (BPCA 1979, 
interviews of three public sector respondents): 
 The Cooper and Eckstut Master Plan was, in principle, adopted. 
 The area would no longer be subject to the detailed planning 
constraints and time-consuming review processes of the former plan 
but to a ‘revised policy and programme’ that the City and the BPCA 
would develop. 
 The State would acquire the land under expropriation by the UDC; this 
would release it from the financial and planning controls imposed by 
the City. The City was to receive $1 for the exchange and all future 
profits and tax equivalents.  
 All land was to revert back to the City once the project was complete 
and the debts were paid off (beginning of the next century).  
 The State would guarantee the bonds by providing an $8 million loan. 
 The City agreed to provide tax incentives for office development for the 
term of ten years. 
 
Ten weeks of negotiation brought to a close the frustrations and political 
problems that had been plaguing the relationship. At the end though, the 
City essentially relinquished control over the project to the State. It gave up 
control over design and approvals, immediate financial returns, and its initial 
interest to accommodate social housing in the area. The different parties 
signed the MoU on 8 November 1979 (Gordon 1997: 63). 
 
The MoU was incorporated into the Settlement Agreement signed by the 
State, the City and the BPCA on 6 June 1980 and in another amendment to 
the Master Lease. These were approved by the two key city organizations, 
the CPC and the B of E. 
 
The MoU contained only very general planning controls and eliminated any 
role for the City in regulating development. The MoU specified basic height 
restrictions, the total area of the commercial space and Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR) calculations for the commercial component (BPCA 1979). Greater 
planning control was later built into the detailed design guidelines developed 
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by the BPCA for the commercial properties and each neighbourhood (see 
below). 
 
Standards/responsibilities set for the BPCA for the course of the project were 
as follows (Gordon 1997, public sector respondent): 
 BPCA had the full authority to review and approve the design plans 
being submitted by the developers, shortening the review process and 
keeping it out of the city’s bureaucracy. 
 BPCA had full authority to accept and approve tenders for the 
development of the plots. 
 Developers were limited to a total of two or three plots, preference 
would be given to different architects, particularly minority firms. 
 The land would be leased to the developers on a long-term basis. 
 
The Master Plan contained cost estimates that significantly reduced the 
amount of public investment necessary. As opposed to the $175 million 
(dollar value in 1972) needed in the previous plan, Cooper and Eckstut 
calculated that BPCA would require $53.2 million (dollar value 1979) for 
circulation, open space and utilities (Gordon 1997: 70).  
 
Kahan negotiated bridge finance from the State to avoid defaulting on the 
bonds obligations and to cover expenses while the agency got up and 
running. The State provided the BPCA with a loan of $35.7 million to cover a 
period of five years (1979-1984); this would provide repayable advances 
while BPCA looked for investors (Gordon 1997: Appendix A). 
 
The Chief Financial Officer of BPCA described the process and approach: 
te did a quick analysis that suggested that within one to two years, the 
uthority would run through its interest rate reserve and would not 
have funds available to pay the down service. So we commissioned two 
studies: one by Cooper and ckstut and one by astdil (Zealty), to 
independently come up with a plan. One was a physical plan and the 
other a financial plan for the uthority . . . [what the reports revealed 
was that] you could either do nothing and, in one year and a half, face 
the fact the legislature would have to appropriate $2ϬϬ million to pay 
off the bonds. Or, two, you could invest 57.ϲ million dollars. nd that 
money would do two things: it would continue to pay interest on the 
bonds, but it would also put in some infrastructure and complete some 
public infrastructure. (public sector respondent 2009) 
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The State re-established the BPCA and Richard Kahan hired Barry Light to act 
as President. To keep costs low, he set up the offices in a trailer on the site, 
and hired a small core staff (Gordon 1997: 63, public sector respondent 2007, 
public sector respondent 2008). The team worked with consultants to 
complete key reports and to develop the plan for the site.  
 
So, the first step for the BPCA was to get the residential tower, Lefrak’s 
Gateway Plaza, redesigned, financed and constructed. Construction started 
in June 1980. Then, as suggested in the 1979 MP, the commercial properties 
were also a priority to get income coming into the project. 
 
At the beginning of 1980, Kahan commissioned Cooper and Eckstut to 
produce detailed planning criteria and urban design guidelines for the 
commercial site; these were to be the basis for BPCA’s calculation of the 
agency’s investment in infrastructure and services, and for their assessment 
of bids by developers for the site (Cooper interview 1986 in Gordon 1997: 78, 
Master Plan 1979). These guidelines played an important role in the project: 
they gave developers and architects a precise indication of the level of quality 
required in the design of buildings. 
 
The Battery Park City Authority began to remarket the area, concentrating 
on what was felt to be significant advantages to developers (public sector 
respondent, project documentation). 
 
 A simple, established zoning situation, maximizing the certainties and 
minimizing the unknowns. 
 Commercial guidelines, requiring a high level of quality (incremental 
costs totalling an additional 10% for the developer) such as, unified, 
coordinated development of separated parcels, with a total of 600,000 
m2 commercial space, a complementary relationship with the World 
Trade Center, the accentuation of space for pedestrian and street life, 
building heights that stepped down to the waterfront, maximum use of 
the waterfront space for the general public.  
 High-quality standards for residential areas, a housing mix focusing on 
middle- to high-income classes. 
 
BPCA issued a Request for Proposal in July 1980, inviting 30 developers to 
bid. The RFP contained the ground plan, and the zoning and design/quality 
guidelines. The requirements for submission were unusual in that they did 
not ask developers to submit both design and financial plans, as is typical, 
but asked only for the credentials and track record of the responders, plus 
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the financial terms proposed for any or all of the seven parcels presented 
(ULI presentation 1985, BPCA 1990; transcript speech 1986, project 
documentation 1990). Kahan had introduced a new form of competition for 
the project: it was a financial competition, not a design competition. The 
guidelines were very specific on design standards to which bidders had to 
adhere. This eliminated the need for the Authority to have to assess the 
relative merits of design and financial proposals (Gordon 1997, Foster 1986, 
two private sector respondents 2008). The RFP received a dozen responses, 
Canadian developer Olympia and York Developments (O & Y) was chosen for 
the commercial space. One respondent recounts the meeting between 
Kahan of the BPCA and Paul Reichmann, the President of O & Y: 
There was a famous meeting . . . Waul Zeichmann asked to see 
Zichard Kahan. He sat down with some people: Zichard, the team, 
'arry 'allagher. Then he said ‘This is my bid.’ He took out the BWC 
annual report and put it on the table. veryone said, ‘What do you 
mean, this is my bid?’ So he said, ‘Well, your debt service is $14 
million a year. My bid is to build all the buildings. And I will pay your 
ground rent of $14 million a year. So, I will solve your bond problem. 
And I will pledge the assets of my American company to do that.’ He 
had previously bought a big Ez portfolioϰϲ . . . He said, ‘I will pledge 
that portfolio to secure my obligation to pay 14 million dollars a year 
to pay off your bonds.’ That is why he was chosen to do the torld 
Financial Center. (public sector respondent 2009, Foster 1986 and 
public sector respondent 1997 similar) 
What set O & Y’s bid apart was the fact the organization offered a financial 
solution (Foster 1986: 44, public sector respondent 2009, public sector 
respondent 2008). O & Y also committed to the construction of the interior 
court (the Winter Garden) of the Commercial Center (zoned as a public 
space) and was commissioned to design, build, operate and maintain all 
exterior public areas over the length of the project and thereafter 
(unpublished paper 1990, private sector respondent 1994). O & Y also 
offered to sign a letter of credit that ensured, if there was a delay in 
construction (they guaranteed the completion of the Commercial Center by 
1985) that the organization would still pay the $50 million in ground rent and 
taxes it was obligated to pay upon completion of the buildings. 
 
46 He had acquired the office holdings of the Uris organization in 1976 (Gordon 1997:78 and 
Foster 1986). He had bought it for 200 million dollars cash and 200 million dollars debt. In 
the succeeding 4 years it had become worth 2 billion dollars (public sector respondent) 
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In the deal offered by O & Y, the revenues generated from the commercial 
ground leases were enough to cover BPCA’s annual financial commitments 
on the bond repayment. The development of the commercial properties and 
the repayment schedule proposed by O & Y would assure the financial 
security of the BPCA and the project (Gordon 1997, transcript speeches 
1986). 
 
The BPCA designated the developer in September 1980 (Gordon 1997: 78). 
6.6.3 Round 5: Building Battery Park City (1980-1984) 
Change in stakes 
This decision was significant. In effect, the BPCA decided to ‘put all its eggs in 
one basket’ by designating one developer to take over all of the Commercial 
Center. The stakes changed for the BPCA with this decision. The question 
remained if O & Y would be able build out the commercial portion of the 
project, guarantee tenants and revenues, and do this quickly (speed was of 
the essence given the sensitivity of the State to the inaction after the 
completion of the landfill).  
 
For O & Y, the decision to do the project also implied that the stakes became 
significant. O & Y made a commitment (to take on the risk) that eliminated 
the most important of BPCA’s concerns: paying back the debt service on the 
bonds. The two organizations became highly interdependent. 
Change in actors 
The actors (and the content of the project) changed as the staff taken on by 
O & Y came on board and began the process of designing and building the 
project, in coordination with the BPCA. Reichmann of O & Y began to select 
personnel to staff the O & Y team in NYC. Many came from Toronto, the 
home base of the firm. Others were professionals that O & Y had come across 
in business over the years. Interestingly, he chose a number of people from 
the public sector, knowing that they would ‘speak the same language’ as 
their partners at BPCA. 
Waul Zeichmann was very smart. He staffed his organiǌation with 
former public officials. Strategy! Because he knew all of the work that 
he was going to be doing in this country was renewal work and 
government work, etc. So, everyone from O Θ z that I was dealing 
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with (names a number of people).ϰ7 He hired as his staff everyone 
from the public sector in Toronto, who knew, when they came in, how 
to talk to the public folks. So, it was really smart strategy. (private 
sector respondent 2008) 
As O & Y had not come to the bidding procedure with a fixed design, but 
chose to focus on the financial aspects of the project, the organization now 
had to find the right architect. Soskolne of O & Y invited three architects to 
participate in a limited design competition, providing them with the BPCA 
guidelines as a basis. O & Y’s internal committee of Soskolne, Dennis, 
Coombes and the construction chief Keith Roberts discussed their preference 
with Paul Reichman and his brother Albert. O & Y selected Cesar Pelli in May 
1981 (Gordon 1997: 79, Foster, 1986: 50). One respondent working for the 
BPCA stated: 
Zeichmann ran a design competition, to design the commercial 
centre. He set out with the brief and the design guidelines (produced 
by Cooper and ckstut for BWC). Half of them (the developers 
bidding) completely ignored them (the design guidelines) . . . He 
(Zeichmann) chose the scheme that most closely followed the design 
guidelines. nd that is why he picked Welli. He chose it because it 
would be the easiest to get approved, and would not cause any 
fights. nd Welli slavishly followed the guidelines. (private sector 
respondent 2008) 
Up until that moment, Kahan had been working with a skeleton staff, keeping 
costs low. He also began to take on more people and to build a team. 
By the time that the Commercial Center was underway, Zichard 
started filling in the staff. So by ’87 he had full time staff. Zichard had 
a lease in his hand from O Θ z, so he could hire. He could not hire 
before he had that. So, he got a full staff by the ’8Ϭs and they were 
good. nd they (also) followed the guidelines slavishly. (private 
sector respondent 2008) 
Interaction 
The interaction between the BPCA and O & Y intensified. The two parties 
negotiated the details of the lease, as Pelli worked on completing the design 
of the buildings and of the Winter Garden. During the negotiations and 
47 Ron Sosklone, an architect that had worked in the planning department on the Toronto 
Central Area Plan; Michael Dennis, a lawyer with development experience, who had been 
the advisor to the Mayor of Toronto, David Crombie, and the Head of the Housing 
Commission; Tony Coombes, a planner that had succeeded Soskolne as the chief city planner 
in Toronto. 
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design process, BPCA began to become aware of the Reichmanns’ design and 
development principles. Foster explains the principles that the Reichmanns 
brought to the partnership. 
“The principles upon which they built their empire seemed remarkably simple. 
Waul Zeichmann would sum them up . . . ‘you build on cost and you borrow on 
value.’ . . . They had, from the beginning, paid close personal attention to 
maximiǌing the ‘efficiency’ of their buildings, squeeǌing out the greatest 
possible rentable and usable space. This helped to cut costs, but at the same 
time, they emphasiǌed quality and service. Thus they could command top rents. 
These rentals determined the value of the building, and it was this value that 
they could take to the banker as collateral for loans for further ventures. The 
greater the gap between the costs of the building and the amount that they 
could borrow against it, the more funds there were to fund growth. By adding 
the most value, the Zeichmanns established the best collateral and this had the 
most funds to expand.” (Foster 1986: 36)  
O & Y’s vision was to reposition the BPC project as a location for the head 
offices of investment firms. O & Y named the complex of buildings in the 
commercial centre the World Financial Center (WFC). However, to fill the 
space, the developer would have to acquire large tenants. As one of the staff 
mentioned, “we had make Battery Wark ‘an address’” (Foster 1896: 54, 
Dennis interview 2008). The Reichmanns and their staff began the intensive 
search for tenants for the 8 million square feet of space. Michael Dennis and 
Eddie Minskoff (former real estate broker who had been involved in the Uris 
deal) of O & Y began to acquire and negotiate with the tenants for the 
buildings. They realized that the older buildings on Wall Street could no 
longer accommodate the needs of the financial industry, they had too little 
power, they could not be transformed into the large spaces necessary and 
they could not cope with fibre optic cables and other technologies necessary. 
Dennis and Minskoff began to target firms in the area. O & Y offered a novel 
leasing deal and employed a concept called ‘inventory management’,48 
which entailed buying buildings from owners that needed a capital gain, and 
offering to lease them space in the WFC. Dennis and Minskoff offered state-
of-the-art and custom-fitted spaces, to buy out leases and to pay for moving 
costs. O & Y managed to attract and to secure pre-rental agreements from 
its first anchor tenant, American Express. in March 1982. As soon as this 
48 Inventory management is a tool employed by private developers. The developer offers to 
buy the building from their owners and negotiates their relocation to a newer, more suitable 
location on attractive financial terms. In this case, the offer was made to commercial tenants 
in the Wall Street area who found the option of moving to the Battery Park area very 
positive. The old buildings then become part of the developers’ new inventory for 
retrofitting, rental or sale to another tenant (Frucher 1990, 1994). 
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happened, others followed, wanting to be in close proximity. O & Y also 
attracted Merrill Lynch, Dow Jones and Oppenheimer, finally leasing all of 
the space on offer (Gordon 1997, Foster 1986: 52; private sector respondent 
1994). 
 
It took one year of negotiations and working sessions for O & Y and the BPCA 
to negotiate the final details of the deal. Reichmann was true to the 
guidelines and introduced modification to the plan, based not primarily on 
improving the aesthetics, but more on enhancing the image and ‘leasability’ 
of the commercial properties. He chose a design for the Winter Garden that 
would make the space a showpiece for the site. It was to become a 130-foot-
high crystal palace of vaulted glass that would contain the retail, restaurant 
and entertainment areas (Foster 1986). This was quality that was greater 
than expected by the BPCA. One year after BPCA designated O & Y as 
developer of the commercial portions of the project, in September 1981, 
BPCA and O & Y signed the Master Ground Lease for the properties. O & Y 
began construction on the first building three months later, in December 
1981; it was possible to make such a quick start due to the accelerated 
approval process negotiated with the City (Gordon 1997).  
 
The plan placed considerable emphasis on public spaces, following the 
philosophy that public space was important for building the image of the 
project and the value of the sites in the eyes of the developers and the city 
inhabitants. As a principle, the BPCA built public spaces prior to putting sites 
out to bid. The Authority built the Esplanade adjacent to the Gateway Plaza 
first, and then moved on to the spaces in front of the WFC and the residential 
area, Rector Place. Kahan set up a Public Art Advisory Committee to 
commission artists to work with the BPCA architects on designing the public 
spaces. The first public space related to the WFC was the large interior Winter 
Garden (Gordon 1997).  
 
In the meantime, the BPCA began to focus on building more residential sites, 
again using the guidelines to provide standards to developers when bidding, 
designing and getting approval from the Authority. 
The commercial guidelines were so successful that Zichard said to me: ‘Other 
than doing the open space, we’ve got to do a set of residential guidelines. Ez 
developers left to their own (devices), would be disastrous. zou have to make a 
coherent set of guidelines for the residential neighbourhoods.’ Then, we 
actually started the South neighbourhood . . . So that became very 
straightforward, developing a set of residential guidelines and open spaces. 
(private sector respondent 2008)  
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In mid-1982, the CFO of BPCA became aware that the financial status of O & 
Y was less secure than anticipated. A year after the signing of the deal, the 
CFO went to the offices of O & Y to check on the financial situation and 
discovered that O & Y was ‘overleveraged’. O & Y had borrowed $ 2 billion, 
using the BPC assets (not yet built) as collateral, and had used these funds to 
build projects in other cities in the US. At the same time, the banking laws in 
Canada had changed and O & Y no longer had the unrestricted access to 
Canadian finance that it once had. 
 
O & Y had signed a lease that committed the organization to building all four 
buildings in the commercial centre. O & Y had committed to constructing the 
first building (at least) with its own working capital (they were not therefore 
subject to the stringent requirements of a construction lender or to the high 
price of construction loans for risky projects) (transcript speeches 1990). At 
this point, Reichmann requested ‘severing’ the lease, meaning ‘cutting’ the 
lease into four separate leases and financing each building individually. This 
was not the agreement that had been made; the contract would only allow 
him to ‘sever’ a lease of a building when he completed the building. The CFO 
of BPCA explained: 
In fact, the year after the deal was signed, I was asked to do some due 
diligence. The reason I was asked to do this is that, to this day, there are four 
ground leases that are referred to as the ‘severance leases’. In the original deal 
(O Θ z) had pledged their hS equity to this project . . . They could sever each 
lease of the four leases when the building was complete. Or in the case of last 
two buildings, they could post 25Ϭ million dollar guarantees and then could 
sever leases. The importance of severing the leases is you can have an 
individual mortgage on each one and they can be financed individually. So you 
build them, you put merican xpress in one . . . zou put Derrill >ynch in two of 
them. zou sever them, finance against them. zou put Oppenheimer in another 
one and you finance against that. But in the first instance, because Waul 
Zeichmann said ‘I guarantee you 1ϰ million’, [the lease] had to be un-severable 
. . . [In addition], after about a year, the lending climate changed . . . ll of a 
sudden, the Zeichmanns did not have the unrestricted access to Canadian 
finance that they had had. It turned out when I did my due diligence, that they 
had borrowed 2 billion dollars against their hS assets. (public sector 
respondent 2008) 
The two parties negotiated for a period, the BPCA held its position; O & Y put 
up a letter of credit and pledged some of its Canadian assets. O & Y also 
managed to get the anchor tenants it needed and to arrange the ‘pre-sale’ of 
the first building. O & Y signed the final leasehold agreement with American 
Express for the first building in June 1983, pinning down the details of the 
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lease a bit more than one year after the agreement was reached. Merrill 
Lynch also committed to two buildings at that point.  
 
Construction on the buildings began as soon as possible. Foster describes the 
speed with which O & Y (and BPCA) worked to get the first building up. He 
describes the process at the point of signing the two first tenants in the 
Commercial Center: 
“Half of the space still had to be leased. nd the project had to be built in 
record time” (58) “. . . the Zeichmanns demanded as much of their staff as they 
demanded from themselves and that, in particular, meant both quality and 
speed. (The construction manager) soon learned what ‘fast tracking meant’, 
that is literally designing and building as it was being put up. This method – to 
generate rentals as quickly as possible – put a lot of pressure on people.” 
(Foster 1986: 59) 
O & Y and BPCA staff worked closely to ensure that the process of 
construction went smoothly.  
 
It was an approach along the lines of ‘wanting to get things done between people’. 
It worked from the beginning . . . It was almost like fitting two organiǌations together; 
it was almost an integrated organiǌation . . .te had enough definition of roles, but 
we worked these out as we went along. (private sector respondent 2008)  
 
O & Y began to explore a financing strategy for the Commercial Center. The 
feeling was that for a project of such size and complexity, O & Y needed to 
explore new financial structures and courses of capital (BPCA 1990). Tower 
A rose and tenants were secured; in October 1983, after 22 months of 
internal financing of construction, O & Y refinanced and secured $728 million 
in short-term loans from Manufacturers Hannover Trust and 21 International 
Banks (Gordon 1997: 124 and private sector respondent 1994). It was a fairly 
conventional loan, and included substantial guarantees from O & Y 
(transcript speech 1990). Tower A was completed in December 1984, and O 
& Y again restructured the loan to release most of the collateral, other than 
Tower A, and to extend the financing for another ten years. The refinancing 
of the buildings was to continue as the project was built out. 
 
At the end of 1983, at a time when construction and the partnership were in 
full swing, the newly elected Governor Cuomo requested Richard Kahan, 
Chairman, and Barry Light, President of BPCA to step down; they both 
resigned on 1 January 1984. Cuomo appointed Sandy Frucher to be the new 
BPCA President (Gordon 1997: 124). 
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6.6.4 Round 6: Battery Park City evolves (1984-1988) 
The BPC project’s financial circumstances were by now stable, and its future 
secured. The partnership was running smoothly. Still, this decision had a 
substantial impact on the BPCA, and by association on the partnership. Kahan 
and Light were leading a successful team at the BPCA and the Governor 
decided to bring in new leadership, and to change the focus of the project. 
This constituted a change in actors and in the content. In contrast to the 
political philosophy of Governor Carey, who saw the project as a ‘fiduciary 
responsibility’, Governor Cuomo wanted the project to evolve ‘above and 
beyond economics’ (Gordon 1997: 90). Cuomo asked Frucher to ‘give the 
project soul’ (public sector respondent 1995, 2008).  
Change in stakes 
Public and private respondents that worked with Frucher mentioned 
wondering how the new leadership would influence the project. They 
mentioned posing question such as: Would Frucher provide good leadership 
and maintain the positive culture within the BPCA and in the partnership? 
Would his vision for the project take the project further (public sector 
respondent 2008, private sector respondent 2008)? For O & Y the question 
was: Would Frucher understand and protect the interests of the partnership 
as Kahan had? Would he keep the political risks to a minimum?  
 
From Frucher’s point of view, he was new on the scene and the stakes 
involved ensuring the continued success of the project, keeping up the 
tempo and putting ‘his own stamp on it’ (public sector respondent 2008, 
private sector respondents 2008). This request to ‘give the project soul’ 
involved changing the content of the project and adding amenities, making 
the site more multifunctional and creating the sense of neighbourhood 
(public sector respondent 2008). 
Change in content 
There was no substantial change in content: the construction of the 
Commercial Center continued as usual.  
 
However, as part of the building out of the rest of the project, Frucher 
decided to focus on the issues of housing for low-income groups, an issue 
that was important in the project from the outset but that had ultimately not 
been incorporated into the project. He approached the Governor on the 
issue and received support from both the Governor and the Mayor. The 
question was then, should the BPCA build affordable housing on the site or 
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should the funds be used to create a housing programme in other parts of 
the city? After Frucher met with key leaders in some of the lesser 
neighbourhoods, the decision was that Battery Park was to subsidize a large 
housing programme in the South Bronx and Harlem (Gordon 1997). On 23 
May 1985, Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo signed a MoU to use the excess 
BPCA revenues for low- and moderate-income housing in the Housing New 
York Program (Gordon 1997: 124 and public sector respondent 1994 and 
2008). The State Legislature reached an agreement in March of 1986 and 
legislation was passed in August of that year. The project did this for many 
years; in 2006, the Battery Park City Authority committed an additional $130 
million of its revenues to the NYC Housing Trust Fund. 
 
Another issue for Frucher was the growing number of inhabitants in the area. 
For years, the BPCA had the freedom to build out the property without being 
‘concerned’ with the interests of the community. In fact, the partnership had 
been built in time with no political risk from the inhabitants, pressure groups 
or lobbyists. As more inhabitants moved into the area and residential areas 
filled up, the balance of power began to shift, and the local politicians and 
the residents of the BPC and adjacent areas gained input into the 
development of the remainder of the site. They lobbied for community 
facilities and for other amenities. Frucher spent a substantial amount of time 
negotiating with the inhabitants and responded to their concerns by building 
a school and the Holocaust Museum, as well as baseball fields and other 
public spaces.  
Interaction 
In fact, concerns over Sandy Frucher’s role were laid to rest from the 
beginning. The BPCA and O & Y staff encountered a professional who 
protected the interaction that had been built. Though the Commercial Center 
was not complete, it was being built out at a fast pace. BPCA and O & Y had 
a well-tested manner of working together and this remained the same. 
 
Frucher took over as President and the BPCA team continued to work with O 
& Y on ensuring the Commercial Center was completed. The first building 
was completed and American Express and Merrill Lynch took occupancy of 
the first two buildings in October 1985 (New York Times 1985).  
 
In 1988, as the partnership was coming to an end, Frucher left the BPCA and 
went to work for Olympia and York. The Winter Garden opened in October 
1988, just after Frucher left the BPCA. 
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6.6.5 Conclusion 
Of note in this interaction, was the intensity of the interaction in Round 5 
between BPCA and O & Y, both the leadership and the staff, and how quickly 
the relationship formed in that round. The speed with which activities took 
place and the development of the ‘rules of the game’ in the interaction was 
due to the pressures on both sides to make things happen in a short amount 
of time; these pressures also creating substantial interdependence. By Round 
6, the parties had developed a tried and true manner of working together, 
weekly meetings, standard approval processes, and ways of settling 
differences. Respondents referred positively to how the partners worked 
together. The analysis in the following section also argues that these 
responses were the result of the positive perception of the outcomes of the 
partnership, of the trust that was built between the partners in the time they 
worked together and that this trust was fundamental in reducing the 
perception of risk. Rounds 4 to 6 are analysed in the next section. 
6.7 Analysis of Rounds 4 to 6 and the partnership 
with Olympia and York 
Introduction 
This section describes the perception of the public and private respondents 
of the outcomes of the project and the partnership. These perceptions are 
provided for each round, as well as the general perceptions of the outcomes 
of the project; the research also described how these perceptions influenced 
the behaviour of the partners. This is followed by an analysis of the 
perceptions of the risk per round and the influence of these perceptions on 
the coping strategies of the two partners. Finally, the chapter looks at the 
trust of the partners in each other, its growth over time (the trust cycle), and 
links the build-up of trust to the perception of risk as well as to the factors 
that contributed to the change in trust.  
6.7.1 Perception of outcomes and influence on strategies 
Perceptions of outcomes Round 4 
In the beginning of Round 4, the perception of the public sector officials was 
that the outcome of the project looked bleak. This changed by the end of 
Round 4. Public respondents were more (cautiously) optimistic about the 
Battery Park City project. The perceptions were that the project was 
underway, and that some of the external and internal risks that had plagued 
the project at the beginning of the round had been tackled, to a great extent 
by the BPCA.  
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Key outcomes of the round were that, for one, Kahan of the BPCA had 
succeeded in getting support (bridge finance as well as consent to go ahead) 
from the State Legislature. The real estate market was showing signs of 
picking up and developers were demonstrating greater interest in the 
project, evident in the reaction to the RFP for the commercial properties. The 
BPCA and O & Y had made a deal that appeared to promise to turn the project 
around (Graham 2009, Cooper 2009, McGregor 2009). A member of the 
BPCA team reflected on the outcomes of Round 4.  
BWC suffered the first ten years . . . then things clicked, the market turned 
around, the plans were better, O and z came along. But people took advantage 
of it and the product was good. It was always a good idea. It was just the right 
time, as is often the case in large-scale development. (public sector respondent 
2008) 
The initial positive perceptions were evident in the strategies of both the 
public and private partners who began immediately, at the outset of Round 
5, to make investments, to staff the project and to work (together) at an 
accelerated pace on the design and getting the necessary approvals and on 
the construction of the infrastructure, public spaces and the buildings.  
 
By the end of Round 5, both public and private respondents reported highly 
positive perceptions of the outcomes of the round, of the process in place. A 
respondent from O & Y mentions: 
te started with the guidelines (we were the first to use the guidelines) and 
responded to these. Cesar Welli created a sense of space; it was about ‘a making 
of place’, specially a great EzC place. Or: ‘Doing good to make good.’ . . . It was 
also comfortable; the feel of the public spaces. The tinter 'arden was not 
required but Welli chose to do something with the spaces between the buildings 
. . . It was a great project. (private sector interview, 2008) 
Public respondents confirmed the perceptions of the private partner and the 
focus in the interaction on creating ‘quality of place’ (private sector 
respondent 2008, public sector respondent 2008). They mentioned creating 
quality as a key public goal of the project, a criteria embedded in the 
guidelines. From the start of the interaction, it was clear that there was goal 
convergence on two fronts: the search for quality and the use of the 
guidelines to steer this. This perception was clear in the strategies: BPCA was 
adamant that developers stick to the guidelines, and as mentioned above, O 
& Y accepted this without resistance. O & Y used the standards set out in the 
guidelines in their buildings and in the Winter Garden; the quote above 
underlines the realization on the part of the private sector of the value of 
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high-quality public spaces in leveraging investments and obtaining tenants 
(three private sector respondents 2008, public sector respondent 2009). 
 
By the end of Round 5, the project was a financial success for both partners 
and the revenues coming into the BPCA ensured that the debts on the bonds 
would be repaid. One public respondent stated: 
By 198ϰ the BWC had paid everything back; from the tFC and the 'ateway 
Wlaǌa, we had money coming in. te had positive cash flow, and we had paid 
the State back with interest. (public sector respondent 2008)  
These financial gains produced such investor confidence that developers 
were eager to invest in the build out of the rest of the project, the additional 
residential areas, in Round 6. 
Conclusion 
Respondents emphasized that the interaction resulted in a ‘cycle of positive 
outcomes’, step by step the partners worked together on the project, it 
began to turn around and transformed into a successful project. ‘Things just 
kept getting better’ (public sector respondent 2008). Each partner made a 
series of moves that were perceived positively: the public sector laid the 
groundwork, set strong standards and facilitated the public process; the 
private sector understood the public goals, committed entirely to the public 
standards and invested in quality, also in the public spaces.  
Talking about a private company acting like a public entity. I do not know how 
there could be a better example of a WWW. There is a partnership where in some 
ways, you look at them, they have so many common characteristics; they act in 
concert even though they are acting independently. nd even though these 
guys are the landlord (he taps a map and indicates the BWC) and they 
(indicating O Θ z) are paying them (BWC) rent, (O Θ z) acted in ways like the 
bigger landlord, the master developer here. (public sector respondent 2008) 
The nature of the process and relationship resulted in a highly positive 
perception of the project and the partnership.  
conomically, (the project) was very successful. The return on investment the 
public sector made was huge. The return came in the form of hard dollars. The 
project created revenues for housing. It created neighbourhood, it set a 
standard that other people use. It has helped to do what (Dayor) >indsay 
wanted: that is to create a ‘2ϰ/7’ neighbourhood. (public sector respondent 
2008) 
The perceptions are supported in the qualitative results below. 
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Outcomes: assessment of the results of the questionnaire49 
Perceptions of outcomes were also measured and verified in the 
questionnaire. The results back up the positive perceptions of the project and 
the partnership from the interviews. In the questionnaire the respondents 
were asked to rate the statements made concerning the outcomes of the 
project and the partnership (see Table below) on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly 
agree, 5 = strongly disagree). 
dĂďůĞϲ-Ϯ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
  WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨKƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
  N Missing Mean Std. Deviation 
1 I am satisfied with the results of the 
collaboration/project 15 0 1.33 .488 
2 The goals of my organization were met by the 
partnership 15 0 1.47 .516 
3 The partnership led to additional investments that 
would not have occurred if my organization had 
worked alone 
14 1 1.79 .893 
4 The collaboration created a number of innovative 
ideas, concepts and plans 14 1 1.57 .938 
5 The partnership resulted in the implementation of a 
project that added to the quality of life of the 
neighbourhood and city 
15 0 1.13 .352 
6 Working closely together led to improved 
cooperation between partners 15 0 1.60 .507 
7 Working closely together led to improved 
coordination of project elements 14 1 1.64 .633 
8 Working in partnership led to long processes of 
decision making and additional costs 15 0 3.13 1.356 
Note: for statement 3, four respondents indicated that the statement was 
‘not applicable’ 
 
The results of the questionnaires confirm the overall satisfaction with the 
outcomes of the project and the partnership, on both the public and private 
sides. The most striking results and commonly held perceptions are the 
responses to statements 5, 1 and 2. In particular, 86.7% (13 of the 15) of the 
49 WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞ: The questionnaire and its results were used to clarify and verify the 
results of interviews and information provided by respondents in each case on their 
perceptions. The response rate remained low. Though the graphs and tables in this 
chapter provide a ‘quantification’ of trust levels (looking at the averages of 
responses), perception of risks, and outcomes, the analysis remains a qualitative 
assessment of the value of these variables.  
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respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the partnership 
resulted in a project that improved the quality of life in the city; two 
respondents (one State official and one private) agreed with the statement. 
The respondents were generally satisfied with the results of the 
collaboration/project: 66.7% strongly agreed (five State, two City, three 
private) with the statement, while the remainder agreed (three State, one 
non-profit, one private). When asked if the goals of my organiǌation were 
met by the partnership, (53.3%) seven public sector respondents answered 
with strongly agree and three (46.7%) agreed, while only one private sector 
respondent strongly agreed, and three of the private sector respondents 
agreed.  
 
One respondent abstained from answering and four responded that the 
statement the partnership led to additional investments than would not have 
occurred if my organiǌation had worked alone was not applicable (rated it 3); 
this affected the outcomes. Those closely involved in the project did respond. 
46.7% responded with strongly agree (five State, one City, and one private) 
and 20% with agree (three State).  
 
With regard to whether the collaboration created a number of innovative 
ideas, concepts and plans, there was some differences in the results: 60% of 
the respondents strongly agreed (six State, three private), while 20% agreed 
(one State, two City), one State official had no opinion and one respondent 
from the private sector disagreed. This negative reaction from the private 
sector respondent is surprising as it is in direct conflict with the comments 
made during the interview.  
 
In one case, there was a clear difference in opinion. 46.7% of the respondents 
strongly agreed/agreed with the statement that working in partnership led 
to long processes of decision making and additional costs, while 46.7% 
disagreed/strongly disagreed (the remainder indicated not applicable). 
Interestingly, for those that strongly agreed/agreed, one qualified with a 
comment ‘yes, long decision making: but better product for value!’; others 
made similar comments. Key decision makers in the project, both private and 
public partners, and those making decisions on a daily basis, were the 
respondents that disagreed/strongly disagreed with the statement, allowing 
one to surmise that they had reached an effective system of making decisions 
in the partnership.  
 
Overall, the responses were extremely positive and consistent with results of 
the qualitative results. Of note are the responses to statements 4, 6 and 7. In 
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these responses, the more positive ratings were given by those more 
involved in the partnership, showing a link between the perception of 
positive outcomes and taking part in the partnership as ‘a member of the 
inner circle’. 
6.7.2 Perception of risk and influence on strategies 
This section analyses the perception of risk per round, and the strategies that 
partners in the interaction used to cope with the perceptions of risk. The 
focus is on external and internal risks: namely risks external to the project 
such as political risk (i.e. State Legislature, State and City conflicts, planning 
and regulatory risk, media) as well as market/demand risks, and internal to 
the project (contractual, financial, project design, and construction). These 
are presented in the two frequency assessment figures below. 
Figure ϲ-ϭ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů;ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůͿrŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϰ-ϲ 
  
Figure ϲ-Ϯ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů;ƉƌŽũĞĐƚͿrŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϰ-ϲ 
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Zound ϰ: perception of risks at the beginning of the round 
As the frequency assessment of political risk reveals, at the beginning of 
Round 4, a substantial number of the public and market respondents 
perceived various types of political risk. This perception of risk was so 
substantial that it was clearly visible in the strategies employed by the public 
and private sector; people stayed away from the project, politicians, public 
officials and developers alike. Respondents confirmed that the perception of 
risk stemmed from the position of the State Legislature, State and City 
conflicts revolving around the project, and planning and regulatory hurdles. 
The perception of market risk was particularly high. The media were also 
extremely critical of the project. 
then we got started in ’79, the city was almost bankrupt; the hDC had built a 
lot of housing and had had a lot of problems with the mortgages. Housing 
projects were bankrupt . . . Wrices were up and inflation was huge. Eo 
politicians wanted to get involved with Battery Wark City except ['overnor] 
Carey; State senators, local assemblymen, anyone who likes to jump on the 
winning team or a boat, and get a piece of the boat and influence it. Eo one 
wanted come near us, even the City . . . Weople just stayed away. then we 
started to build and make decisions, we did not have people hanging about 
asking ‘What are you doing, what about my friend? You can’t do that and so 
on.’ So, we got a running start. nd things happened. te did things that today 
you could not do. zou got many more people hanging over your shoulder asking 
. . . Weople were just afraid. Weople did not want to get saddled with a(nother) 
failure. They felt ‘you are going to build something and no one is going to 
come’. te did things for a full two years without interference. (public sector 
respondent 2008) 
Of note, in this quote, is the fact that, in the face of such risk, the staff of the 
BPCA used this perception of risk to their advantage; in getting the project 
off the ground again, their coping strategy was to use the lack of interference 
that accompanied it as an opportunity to move quickly. 
 
In addition to the perceptions of political risk, market parties were sensitive 
to market risks, and were waiting out the recession and the dip in the real 
estate market. Kahan of BPCA confirms the investors’ perception of market 
risk in the quote below, in particular stemming from competition from other 
and better sites.  
The site was viewed as a site owned by a bankrupt public organiǌation. It was 
burdened by a lease created by my predecessor. The planning approach was 
the old planning approach. They had put in the infrastructure first to support 
the building of a megastructure that could not be broken down into pieces (and 
phased). The market was bad, and there were better sites elsewhere. The 
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market analysis performed by astdil Zealty revealed that we could not build 
offices for ten years. But we could only do commercial to bring in the revenues 
to pay off the bonds. It was a gamble to defy the market. (public sector 
respondent 2007) 
Figure 6-2 confirms that at the beginning of Round 4, public parties (the 
State, the City and the BPCA) had a perception of the internal risks of the 
project (in its current form), in particular, as mentioned above, related to an 
ill-conceived project design and formulation, as well as the financial risk of a 
bankrupt public institution. The quote above also refers to contractual risk, 
in the form of the old lease between the City and the State, and governing 
the activities of the BPCA. 
Coping strategies at the beginning of Zound ϰ 
The perceptions of high risk at the beginning of the round implied the need 
to engage coping strategies to deal with these perceptions. The fate of the 
project was hanging in the balance and the choices were: to give up or to go 
forward. The decision was to go forward. One public respondent mentioned 
that when weighing decisions on the project, the political risk of NOT taking 
the project further would have been greater.  
The greatest risk was nothing happening. te had evidence that, in the 
development world, you have to weather pretty bad economies. te got 
through that (referring to the previous rounds). The risk (now) was that we 
would fail. That it would be a State failure, State bonds, State institution. But it 
would be a City failure as well, something of that scale . . . so that was the 
biggest risk . . . nd they (BWC) were no closer to getting development that 
they had been before. The risk was that the whole thing would go down the 
tube and be saddled with the State bond failure. (private sector respondent 
2008) 
This perception was essential in determining the strategies employed; this 
provided the State with the impetus to take the project further. 
 
BCPA employed a ‘menu’ of strategies to counteract the perceptions of 
political risk, on the part of public and private parties alike, as well the 
perceptions of market risk on the part of the private sector; doing this was 
essential to attracting investment. The Authority also focused on reducing 
the perception of internal risks related, in this round, mostly to project design 
and contractual issues with the City. Kahan and his staff spent substantial 
time during Round 4 working on developing and executing key coping 
strategies and managed by the end of the round to reduce the perception of 
risk on the part of the State, the City and the developers. 
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One strategy involved changing the planning approach and the project 
design. In the new 1979 Master Plan, Cooper and Eckstut broke the 
superblock approach down into smaller manageable bits allowing for phased 
construction (minimizing upfront costs) and entry into the project by a 
multitude of developers (minimizing the market risk). In addition, the 
philosophy behind the phasing was to build the most profit-oriented bits of 
the project first, thus the new Commercial Center, with the goal of reducing 
the financial risk and the risk to other components over the length of the 
project (Frucher 1990). In the initial discussions with the City, the BPCA 
managed to negotiate a simplified development process, giving substantial 
power to the BPCA to make decisions on development, and eliminating any 
political risk from a complex city approval process. The new MoU with the 
City reflected this new simplified approach, reducing contractual risk. 
 
A second strategy involved Kahan persuading the legislature of the State to 
provide bridge financing for the project and a ‘go’ decision on his proposed 
approach. Kahan negotiated practically and was able to influence the State 
Legislature, reducing the political risk. The CFO of the BPCA remembers: 
It (the BW Wroject) was a high risk, lots of leverage money. Here you were 
looking to create something that people would actually pay money for, because 
you have to pay the bonds off. That was the objective; to pay the bonds off . . . 
Then we went to the governor and said: ‘OK, we have two options. We can put 
up $200 million . . . we can just go the way it is.  No one can fault you, you 
didn’t create it. It was just a disaster and in year and half we can do this. Or we 
can appropriate 50 and some million dollars, which shall extend the amount of 
time you have to keep the bonds outstanding; and pay for some of the 
infrastructure, and some of the other work that has to be done.’ then they 
looked at the two (options) from the financial point of view, some part of that 
5Ϭ million dollars would have been paid in the 2ϬϬ anyway. So, for an 
incremental X million dollars, why don’t we see if can make it work? (public 
sector respondent 2009) 
The BPCA also employed a third set of strategies to change the perceptions 
of the politicians, the developers and the media of the political and market 
risk. This strategy used the media and the plan to change the perception of 
the project. 
te had to create a ‘psychology’ around the site. In a New York Times article, . 
Huxtable wrote that (the design for the tFC) was the best thing since the 
Zockefeller Center. In effect, we created competition between developers . . . 
The BWC had no credibility because it kept holding ground breaking 
ceremonies and nothing was built after 12 years. te reversed the psychology 
through the design . . . fter that it was easier to get interest in the site. I 
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wanted to create frenǌy in the market so I invited the big developers in one time 
to see the new plan. (public sector respondent 2007) 
The BPCA architects describe further the coping strategies used to reduce 
the perceptions of internal and external risks on the part of the developers: 
So we did the plan . . . we had a public opening, and the plan was as high as this 
room. It showed the streets and the parcels and the trees and parks. te 
reached the developers before it went public. They looked at it and saw (what 
we were planning). They talked to Zichard and said: ‘If you take some of your 
remaining money and start putting in infrastructure . . . sure! Then we believe 
this is going to happen.’ So Zichard started building streets, starting putting in 
lights, starting making things credible. (private sector respondent 2008) 
The final coping strategy related to the use of the guidelines. The standards 
set in the guidelines, to which the private sector had to adhere, coupled with 
the simplified, internal approval process essentially ‘routinized’ the project 
design and the approval process. The political risk related to the approval 
process was ‘internalized’ (the BPCA took over a great deal of this) and 
turned into an internal, project-related risk.  
This limited risk in the bidding process. Weople knew what they were getting 
into; that was a big part of it. s I said, when a developer bid . . . he looked at 
the guidelines and did not have to worry about going through a city council or 
through a ǌoning change or other approvals that created political risk (1.3ϲ.ϬϬ 
countdown). The political risk was essentially gone. His only risk was the 
market; when the building was built, could he get the tenants in?  . . .  
Developers had to go through the design process, and to design according to 
the guidelines made by the BWC. The BWC helped with getting the permits, 
this reduced the risk to the developers. The public sector helped with the 
approval process and worked closely with the city agencies to keep the 
communication open. It was all about the public sector dealing with the private 
sector perception of risk. (public sector respondent 2008) 
The strategies were crucial in enhancing investors’ confidence and laid the 
foundation for the signing of the initial developers (O & Y and Lefrak). In 
addition, BPCA’s decision to go forward with O & Y changed the perceptions 
of risk. 
Zound 5 perception of risks 
As the frequency assessment shows, the perception of political risk on the 
part of most of the respondents began to decline after the end of Round 4 
and start-up of Round 5. As a result of the coping strategies, the political risk 
from the State legislature was eliminated; the conflict with the City no longer 
existed. The regulatory and approval processes had been dealt with.  
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As the figure on project risk reveals, O & Y’s bid and unique understanding of 
BPCA’s financial situation was essential in reducing the BPCA’s (and the 
State’s and the City’s by association) perception of financial risk. 
“Zeichmann has gone straight to the heart of the officials’ most pressing 
problem: the threat of default of the bonds. thile other developers were still 
treating the project as a normal development, Waul Zeichmann has seen that 
required solution was not architectural, but financial. He offered an ironclad set 
of guarantees. If there was a delay in construction, letters of credit ensured that 
O Θ z would still pay the $5Ϭ million in ground rent and taxes it would owe if 
the buildings were finished. He also undertook to build the project much faster 
than any of the other contestants, in five years.” (Foster 1986: 44-45) 
In fact, O & Y was now confronted with most of the risks. Of the risks in the 
first figure, the perception of market risk remained strong at the outset. 
“There was big risk; we did not know what would happen in the market. There 
was huge risk for Waul Zeichmann, he had to provide ϲ million f2 with the 
tenants: he did no marketing, beyond ‘personal contacts’ . . . It was classic 
Zeichmann.” (Foster 1986: 45) 
The project risk was also largely O & Y’s. 
“[Zeichmann] had committed his organiǌation to finance, build, and lease the 
world’s largest commercial developments in record time and one of the world’s 
toughest building environments. ‘Eew zork’ in the words of the O Θ z 
construction supervisor who had worked there all of this life, ‘is a snake pit’.” 
(Foster 1986: 45) 
O & Y’s coping strategy was to find good tenants for their properties in the 
WFC and to fast-track the construction so that the buildings could be 
delivered as quickly as possible. 
 
It took the first year of Round 5 to negotiate the deal and the details of the 
lease between the BPCA and O & Y. O & Y’s coping strategy, even without a 
formal and binding lease document, was to move forward, expending 
considerable resources, taking on an architect and key staff. One of the 
managers from O & Y, when asked about O & Y’s perception of risk as the 
project got under way, stated: 
First, there was [the risk of] the weakness of the title. BWC had a land lease. O 
Θ z ended up with a 99-year lease. BWC had the obligation to return the land 
and the returns on the land to the City at the end of the bond repayment . . . 
Second: the risk of double bankruptcy. O Θ z borrowed from the bank. BWC 
had the bonds due. The head landlord could renounce its obligation on the 
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lease at any time. then the lease document was finally settled, it was after one 
year of negotiations had gone by. They (BWC) had to change the legislation to 
settle the lease issue . . . (He then mentioned that O Θ z took the risk to start 
work before the leases were signed). O Θ z had been selected; we were getting 
the design done, bidding the project, getting insurance, and beginning the 
construction. The agreements with the tenants had been signed. (Then, related 
to why O Θ z felt the risk was manageable without a signed lease) . . . s we 
negotiated, the market got better. te had a $ϲϬϬ million mortgage. te had 
made a deal with mex. The prospects looked good. The risk of quitting was 
higher, it was too high. (private sector respondent 2008) 
As the project got underway, the perception of financial and contractual risk 
was still present. The perception of construction risk was on the rise. The 
private respondent mentioned that O & Y’s perception of the internal risks 
and market risk improved towards the end of Round 5. There is evidence of 
this in both figures. 
 
As Round 5 progressed, a manager from O & Y confirmed that the simplified 
development process set up by the BPCA reduced O & Y’s perception of 
political (planning and regulatory) risk: 
In our work with the BWC, we had certainty. Wlanning approval was not at the 
planning commission level. That was already taken care of; we did not have to 
wait. te could start immediately. If we did not have to deal with the City, it 
reduced risk. te could go in and build. Someone had worked everything out 
already. It was a huge thing. Someone comes to you and says: ‘You can start to 
work now, no delays!’ zou cannot believe it! . . . But, part again of the 
‘certainty’: we knew that we were not going to be slowed down. then we 
started construction, things started to go extremely fast, we had the building 
full within six months . . . (private sector respondent 2009) 
He describes BPCA’s strategies from Round 4 and how these positively 
influenced O & Y’s perceptions of risks, giving room to O&Y to work in an 
accelerated manner. 
The best way to reduce risk is: (1) zou need to be able to move quickly. zou 
need people that know what they are doing, that have the authority to make 
decisions. This requires good quality people. (2) There have to be financial rules: 
we had the tax abatement, the ground rules on the land lease. ll this was set 
out ahead of time. (private sector respondent 2009) 
The perception of financial (and contractual) risk on the part of both BPCA 
and O & Y were still relatively high in Round 5 when the CFO of BPCA sensed 
a problem and Paul Reichmann admitted to having some financial difficulties. 
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The CFO mentioned that his perception was that the developer was trying to 
change the rules of the game, after the deal had been made (Graham 2009). 
They came to us and said: ‘We would like to sever the leases.’ nd I said: ‘What 
collateral do I have if you are going to sever the leases? We had the 
arrangement that you would build (all of) the buildings.’ This was in 198Ϭ; the 
first building was not built. . . nd I said: ‘What good is collateral on buildings 
that have not been built?’ . . . (they said): ‘It will be just as good.’ nd we said: 
‘No, it will not be just as good.’ . . . ‘How do we know you are going to pay the 
14 million?’ Zeichmann said: ‘Well, you know, this is my ground; this is my 
security.’ te said: ‘Well, that is not good enough, because we (the State) 
already own the ground.’ Zeichmann answered: ‘Well, then my company is, but 
I have able to get my company’s guarantee out from underneath this at some 
point.’ . . . and I went and saw their books. ll of a sudden, I saw that the 
property they had pledged to us, they had borrowed against. So I said: ‘Where 
is the 2 billion dollars? Eo one could explain where the 2 billion dollars was. 
They had taken the 2 billion dollars, and had gone out and done projects in 
every city in Eorth merica, one in Chicago,  one in Wortland, one in Florida, and 
one in Boston. They built a whole bunch of buildings. then I asked Waul 
Zeichmann, he said: ‘They are going to be done in the next year. I am going to 
have tenants and I am going put the mortgages on them. Then the money is 
going to come back; there is the money for you.’ t the end of the day, we 
never consented to severing any of their leases. (public sector respondent 
2009) 
In the end, BPCA’s coping strategy was to stands its ground, requiring O & Y 
to provide letters of credit to sever the leases.  
 
As the figures show, as the project took off in Round 5 and into 6, the 
perceptions of risks on the part of both of the partners reduced substantially. 
A public respondent commented on BPCA’s reduced perception of financial 
and market risk:  
So you then have BWC off and running. t the same time, you have >efrak 
(residential developer) going and getting a 'F guarantee on 'ateway. ll of 
sudden you have two income streams that were going to pay off the bond. 
From there, essentially you continue to build out the infrastructure, and sell off 
the pieces individually, and you are increasingly successful. (public sector 
respondent 2009) 
Continuing into Round 6, the BPCA’s perception of financial risk was low 
enough that the strategy was to continue to pre-service sites as a way of 
leveraging private investment. One could conclude that with the excess 
revenues at its disposal, the BPCA’s perception of market risk was also low, 
even in the face of changes in the market (1982 dip); the perception of 
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political risk as also low due to the relationship that the BPCA had been 
building with the community. 
There was a rhythm to what we were doing. This reduced the risks. . . The 
Battery Wark City was willing to make investment in utilities even when there 
were no tenants; pre-servicing. This was even before we had return on our 
investment. s the public sector we took the risk to put in the infrastructure . . . 
te continued to go out and put infrastructure in, to do the pre-servicing even 
though we knew that we were subject to the market, and that the market was 
not going to come around for another two years. That was the luxury that the 
BWC had, no private developer would have had the resources . . . The north 
(residential) neighbourhood was entirely per-serviced. It stood prepared for a 
long time, it needed to be ready. te were able to do this, and it reduced the 
future risk to developers who could come in and get a permit and hook up. 
(public sector respondent 2008) 
Conclusion 
When looking at the trends in risk levels, the perceptions of all forms of risk 
changed as the partnership developed, risks reduced and became minimal 
by the end of Round 5. In the following sections, it will be interesting to see 
if the growth in trust did, in fact, influence the perceptions of risk and bring 
them down to the negligible levels evident in the frequency assessments on 
external and internal risks. 
 
Assessing the links between risk and trust usually presupposes that the 
partners have had time to get to know each other, and that trust builds over 
time (the trust cycle takes place) and influences the perception of risks as the 
risks grow (and the interdependence between parties grows). This case is 
different, however. The two parties started up the partnership at the point 
when the risk was the highest and the project’s future most unsure. There 
was no time to get to know each other and to build trust. So, what level of 
trust can one expect to find between the two partners? 
 
One can argue that, from the outset, the two partners found themselves in a 
highly risky, ‘do or die’ situation, or more precisely, that the BPCA had one 
more chance to make the project work. O & Y became party to this by taking 
on the risk of building all the buildings in the Commercial Center. This was a 
crucial moment: given the situation, the relationship was characterized by 
strong interdependence from the start, one can argue that the parties had 
no choice but to trust each other. Trusting each other was a leap of faith. The 
existence of these levels of risk was an essential factor in building trust. 
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The question then remains if there was evidence of a trust cycle, if trust was 
built over time as a result of a number of different factors. The following 
section of the chapter argues that trust was high at the beginning and 
remained high throughout the partnership. Trust between the partners 
‘matured’ even further. BPCA was vulnerable; O & Y had ample opportunities 
to take advantage of the situation and demonstrate opportunistic behaviour, 
but did not. The build-up of trust very much revolved around the choices 
both partners made and behaviour exhibited in Round 5, and whether the 
factors that are the basis of trust were present. The next section charts the 
build-up of trust, and the factors that contributed to this. 
6.7.3 The perceptions of levels of trust and the factors 
that contributed to these 
In fact, the interviews and the results of the questionnaires refer to a 
relationship between the staff of the BPCA and of O & Y as characterized by 
high levels of trust. Interviews (and the questionnaires confirm this) with the 
public respondents indicate an almost unbelievably high level of trust in O & 
Y from the very start of the relationship (see figures and table below). The 
average levels of trust of O & Y in the BPCA were almost identical and also 
extremely high. Public respondents mention the reputation of O & Y as being 
the basis of initial trust (2007, 2008). One public respondent mentioned ‘te 
made the deal on a handshake and Waul Zeichmann was notorious for being 
honourable’ (public sector respondent 2007).  
Changes in trust over time 
The following section on trust looks first at the results of the assessment of 
the changes in the levels of trust over the second four rounds; the results 
from the questionnaires are shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4  below.  
 
The figure below provides a view of the change in average trust levels for the 
three parties most directly involved in the partnership: the Battery Park City 
Authority and its architects Cooper and Eckstut, and Olympia and York, the 
private partner. To make a comparison in changes in trust levels in the private 
sector, the figure also provides an indication of the trust levels in the other 
private developer working on the site at the same time, and also a partner, 
Lefrak and Fisher, the residential developer.  
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Figure ϲ-ϯ͗ǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƚƌƵƐƚin ŬĞǇƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ͕ ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ 
ƚŚƌĞĞ ƌŽƵŶĚƐ 
 
N= 12, 6 State, 2 City, 3 private, 1 non-profit 
 
The figure shows a steady increase in the average trust levels in the Battery 
Park City Authority over the three rounds (from 8 to 9.5). The average level 
of trust in O & Y also rose over the rounds (from 8 to 8.5), though less than 
the trust in its public partner. The average level of trust in Cooper and Eckstut 
started high (8.8) at the start but dipped slightly to (8.2) at end of Round 6. 
Generally, these average ratings are high for all of the partners.  
 
Of note is the fact that the private respondents (N = 3 of 4) gave the highest 
ratings for the BPCA (straight 10s for all rounds). The highest ratings (10s for 
all rounds) were given to O & Y by two public respondents (of the six that 
responded).  
 
By comparison, the average trust level in Lefrak was 6 at the start, took a dip 
to 5 at the end of Round 5, and rose to 6.5 by the end of Round 6. 
 
The figure below shows the change in trust in the key but more peripheral 
players during the rounds.  
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Figure ϲ-ϰ͗ǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƚƌƵƐƚin ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ͕ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ͕ 
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ ƌŽƵŶĚƐ 
 
N = 12, 6 State, 2 City, 3 private, 1 non-profit 
 
Average trust started relatively high in the Governor’s Office (8.5), the BPCA’s 
key contact in the State Government, and remained consistent (8.44). The 
Battery Park City Parks Corporation was set up as a non-profit organization 
at the end of Round 4, and average trust in the organization rose quickly to 
8.83 from 7.0. The average trust in the Public Arts Advisory Committee fell 
slightly from 9 to 8.33. The trust in the Mayor’s Office started lower and rose 
over the rounds, ending at 7.56 from 7.17, it fell for the other key city agency, 
the CPC, to 7.0 from 7.44. For the two rounds that the community played a 
role, its average score remained stable at 8 (N = 3, for the officials that had 
most contact with the community).  
Overall ratings 
The questionnaire also asked respondents to provide an overall rating of 
their trust in the main actors, on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the highest. 
Table 5-10 below provides the average rating per actor. Below that, Table 6-4 
also provides the average trust ratings, cross tabulated by category of 
respondent. 
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dĂďůĞϲ-ϯ͗dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ;ϭ to ϭϬ͕ϭϬďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
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N Valid 13 12 14 12 14 14 7 11 13 7 8 
  Missing 2 3 0 3 1 1 8 4 2 8 7 
Mean 8.46 5.17 6.87 7.00 9.21 8.86 8.00 4.73 7.92 8.00 9.75 
 
The results reveal high average levels of trust in the BPCA (9.21) and their 
architects, Cooper and Eckstut (8.86), but lower average levels of trust in O 
& Y (7.92). When looking at the table below, which splits the results over the 
different types of respondents, the BPCA is highly rated by both public (State 
and City) and private respondents, C & E by State and private respondents, 
and O & Y by the State respondents, the highest ratings from those 
respondents most involved in the partnership. Of the more peripheral 
organization rated, the Governor’s Office, the BPCPC and the Public Arts 
Commission were again rated the highest.  
dĂďůĞϲ-ϰ͗ƌŽƐƐƚĂďƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚďǇƚǇƉĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ 
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The results above are somewhat but not entirely consistent with the results 
of the analysis of trends in average trust in the partners, as seen in Figure 
6-3. There responses related to the BPCA and C & E (and Lefrak) are 
consistent, but the ratings of trust in O & Y are lower than expected. The 
differences in the results can be explained by the differences in the response 
rate in Figure 6-3, Figure 6-4 and in Table 5-10. In the case of the trend 
analysis, only respondents with a more central role in the partnership felt 
comfortable providing an assessment of trust over the length of the 
partnership. In contrast, the response rate in Table 3 was higher, most 
respondents, even ones with a peripheral role, were willing to provide a 
single assessment of trust in O & Y.  
6.7.4 Different dimensions of trust 
The research asked respondents, as a further measure of levels of trust, to 
rate the degree of trust in all actors, using the different dimensions of trust 
defined in the theoretical chapter. In the questionnaire, respondents were 
asked to assess each of the items related to the other parties in the 
partnership on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = to 5 = strongly disagree). The table below 
provides the results.  
dĂďůĞϲ-ϱ͗dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶĞĂĐŚĂĐƚŽƌ 
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  Took interests into account when making a decision 
 Valid 15 15 15 14 13 14 13 13 13 13 12 
 Missing 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 
 Mean 1.8 3.2 2.27 2.43 1.54 1.79 2.69 3 1.77 2.08 1.75 
 Standard 
Deviation 
0.676 0.676 0.961 0.938 0.519 0.893 0.63 0.913 0.927 0.862 0.866 
  Would NOT have met obligations, if their activities had NOT been defined in 
the contract* 
N Valid 13 14 13 12 11 12 12 12 12 10 9 
 Missing 2 1 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 5  
 Mean 3.15 2.57 2.46 3 3 3 3.25 2.08 3.17 3.1 3.67 
 Standard 
Deviation 
1.06
8 
0.75
6 
1.05 0.73
9 
1.26
5 
1.20
6 
0.62
2 
0.9 1.26
7 
0.31
6 
1.11
8 
  Was capable of completing the project/ their obligations according to 
agreements made 
N Valid 14 15 15 14 13 14 13 13 13 12 11 
 Missing 7 6 6 7 8 7 8 8 8 9 10 
 Mean 1.93 2.4 2 2.21 1.46 1.86 2.85 2.31 1.85 2.5 1.91 
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 Standard 
Deviation 
0.73 0.91 0.655 0.699 0.519 0.535 0.555 0.751 0.801 0.674 0.944 
  Committed more (time or personal resources) to the collaboration/project 
than was specified in the contract 
N Valid 14 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 12 11 
 Missing 1 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 
 Mean 2.57 3.33 2.87 3 2.38 1.92 2.62 3 2.23 2.58 2.36 
 Standard 
Deviation 
0.852 0.617 0.834 0.784 1.044 0.641 0.768 0.707 1.013 0.793 1.286 
  Had, in general, good intentions 
N Valid 14 15 15 14 13 14 13 13 13 12 11 
 Missing 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 4 
 Mean 1.64 2.8 2.27 2.21 1.54 1.64 2.23 2.62 1.77 2.17 1.82 
 Standard 
Deviation 
0.745 1.014 0.961 0.802 0.519 0.633 1.013 0.87 0.832 0.937 0.874 
  Sometimes did not meet their obligations, but we were willing to give them the 
benefit of the doubt50 
N Valid 13 14 14 13 12 13 12 12 12 11 10 
 Missing 2 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 5 
 Mean 2.69 2.93 2.79 2.69 2.17 2.38 2.75 2.83 2.5 2.73 2.7 
 Standard 
Deviation 
0.63 0.82
9 
0.57
9 
0.48 0.83
5 
0.65 0.62
2 
0.83
5 
0.79
8 
0.78
6 
0.94
9 
 Total Ϯ͘ϮϰϮ Ϯ͘ϳϴ Ϯ͘ϯϱϴ Ϯ͘ϱϬϴ ϭ͘ϵϰϮ Ϯ͘ϭϯϰ Ϯ͘ϳϱϰ Ϯ͘ϱϲϴ Ϯ͘ϮϭϮ Ϯ͘ϱϭϲ Ϯ͘ϯϳ 
N = 15 (1 strongly agree, 5 strongly disagree, in the case of *1 strongly 
disagree, 5 strongly agree)  
 
The totals, an aggregate of all of the dimensions of trust, reveal higher levels 
of trust in three parties: the two key partners, BPCA and O & Y, and Coopers 
and Eckstut, BPCA’s architects. The remainder of the results, per dimension, 
provide a similar picture. Consistently, these three parties scored the highest 
of all of the parties. The differences in the scores are negligible. These results 
are consistent with the other measures of trust. 
 
 W  ŽŽƉĞƌƐĂŶĚ
ĐŬƐƚƵƚ 
 KΘz 
1.46 Was capable     
1.54 Took interest/good 
intentions 
    
  1.64 Good intentions   
50 Note: again there is some question as to whether the responses to the last question are 
correct. Some of the respondents indicated some confusion with understanding the 
question. 
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  1.79 Took interest 1.77 Took interest/good 
intentions 
 1.86 Was capable 1.85 Was capable 
 
Of the results above, the three parties scored the highest on three 
dimensions: (1) took interests into account when making a decision, (2) was 
capable of completing the project/ their obligations according to agreements 
made; and (3) had, in general, good intentions. As is the table above shows, 
the BPCA scored consistently higher than the two other parties and highest 
on the dimension: was capable of completing the project . . . The other two 
parties scored marginally lower, and ratings that are higher related to 
whether they had good intentions or took interests into account when 
making a decision. This demonstrates a higher level of trust in BPCA when it 
comes to the competence dimension of trust, and a higher level of trust in 
the other two parties when it comes to the goodwill dimensions of trust. 
 
The statement the parties committed more (time or personal resources) to 
the collaboration/project than was specified in the contract resulted in lower 
ratings and differences in the responses, leading on to surmise that 
respondents had different perceptions of the statement. 
 
Of the parties external to the contractual parties in the partnership, the 
Governor’s Office and the BPC Parks Authority consistently scored the 
highest. 
Basis for trust 
Respondents were asked to rate each item from 1 to 3 (1 = very important, 2 
= relevant, 3 = not so important). The average results were as follows: 
 
dĂďůĞϲ-ϲ͗&ĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚďƵŝůƚ;ŽƌďƌŽŬĞͿƚƌƵƐƚ 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation Valid Missing 
1 CalBase I have to have sufficient 
information on the other 
party's reputation, 
qualifications and past 
performance record 
15 0 1.57 .756 
2 CalBase I have to be confident 
that the penalties 
stipulated in the contract 
are sufficient to ensure 
the compliance of the 
other party 
15 0 1.86 .770 
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3 KnBase The other party must be 
willing to share 
information and 
resources 
15 0 1.21 .426 
4 KnBase I must get to know them 
well enough that I am 
able to predict their 
behaviour 
15 0 1.36 .497 
5 KnBase On the basis of the 
interaction, I come to 
know and respect their 
capacities 
15 0 1.21 .426 
6 IdBase We must learn to 'speak 
the same language' 
15 0 1.57 .514 
7 IdBase We must come to share 
the same values and 
norms 
15 0 1.71 .611 
N = 15 respondents: 8 State, 2 City, 1 non-profit, 4 private 
 
On average, respondents felt that the two statements: the other party must 
be willing to share information and resources (1.21) and on the basis of the 
interaction, I come to know and respect their capacities (1.21) were the most 
relevant. The statement rated as the next most important was I must get to 
know them well enough that I am able to predict their behaviour (1.36). 
Another party’s reputation or the penalties in the contract were regarded as 
less important, as well as learning to speak the same language or sharing the 
same norms and values.  
 
These results indicate that the respondents from both the public and private 
sectors found, as the basis for trust, knowledge-based trust (all three 
indicators – nos. 3-5 – measure this) the most relevant and the first two 
(measuring calculus-based trust, factors in the first phase of the trust cycle) 
and the last two (measuring identification-based trust, factors in the third 
phase of the trust cycle), less relevant. These three bases of trust assume 
that partners have experienced a certain amount of interaction and, from 
knowing each other, can predict behaviour. Information, repeated 
interaction and understanding create predictability, which creates trust. The 
more behaviour (and therefore predictability) is confirmed through 
interaction, the more trust is developed. Such understanding only comes 
from repeated contact, continued communication and information 
exchange, in other words, greater interdependence.  
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Factors that contributed to the build-up of trust  
To complement the results of the table above, the research charted the 
factors that contributed to trust build-up over time, as mentioned in 
interviews with key respondents. Of interest is the fact that the respondents 
confirmed that the factors as outlined above where present during different 
phases and served to build-up trust, thus the trust cycle, over time.  
 
WĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ 
Given the highly contentious relationship between public sector players at 
the beginning of Round 4 (and the complete lack of trust), the BPCA was 
disbanded and a new team assembled. The results described below reflect 
the perceptions of this new team, and not those of employees of the BPCA 
from Round 3.  
 
In this new era, faced with abject failure and high risk, trust among staff of 
the BPCA was also essential. Interestingly, the trust ratings by public 
respondents in the BPCA were high from the outset. Again, the situation 
brought about interdependence between staff members; they had a clear 
and common goal to make the project work. This interdependence can be 
argued as an immediate basis for the high levels of trust within the 
organization. The high average levels of trust internally are evident (9.71, 
public respondents) in the table above. 
 
Public respondents confirm this. At the outset of Round 4, a skeletal BPCA 
staff worked together on the site, in a trailer. When asked what factors led 
to trust build-up, respondents mentioned that, in fact, the pressures they 
were under (one more chance!!) and the pioneering nature of the working 
relationship created a clear basis for trust. One public respondent describes 
the behaviour of the staff and the Board, and the experience of working 
together in this situation as leading to the build-up of trust among staff. The 
interaction in the small group was informal and the team shared information 
and resources; the experience of working together over time allowed the 
members to come to predict behaviour, as well as to share norms and values: 
‘creating something that mattered’. This experience was instrumental in 
binding them together and building ‘a team’ and all factors essential in the 
trust cycle (public sector respondent 2008).  
The advantage for me was that I was there when (BWC) was very small; there 
were only five people . . . that I want to say, siǌe is relevant. zou do not have 
all that many people to deal with . . . te were a core of people . . . the 
organiǌation grew up around us, we got there first. Initially we worked together 
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in a trailer . . . we created an informality, a common experience, there were no 
walls. The Board of Trustees, appointed by the governor, met once a month; 
four persons setting policy. There was also an informality [with them]. They 
made decisions promptly (1.ϰϰ.5ϲ). They cared enough to be involved, they 
showed confidence. They would come to visit even if there was not a meeting. 
They cared enough to be part of creating something that mattered. (public 
sector respondent 2008) 
Trust internally remained high over the rounds. In Round 6, when Sandy 
Frucher took over, respondents mentioned wondering if the state of trust 
would change (public sector respondent 2008). Staff grew to trust him 
quickly. The public ratings of the BPCA reflect the continued trust in the 
organization and the leadership of the Authority. 
I think Sandy Frucher, at that point, dedicated his life to public service. That was 
very much part of what he was all about. verybody easily latched on to him. 
Sandy was also a very smart guy. He saw to a lot of the political leverage, of 
financial leverage, and the political via the financial. He made use of this, also 
on behalf of 'overnor Cuomo – but all behind that was the strong ethic of 
public service. (public sector respondent 2008) 
The most important factors mentioned by several public respondents were 
the fact that Frucher was willing to share information and resources and, as 
mentioned in the quote above, that through the interaction, they grew to 
respect his capacities. He had a particular ‘political savvy’ that made it 
possible ‘to get things done’ (public sector respondents 2008).  
 
dƌƵƐƚŝŶƚŚĞW 
The trust in the BPCA from external parties was also surprisingly high from 
the beginning of Round 4, even before O & Y arrived on the scene. The figure 
above shows that trust grew over time. Several respondents mention that an 
initial and essential factor, in the early days and over Rounds 4 and 5, was 
the consistency of the behaviour of the management, which led to the 
development of a reputation on the part of the BPCA, as a factor of trust 
build-up. The Chairman and CEO of the BPCA developed a reputation for 
being somewhat abrasive and hard-nosed, but also straightforward and fair, 
and most importantly, unwilling to make concessions in negotiations when it 
came to the guidelines and public standards (private sector respondent 2008, 
public sector respondent 2008). He remained strong on protecting the public 
interest. This was difficult to do in the face of the extreme risk. 
Zichard was an entrepreneur, a doer . . . I mean this thing could have fallen 
apart if Zichard had been a cowering type. Fact is Zichard did not cower easily. 
nd he was as smart as those guys. So, nobody could pull one over on him. . . . 
Ϯϱϯ | P a g e  
 
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 286
then people stepped out of line, he had to go and kick them back in line. 
ssentially, what he would say to people was: ‘You don’t like it, tough.’ He said 
that the first time and word got around in a hurry. Oh, Oh! Somebody (a 
developer) came in for the Commercial Center; he thought he was pretty hot 
stuff. BWC had been a failure and his participation would be a sign of it turning 
around. He came in and said: ‘I am not going to design to the guidelines.’ 
Zichard said: ‘Fine, don’t bid.’ . . . The guy could not believe it. nd the word got 
around pretty fast. Oh, and he bid . . . (private sector respondent 2008) 
This respondent also mentioned that as word spread, this reputation became 
known to the developers bidding on the project. Developers bidding on 
projects ‘tested’ him, but he remained consistent. Over time, those 
interacting with him grew to know and respect his capacities. O & Y was also 
aware of his reputation (private sector respondent 2009).  
 
The second key factor contributing to trust build-up was the coping strategies 
that BPCA employed to deal with the external and external risks (see risk 
section). For one, the development process established added certainty that 
the conditions set in the bid, the guidelines and the contracts were sufficient 
to ensure the compliance of the other party. In addition, private respondents 
mentioned that these coping strategies set up by the BPCA allowed for 
immediate action by O & Y and established a clear basis for trust. These 
coping strategies indicated an understanding of private needs and helped to 
reduce the developer’s perception of risk. This built initial trust. 
Certainty and clarity were important from the beginning . . . te had certainty 
and we had coordination. (BWC) gave us some (way) of being able to link the 
pieces. (tithout it) a developer would have a hard time doing what we did; it 
was too complex . . . (private sector respondent 2009) 
Trust, according a respondent from O & Y, then entered a stage where it was 
based on greater knowledge of the needs, preferences and priorities of the 
other party, the second stage of the trust cycle. He mentioned in particular 
that through the interaction, the partners came to know and respect each 
other’s capacities; they acted in concert, sharing information and resources. 
It was an approach along the lines of ‘wanting to get things done between 
people’. It worked from the beginning . . . It was characteriǌed by mutual 
respect. I was able to go directly to the Head of Wlanning or to the contractor to 
deal with things. I was able to act quickly. It was almost like fitting two 
organiǌations together; it was almost an integrated organiǌation. te had 
enough definition of roles, but we worked these out as we went along. te had 
to make decision every day on the site about (cites numerous issues). (private 
sector respondent 2009) 
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Factors of trust of BWC in O Θ z 
At the beginning of the relationship, one of the factors in building BPCA’s 
trust in their partner was the information available on O & Y’s reputation, 
qualifications and past performance record. Interestingly enough, most of 
the developers in the market were from the US and known entities. O & Y 
was less known at the time, but arrived in town with a mystique built on past 
projects and a reputation for being honourable.  
Before working with [developers, in general], you knew so much about them. 
zou knew what they had done. If they did something bad, all competitors were 
happy (telling everybody). zou knew early on what you were dealing with. For 
instance, the Zeichmanns were really hard negotiators and absolutely 
honourable people. If you had to deal with the Zeichmanns, they would almost 
break their own company to make it work. It was hard to get a deal, but once 
you had the deal, it did not even have to be written down. (private sector 
respondent 2008) 
At the beginning of Round 5, after the BPCA and O & Y had reached the initial 
agreement, there was a year of negotiation between the two parties on the 
details of the Master Lease. The City was also involved and its position to 
protect. Foster (1986) recounts the process and the build-up of trust of Kahan 
and BPCA in Reichmann and O & Y: 
“There was a year’s delay between the ‘winning’ of the deal and completing the 
documentation . . . (he then mentions some of the hard negotiations with the 
City). Zichard Kahan’s regard for Waul Zeichmann increased during the course 
of the negotiations. Opposition lawyers constantly tried to pick holes in the 
verbal agreement between them (Kahan and Zeichmann). But if Kahan said 
that something had been agreed, Waul Zeichmann went along with it. >ater 
Kahan said: ‘My faith in this project comes from Paul.’ . . . ‘He was,’ said Kahan, 
‘the biggest crapshooter this town has ever seen.’” (Foster 1986: 53-54) 
What is of importance in this quote is that in the face of such 
interdependence between the two partners and the vulnerability of the 
BPCA, O & Y did not act in an opportunistic manner. And through repeated 
interaction, the parties got to know and respect each other’s qualities. The 
consistency of repeated behaviour confirmed the initial and strong trust that 
existed at the beginning. This trust also served to reduce the perception of 
risk on the part of Kahan (and the BPCA). 
 
In Round 5, the teams of O & Y and BPCA developed a working relationship, 
and met on a weekly basis to make decisions (Donohoe and Coombes 2008). 
Through the interaction, partners grew to know each other, and well enough 
to be able to predict behaviour, a knowledge basis for trust. Indeed, again, O 
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& Y did not act opportunistically; the behaviour of O & Y exceeded 
expectations built and that the developer continued to ‘deliver’. This was an 
important factor in trust build-up. 
[Concerning΃ O Θ z, I am sure there was lot of concern initially [within BWC], 
when you are putting all of your eggs in one basket. torking with O Θ z, trust 
grew geometrically as we worked with them. The initial effort was to take the 
design and take it through [the process]. te had approval over the design at 
certain stages. They had to meet [our requirements]. O Θ z always exceeded 
the design expectations and were always interested in making it better, from a 
physical point of view. They always wanted it to look better; they were 
interested to hiring the best architects. They let the uthority design and review 
people be involved . . . The tinter 'arden was originally a little greenhouse at 
the back end of this building, part of this little plaǌa out here (pointing to the 
plan, showing that the t' connected two buildings). O Θ z turned it around 
and made it into what it is, a huge attraction . . . that is huge overhead cost. It 
is hard to figure out the return on it. But because it is a huge attraction, a place 
in Battery Wark City that people know about. . . . nd that was their decision [O 
Θ z’s], it was not BWC’s decision. To me, trust was built because they just 
delivered. Eot because you always agreed on things, but because there was a 
great delivery system . . . there was a rough plan (pointing to the whole 
development), but it had never been really designed and worked out. The more 
we worked with them, they had things more worked out; sometimes they were 
always ahead of us. They just delivered. They did not just talk a good game; 
they just delivered. (public sector respondent 2008) 
This respondent underlined in the first sentence that there was some 
concern about BPCA’s vulnerability when entering into the partnership with 
O & Y. He referred to interdependence of the two partners (when you are 
putting all of your eggs in one basket), and the worries that the developer 
might either display opportunistic behaviour or might not meet expectations 
built. In fact, he then described the contrary, also mentioning that O & Y was 
willing to design, invest in and build the Winter Garden, a public and non-
revenue generating space. This showed an understanding of the public goals 
and values. 
 
When towards the middle of Round 5, Reichmann admitted he was in 
financial trouble, the BPCA gave him the benefit of the doubt, and trust did 
not waver. The figure above shows no dip in average trust levels and of all 
respondents, the BPCA respondents showed the highest average level of 
trust, overall. For the management of the BPCA, trust remained strong also 
in the face of Reichmann’s secretive behaviour. 
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He was very secretive, you could not find out information on [O Θ z]. He was 
not very open. The fact that there was no market . . . it became a real issue, and 
he almost went bust. Our financial offices would go over once a month to look 
at the books, at financial conditions. One day, Waul Zeichmann said: ‘We are in 
a lot of trouble.’ He asked to renegotiate the lease. This is not typical of hS 
developers. (public sector respondent 2007) 
The respondent refers to the fact that Reichmann made himself vulnerable 
to the BPCA, admitting that O & Y was in trouble, something atypical of New 
York developers, who are perceived as opportunistic by nature (and not 
trustworthy).  
tithin the context of Eew zork developers, you trusted him more than other 
developers. He took bigger risks. He generally performed, if he said he was 
going to perform. However, when the world changed, it did not stop him from 
coming in and saying: ‘I’d like to renegotiate the deal.’ Then, we essentially said 
no. I am sure that we renegotiated at the edges, but he had to put up collateral 
for all of those severed leases. He did something very different. It was very 
dramatic. He said he would do it and then people worked on faith . . . There was 
certainly the faith to go forward on that pledge (Then referring to whether 
Zeichmann was being opportunistic when he renegotiated the deal). Eo, he had 
a problem. But the problem was a problem of his own making, to some extent . 
. . developers typically over promise government. (public sector respondent 
2009) 
BPCA’s perception was that O & Y was still acting in good faith. The BPCA still 
required O & Y to put up letters of credit, which the developer did. And O & 
Y performed.  
nd so, when Waul Zeichmann suggested that he was going to do something 
more than other developers, he created higher expectations. nd he performed. 
That was the magic of Waul Zeichmann. (public sector respondent 2009) 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter described the interaction between partners and actors in the 
Battery Park City Project, in New York City. The chapter and the analysis of 
the results above were structured to respond to the research questions. The 
conclusions in this section will look at the important points that came out of 
the chapter. 
6.8.1 The interaction  
This intense interaction took place over a period of eight years. The partners 
took on the project in the midst of a highly charged economic and political 
context. The partners were interdependent from the start, faced with the 
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pressing need to succeed. They came together, a relatively small team from 
both sides, focused on a common goal: to get this project off the ground after 
years of false starts and to build a series of commercial buildings in the 
‘biggest snake pit in the world’. 
 
This single and common purpose was perhaps a good setting for trust 
development. 
6.8.2 The dynamics of trust 
There is strong evidence of high levels of trust and trust cycle in this case. 
Figure 6-3 in section 6.7.3 of this chapter shows high levels of trust in the 
main partners in the PPP, trust started high and grew over time, with little 
disruption. Interestingly, trust was built and existed at different levels of the 
organizations: between the Chairman of BPCA and the President of O & Y, 
and between the teams from both parties working on the ground. Trust in 
non-core parties was somewhat lower, but grew over time. Overall 
assessments of trust confirm this trend. Overall, these results were higher 
than in the Polish PPP, reflecting the more positive nature of the interaction 
in this case.  
6.8.3 Perception of outcomes 
It is interesting to note the similarities in perception of outcomes on the part 
of the public and private respondents, though still coloured by sectoral 
interests. The results of interviews demonstrated a common perception of 
outcomes, such as the quality of the design and space, success in meeting 
the goals of the project, and the influx of finances from tenants and 
subsequent repayment of debts. Public sector respondents, for instance, 
mentioned their satisfaction with the fact that O & Y was clearly promoting 
public interests in its design and approach, leading to a project that met 
public service objectives. In the end, positive outcomes led to greater 
investor confidence, essential for the long-term return on investment for O 
& Y, and the long-term success of the project, important for the BPCA. A 
multiplier effect were the funds channelled into the Housing New York 
Progam, good for the reputation of O & Y, BPCA and the project. The 
outcomes satisfied the interests of both parties and were a mix of short- to 
long-term outcomes. The results of the questionnaire confirmed the 
responses from the interviews, indicating that respondents were satisfied 
with the collaboration/project, that the partnership helped to achieve 
organizational goals, and produced a project that contributed to the quality 
of life in the area. 
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In contrast to the Polish case, the perception of outcomes was aligned, 
perhaps particularly as the interaction was a positive one and trust was high. 
6.8.4 Perception of risks 
As stated above, the risks that the partners faced were inherited from the 
past; they faced the political risks of a failed project and the economic crisis 
of that time, and the perception of this was clear from the interviews.  
 
In this case, the partners’ coping strategies were essential. On the public side, 
coping strategies involved the reprogramming of the project, the 
development of the guidelines and acquisition of bridge finance, also to be 
used to leverage private sector investment. On the private side, strategies 
focused on dealing with market and demand risks, namely the acquisition of 
tenants for the buildings. Partners did what they do best. Over the length of 
the project, the perception of certain project risks remained, financial, 
contractual, construction risks that respondents termed as normal project 
risks, though the perception of other types of risk declined substantially. 
6.8.5 Factors of trust 
The results of the questionnaire focus on the three knowledge bases of trust: 
sharing of information and resources, predictability and respect for capacity.  
 
Though not noted in the results of the questionnaire as relevant, interviews 
revealed that reputation and past performance were important factors of 
trust, at least for the public sector. O & Y came to the partnership with a 
reputation for being honourable, and for delivering what it promised. This 
was an important starting point for trust build-up.  
 
This case highlights aspects of predictability as being an important factor of 
trust. Predictability, for instance, came from the coping strategies that the 
BPCA used to minimize the perceived risks to O & Y prior to the start-up of 
the partnership. As one O & Y respondent indicated, there was clarity and 
certainty when they entered into the project (Coombes, 2009), allowing the 
developer to move quickly and unhampered. Predictability came, also, from 
consistency in behaviour on the part of both partners (the public sector 
consistency when dealing with developers, and O & Y being consistent in 
negotiations and keeping to the quality guidelines). In the long run, 
predictability came from O & Y’s ability to deliver according to expectations 
(to achieve outcomes); this reinforced the initial trust built. 
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This case also highlights another factor of trust: the willingness of partners 
to take risk in the face of a perception of a risky situation or, to make a 
distinction, the risk taking that is the outcome of this willingness. O & Y was 
not only willing to take the risk but also took the risk to build all of the 
Commercial Center in conditions of extreme uncertainty; this contributed to 
trust build-up. Possibly the most notable quote is that of Kahan who referred 
to Paul being ‘the biggest crapshooter in town . . .’ (Foster 1986: 53-54). 
 
The second in line at O & Y confirmed this: ‘To demonstrate trust from our 
side we kept sending tens of millions of dollars of rental income when the 
whole project was not yet settled’ (willingness to take risk in the face of 
uncertainty . . .) and on why O & Y took such risk: ‘That is what developers 
do. te take huge risk. te create value, in this case, 3Ϭ billion hS$. te took 
a gamble and won’ (private respondent).  
6.8.6 Influence of trust on perceptions of outcomes and 
of risk 
Influence on outcomes 
Respondents in this case described the interaction as resulting in a ‘cycle of 
positive outcomes’. Each partner made a series of moves that were perceived 
by the other partners as positive, and this appears to be reflected in the trust 
cycle, which also grew over time. One could argue that the perceptions of 
outcome led to trust build-up, further investment in the project and the 
interaction, which then led to more positive perceptions of outcomes, and to 
the growth of trust. The figure below gives a representation of this 
sequencing of strategies, outcomes, growth of trust, then further strategies. 
One can argue that trust resulted in strategies that contributed to the 
outcomes achieved. 
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Figure ϲ-ϱ͗ >ŝŶŬŽĨƚƌƵƐƚƚŽŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͕h^ĂƐĞ 
 
 
 
Influence of trust on perception of risk 
Trust was high from the outset of the partnership; one can argue that it offset 
the perception of risk. In this case, the trust appears to have bordered on 
‘blind faith’, the intense belief that the partners could pull off the project in 
the face of the perception of extremely high risk. The teams of the two 
organizations knew that the alternative, failure, was not an option. This 
single purpose or urgency engendered strong trust, and this trust was very 
strong from the outset.  
 
Of interest in this case is that when partners perceived that risk was high, so 
were trust levels. This leads one to conclude that trust can continue to grow 
in the face of the perception of risk, and be sufficient enough for partners to 
continue to interact. An increase in trust does not automatically cause a 
reduction in the perception of risk (and rising risk does not automatically 
cause a reduction in trust). 
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7 Brabantse Poort, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces, describes and analyses the interaction and build-up 
of the trust relationship between the public and private parties in a 
partnership in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. This partnership is an example of 
a relatively ‘smooth’ partnership with high levels of trust. 
 
The advent of the project took place in the context of an economic crisis. In 
the mid-1980s, the city of Nijmegen was not a competitive city. Investors did 
not perceive Nijmegen as interesting and showed no desire to locate or 
invest in the area. The Council was aware, for instance, that Arnhem, just to 
the north, was a more attractive city for investment. There was a general 
sense of urgency that something had to be done. The political parties in the 
city deliberated on the best approach to improving development of the area. 
There was interest on the part of the Council, as way to jumpstart economic 
activities, provide high-quality living, working and recreation, to develop an 
area called the Brabantse Poort as a Public-Private Partnership. 
 
On 18 July 1989, the city released a tender document to 18 potential 
candidates and at the end of 1989, The Council and city of Nijmegen released 
the information that they had decided on a consortium comprised of three 
private parties, two developers (Heijmans and Hendriks) and the Dutch 
National Investment Bank (NIB). In March 1990, three months after the start 
of negotiations, the private partners attracted their first (anchor) tenant. 
Even prior to the completion of the negotiations on the partnership 
agreement in October 1991, the partners had landed three large clients and 
were working together on completing the first portions of the project.  
 
The partners have now been working together in a joint venture, in a limited 
liability company, for over 25 years and are now completing the build out of 
the project. 
7.2 Structure of the chapter 
The first section, as in the last chapters, looks at the actors involved in the 
decision-making process, and their interests relative to the partnership and 
to the project (see Table 5-1). The second section describes the interaction 
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process in detail, again depicted in rounds, each of which ends with a key 
decision point. This is followed with the analysis section of the chapter, 
including both the qualitative and results of the questionnaire of the 
research: the perception of outcomes, the perception of the risks per round 
and the influences of these on strategies, the perception of the trust, and the 
factors that contributed to these, ending with a conclusion. 
7.3 Actors on the scene 
The actors in this project can be categorized in three main groups: 
government actors (local and national), the private sector (the consortium 
that partnered with the municipality of Nijmegen) and the community. The 
table below lists the different actors, gives information on the nature of each, 
and outlines their primary interests as relates to the project.  
 
dĂďůĞϳ-ϭ͗ĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ;ϭͿ 
ĐƚŽƌ EĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ 
The National 
Government of the 
Netherlands 
  
Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) 
Ministry of Housing, 
Planning and 
Environment (VROM) 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (EZ) 
Ministries that set policy 
at the national level and 
provide substantial 
finance to large-scale 
projects such as this one 
 MoF: to use subsidies to achieve 
national policy priorities in terms of 
housing and work 
 VROM: to stimulate growth in key 
areas of the country, and to ensure 
quality of living and work in these 
areas 
 EZ: to improve the economic links of 
cities in the east of the Netherlands 
with cities in Germany 
The city of Nijmegen   
The Land Agency of the 
City (Grondbedrijf) 
Agency that prepares 
land policy, buys, 
manages, services and 
sells land 
 To sell the land to the PPP at a price 
that will (for the most part) cover 
the costs of servicing the land 
 To use this uniquely located zone to 
respond to the shortage in 
economic activities and housing 
 To have the land services with 
infrastructure at the right time for 
the project to succeed 
The City Council, the 
Council Commissions 
and the Mayor of 
Nijmegen (E. M. 
d’Hondt) 
The political bodies of the 
city, key to getting 
approvals in the PPP 
 To compete with other cities in the 
Netherlands in attracting new 
functions to the city (offices, 
commercial and residential) 
 To generate additional employment 
in Nijmegen, to improve the 
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environment for investment, to 
improve on the accessibility  and 
quality of the housing in Nijmegen 
The Projectbureau  The group within the 
municipality (under 
the ‘Hard Sector’) 
managing projects 
for the city, and 
coordinating project 
activities with the 
departments of the 
city 
 The body that 
worked closely with 
the Land Agency and 
the city lawyers in 
the negotiations 
with the private 
partner 
 To negotiate the best deal for the 
municipality with the private sector 
 To ensure that the project takes 
place; and is well planned and 
executed 
 To make sure that the tasks of the 
city are well coordinated (the 
departments) 
 To ensure that the Council is well 
informed and approves of all the 
activities and decisions taking place 
The city government 
departments: Planning, 
Transport, etc. 
Municipal departments 
responsible for public 
works: in both the soft 
and hard sector 
 To transform a underutilized portion 
of land in the city into a vibrant, 
high-quality multifunctional area 
 To ensure that the interests of each 
department was taken into account 
in ongoing discussion on project 
development  
The Netherlands 
Railways 
The national company 
managing and operating 
the railways throughout 
the Netherlands 
 To coordinate investment in rail and 
station services with the City Of 
Nijmegen 
 To have to spend as little money as 
possible on extra services 
The consortium (private 
partner) 
  
National Investment 
Bank (NIB) 
A public/private 
investment bank, 49% of 
stocks owned by the 
State, 51% in private 
hands. 
The biggest investor in 
the PPP project, with 40% 
in project finance; playing 
a intermediary role 
 To protect its investment by 
minimizing risks 
 To get return on its investment 
 To protect the interests of its 
shareholders 
 To bring to the BV its experience 
with project finance for the real 
estate market 
 
Heijmans 
Projectontwikkeling BV 
A privately held (at that 
time) developer, with 
25% shares in the BV51 
 To be able to attract clients for their 
office buildings in the project as 
quickly as possible, through pre-sale 
or pre-rental contracts 
51 The term BV is Dutch for Besloten Venootschap or Limited Liability Company or Private 
Limited Company. 
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 To build a project that would 
enhance the company’ reputation 
on a national level 
 To make a profit 
Hendriks 
Projectontwikkeling BV 
A privately held (at that 
time) developer, with 
25% shares in the BV 
 
De bouwcombinatie 
Heijmans – Hendriks 
Nijmegen V.O.F. 
Daughter construction 
company of the two 
developers 
 To get as much business as possible 
in the construction of the project 
Community   
Various groups that 
took part in the 
participatory process 
Mix of types of 
community members 
 To ensure that concerns are met by 
the project, these varied 
The owners in the 
shopping complex 
Various  To ensure that the extension of the 
shopping centre met their objectives 
to achieve quality, in the case of 
relocation, to get the best possible 
deal 
7.4 Conclusion 
The parties remained the same over the length of the project. This implies, 
with the exception of the planned moments for community participation, 
and the periodic changes in the city council, that there was no change in the 
composition of the actors. Personnel did change on the public side over the 
length of the project (in the council and in the BV), but this did not 
significantly alter the objectives on the public side. 
7.5 The process52 
The table below provides a quick outline of the rounds, the actors, the stakes 
or the content of the project. It highlights per round, the key and peripheral 
actors, the intensity and nature of their interaction, crucial decisions made, 
as well the evolution of the stakes. 
 
The Brabantse Poort partnership is divided into four decision-making rounds. 
The first, the Orientation and Choice Phase, 1987-1989 (market studies 
began in 1985), was the period when the city of Nijmegen explored different 
development options; such as key development objectives, different projects 
to achieve these objectives as well the possibility of executing a PPP. The 
Council decided to develop two key areas: the Brabantse Poort and the 
Spoorzone, and to develop the project as a PPP. A special task force prepared 
52 See Annex 4 for the schedule of activities in setting up the partnership 
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and tendered the project (July 1989), finally choosing a consortium of three 
partners in December 1989. Interaction took place in the period September 
– October between a working group set up to assess bids and the five private 
parties shortlisted for second interviews. In Round 2, the public and private 
parties began negotiations on the project. This round was characterized by 
regular (weekly) and intense discussions of the partners on mutual interests 
and objectives as well as the programming and financing of the project. This 
round ended after one year in the decision on the part of both parties to sign 
a Letter of Intent (December 1990), and to enter into detailed negotiations 
that would lead to the signing of a partnership agreement. The regular and 
intense interaction continued throughout the following round, Round 3, and 
focused on the detailing of the project and the nailing down of the financial, 
organizational and legal aspects of the project. The partners signed the 
partnership agreement eight months later in August 1991. In the 
implementation round, the partners worked together on the build out of the 
project, which was in principle completed by 1997. The project, however, 
continued to expand, taking on new properties. The project is now pretty 
much complete, and the partnership company will be dissolved in the near 
future. 
 
Table 7-2: Rounds and their most striking features provides an overview of 
the four rounds and their key features. 
dĂďůĞϳ-Ϯ͗ZŽƵŶĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŵŽƐƚƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ 
ZŽƵŶĚƐ dŚĞKƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŚŽŝĐĞ: the 
city deliberates on 
its objectives. 
tenders and 
chooses a partner, 
1987 - December 
1989 (prelim. 
choice 10 Nov) 
dŚĞŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ͗ 
the city and the 
partners  
negotiate on 
their interests 
and conditions 
December 1989 - 
17 December 
1990 
dŚĞĞƚĂŝůƐ͗ The 
city and partners 
negotiate the 
details of the 
project, 
partnership and 
the contract 
December 1990 – 
8 October 1991 
dŚĞ
WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ͗
Execution of 
the project 
begins and 
continues for 
24 years. 
October 1991 
to the present 
Actors City departments 
and the City 
Council, external 
consultants 
(planning and 
market studies), 
working group 
established by the 
city; wide range of 
private sector 
developers 
A team from the 
public sector 
assembled to 
handle the 
negotiations (i.e. 
a project 
manager, the 
City Lawyer, a 
manager from 
the land agency, 
etc.); 
representatives 
The public sector 
and private sector 
teams; the City 
Council and 
Departments 
Various 
consultants taken 
on to do studies 
and provides 
services 
The public and 
private  
representatives 
taking part in 
the BV 
Various 
consultants 
taken on to do 
studies and 
provide services 
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from each of the 
private partners; 
the City Council 
and Departments 
Intensity of 
interaction 
Regular interaction 
between public 
parties of the 
municipality, 
interaction with 
developers 
tendering 
Intense 
interaction of the 
representatives 
of the private 
consortium and 
the public sector 
working group 
Intense 
interaction 
between the 
representatives of 
the public and 
private partners 
Intense 
interaction 
public and 
private staff of 
the BV 
Nature of 
Interaction 
Crucial discussions 
on the future 
direction of the 
city, and the need 
to compete with 
other cities in 
attracting markets 
to Nijmegen  
A working group of 
the municipality 
puts together the 
tender and assesses 
all bids. Interviews 
take place with 
shortlisted private 
parties 
The public team 
and the private 
partners 
negotiate the key 
elements and 
conditions of the 
project, and 
assess the 
feasibility of the 
venture. 
The public and 
the private teams 
work out the 
details of the 
project, finalize 
the partnership 
agreement 
The partners 
work together 
on 
implementation 
of the project 
Crucial 
Decisions  
The Council decides 
to execute a PPP, 
tenders and 
chooses a partner 
for its priority 
project 
The partners 
decide that they 
have settled all 
the major issues 
faced in the 
negotiations and 
agree to sign the 
Letter of Intent 
(this indicates 
their intent to 
collaborate) 
The partners 
decide that all 
details of the 
project have been 
worked out. They 
choose to sign the 
partnership 
agreement 
The ongoing 
decisions made 
as part of the 
PPP  
Stakes Sense of urgency 
on the part of the 
city to improve on 
the physical, social 
and economic 
qualities of the city. 
Perception of 
Nijmegen as a 
uninteresting city. 
Interest to find the 
right partner to 
High pressure to 
work out the 
conditions that 
are acceptable to 
both parties, and 
when faced with 
differences to 
find innovative 
solutions that 
would satisfy all. 
Stakes less 
urgent, now 
working out the 
details, some 
pressures related 
to ensuring the 
revenue stream. 
The public and 
private team have 
to respond to a 
second client and 
To build the 
project 
according to 
schedule and to 
earn money 
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pursue public 
objectives 
The public and 
private team 
have to respond 
to a first client 
and deliver an 
office building 
deliver an office 
building 
 
The following sections describe the setup of the partnership and the 
interaction between the local government of Nijmegen and the private 
consortium of three partners. As in the previous two cases, the interaction is 
broken down into rounds, and each round is completed with the key 
decisions that resulted in substantial changes, namely in actors, stakes and 
project contents. 
7.5.1 Background 
The advent of the project took place in the context of an economic crisis. In 
the mid-1980s, the city of Nijmegen was not a competitive city. Investors did 
not perceive Nijmegen as interesting and showed no desire to locate or 
invest in the area. The Council was aware, for instance, that Arnhem, just to 
the north, was a more attractive city for investment. There was a general 
sense of urgency that something had to be done.  
In the mid-1980s, the political parties in the city of Nijmegen deliberated on 
the best approach to improving development of the area. (multiple 
interviews public and private respondents) There was also a consciousness 
on the part of the Council of two beneficial trends: 
 
 The ongoing market and real estate recessions were coming to an end. 
(private sector respondent) 
 The National Government of the Netherlands intended to provide 
monetary support to municipalities located in ‘key areas’, areas with 
strategic economic links to the European countries to the east. There 
was also support for cities engaging in Public-Private Partnerships 
(Regeerakkoord, 1986). 
 
In 1986, the national government made the following policy statement: 
“Eew forms of Wublic-Wrivate Wartnerships are being established between 
municipal governments and regionally-located private sector firms, and when 
necessary, the national government, which focuses on the increase in the 
volume of investment in, among others, urban renewal.” (Zegeerakkoord 
198ϲ). 
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7.5.2 Round 1: Orientation and Choice: the city 
deliberates on the project, tenders and chooses 
partners (1987 to December 1989)  
On 8 May 1988, the City Council of Nijmegen voted to request a special 
commission of the Municipality Executive (College van Burgemeester en 
Wethouders) to work out a strategic plan for the city and the surrounding 
areas. The City Council requested insight into the potential use of as yet 
unused zones in the city, the types of properties that should be built, priority 
projects, and the financial, planning and organizational consequences of 
implementing these projects. The Council also prioritized, and made as one 
of the conditions for the projects, the use of the PPP model.  
 
On 7 December 1988, the municipality, represented by the Projectburo, 
presented the Wlan van anpak Stedelijke Ontwikkelingsǌones (PvA, Action 
Plan for the City Development Zones) to the City Council. The municipality 
earmarked two key zones and two projects, the Brabantse Poort and 
Spoorzone, as the focus of future development. The proposal stated that the 
plans for the area responded to two major challenges for the city: 
 
 How to utilize these uniquely located zones to respond to the shortage 
of economic activities and housing. 
 How, through the development of these zones, to improve upon the 
physical quality and the spatial and functional relations in the existing 
area, while preventing undesirable development and continuing to 
support the daily functions of the local residents (PvA 1988: 2).53 
 
The arguments behind the development of the programme were supported 
by market research commissioned by the city on the demand for and supply 
of employment, business and industrial activities, housing and work space in 
the area. Research conducted revealed: 
 
x A shortage of office space and land for the development of office 
buildings for the growing office market, implying a distinct pressure on 
the centre area of Nijmegen for this kind of facility. 
x Coupled with the growth in the office market and the existing and 
growing industrial sector in the city, a substantial growth in the service 
sector, mostly small and medium sized firms. The service businesses 
53 Translated word for word 
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showing the most growth potential were legal counsel, accountants, 
advertising agencies and computer companies. 
x An interest on the part of the large businesses interviewed in locating 
or relocating to an area where there would be easy access to service 
businesses. These large firms, in an effort to trim costs, were 
contracting out a good deal of their services to specialists in the service 
industry. 
x An interest on the part of these smaller service firms in locating to an 
area close to other service firms. Common practice was to join forces 
with other service firms to be able to produce a better package of 
services. 
x Unemployment figures of 25% in the office/education categories. Of 
the women searching for a job, 35% were also in this category. 
x A desire on the part of the businesses to be located in an area with 
integrated housing and retail functions.  
x A serious shortage of housing in Nijmegen proper (Toelichting Plan 
Brabantse Poort, 1989).54 
 
The city had, in its preparation of the Plan van Aanpak (PvA), put out feelers 
to see if there was interest in these two projects. The PvA reported that the 
projects . . .  
“. . . were met with enthusiasm. The construction world is deluging us 
with requests for more information, or wants to be involved in the 
developments. Investors and project developers are coming with 
proposals and are trying to gain exclusive rights.” (PvA 1988: 1) 
The municipality also included in its initial proposal to the City Council its 
arguments for executing the Brabantse Poort in the form of a Public-Private 
Partnership. It underlined the need for a more ‘moderniǌed and far reaching’ 
form of partnership,55 one that could be structured to respond to the 
requirements of a large and complicated project such as the Brabantse Poort 
(PvA 1988: 6). The PvA concluded that the Brabantse Poort was a good 
candidate for a PPP.  
 
In the document, the city enumerated what preconditions for success would 
be: 
 
54 Literal translation. 
55 The municipality’s call for a more ‘modernized’ form of partnership stems from their study 
of various PPPs in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, Groningen, 
Maastricht). 
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 A broad basis for trust between the participating parties. 
 Mutual interests and objectives that are clearly known, recognized and 
respected by all partners. 
 Clarity and certainty related to sources of finance from all parties as 
well as personnel, with a clear and fair distribution of risk, long-term 
commitment by knowledgeable personnel. 
 A situation in which the cultural differences of the private and public 
sectors do not become an obstruction to the project, suggesting the 
need for a coordinated approach via a project organization that handles 
the project management, for a legal mandate that would give local 
public representatives sufficient leeway to negotiate, and for a legal 
structure that would ensure a clear system of satisfying conflicts and, in 
the long run, the continuity of the project.  
 Timely participation of the community in the decision-making process 
and in all phases of the process (PvA 1988: 8).56 
 
The City Council approved the initial proposal at the end of 1988 and the 
municipality started the process of preparing the tender and looking for a 
private partner. The Projectburo,57 under project manager Jean Buskens, was 
responsible for putting together the tender document and to begin pre-
tender discussions with private parties to gauge interest in the project. He 
worked with the Urban Planning Team to create the planning documentation 
necessary to demonstrate the city’s vision and programming of the project 
(two public sector respondents). 
 
The Projectburo first attempted to create interest in the market among 
developers and investors via participation in congresses, mailing of 
brochures, directed visits, and marketing of the city in general. The 
Projectburo talked to 60 interested developers (two public sector 
respondents). 
 
On 18 July 1989, the city released a tender document to 18 potential 
candidates, which outlined the parameters of the project, the local 
government goals and objectives, their views concerning the division of tasks 
and, finally, a questionnaire that was to be filled out by all private parties. 
56 Literal translation. 
57 At the time of the project, the city was undergoing a reorganization. Projects of this sort 
were managed by project managers (often planners, chosen for their integrated approach to 
projects) who had a high level of autonomy to make decisions. These project managers were 
responsible for coordinating the functions of the activities of municipal departments on 
complex projects, and in future years on PPPs. 
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The criteria for selection were based on the ability of the private firms to 
make substantive suggestions regarding the proposed project and were 
structured around three main themes (Toelichting Plan Brabantse Poort, 
1989), namely 
 
 the qualitative and quantitative visions of the applicants concerning the 
realization of the programme and the urban design; 
 the candidates’ access to finance and to potential tenants; and  
 the manner in which financial, juridical and contractual aspects of the 
project were dealt with. 
 
The government supplied, in the document, the following financial and legal 
parameters for the project: 
 
 The city would only contract with one party. This contract party could 
be made up of a combination or consortium of parties. 
 The contract would require the completion of the project in an agreed 
upon period, against penalties. 
 The city would take care of implementing the large-scale infrastructure 
(outside of the PPP). The preparation and the supervision of the 
infrastructure works would be the city’s responsibility. 
 The municipality would not accept constructing a building without being 
somewhat certain of its future occupancy (through pre-sale or rental) 
since adjustments to the programme in mid stages could harm and 
delay the project in many ways. 
 The developer would in principle be allowed to choose between 
ownership and lease of the land. 
 The ground prices at which the municipality proposed to sell land to the 
developers at the level of prices in mid-1989 were listed as: 
 
 364 residences at an average of Nfl. 20,000 7,280,000 
 20,000 m2 for office space at Nfl. 175 per m2 (b.v.o) 58 3,500,000 
 3,000 m2 for shops at Nfl. 750 per m2 2,250,000 
 dŽƚĂů EĨů. ϭϯ͕ϬϯϬ͕ϬϬϬ 
 These prices were to be based on the provision of land in a ready state, 
were exclusive of sales tax and were based on a design with parking on 
the property (a higher cost to the private parties). 
58 Square meter calculations are based on gross floor (b.v.o) area calculations. 
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 In the period between the signing of the contract and the date at which 
the land would be sold for development, no financial commitment in 
the form of a down payment would be required from the developers.  
 These prices could be readjusted to meet changing land values. The 
land price would have to be paid at the time of transfer of the land. 
Delays in the payment in full would result in a late penalty being 
applied. Certain financial benefits could be arranged in the structure of 
the sale, for instance an ABC sale construction could be implemented. 
(This process, in which entity ‘A’ sells to entity ‘B’ who then sells to 
entity ‘C’, is a process that is subject to reduced taxes for all parties 
involved.) Backing out of the contract before the start of construction 
would lead to a non-refundable charge of 10% of the total land 
purchase price.  
 Pulling out at the midway stages during building would lead to a 
substantial penalty since the city, as well as the other developers of 
other portions of the Brabantse Poort, would have to be able to depend 
on the realization of the project (Toelichting Plan Brabantse Poort, 
1989). 
 
The city assembled a working group made up of representatives of the 
different municipal departments (Policy Development, Financial Policy, 
Projectburo, Economic Development, and Urban Planning) to assess the bids 
from private parties (Memorandum Gemeente Nijmegen, Selectie 
Procedure, 10 November 1989). Ten weeks later, 12 proposals were 
submitted and the municipal working group started the work to assess these. 
It analysed the differences in the reactions of the applicants, for example, to 
what extent the applicants addressed the questions (not at all, generally or 
in great depth), or how tentative or creative the answers were.59 
 
At a certain point in the decision-making process, the working group 
narrowed the choice down to five applicants, which stood out from the rest, 
all of them consortiums. The documentation of the selection procedure 
shows a further analysis of the proposals (Memorandum Gemeente 
Nijmegen, Selectie Procedure, 10 November 1989). 
 
59 Some parties demonstrated a preference for breaking the project and the contractual 
obligations down into phases with a commitment to go forward with the project only if the 
market permitted. This reduced the risk to them but also reduced the comprehensiveness of 
the project and virtually eliminated the possibility of having a partnership of the kind foreseen 
by the city. 
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Some proposals added aspects or suggested changes, some diverging a great 
deal from the original ideas. Most of the consortiums used visuals with text 
to support their bids and to express their vision. Related to the financial, 
juridical and contractual issues, applicants gave comments on their 
preference for certain forms of PPPs and the extent of risk sharing to be 
undertaken by all parties (and at what stage in the process). They also 
analysed the level of the land prices set by the municipality, and the timing 
and scheduling proposed. All applicants wanted to involve investors (through 
pre-sale or pre-rental) right from the start. All five were strong. 
 
With reference to the market orientation/ acquisition possibilities of the 
applicants, the working group looked at the ideas on and financial analysis of 
the mix of housing for the area (flats versus attached single family, sale 
versus rent, social versus market and the pricing of the units). The applicants 
were also judged on their suggestions concerning the acquisition of tenants. 
The working group looked for substantive understanding of the market and 
target groups, and how the parties would approach the acquisition of future 
tenants (Memorandum Gemeente Nijmegen, Selectie Procedure, 10 
November, 1989). 
 
In the end, the assessment was that the 
 applicants’ spatial visions were different, but all of high quality and 
feasible; 
 financial, juridical and contractual proposals were so similar that the 
final decision could not be based on these aspects; and 
 acquisition strategies and assessment of the market of one consortium 
was the deciding factor; it was by far the best (Sweens 1996, 2e aanzet 
Artikel Privatisering). 
 
The Projectburo presented the working group’s preliminary choice to the 
Council for approval on 10 November 1989 (Memorandum Gemeente 
Nijmegen, Selection Procedure, 10 November 1989). In the same period (7 
November 1989), the General Urban Plan was made public and subject to 
comments by the community. At the end of 1989, The Council and city of 
Nijmegen released the information that they had decided on a consortium 
comprised of three private parties, two developers (Heijmans and Hendriks) 
and the Dutch National Investment Bank (NIB).  
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7.5.3 Round 2: The conditions: the city and the partners 
negotiate on their interests and conditions 
Change in the stakes 
This decision brought about the start in the negotiations between the public 
and private parties. The stakes changed as each partner put their demands 
on the table in negotiations held on a weekly basis, each Friday for six 
months. The goal of these meetings was to come to an agreement on the key 
elements of the project, the “planning, economic and financial” conditions 
(Letter of Intent 1990: 5) that had to be met, and the overall feasibility of the 
programme. The goal was also, ultimately, to lay out the outcome of these 
negotiations in a Letter of Intent (LoI, Intentieovereekomst in Dutch) signed 
by all parties.  
 
The Letter of Intent had a special function: it constituted a commitment to 
the intent to establish a partnership, but was not contractually binding. The 
stakes in this round, therefore, related to ensuring that the negotiating 
parties would be able to iron out all differences, and to establish the ‘rules of 
the game’ to such an extent that the parties were willing to sign a document 
that committed them to negotiating the specifics of the partnership (and to 
eventually signing the partnership agreement).60  
 
One of the municipal lawyers described this in a memorandum to the Local 
Council. 
This >etter of Intent is the written declaration made by the different 
parties of their intent to explore the feasibility of a partnership 
focused on the development and realiǌation of the central area of the 
Brabantse Woort. (Gebbink, Raadvoorstel, 26 June 1990) 
Change in actors and in the content of the project 
The city assembled a team to negotiate with the private consortium. The 
team was made up initially of the Head of the Projectburo, Jean Buskens, the 
Head of the Land Agency, Carel Sweens, and two municipal lawyers (Dorinne 
Gebbink and Frank Delissen). The Urban Planning Department took part in 
many of the meetings to discuss the detailed urban plans created for the 
project and the programming of the project (Memorandum Gemeente 
Nijmegen, Selection Procedure, 10 November 1989: 2; also three public 
60 Final negotiation of the terms of the partnership still had to take place. Ironing out 
differences and coming to terms with conditions became the deciding factors on whether or 
not the partnership would actually be established. 
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sector respondents). On the private side, one or two representative of each 
of the three private partners attended the negotiation meetings, depending 
on the issues to be discussed. (Heijmans: Van der Hoven and Schuwer; 
Hendriks: Hendriks and Prikarts; NIB: Breskens and Groen). When needed, 
parties brought in private consultants to provide services. 
Interaction 
In general terms, the interaction focused first on pinning down the mutual 
objectives and interests of the partners. The partners defined these in 
discussions as (Letter of Intent 1990: 4, Sweens 1996: 6): 
 
 The 'eneral Objective: the research and determination of the urban, 
economic, financial and other criteria for the project to be executed as 
a partnership. 
 For the municipality: contribution to and an increased role in the 
regeneration of the central area, thereby serving the financial, 
employment and housing needs as optimally as possible. 
 For the developers, Heijmans and Hendriks: through the development of 
the project, the generation of turnover and profit for themselves and 
for their daughter construction companies.61 The project scope was to 
include the initiation, realization and sale of real estate. 
 For the EIB: the financing of the partnership and the project with equity 
as well as debt financing, and ensuring the most optimal yield on the 
debt financing.  
 
Further, in discussions, the group agreed to focus on the following agenda: 
 The commercial concept, the target groups to be reached, the quality of 
the shops, housing and office spaces. 
 The quality of the planning (public spaces and infrastructure) and 
architecture.  
 The guiding principles and objectives to be used in the land use plan, 
the detailing of the project components in the land use plan, and the 
phasing of the project in the plan (essential for the approvals). 
 Assessment of the needs/process for applying for subsidies from: 
 -the Ministry of Finance 
 -the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment 
 -the Ministry of Transport and Water 
61 This negotiation point will be discussed later. 
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 The process by which decisions were to be made, i.e. the partnership in 
coordination with different departments in the municipality, dealing 
with public space and major infrastructure. 
 The process by which decision were to be made by the municipality 
with regard to major office and retail projects in other parts of the city. 
 The conditions under which the city’s Land Agency would deliver/sell 
the serviced land to the PPP; for instance, whether the quality of the 
infrastructure might be higher than what is normally required by 
municipal regulations. 
 An estimation of the partnership’s/project’s expenditures and 
revenues, as well as the risk profiles of each of the partners, the 
drafting of a ‘business’ plan, in which all this would be described. 
 Juridical and financial aspects of the PPP (statutes, project organization, 
partnership agreement) as decided upon by all the partners.  
 Setup of a management structure for the PPP that would guarantee the 
quality of the project (IO 1990: 7). 
 
The team decided on a two-pronged organizational structure: a Policy Group 
that made all strategic decisions, composed of four representatives, one 
from each partner; and a Project Team responsible for the management of 
the project, also composed of four members. All decisions had to be 
unanimous. The Project Team was seen as flexible; other members of the 
partner organizations could join as needed. In addition, the team decided to 
appoint a Project Manager to handle all daily management and coordination. 
Jean Buskens took on this role (LoI 1990, Sweens 1996). 
 
The team decided that each partner would bear the costs of the negotiations 
and would share each in 25% of any direct expenditures. 
 
The team also set 7 January 1991 as a deadline for the completion of the 
negotiations, the activities listed above and for determining the feasibility 
and viability of the project. This was a key cut-off date, if issues could not be 
settled the Policy Group would be tasked with deciding whether to go 
forward with the negotiations (LoI 1990). 
 
The intense weekly negotiations came to a key moment three months later. 
The partners concluded that all major conditions had been set, and the 
lawyers finalized the LoI for submission to the City Council and in preparation 
for the Council Meeting in June 1989. The City Council approved the LoI in 
June. The partners continued to work on the activities outlined in the LoI for 
the next few months.  
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In March 1990, three months after the start of negotiations, the private 
partners attracted their first (anchor) tenant, TRN (the name of Deloitte and 
Touche at the time), who was interested in office space in the project area 
(Sweens 1996, 1e aanzet Artikel Privatiseren, Schuwer, correspondence 22 
November 1996, private sector respondent).  
 
In September 1990, the private partners set up a Limited Liability Company 
(called a BV in the Netherlands) called Brabantse Poort Nijmegen BV. At that 
time, the city had not come to a decision on their choice of partnership form, 
but the expectation was that the public sector would at one point join the 
BV.  
 
In October 1990 the BV signed a contract with TRN. The partnership 
promised to start construction of the office building in January 1991 and 
agreed to deliver 3000 m2 of office space to the company in December 1991 
(Gebbink, Advice to council on representation of the city in the temporary 
BV, 10 October 1990, public and private sector respondent). 
 
All parties signed the final LoI document on 17 December 1990. 
7.5.4 Round 3: The details: the city and partners 
negotiate the details of the project, partnership 
and the contract (December 1990 – 8 October 1991) 
The stakes, actors and content of the project 
The decision of the Council to approve the LoI provided the support and the 
impetus for the public and private project group negotiating the project to 
take the step to focus on the detailing of the project. The activities of this 
particular round focused on working out the details that would be set out in 
the final partnership agreement.  
 
The actors, as did the organizational structure, remained the same while the 
content of the project continued to develop and take form. The stakes were 
mixed: they rose when the partners obligated themselves to build their first 
building. They were catapulted into motion and continued to work at high 
speed, before they were even contractually bound. The LoI did not commit 
them in any way to the partnership. On the other hand, much of the 
conditions had been placed on the table and defined, what remained was the 
detailing of the partnership agreement. Several strategic issues were left on 
the agenda: (1) the juridical form to be chosen, (2) the share of the risk per 
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partner, and (3) the final budget for the project (which was dependent on 
resolving the points worked out in the LoI). 
 
After considering a number of different legal forms for the partnership, the 
municipality of Nijmegen finally settled on a private company with limited 
liability (BV). On 20 August 1991, the City Council decided that the city would 
take part in the BV set up by the private consortium, the Brabantse Poort 
Nijmegen BV. The city entered into the BV with an initial investment of 300 
shares of 1000 guilders (454 euros) apiece. 
 
The partners continued negotiations. The decisions that came out of the 
negotiations resulted in the following project standards: 
 
 The project must be in accordance with national standards for physical 
planning, the environment, and transportation. Central government 
regulations required that the project respond to environmental 
concerns by focusing on reducing car use in the area, by increasing the 
use of public transport and the bicycle. The project had high standards 
regarding sound transmission throughout the area. Sound barriers had 
to be installed in all residential areas to reduce the noise level to the 
required 65 dB at building façades. 
 The project must conform to the requirements of the land use plan. 
 The project must be phased to protect against risk of financial loss and 
to increase options for plan readjustment and flexibility. 
 The land must be issued (sold) to the BV ready for construction 
(serviced). 
 Infrastructure provision must be put up for public bidding. This was 
based on a EU requirement that all projects with costs in excess of 5 
million ECU (Nfl. 11 million) must be made available for bid to all EC 
firms. 
 If a higher than standard level of infrastructure was desired than was 
required by law, the cost must be borne by the BV. 
 Parking was to conform to the standards of 50 m2 gross coverage and 
must be built within project property lines at the costs of the BV. 
 Developers must rent out 40% of the office buildings before the start of 
construction. For the rental shopping and housing, acceptable renters 
must also be found prior to the beginning of construction. 
 Parts of the project could be sold to investors and/or the end users. The 
partnership did not wish to undertake the management of the 
properties after completion. 
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 The BV must make additional investments for the renovation of the 
railway station. After renovation, the property was to be returned to 
the National Railroad for maintenance and upkeep. 
 For areas surrounding the project area, options could be given to 
private parties outside the BV to develop land according to their own 
initiatives. Projects by outside firms included: the theme park, the ice 
rink/convention centre, the hotel and business centre. The ice 
rink/convention centre was to receive major financial contributions 
from the municipality, in keeping with Dutch policy to subsidize the cost 
of tickets to entertainment events. Investors included the local, regional 
and national government, a bank, and other local investors. 
 With respect to the bids for the construction of (parts of) the project, the 
partnership was to give the first opportunity to the construction 
company Heijmans-Hendriks Nijmegen VOF to give an open bid.62 In this 
bid, the VOF would assure a standard mark-up of 9% for administrative 
costs, profit and risk.  
 National grants: only for those portions of the project that focused on 
improvements in environmental conditions: 80% for costs related to 
improvement in bus system, 50% for costs related to bike paths (Sweens, 
1992 and Partnership Agreement (PA) 1991). 
 
The lawyers of the parties incorporated the outcome of the negotiation 
process into the partnership agreement, this were sent to the Council in July 
1991 and the contract was signed on 8 October 1991.  
7.5.5 Round 4: The partnership: implementation of the 
project begins and lasts for 24 years (October 1991 
to the present) 
The change in stakes and content 
The implementation phase got underway contractually in October of 1991. 
Again the change in stakes was mixed. On the one hand construction was 
underway on two buildings and the partners were already working together. 
On the other, the partners were now formally obligated and contractually 
bound to work together to complete building the programme as developed 
during the two previous rounds, quite an ambitious programme. The content 
of the project was now set down and agreed upon: 
 
62 Daughter construction companies mentioned before. Point negotiated by the private 
partners. 
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dĂďůĞϳ-ϯ͗^ĐŚĞĚƵůĞŽĨƐĂůĞŽĨůĂŶĚͬĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƌĂďĂŶƚƐĞWŽŽƌƚϲϯ 
Building Size in m2, 
gross floor 
area 
Starting 
construction= sale of 
land 
Land price 
(Nfl. without 
VAT) 
Phase I       
O-1: Office Bldg. 5000 1 June 1994 875,000 
O-2: Office Bldg. 5000 1 June 1992 875,000 
A-1: Office Bldg. 2500 1 January 1992 437,500 
A-2: Office Bldg. 2500 1 January 1992 437,500 
A-3: Office Bldg.* 2500 1 January 1993 437,500 
A-4: Office Bldg. 2500 1 January 1993 437,500 
C-1 Office Bldg. 2500 1 January 1994 437,500 
C-2 Office Bldg. 2500 1 January 1994 437,500 
B1 Shops 2650 1 January 1993 987,500 
B2 Shops 900 1 January 1997 675,500 
  6,038,000 
Phase II       
A5 Residential (rental) 15 01 June 1992 180,000 
A6 Residential (rental) 18 01 June 1992 216,000 
A7 Residential (sale) 44 01 June 1993 880,000 
A8 Residential (rental) 18 01 June 1993 261,576 
A9 Residential (rental) 15 01 June 1993 180,000 
B2 Shops 40 01 January 1997 480,000 
B3 Shops 25 01 June 1995 300,000 
B4 Shops 25 01 June 1995 300,000 
D1 Residential (rental) 54 01 June 1994 784,728 
E1 Residential (rental) 9 01 June 1996 108,000 
E2 Residential (rental) 9 01 June 1997 108,000 
E3 Residential (rental) 15 01 January 1997 282,000 
E4 Residential (rental) 15 01 June 1997 282,000 
   4,362,304 
  Grand Total 10,400,304 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗;W ϭϵϵϭ͕^ǁĞĞŶƐϭĞĂĂŶǌĞƚƌƚŝŬĞůWƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĞƌŝŶŐ͕ϰĞĐĞŵďĞƌϭϵϵϲͿ͘ 
 
The expectation was that the project would be built out by the late 1990s. 
 
The shares and profits were divided in the BV as follows: 
63 1 US$ = 1.877 Nfl., at that time 
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 NIB (represented by Projectum in the BV): 40% 
 Heijmans Project Development BV:  25% 
 Hendriks Project Development BV:  25% 
 Municipality of Nijmegen:  10% 
 
Initial finance came from two sources, from the partners in line with their 
proportional share in the BV, and subordinated capital, an additional loan to 
the BV. 
 
Own capital  Subordinated capital  
Projectum: Nfl.  1,200,000 Nfl.  300,000 
Heijmans Nfl.  750,000 Nfl. 187,500 
Hendriks Nfl.  750,000 Nfl.  187,500 
Municipality Nfl. 300,000 Nfl.  75,000 
Total Nfl. 3,000,000 Nfl. 750,000 
 
For additional capital, the NIB was prepared to provide a standby roll-over 
fund of Nfl. 12,5000,000. In the event that more is necessary, the NIB would 
first be approached to provide finance according to the standard market 
interest rates. 
 
On the financial side, projections were that the total investment by the BV 
(at the start of the process) would be Nfl. 112,800,000 excluding the two 
extra office buildings and Nfl. 146,500,00064 including the two extra office 
buildings.  
 
Other than the initial investment of Nfl. 3000,000 and Nfl. 75,000 listed 
above, the municipality was not liable for any further investment in the 
shares of the partnership, for any additional loans, for offering any 
guarantees of finance for the project or for any further risk sharing in the 
partnership. 
 
In the case of profit over and above a given margin per year, the municipality 
was to get 60% of the extra. This was to compensate the city for any losses 
incurred on the sale of land (S0 1991, Sweens 1e aanzet Artikel Privatisering, 
4 December 1996). 
64 The value in euros on 1 June 1994 would have been approximately €51,606,000 and 
€67,023,750 respectively. 
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Change in actors 
The actors did not change much, most of the professionals involved in the 
previous round continued to work in the BV. What did change, however, was 
the fact that the city was now working within the BV, and autonomously from 
the city apparatus.  
 
The daily affairs of the BV were run by three directors: one representative of 
the NIB, one from the city of Nijmegen and one from the two developers 
combined. All decisions were to be made by a unanimous vote, ensuring that 
the city had an equal voice even though the proportions of the shares were 
less.  
 
The company’s Supervisory Board (SB) was comprised of five members: two 
from NIB, one from each of the developers and one from the city of 
Nijmegen. These representatives had an overseeing function and were 
expected to settle any disputes that could not be settled by the daily 
managers. Their input was necessary for the acquisition, management and 
sale of real estate, the bidding of construction, and contracting of architects, 
advisors and contractors. 
Interaction 
Interaction began under the auspices of the BV. Interaction took different 
forms (Prikarts, correspondence contributing to Artikel Privatisering, 25 
November 1996). 
 
The partners set up a working or ‘building’ group to focus on the 
development of each piece of real estate. These groups were composed of 
representatives of the partners, architects, contractors, planners and any 
other advisors needed for the project. Parallel to this a team from the 
daughter construction company (VOF) of Heijmans and Hendriks worked on 
the technical and pricing details of the bid for construction. These groups met 
often to work together. 
 
Upon completion, the VOF subjected its bid to an advisor hired by the 
Projectum/NIB, to verify that the bid was on target and that the margin did 
match the 9% agreed on by contract. If the budget produced by this 
consultant came within a 5% margin of the budget of the partnership, the 
parties negotiated the terms of the contract. If the difference was greater 
than 5%, the BV was free to take bids from other contractors (SO 1991). 
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Once per month, a coordination team, led by the municipal Project Leader, 
met to coordinate the activities of the BV with the activities of the 
municipality, such as issues related to urban planning issues, traffic, 
environment, safety, quality, etc. (Prikarts 1996). Of particular importance 
was coordinating the implementation of the infrastructure for the project, a 
task kept as the responsibility of the municipality. As part of the contract, the 
city departments were expected to have serviced the land in time for the 
Land Agency to sell it the BV according to the schedule. 
 
The directors of the BV also held their formal meeting once a month. More 
informal meetings were held in the meantime. During these meetings, those 
involved in the projects (any of the staff working for the partners) reported 
to the directors on progress, problems and the financial status of the 
projects. Directors discussed the market strategy being taken and issues 
being faced with PR, and rental or sales of properties to investors or clients 
(Prikarts 1996, private sector respondent).  
It was very special because you suddenly were sitting at the other side of the 
table. te took part in management meetings once every two weeks, in 
Zosmalen, in the office of Heijmans  . . . Henny serstegen was in fact in the 
management (of the Bs) as the representative of the municipality. I took 
part (as support). ll project leaders came as support to their managers in 
management meetings. te worked together a lot on the work floor in 
‘building teams’. zou were completely focused on an objective. I have seldom 
been involved in a project that moved so quickly. (public respondent) 
With regard to marketing of the project, staff within the Department of 
Economic Affairs, the Planning Department and the Projectburo also took an 
active role in marketing of the project (private respondent, public 
respondent).  
 
The members of the Supervisory Board met four times a year to discuss the 
policies and strategies of the BV, and to look at the upcoming programme for 
the next three months. The directors provided technical and financial 
progress reports for each quarter.  Any difficulties or delays with divestiture 
of the properties were discussed in the meetings, and any changes to the 
strategy were approved by the Board members (Prikarts, correspondence 
contributing to Artikel Privatisering, 25 November 1996, private sector 
respondent). 
 
Construction of the second building (O-2), located on the roundabout, for 
client Bovemij had started in May 1991, prior to the signing of the 
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partnership contract. It continued into the implementation period. One 
respondent wrote: 
It was again impossible planning. Construction had to start while traffic 
rushed by a couple of metres from the site. Servicing of land was under 
tremendous pressure. Still with good coordination and cooperation the 
building was completed, including the required infrastructure. (private 
respondent, correspondence contributing to Artikel Privatisering, 22 
November 1996) 
In the years up to 1996, the city tried to attract a client to build the hotel and 
business centre (a property outside of the PPP), and after months of 
discussions with what looked to be a good developer, this did not go through. 
The rights to develop the location were given to the BV. An additional 
location for an office building (O-3) was added to the BV’s list of property 
developments and changes were made to the design and the infrastructure. 
In 1995, the properties developed were as follows: 
 
dĂďůĞϳ-ϰ͗WƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞsďǇϭϵϵϲ 
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ^ŝǌĞŝŶŵϮ 
;ĞǆĐĞƉƚĨŽƌ
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞƐͿ 
^ƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶс
sĂůĞŽĨ>ĂŶĚ 
>ĂŶĚWƌŝĐĞ
;EĨů͘ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
sdͿ 
sŽůƵŵĞ ŽĨ
/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ;EĨů͘
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚsdͿ 
O-1: Office Bldg. 5,400* 1 December 1990 970,000 12,900,000 
O-2: Office Bldg. 6,000* 1 May 1991 1,100,000 12,900,000 
A-1: Office Bldg. 3,200* 1 March 1992 600,000 7,800,000 
A-2: Office Bldg. 2,300 1 March 1992 430,000 5,900,000 
0-3: Office 
Bldg.* 
6,500  1 May 1993 1,700,000 16,300,000 
Shops 3,000  1 May 1994 2,500,000 21,300,000 
A5/A6 36 residences  1 May 1994 450,000 3,900,000 
 (rental)  
A8/A9 36 residences  November 1994 560,000 5,900,000 
(rental)  
Subtotal     8,310,000.00 86,900,000 
*Greater number of m2 than originally programmed, O3 was an additional office 
building 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗,ĞŝũŵĂŶƐ͕ϭϵϵϱ 
 
It appeared after market research and market sounding that certain 
properties were not in demand, mostly the housing. There were also certain 
delays in the schedule. The revised programming of the project below: 
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dĂďůĞϳ-ϱ͗WƌŽŐŶŽƐŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐǇĞĂƌƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚs 
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ^ŝǌĞ ŝŶŵϮ 
;ĞǆĐĞƉƚĨŽƌ
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞƐͿ 
^ƚĂƌƚŝŶŐĚate >ĂŶĚƉƌŝĐĞ
;EĨů͘ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
sdͿ 
sŽůƵŵĞ ŽĨ
/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ;EĨů͘
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚsdͿ 
O-4: Office Bldg.* 7,000 1 January 1998 1,600,000 17,000,000 
A-3: Office Bldg. 2,000 1 March 1997 420 5,200,000 
A-4: Office Bldg. 3,000 1 April 1997 600 7,500,000 
C-1 Office Bldg. 2,000 1 June 1998 410 5,200,000 
C-2 Office Bldg. 3,000 1 January 1999 630 7,800,000 
A7a/A7b 44 residences 
(rental)  
1 March 1997 1,000,000 8,000,000 
Shops West 550  1 January 1999 520 2,500,000 
B 2-4 121 residences  1 January 1999 3,600,000 28,000,000 
Subtotal 
  
8.780.000 81,200,000 
* O-4  additional office building 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗,ĞŝũŵĂŶƐ͕ϭϵϵϱ 
 
The building groups, management of the BV and the Supervisory Board 
continued to interact and develop the project. From time to time there were 
changes in personnel. 
then I joined in 2ϬϬ8, I noticed that I was getting on a moving train (with a 
group) that already knew what it was doing, together, and (had been) for 15 
years. nd then something developed, like: ‘We are just going to finish this 
together.’ That process was built up in the 15 years. This occurred due to the 
people that were steering the process. (private respondent) . . . From the 
municipality there were really only three key figures involved (names three 
people). nd every time a new person came on stage, he had already been 
getting assimilated behind the scenes for a year. zou got a smooth transition 
like this. (2nd private respondent) These people had broad support from 
within the municipality. Directors were not appointed to the partnership ‘just 
like that’ . . . there was sufficient continuity from people that were present at 
the basis and when the baton had to be passed on, the people that joined 
did so in the same spirit. (private respondent)65 
7.6 Analysis of the Brabantse Poort Partnership 
Introduction 
This section (1.6) describes the perception of the public and private 
respondents of the outcomes of the project and the partnership. These 
perceptions are provided for each round, as well as the general perceptions 
65 Note: two respondents during one interview commenting on the same point. 
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of the outcomes of the project; the research also described how these 
perceptions influenced the behaviour of the partners. This is followed by an 
analysis of the perceptions of the risk per round and the influence of these 
perceptions on the coping strategies of the two partners. Finally, the chapter 
looks at the trust of the partners in each other, its growth over time (the trust 
cycle), and links the build-up of trust to the perception of risk as well as the 
factors that contributed to the change in trust.  
7.6.1 Perception of outcomes and influence on strategies 
Perception in Round 1: deciding to do a PPP/complex project and choosing a 
partner (1987-1989) 
Wublic perspective 
Interviews revealed a perception on the part of the public sector respondents 
that, at the end of this round, substantial work had been done by the 
Projectburo and colleagues on a strategy for the area and to underpin 
rationale for PPPs. There was growing interest within the Council, and 
support for the project and the setting up of a PPP (public respondent, public 
respondent). This support was translated into the commitment of the Council 
to invest in infrastructure upfront, also to stimulate developers (two public 
respondents).  
t the end of the 198Ϭs, we were just coming out of a crisis, so these were 
exciting times. It was courageous of the government to say: ‘We are going to 
invest in the area, without knowing if we will be able to find the offices and 
housing to fill the space.’ . . . and to say: ‘We are going to do this!’ (public 
respondent, second public respondent similar) 
The city had undertaken a marketing process that had resulted in substantial 
reaction (two public respondents). One respondent reported taking 60 calls 
from developers interested in working on the project (public respondent). 
This led the city to conclude that there was interest from the market 
(multiple interviews). 
lso the moment that we noticed that there was interest in the market . . . 
so that it appeared that we were right. I can remember that at a given 
moment, we revealed the name (of the project), that was a nice moment: 
‘Now, we have really put this thing on the market.’ nd well, there was a 
reasonable response, as I can remember . . . (the developers) called in pretty 
quickly . . . that gave us a stimulating idea: ‘We might be able to do this!’ 
That this was not only on paper. (public respondent, second public 
respondent similar) 
The working group managing the tendering process interviewed a number of 
good candidates and there was widespread consensus that there were five 
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good options, and that a good choice had been made. The team had chosen 
a good consortium (two public respondents). 
 
Wrivate perspective 
The perception of the private sector respondents was a sense of satisfaction 
that the consortium of Heijmans, Hendriks and NIB had been chosen to 
execute the project; they had managed to pass through a series of stages in 
the selection process and had come out ahead of their competitors.  
te were very interested in the project because it had a good mixture of 
offices, houses and shops in a good, defined area of the city in which during 
the years before the office buildings were not developed very well. te were 
sure that the project would succeed if you were able to find good users and 
financiers for the office buildings, especially. The houses (apartments) and 
the shops were not that difficult in that market, but the office buildings were 
very difficult to sell or to rent (or so we thought). (private respondent, 
correspondence referring to that period, 15 December 1995). 
The developers and NIB were now going to be involved in a project that could 
possibly: (1) improve their relationship with the municipality, (2) allow them 
to get involved in a large, complex project with substantial returns, and for 
both Heijmans and Hendriks, this meant entering into a type of development 
in which they had up to that moment not been involved, and (3) improve 
their reputation in the market and their chances for more work of this sort 
(multiple interviews, public and private). 
Perceptions in Round 2: Negotiating the Letter of Intent (December 1989 to 
December 1990) 
Wublic and private perspectives 
By the end of the round both public and private respondents perceived that 
they had just managed to get through one year of intense discussions and 
working tempo (multiple interviews, public and private), with positive 
outcomes.  
 
Within three months, the members of the Project Group had managed to set 
the agenda for discussion, to iron out most of the conditions of the 
relationship, and to reach consensus on the public and private positions in 
the project. The draft LoI was ready for submission to the Council for the 
meeting on 26 June 1990. 
fter the tenders we had an >oI in two or three months. te did it quickly but 
gave full form to quality, and there were other ambitions, to serve objectives 
such as social safety and traffic safety, improvement of public transport, 
with a link between the two neighbourhoods, to make more of a heart for 
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the two areas. These objectives were completely achieved (in the 
negotiations up to the >oI) . . . (public respondent) 
The project had managed to attract its first client. This was a confirmation 
for the partnership that there was after all a market for offices in the area. 
This also resulted in a step up in tempo as construction was to start by the 
end of the year and before the signing of the LoI (private respondent, public 
respondent). 
 
Lastly, there was a general commitment on the part of all partners that this 
project should be done as a PPP. From the perspective of the city, this was 
approved by the Council. In addition, the private sector also made the 
participation of the city as a risk-bearing partner a precondition for working 
together (project correspondence on the round, 1995, private respondent).  
Perceptions of Round 3: Negotiating the Partnership Agreement (December 
1990 to October 1991) 
The perceptions of the respondents of this round was somewhat an 
extension of the last round, but ‘development for real’ (two public 
respondents). The round resulted in a swift (in seven months) completion of 
detailing and negotiation of the contract; this included studies defined in the 
LoI, and the budget for all project components. The parties signed the 
partnership contract within ten months of signing the LoI. 
The perceptions (of outcomes) flowed (from the >oI) over to the SO. (The 
next step) was just a working out and a deepening of the >oI . . . there were a 
few elements. The element of separating servicing and sale of land from the 
property development. That makes the discussions a bit easier. nsures that 
there is a good implementation plan. The agreements related to extra yield 
on the more profitable bits such as the shops (understanding the benefits 
from the more profitable bits), from which an important part reverts back to 
society. These were all (key) elements. (public respondent) 
Respondents working on the contract mentioned the perception that the 
interaction also led to sufficient detailing of the risks and the phasing of 
these: 
The process of making the contracts went well. Weople just got to work. te 
managed to dodge the failure factors, let’s put it that way. It all went pretty 
quickly and it went well . . . if you phase things well, and do not go too quickly, 
make sure that the risks are not too extensive and come too quickly on top of 
each other; because that is what it is all about. Then the processes go well. 
(private respondent) 
Contracting a second customer in this period helped to reinforce the positive 
perception of the outcomes to date. Construction started in May 1991 and 
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the partnership completed the first building for its first client by the end of 
year. 
During this phase we worked out a lot of studies that were defined in the >oI. 
The breakdown was defined, but we also worked on the first building. So we 
had a commitment to start! During this phase we contracted a second 
customer, so we had a very good starting position for finishing the contract; 
there was no escape! te were working fine together already and we had 
our WWW, although it was not written on paper. (correspondence referring to 
this round, 1995) 
Both public and private respondents reported a perception of positive 
outcomes from the negotiations. On the private side, the developers 
managed to negotiate a clause in the contract allowing their VOF first 
building rights and returns that would revert directly to them. On the other 
hand, the city had managed to negotiate the quality it desired and its own 
benefits, namely, above a base return on certain properties, 60% of the 
profits for the city (two public respondents, private respondent, PA 1991). 
 
Some of the respondents did not feel, however, that the negotiations 
resulted in equal outcomes.  
Hey, you would do it differently now, but . . . as a lot of infrastructure was 
subsidiǌed, and they came along and did a lot of ‘cherry picking’. So that was 
very lucrative for Heijmans. nd what remained, that was for Hendriks . . . 
that is the way I experienced it. (public respondent) 
This perception was prevalent for several public respondents who called the 
city ‘naive’ in the negotiations, and that these therefore resulted in outcomes 
that benefitted the private sector more (three public respondents). Some 
stated that the private sector ‘had it easy’.  
Round 4: Implementation (October 1991 to the present) 
Implementation of the project has lasted for 24 years (at least 14 years longer 
than planned) and is about to come to an end. This section refers to the 
perception of outcomes for the round and then concludes with perceptions 
of the project, process and the PPP overall. 
 
Some respondents indicated that the main quality of this project from the 
offset was ‘getting down to business and doing the work’, implying that 
entering into the implementation rounds did not really change much, 
activities were already underway:  
tell, you know, (signing the contract did) not really change things; the 
strength of the Brabantse Woort was that we just got to work. That is always 
the success of a project; you just have to begin. (private respondent) 
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There was also a perception on the part of many respondents that not only 
was there a market for the project, but that the PPP managed to ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞ 
the market. 
zou have to remember though, that this was built in a period in which things 
were not going so well in Eijmegen . . . I do not know for what there was 
market, at that moment, but I said: ‘Guys, we are going to try to create a 
market’ and we did that. te tried to create a market; the ambition of the 
plan was to create a market. (public respondents and others similar) 
There was also some indication that the mix of functions made the project 
popular in the market. ‘te made a clear choice to go for a mix: shops, 
housing, and other services. The project was less vulnerable because of this.’ 
(public respondent) 
 
Over time, things went pretty much as planned, but the tempo was not quite 
what was planned, many respondents perceived a slowing of production, and 
impatience on the part of certain professionals from within the city. 
Once the SO was signed, it was a promising start. The plan was divided into 
a number of phases. The start was promising and certainly in the first phase, 
that went very well. In one of the later phases, I know that it got a bit rough. 
>et’s say, the tempo in which things were being realiǌed. This says something 
about the market for things and those types of things. I know that there was 
at that point some tussle between parties over timing. It was about how 
certain areas were to be filled in and the tempo. nd: ‘Hey hurry up a bit.’ 
(public sector respondent, multiple interviews similar) 
One respondent referred to the later years of the PPP and mentioned that 
the delays were also the result of the private sector’s interest to deal with 
the ‘easy plots’ and avoid the ‘difficult plots’, leaving these for last. He points 
the finger at the private partners, as the cause of the delays (public 
respondent). 
 
KǀĞƌĂůů 
For the most part, respondents report satisfaction with the outcomes of the 
project overall: with the partnership over time and trust built, and mention 
that this was in the face of risk and substantial uncertainty. 
If you see where we started in 1989, almost 2ϰ years back, that we achieved 
2ϰ years of partnering, and that it was declared a key project in the 
Eetherlands, I think that we were very much ahead (of the times), in 
anticipating what would be needed. Wartnering, controlled trust, trust, 
openness, and transparency: we managed for 2Ϭ years. te did not know 
what we were getting into, but we went on a quest together and brought it 
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to a success. nd I think that this was unique at that time. (private 
respondent) 
The developers managed to book a financial success. Upon completion, 
which the project is approaching: 
In any case, the project is for the most part built out, and after the shopping 
centre, the investors recouped almost all of their investment. Eow there is 
very little money left in the project, only for the last project on the Daas-
taal Canal. This was also financed by the party that purchased it. So there 
was no financing necessary. There is just a small amount of capital in the 
partnership. I think that the return on investment (ZoI) must be somewhere 
between 15 and 2Ϭ%. It was a successful project. te had a few other 
successful projects, and this is a usual ZoI. (private respondent) 
The city within the BV also took its returns (10%), and these were substantial, 
particularly in the early years. These positive outcomes were offset by the 
losses that the city took (and agreed to take) on the land servicing and sale 
allocation to the PPP (outside of the PPP, taken up in the reserves of the Land 
Agency of the city). In 2011, these amounted to € 6.6 million, approximately 
US$ 7.4 million (Specifiek Kader voor de Verbonden Partij Brabantse Poort 
Nijmegen BV, October 2011). 
 
Both the city and the private sector enjoyed long-term benefits: prestige, 
reputation and confidence for Nijmegen as well as the developers. 
Respondents mentioned that the project made the developers into national 
and regional players.  
On the whole, I think it was a win-win situation, because the result is an 
attractive project that brought Eijmegen a lot of prestige, and changed the 
perception of Eijmegen too, brought pride. The self-image of people from 
Eijmegen was very low and that changed. This began with other projects 
(describes), but Brabantse Woort contributed decidedly to this. So, the win-
win situation was that the project developers were able to get some benefit, 
the offices are located there, and Eijmegen certainly gained some 
confidence. (public respondent) 
One respondent mentions the long-term benefits, that development in the 
south stimulated growth along transport corridors to the north and in the 
long run stimulated upgrading in the centre of Nijmegen (private 
respondent).  
 
Respondents also reflected on their perceptions of the benefits of working in 
partnership. They made note of the fact that the project, owing to its 
complexity, most likely would not have been possible without the 
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collaboration. The perception was that the partnership achieved improved 
coordination and quality. 
I think that the city would never have been able to do this on its own. nd I 
think if you ask one private party to take it on, it also would not have 
happened. zou cannot leave it to one private party. This is because there are 
aspects of the project that are commercially more interesting than others. I 
do not think that everything would have been built as it was, in such a 
coordinated and high-quality manner, also taking into account certain urban 
planning priorities (taking interests of the municipality into account. tith 
one private party only buying land for building), the public spaces would 
never have been equipped the way they were. nd you would never have 
gotten the sound barrier financed in this manner.  It would have been 
entirely on the municipal bill. (public respondent) 
This respondent recognized that additional investments in the public spaces 
became part of and occurred in the project due to the partnership. From the 
private perspective, one private respondent indicated that none of the 
commercial clients (in this case referring to the office buildings that were 
contracted in the first years of the PPP) would have been brought in had the 
project been done in a more traditional manner. He went so far as to state 
that ‘if the city had developed the area in the traditional model, where you 
put plots on the market and sell them to a developer, the project would never 
have succeeded . . .’ He also agreed that ‘this was a form of co-creation, what 
co-creation had going for it is you put in a lot of energy that has a positive 
effect on progress and the quality of the product that the partnership is 
making. (Other models) are fight models; there you commit energy to 
improve your own personal margins. But this is always at the cost of 
something.’ (private respondent) 
 
A number of respondents mentioned another outcome of the project and 
partnership: and that is that the city built a reputation for competence in 
taking on a complex project in partnership with the private sector. One 
respondent mentioned that the municipal staff learned a great deal and 
increased their professionalism in the process. 
The professionalism internally, within the municipal organiǌation, improved. 
Before this project, we were doing nothing! But also knowing as a city that 
you can cause these kinds of projects! I think that this was the beginning for 
the city of Eijmegen to establish a whole other image of the city 
countrywide. fter this, there were all kinds of variations of partnership 
contracts developed, some more successful than others. (public respondent, 
similar to two public and private respondents)  
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There were some widely held reservations on the outcomes, in particular 
related to the quality of the architecture (the furniture boulevard was 
mentioned by all) and the sense that the project could have been more 
ambitious or, as one respondent stated: ‘it could have had more teeth’ (public 
respondent). 
In fact, I am a bit proud that it succeeded, and that it is there, but about the 
quality of the products, I am not. Eo, as architectural quality group, we 
acted weakly. Eo daring architecture was developed, while we actually 
found that this place was unique and that it could easily have happened. But 
perhaps we were too optimistic, that’s possible. Zegularly we got the 
answer: ‘Yes, but you cannot demand that, that is too ambitious. Nijmegen 
cannot deal with that.’ fter the fact, I think that we might have been able 
to do it. (public respondent) 
Outcomes: assessment of the results of the questionnaire66 
Perceptions of outcomes were also measured and verified in the 
questionnaire. With the exception of one respondent (public), the results 
back up the positive perceptions of the project and the partnership from the 
interviews. In the questionnaire the respondents were asked to rate the 
statements made concerning the outcomes of the project and the 
partnership (see Table below) on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree). 
dĂďůĞϳ-ϲ͗ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ͛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
 WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨKƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ E  Mean ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ 
  sĂůŝĚ Missing    
1 I am satisfied with the results of the collaboration/project 8 0 1.86 1.07 
2 The goals of my organization were met by the partnership 8 0 1.71 0.49 
3 
The partnership led to additional 
investments than would not have 
occurred if my organization had worked 
alone 
8 0 1.71 0.49 
66 WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞ: The questionnaire and its results were used to clarify and verify the 
results of interviews and information provided by respondents in each case on their 
perceptions. The response rate remained low. Though the graphs and tables in this 
chapter provide a ‘quantification’ of trust levels (looking at the averages of 
responses), perception of risks, and outcomes, the analysis remains a qualitative 
assessment of the value of these variables.  
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4 The collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, concepts and plans 5 3 2.00 1.41 
5 
The partnership resulted in the 
implementation of a project that added 
to the quality of life of the 
neighbourhood and city 
8 0 1.29 0.49 
6 Working closely together led to improved cooperation between partners 8 0 2.00 1.00 
7 Working closely together led to improved coordination of project elements 7 1 2.14 1.07 
8 
Working in partnership led to long 
processes of decision making and 
additional costs 
8 0 4.29 1.11 
 
Three respondents (one public, two private) abstained from responding to 
question 4 on innovative ideas. The private respondents were involved in 
later periods of the project, during the implementation period, when the 
major conditions had been ironed out. The public respondent felt that it was 
too long ago to gauge the innovation in the collaboration. 
 
On the whole, the responses were consistent. All seven respondents either 
strongly agreed or agreed with statements 2, 3 and 5, indicating that (2) the 
goals of their organiǌations were met, (3) the WWW led to additional 
investments, and (5) to a project which added to the quality of life for the city 
and the neighbourhood (1.29, rated the most relevant). For the remainder of 
the statements, the responses were again consistent, except for one public 
respondent who was not as positive about the outcomes. Six respondents 
strongly agreed or agreed with the statements (in the case of statement 8, 
six respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
that the PPP led to long processes of decision making and additional costs). 
This single respondent did not agree with the statements 1, 4, 6 and 7, and 
agreed with statement 8. So, on the whole, there was satisfaction with the 
collaboration, working closely together added to cooperation and 
coordination, and the process did NOT add extra time and additional costs. 
These results are consistent with the results of the interviews.  
7.6.2 Perception of risk and influence on strategies 
This section analyses the perception of risk per round, and the strategies that 
partners in the interaction used to cope with the perceptions of risk. The 
focus is on external and internal risks: namely risks external to the project 
such as political risk (i.e. council interference, delays from the Council 
approvals or department approvals, the community participation process, 
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and execution of ‘segmentatie’ policy67) as well as market/demand risks, and 
risks internal to the project (costs, access to finance, project design, size and 
scope, the balance of public versus private interest). These are presented in 
the three frequency assessment figures below. The interviews provided 
results from 12 respondents (seven public, five private).68 
 
Starting in Round 2, four (33%) of the 12 respondents mentioned the various 
political risks as an issue, with possible interference from the Council and 
possible delays stemming from Council/departmental activities perceived as 
present in Rounds 2 and 3.  
 
Figure ϳ-ϭ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů;ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůͿƌŝƐŬƐ͕ ZŽƵŶĚƐϭ-ϰ 
 
N = 4 public, 4 private 
 
In Round 4, respondents felt that political risks were at a minimum (zero for 
three of the risks), except for two private sector respondents who were still 
concerned about the implementation of ‘market segmentation’ policy by the 
municipality. 
 
The perceptions of market risks were more substantial (see figure below). 
Seven of the 12 respondents mentioned these types of risk. In Round 1, the 
67 ‘Market segmentation policy’: a policy that ensures protection of the PPP from competition 
by limiting similar types of development in other areas of the city for a period of years.  
68 The research categorized respondents coming from the NIB as private sector respondents. 
The NIB was both a public and private entity with 49% of the public shares. As it was a bank, 
it has been counted as a private entity. 
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context of the economic crisis was important (seven of 12); some mentioned 
the tarnished reputation of Nijmegen as a deterrent to investors (four of 12, 
mostly public). The perception of these risks subsided in subsequent rounds. 
Competition from other developers was mentioned by some; this was very 
much dependent on the ‘market segmentation’ policy of the local 
government, but also included competition from other cities and 
surrounding areas. 
 
Figure ϳ-Ϯ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů;ŵĂƌŬĞƚͿƌŝƐŬƐ͕ ZŽƵŶĚƐϭ-ϰ 
 
 
The most substantial and long-lasting risk was demand risk. The perception 
of this risk was important to many of the players (seven of 12) and continued 
over the rounds, consistently in the minds of the private sector partners. This 
makes sense, as the task of the private sector in the PPP was to capture the 
market. 
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Figure ϳ-ϯ͗&ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ŽĨƚǇƉĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů;ƉƌŽũĞĐƚͿƌŝƐŬƐ͕ZŽƵŶĚƐϭ- ϰ 
 
 
The internal project risks mentioned were also substantial. The risk related 
to the potential conflict between public and private interests (and therefore 
the inability to reach a compromise, resulting in a breakdown of negotiations 
or disruption risk) was cited by 11 of the 12 respondents, both public and 
private, rising in Round 2 and 3 and falling in Round 4 (three respondents). 
Of interest is the fact that the perception of conflicting interests then 
transferred in Round 4 into the perception of the ‘pettenprobleem’ or hat-
problem risk: this is the risk that public officials run when having to make 
decisions in a privately held company, they have to wear different ‘hats’: one 
to protect the public interest, another when making decisions that favour the 
BV – they play a dual role. This perception of risk refers again to a conflict of 
interest, but only for the public sector. This risk was widely perceived by the 
public sector respondents, but not by the private sector respondents, in the 
implementation phase, when the municipality entered the BV. The 
perception of risks related to land sales (delays in sale of land to the PPP, and 
risk of loss of interest incomes) also rose in Rounds 2 and 3 (eight of 12), 
falling a bit in Round 4. Though the private sector recognized this risk, it was 
mostly public respondents that mentioned this risk as relevant. Other risks 
related to the complexity of project design (multifunctional, multi-partner), 
delays in the implementation of the project (related to changes in the 
market), and the growth in scale of the project (as components were added 
on). Most of these rose in Rounds 2 and 3 and fell in Rounds 4. The last risk 
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mentioned by several public sector respondents is the possible unfair 
allocation of risk. This is confirmed in the perception of outcomes with a 
reference by one public respondent to the private sector as ‘cherry pickers’. 
Round 1: deciding to do the PPP/choosing the partner. 
As is clear from the figures, the context in which Nijmegen found itself in the 
first round was important. As mentioned before, the economy was in 
recession and there had been a real estate crash, this implied substantial 
market risk. Also, Nijmegen was an uninteresting destination for large clients. 
Market studies showed a low occupancy rate and a clear shift in demand for 
certain types of properties (Kantorenmarktonderzoek June 1993). This 
implied a need for adaptive reuse of many properties in different parts of the 
city. The city perceived substantial and potential competition from Arnhem 
and other cities. All these risks acted as an impetus to create a strategy to do 
something. One respondent explained the situation at the very beginning as: 
t the time there was a surplus of empty office space. nd then you are 
going to build more office buildings in the area. nd how are you going to 
deal with the market in 199Ϭ? I know that the residential market was very 
bad because at that time, we collected data on a monthly basis from the real 
estate agents on how many new residences were being sold. It was pretty 
dramatic, nothing was being sold. There were months that in the whole of 
Eijmegen only 13 new buildings were sold or something of that sort. It was 
not until after the beginning of the construction that the story came of this 
new fantastic project in the neighbourhood and that fell together with an 
economic upturn. nd then it began to attract, and it began to go slowly. But 
when we began, and were developing the plan, then there was still a lot of 
risk. So, you have to say to each other: ‘If we do not sell anything, how are 
we going to resolve this?’ I think that was pretty clear for everyone that this 
was a real possibility. (public sector respondent) 
Clearly, this risk that was difficult to manage; the municipality dealt with it 
by making the acquisition strategies and assessment of the market one of the 
important criteria in the choice of a private partner during the tendering 
procedure. In addition, the strategy of the Council was to request very careful 
research of the market and of the key issues faced in PPPs.  
There was a type of process that came from the Council. round questions 
such as: that are the characteristics of a WWW? How to develop a WWW? that 
are the risks? nd how do you relate (the process of a WWW) to the democratic 
process? that role will the city have in the Bs? that would be your role and 
what would the limitations to the public role be? ll these issues had to be 
considered within the framework set by the Council. (public sector 
respondent) 
ϯϬϰ | P a g e  
 
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 337
Round 2: negotiating the Letter of Intent 
With the selection of the partners, the negotiations on conditions began. 
Each party covered the costs of their participation and shared 25% of the out 
of pockets; this strategy ensured that these risks were shared.  
 
The risks as discussed from the municipal perspective were expressed in an 
attachment to the proposal to sign the LoI: the legal counsel asked the City 
Council to take the following key points into account (IO 1990). 
 How are public powers and obligations of the municipality formulated 
in the contract? This should not be restricted too much. 
 Do the clauses in the contract ensure the municipal objectives are 
feasible? 
 Conditions should be set with regard to the rights/obligations of the 
city, if applicable, with respect to the results of public participation 
processes, or in obtaining approvals/funding from higher authorities. 
This should be formulated in the form of the city’s obligations to make 
an effort (i.e. not ‘the municipality will ensure that approvals are 
obtained’, but ‘the municipality will strive to obtain approvals’). 
 What will be decided concerning future developments in the city? Will 
development be blocked fully or not, or be restricted in an undesirable 
manner? 
 Have good cost estimation been made and how has the financial risk 
been spread? 
 What form will the collaboration take, i.e. what role will municipal staff 
take in the partnership?; 
 In the case that the public has comments on the form of cooperation 
chosen, will the choice be well argued, fiscally and legally? 
 Have conditions under which changes can be made been taken into 
account and based on what criteria? 
 Have good arrangements been made in case the project does not go 
ahead? 
 Is there a mechanism developed in the case breach of contract by the 
city on grounds of protecting public interest? 
 
This document provided a summary of risks discussed by partners, but from 
the perspective of the city. Of note is that in fact many of these points were 
clearly visible in the initial tender document and had been put on the table 
in discussions. The risks related mostly to (1) the conditions under which the 
city could execute public powers and protect public interest in the PPP, (2) 
the conditions of ‘segementatie’ policy (one of the negotiation positions of 
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the private sector), (3) the costs versus returns and the spread of risks, (4) 
the choice of organizational form, the rationale for this, and the 
powers/restrictions that this would provide the city, and finally, (5) the 
conditions under which the city and its partners could withdraw (risk of 
disruption).  
 
The private sector perceived demand risk as the greatest. The private 
partners proposed focusing on the office market first to begin bringing in 
returns, to make the project financially secure and to cover the costs of land 
servicing and sale. They made as a precondition the participation of the city 
in the partnership, this to improve coordination and to encourage investor 
confidence (In Sweens 1996: 1e opzet Artikel Privatisering, Schuwer 1996: 
correspondence in 1e opzet Artikel Privatisering).They also proposed a high 
level of quality in the public spaces and design as a strategy to bring clients 
to the area. In addition, in the negotiations, the private partners asked the 
municipality to 
 
 curtail major office development in any areas other than the Brabantse 
Poort. The private parties feared a potential over-saturation of the 
market for office space and requested that the Brabantse Poort 
become the primary location for offices in Nijmegen.  
 exercise control over the types of land use in adjacent areas and, 
particularly, limit any industrial development. Experience has shown 
that a mix of industrial terrains and office space does much to reduce 
the demand for such office locations from potential tenants (Pennink 
1997). 
 
This strategy was key to coping with potential competition, until the project 
became stable.  
zou prioritiǌe locations, where commercial and office spaces will be. zou 
stick to this policy and don’t allow a ‘thousand flowers to bloom’ because 
then they will never bloom. Then all you get is half built up areas where no-
one wants to locate in the end. zou also ensure that the area is completed. 
(private respondent) 
Discussions between parties did highlight the risk perception of the private 
sector of sanctions being proposed in the initial tender documents and 
subsequent negotiations, and the potential interference of the Council. 
I can remember in the first year, that we were negotiating with the city 
about the make-up of the >oI and there were some heavy dossiers from the 
municipality that were for us private parties unacceptable because they gave 
us a gigantic risk . . . the risk related to the fact that the city wanted to force 
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us (to commit to) a certain obligation to complete (against penalties). nd 
we only wanted this if certain risks in this were mitigated. But this had 
everything to do with the mistrust that came out of the ‘red’ Council: ‘Those 
big capitalists, you cannot trust them and you have to apply all kinds of 
sanctions.’ (private respondent) 
This quote points out the perception of risk on the part of the private 
partners when dealing with the political (liberal) inclinations of the Council. 
The private sector negotiated enough to make the deal acceptable to the 
Council. 
 
One last risk was the risk of information on the project being made public 
during the initial negotiations. This was a serious risk to the private sector, 
and one that could have caused other developers to start speculating on land 
(private sector respondent). This perception of risk was dealt with by the city. 
There was all kinds of competition-sensitive financial information that they 
rather did not want to have appear in the papers. I seem to remember that 
some of the information was put in a ‘side letter’ (public respondent). 
Round 3: negotiating the Partnership Agreement 
With the signing of the LoI, the partners began negotiating the particulars of 
the Partnership Agreement. Respondents indicated that the risks perceived 
were fewer, as many of the points had been ironed out.  
 
There were still perceptions of risk of delays caused by the public partner. 
This related to the public process and the time it took and to the potential 
need for different parties and commissions to have a say in the plan.  
nd then one of the parties (fractie) of the municipal executive says: ‘So 
that’s quite a lot of high-rises, isn’t it? Honestly, I find this pretty ugly. I want 
more small attached housing.’ . . . One wants more green, the other wants 
more bridges and the third want more of this. nother thing is that there is 
too much asphalt, and whatever. nd this is always a problem, I know. 
(private respondent) 
This seemed, however, to be generally under control. The partners agreed 
on a strategy to aid in decision making in this phase: the organization set up 
and the presence of Council members and key managers in the key groups 
on the project. This aided in shortening communication lines and reducing 
political risk. 
(The plan) went first to the steering group and then to the different forums 
of the partners, so the board of Heijmans, the management of Hendriks and 
the municipal executive. If they all agreed then it was presented to the 
Council. If the Council protested . . .then it would go back to the project 
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group and it would look to see if it could respond by making changes . . . 
there were all kinds of big guys from the city in the project group, and at a 
certain moment, they said: ‘OK we are going to do this.’ It would be craǌy, if 
at a particular moment, the city department that was issuing permits were 
to say: ‘Well no, we are not going to . . .!’ tithin the city there was wide 
support to ensure a sort of ‘flow’ of things, and the permits also went 
quickly. Formally that was not allowed, as everyone has to be treated the 
same. But everyone knew in the municipality what was going on and 
everyone knew the conditions that had to be met. So the permits were 
resolved quickly. (private respondent) 
What also remained was project-related risk: a perception of risk on the level 
of quality desired (this was heavily negotiated), the cost estimations for 
project components (taking this quality into account), the sale price of the 
land and the scheduling of land allocation (linked to the schedule of 
construction), demand risk and financial risks (where the financing was going 
to come from). 
ll kinds of things had to take place, all kinds of studies and urban plans, and 
infrastructure (plans), so also the cost estimates of these . . . I remember that 
there were some real fights over this (the cost estimates). Then you got the 
well-known situation, namely, the municipality wants quality in the plan. 
nd the developer wants that as well. >et’s be honest, no developer wants to 
walk through an unattractive sight and say: ‘This is my work.’ But it is a fact 
that developers pay more attention to money than the municipality. . . . Then 
you get squabbling over: what is this going to cost? The municipality as well 
as the developer, and the bank as well, they all have financial and cost 
estimate specialists. So if you have three financial specialists budgeting the 
same thing, craǌily enough, the results are completely different. nd so the 
municipality says: ‘We are going to make something beautiful, and it will 
cost 6.5 million.’ The developer says: ‘No, we can make this but it will cost 
you 16.5 million.’ nd the bank (EIB) is in the middle of all this. Try coming 
to an agreement on that! It is not easy. (private respondent) 
These discussions on project design, cost estimates for project components 
and levels of quality translated into a perception of tension between public 
and private interests (public respondent). The coping strategy was to develop 
a plan, essentially a set of guidelines that stated levels of quality, and to hire 
a consultant to act as a supervisor. As part of the SO, the partners also 
created an implementation plan that itemized the scheduled programme 
and the cost of all project components (two public respondents, private 
respondent). 
 
From the private perspective, some of the demand risk was offset by finding 
a second client, Bovenmij. Another strategy offsetting the private sector’s 
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perception of risk was the agreements on the ‘market segmentation’ policy. 
The government agreed to a policy of limiting office and industrial 
development contractually to 1997 (PA 1991 and project correspondence 
1995).  
 
Finally, respondents, mostly public, mentioned the perception of the risk on 
land servicing and allocation. Of note is the fact that the risk was borne by 
the municipality outside of the PPP (!) and involved the costs of servicing the 
land and ensuring a price that covered the costs of the servicing and 
management of land. The city assessed, after estimating the cost of the 
project components, that the Land Agency dealing with land management 
would take a loss on the sale of land to the PPP. Market prices were not high 
enough to cover the costs of servicing the land. A consultant reporting during 
contract negotiations on the extent of the loss indicated that the revenues 
from land sale would cover less than 50% of the expenditure and that the 
municipality would have to cover its expenditures from substantial subsidies 
(national, municipal, and from the reserves of the land agency). 
 
The assessment additionally indicated that these costs would be further 
influenced by  
 increases in interest, 
 tempo of the land allocation, 
 returns that might be less than expected, 
 subsidies under what was budgeted, and 
 higher servicing costs than budgeted. 
 
dĂďůĞϳ-ϳ͗ǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐĨƌŽŵůĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞƌĂďĂŶƚƐĞWŽŽƌƚ 
Expenditures   
Servicing, taxes, costs of departments 54 
Corrected for inflation 2 
Loss on interest earning from pre financing 26 
 ϴϮ 
Revenues   
Land sales 37 
Subsidies NG 3 
Municipal Fund/Reserve Fund Land Agency 20 
Corrected for inflation 23 
 ϴϮ 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ͗>ĞƚƚĞƌ͚ǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝĞƌĂďĂŶƚƐĞWŽŽƌt͕dsĚĞZĂĂĚƐǀĞƌŐĂĚĞƌŝŶŐDĂƌĐŚ
ϭϵϵϬ͕Ě,ĞƵƚƐ 
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The coping strategy of the city was to send an application to the national 
government to put this project on the list of ‘key projects’; this would allow 
the city greater access to a variety of subsidies. In the end the city managed 
to acquire quite a number of subsidies to offset their upfront investments. 
Round 4: implementation 
In the implementation round, intervention from the Council was less of a risk. 
The municipality was now taking part in the BV and was working 
autonomously. The Council received regular reports on the project, but had 
limited decision-making power. What was left over, on the part of the 
respondents, was some perception of risk related to change in political 
parties and the influence this might have on continuity; in one instance this 
discontinuity caused a minor riff in the relations with the BV (private sector 
respondent). 
 
As was indicated in the figures, the perception of risk in this round related to 
the ‘hat-problem’, risk perceived by the public respondents. Public 
representatives on the Board and in shareholder meetings had to ensure the 
city’s interests were represented in the BV, but also the interests of the 
project and the partnership. 
For the municipality, there is another substantial risk . . . the council member 
wants to sit on the board of such a project. If this happens, this can cause an 
impossible dilemma. Because if he sits on the board . . . this is also dealt with 
extensively in the law, that the board acts extensively on behalf of the 
partnership . . . so the council member/board member is part of the Bs and 
formally acts in the interest of the partnership. This is completely contrary to 
his interest as a member of the Council. In the Council he is responsible to act 
as he is legally obligated to do (to protect public interest) . . . further you 
have the risk that decision making does not go well. (private respondent) 
One respondent from the NIB, an organization that was trying to straddle 
public and private interests, also pointed out that the interests of the bank 
were also distinctly different, making the negotiations more complicated. 
 
Thought the perception of demand risk was still present, the coping strategy 
was to phase the project to allow flexibility. Over time, the project developed 
a tempo and became stable. There was even natural expansion of the project 
to include more properties (two private respondents). 
t the beginning of the project, you have a substantial amount of risk, but 
during the process . . . the risk profile changes. The moment that you develop 
the first building and have realiǌed it, you get a positive image. This ensures 
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that you can realiǌe the project and even more, that you get asked to include 
the ice rink, the Triavium. Because there was an investor that did not 
succeed in getting it off the ground, so we were asked to get involved as a 
shareholder. (private respondent) 
A respondent from the NIB confirmed that over the years, the BV faced what 
he called ‘normal risks in every project development’ but that these varied in 
terms of the source of finance. Fewer risks ‘if you have a client, a company 
that wants to have its own office building. Then you agree from the outset 
about the price for which are going to put up the building. nd you then run 
not so much risk. But then you have the situation in which the client does not 
want to buy the building but wants to rent . . . Once you’ve agreed with the 
client on the rent, then you have to go to the market to sell to an investor . . .’ 
(private respondent).  
 
When the city’s ‘market segmentation’ policy lapsed in 1997, one respondent 
mentioned that having the city in the PPP was one of the strategies to ensure 
that the city would ‘bring’ projects to the PPP and not leave it ‘out in the cold’ 
‘. . . So the city hands out projects to the different developers: who gets this 
project and who gets that project . . . and the fact that it will not let its own 
WWW out in the cold, makes the risk for the private parties a bit less’ (private 
respondent). He also, however, underlined the fact that the city had to be 
careful not to demonstrate too much preference for the project.  
 
Towards the end of the project, there were some delays; these came out in 
the section on outcomes. Housing was not moving as well as expected and 
there were some rumblings from the shopkeepers. It is clear that this put 
some pressure on the allocation of land by the city. The crisis in 2008 also 
influenced the project. 
The last projects in land development still played a role. The biggest risks 
related to investments were gone. It was more ‘how do we get the last bits 
of land developed?’ But the market had in the meantime completely 
reversed itself. then I came on board, the office market went down the 
tubes in 2ϬϬ8, but by then the biggest portion of the office buildings had 
been sold. I was involved in the development of the housing location; there 
you also saw a bit of reversal. There we had to make an effort to sell housing 
to two housing associations. I also was involved in the shopping centre. Eow 
we are busy with the last land position, to find a solution together. (private 
respondent) 
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Conclusion 
The respondents focused to a great extent on their perceptions of market 
risk and of the risks from conflicts between public and private interests. For 
the city it was important to find a partner with access to the market, this was 
the deciding factor in its choice of partner. The private partner took this task 
seriously, focusing on office development first. With regard to the 
negotiation of interest, the organization strategy chosen was important as 
well as the short lines of communication to the Council from the project and 
steering groups. The PA ultimately focused a great deal on how decisions 
would be made and what would happen if disruption risks would occur.  
7.6.3 Perception of levels of trust and the factors that 
contributed to these 
Respondents indicate, on the whole, stable and relatively high levels of trust 
in each other. Of note is that fact that the outcomes of the survey and the 
levels of trust given may have been somewhat affected by the cultural 
aspects of rating in the Netherlands. An ‘8’ is considered a very high score. 
Changes in trust over time 
The following section on trust looks first at the results of the assessment of 
the changes in the levels of trust over the four rounds; the results from the 
questionnaires are shown in the figure below.  
 
The figure below provides a view of the change in average trust levels for the 
parties involved in the partnership.  
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Figure ϳ-ϰ͗ŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŽǀĞƌƌŽƵŶĚƐ͕ƌĂďĂŶƚƐĞWŽŽƌƚ  
 
N = 8, 4 public and 4 private 
 
When looking at the figure it is important to note that prior to signing the 
contract, parties worked in a project group and a steering group, with 
professionals from the municipal services contributing to work. Councillors 
took part in the steering group and had close contact with the project. The 
interaction was quite intense. After the signing of the contract, that city and 
the three private partners were represented in the BV, and there was a 
measure of autonomy. Though there was still interaction with the municipal 
services on the infrastructure, the Council and municipal services were 
essential parties external to the PPP. Respondents provided their 
perceptions of trust in these different bodies, taking note of the change after 
the contract was signed. 
 
Certain respondents had less contact with the Council and the NIB, bringing 
the response rating down to three of eight and five of eight respectively. For 
the rest, seven of the eight respondents provided ratings. 
 
Respondents showed either a consistent or an increase in perception of trust 
in all parties over the rounds of the partnership. The figure does not reflect 
this as two respondents rated the last round only (the one round in which 
they were involved) and their responses were marginally lower, bringing the 
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overall average of the ratings down (please note the NIB and municipal 
services). 
 
Trust in the three main parties in the BV (the municipal representatives, 
Heijmans and Hendriks) rose over the rounds, but trust in the Council 
dropped in the implementation round (one private respondent indicated a 
drop in trust to 4).  
Overall ratings 
The survey asked respondents to provide an overall rating of their trust in 
the partners on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the highest. The table below 
provides the average rating per actor. The table below that provides a cross 
tabulation of the results, the average trust ratings by category of respondent.  
 
dĂďůĞϳ-ϴ͗dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐ;ϭ to ϭϬ͕ϭϬďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ
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N Valid 7 7 6 6 5 5 7 7 5 5 
  Missing 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 
  Mean 7.00 7.29 8.17 7.50 7.80 7.80 8.14 7.86 8.40 8.00 
  StDeviation 1.15 0.95 1.17 1.38 1.10 0.84 1.21 1.35 1.52 0.71 
N = 8, 4 public and 4 private respondents69  
 
The survey was set up in such a way to assess whether average trust levels 
were different during the initial periods of negotiation and the period of 
implementation when the partners worked in the BV. One aspect of interest, 
for instance, was whether the trust in the municipality changed once it 
entered the BV and worked autonomously.  
 
The results demonstrate that average trust was greatest in Hendriks in the 
BV (8.40) and NIB in the BV (8.00) and that this was up a bit from trust during 
the negotiation rounds. The trust in the municipality during the negotiations 
stages and during implementation changed minimally, slightly down from 
8.17 to 8.14. The average trust levels in Heijmans were slightly lower that the 
69 Those missing stemmed to a great extent from the fact that the respondent was not 
involved at that time, or did not want to comment on his/her own organization. 
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other two private partners, rising a bit in the implementation round. This was 
caused by one respondent who was less supportive of the motives of the 
developer, stating ‘Trust? >et me say this, I was always on guard’ (public 
respondent). Another public respondent gave a similar response. 
 
When looking at responses cross tabulated by type of respondent, the 
expectation was that there would be a correlation between ‘membership’ 
and high levels of trust.70  The table below provides some interesting results: 
membership did play a role when assessing the City Council and municipal 
services, public respondents rated a higher average trust in the two bodies 
than did private respondents. The same was true for the private 
respondents: the average level of trust was higher in Heijmans and Hendriks 
than the public respondents’ assessment of the developers.  
dĂďůĞϳ-ϵ͗ƌŽƐƐƚĂďƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚǇƉĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ 
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Valid   7 7 6 6 5 5 7 7 5 5 
Miss. Public resp. 1 1 1 
 1 2 1  1 2 
Miss. Private resp. 
  1 2 2 1  1 2 1 
Mean Public resp. 8.00 8.00 8.33 7.00 7.33 8.50 8.33 7.25 8.00 8.50 
Mean Private resp. 6.25 6.75 8.00 8.50 8.50 7.33 8.00 8.67 9.00 7.67 
 
Of interest were the ratings of the NIB and of the municipality. Public 
respondents gave higher ratings than the private to the NIB; this most likely 
as the NIB was perceived as protecting public interest as well. The municipal 
representatives in the project group and in the BV were rated almost 
identically by both types of respondents. 
70 Refers to ‘membership’ in a type of group, for instance that public respondents would rate 
their levels of trust higher in their fellow public professionals, those from the same type of 
group. 
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Different dimensions of trust 
The research asked respondents to measure the different dimensions of 
trust. The results are found below, the scale is 1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree to 5 
= strongly disagree). 
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  Took interests into account when making a decision 
 Valid 6.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 
 Missing 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 
 Mean 2.00 1.71 1.60 1.83 1.20 1.75 1.33 1.33 1.25 1.80 
 StdDeviation 0.00 0.49 0.55 1.17 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.50 1.30 
  
Would NOT have met obligations, if their activities had NOT been defined in the 
contract 
N Valid 5.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 
 Missing 3.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
 Mean 3.60 4.17 4.33 3.67 3.67 3.33 4.40 4.00 4.00 2.50 
 StdDeviation 0.89 0.41 0.58 1.53 1.53 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  
Was capable of completing the project /their obligations according to agreements 
made 
N Valid 6.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 7.00 4.00 5.00 
 Missing 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 4.00 3.00 
 Mean 2.17 1.86 1.80 2.00 2.00 2.25 1.33 1.29 1.25 1.60 
 StdDeviation 0.98 0.38 0.45 1.22 1.41 1.26 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.55 
  
Committed more (time or personal resources) to the collaboration /project than was 
specified in the contract 
N Valid 3.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 
 Missing 5.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 
 Mean 4.00 2.67 1.50 2.00 2 2.33 2.83 2.00 2.00 3.17 
 StdDeviation 0.00 1.03 0.58 1.22 1.41 1.53 1.33 1.10 1.41 1.33 
  Had, in general, good intentions 
N Valid 6.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 5.00 
 Missing 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 3.00 
 Mean 2.00 1.71 1.60 1.67 1.00 1.75 1.33 1.57 1.25 1.80 
 StdDeviation 0.00 0.49 0.55 1.21 0.00 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.45 
  
Sometimes did not meet their obligations, but were willing to give tem the benefit of 
the doubt 
N Valid 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 Missing 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 Mean 3.20 3.20 4.33 3.75 4.33 3.33 4.40 4.50 4.67 3.75 
 StdDeviation 1.10 1.10 0.58 1.26 0.58 1.15 0.55 0.58 0.58 1.26 
 Total 2.59 2.53 2.73 2.58 2.44 2.48 2.56 2.54 2.48 2.29 
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First, it is important to look at the assessment of the second and last 
statements. The second (would EOT have met obligations, if their activities 
had EOT been defined in the contract) refers to whether a party has to be 
subjected to a contract to ensure that they meet obligations. The reaction 
was largely negative (so controls were not necessary) but the ‘highest’ 
responses were given to the municipality (in the project group (4.33) and 
within the BV (4.40). The responses to the last question were also negative, 
quite ‘high’ for three of the partners in the BV (4.40, 4.50, 4.67 respectively). 
It became apparent that respondents did not understand that question, but 
provided some interesting results in any case: there was a negative response 
to the idea that the parties ‘did not meet their obligations’. 
 
With regard to the remainder of the results, the statement with the next 
highest rating was: (1) . . . took interests into account when making a decision, 
three of the partners received high ratings (1.33, 1.33 and 1.25 respectively) 
(3) . . . was capable of completing the project/ their obligations according to 
agreements made, the three partners received similar results (1.33, 1.29, 125 
respectively). NIB, interestingly enough, did not score as well related to these 
two statements.  
 
There was not substantial reaction to (4) . . . committed more (time or 
personal resources) to the collaboration/project than was specified in the 
contract, expect with regard to the municipality in the project group (1.50). 
 
With regard to statement (5) . . . had, in general good intentions, it is clear 
that the perception was that Hendriks had good intentions throughout the 
whole project, as did the municipality in the BV. The score given to Heijmans 
was a bit higher (1.57). 
 
The results are somewhat affected by the response rate, respondents were 
unwilling to assess their own organizations. Still, they demonstrate a 
relatively high assessment of the dimensions of trust for three of the 
partners. 
Factors of trust 
Respondents were asked to rate a series of statements concerning the basis 
of trust, giving ratings from 1 to 3 (1 = very important, 2 = relevant, 3 = not 
so relevant). The results are as follows: 
 
 
ϯϭϳ | P a g e  
 
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 350
dĂďůĞϳ-ϭϬ͗&ĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚďƵŝůĚ;ŽƌďƌĞĂŬͿƚƌƵƐƚ 
 
 E Mean 
^ƚĚ 
ĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ 
   sĂůŝĚ Missing     
CalBase 
I must have sufficient information on the 
other party's reputation, qualifications 
and past performance record. 
8 0 2.00 2.17 
CalBase 
I have to be confident that the penalties 
stipulated in the contract are sufficient to 
ensure the compliance of the other party 
8 0 2.63 0.52 
KnBase The other party must be willing to share information and resources 8 0 1.50 0.53 
KnBase I must get to know them well enough that I am able to predict their behaviour 8 0 1.88 0.64 
KnBase On the basis of the interaction, I come to know and respect their capacities 8 0 1.50 0.53 
IdBase We must learn to ‘speak the same language’ 8 0 1.75 0.46 
IdBase 
We must come to share the same 
values and norms 8 0 1.63 0.74 
N = 8, 4 public and 4 private respondents 
 
Respondents indicated that two knowledge-based factors of trust were the 
most relevant in building trust: (1) The other party must be willing to share 
information and resources (1.50), and (2) on the basis of the interaction, I 
come to know and respect their capacities (1.50). This indicates the priority 
given to openness and transparency in the relationship and building trust 
over time by getting to know what a partner is capable of doing. This was 
confirmed in the interviews. The next most relevant factors were we must 
come to share the same values and norms (1.63) and we must learn to ‘speak 
the same language’ (1.75), factors of identification-based trust, factors in the 
third phase of the trust cycle.  
 
Also of note is the fact that five respondents of eight felt that penalties in a 
contract were unimportant, and three relevant. There was little need for 
contractual monitoring. 
Factors that contributed to the build-up of trust 
In Round 1, trust build-up stemmed from factors such as (1) the fact that the 
some of the parties knew each other and had worked together, and (2) the 
reputation and the experiences that the developers brought with them.  
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During the tendering procedure, the consortium had several strong points 
going for them other than the strength of their proposal. First, the NIB (with 
49% of their shares owned by the government) had good contacts in both 
the private and public sector (Pennink 1997). This was strategic for the 
private developers, creating the perception that the NIB could straddle the 
public and private interests in the relationships and would be of help. This is 
the same perception that the city came away with from the tender 
discussions (private respondent, public respondent). 
It quickly became clear that the city took the combination (of the partners) 
seriously into account in their selection process, and the intention was to set 
up a WWW with the city as a full partner . . . That was the first thing, two was 
that the fact that the Bank was taking part, not only gave trust that this was 
not only about short-term gains. One had the idea, then, that the Bank 
might serve public interests more and Heijmans and Hendriks, the two 
private developers/builders more the real estate interests. Eow, that would 
provide a good balance. These were all arguments that the city gave, in 
addition to several substantive that were good, to select the combination (of 
parties). (private respondent) 
NIB and Heijmans knew each other and had past experience working with 
each other. 
Heijmans had a longstanding relationship with the Bank. Hendriks, honestly, 
we knew less well, it was also a smaller company than Heijmans, naturally, 
but was recommended by Heijmans to take part in the consortium. The 
relations are as they are, and that is how we became involved. (private 
respondent) 
Other respondents also mentioned the fact that the two developers had a 
‘Brabants’ approach, this stemmed from the fact that the project was located 
in the Brabant region of the Netherlands and the developers were locals 
(multiple interviews, public/private). The NIB was from The Hague. 
 
Another factor was the previous experience of the developers. The 
developers had solid experience as builders, but limited experience with 
multifunctional, complex projects (public sector respondent). Heijmans and 
NIB had experience with a project in Den Bosch, again working in cooperation 
with government bodies. 
Heijmans had already done Wettelaarpark in Den Bosch and that was often 
given as an example of how you can create an office area of high quality . . . 
That was completely finished . . . the urban planners had positive things to 
say about it in the time, and still do by the way . . . they became beautiful 
buildings, in a park, with a vision. (public respondent) 
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This confirms that at the end of the Round 1, initial trust was based on the 
fact that the public sector had sufficient information on the consortium’s 
reputation, qualifications and past performance record. Within the 
consortium, the developers and the Bank had worked together and therefore 
knew the capacities of each other and what to predict in terms of behaviour.  
Round 2: negotiating the Letter of Intent 
During the initial negotiations, the partners began to gain some experience 
in the relationship. Public respondents mentioned that they formed the 
perception from discussions that the developers were not out to pursue only 
their own interests, and therefore were people with whom they could work 
(two public sector respondents). Factors of trust related to (1) the rules of 
the game from the outset to maintain full transparency in discussions, and 
(2) experience gained from coming out the discussions with win-win 
solutions or a perception of give and take. 
 
One respondent from the public sector assessed why she perceived initial 
trust in the developers: 
This has something to do with they were people that I thought: ‘Well, in the 
land of developers you have all kinds.’ The ones that were only after fast 
money; these were not the ones sitting at the table. These were the types of 
people that understood that you have to build up a long-term relationship 
with each other because you were beginning a long-term partnership. then 
you know that of each other, then you deal with each other differently than 
thinking: ‘I am going to step over you to get rich.’ That would have never 
worked, I think . . . I always got the impression that on a personal level, in 
any case, the people with whom I spoke who were on my level, so to speak, 
that we got to work constructively and got along as people. zou know, I 
understood that they had to earn a living. I had nothing against this just as 
long as it happened honestly. They also understood that we were there to 
represent the city and were trying to do good things for the city without 
having the tax payer pay too much. These were the interests that we told 
each other at the beginning. (public respondent) 
Both the public and private respondents agreed on their perceptions of the 
initial interaction as a factor of trust build-up, stating that discussions were 
characterized by transparency and openness, laying all interests on the table, 
coupled with no double agendas. One private respondent stated: 
The project was a challenge, looking at the time that we got started. It is just 
talking to each other, laying interests on the table, being a listening ear for 
the different actors; finding out where the different interests lie and dealing 
with these. (private respondent) 
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He referred in particular to the fact that they were working in the face of high 
market risk, and so quickly had the sense of ‘trying to do something together’. 
Other respondents confirm this.  A public respondent mentioned: 
It was a completely transparent process (negotiation with private partners). 
te did not have any hidden agendas. The aim was that we could take steps 
very quickly. If you want to take steps quickly then you have to put 
everything on the table. nd because of this we achieved results every week. 
The planning process ran in parallel, so they were busy too. tith the >oI, 
they were busy working out the Daster Wlan  further, the ǌoning plan and 
other procedures and the private parties (and I think that this was also 
desirable), they quickly had trust in us as the government because we 
showed them that we followed up on what we stood for. That the city was 
prepared to accept a loss on the land sales. Due to the fact that we made 
quick progress in the realiǌation of the first property. Because of the fact that 
the parallel processes were going well, you had trust that we could manage 
to put together the contract. They were also busy in parallel making their 
construction drawings. By 199Ϭ, we had already built the first building. 
(public respondent) 
This quote points to several factors of trust. For one, the willingness on the 
part of all parties to share information and resources, a practical need when 
faced with a high working tempo. This respondent then refers to the ability 
of the city to deliver. He mentions this process as essential to getting to know 
one another, to learn about mutual capacities, to be able to predict 
behaviour and to respect one another.  
 
The private sector confirms the perception of the public respondent. 
Working together and gaining experience supported the growth of trust. The 
city worked to speed up the process with the developers to ensure that the 
first client was brought in. The speed with which activities took place 
contributed to reducing the perception of risk. 
(The municipal team) had to completely alter the process of servicing the 
land. Because, in fact, it could not go normally, the process. They had to do 
an article 19 ahead of time, for the urban plan and detailed plan. They did 
that fantastically. Then a tremendous speeding up develops because you are 
already doing what you are still discussing doing with each other. nd 
another reality develops and a lot of energy. This really contributed to trust . 
. . actually already working together, but on the project level. (private 
respondent) 
One public respondent went so far as to state that the parties at the 
negotiation table began to ‘speak the same language’ or that they framed 
their thinking in similar ways ‘someone where you get the feeling that they 
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frame their thinking in the same way, that they share the same 
considerations’ (public respondent). 
 
Interestingly, trust was tested during this round. It appeared that a public 
official leaked information about the project to the press. This was a real risk 
for the developers, mentioned also in the previous section, as it implied the 
possibility that other developers would jump on buying up land, and the land 
would be more difficult to acquire at an affordable price. This was a real issue 
in the uncertain market of the time. This respondent refers to the openness 
of the discussions to resolve this as contributing to trust. 
Trust has a lot to do with the fact that you think someone will not cheat you. 
s soon as the municipality of Eijmegen was able to make clear that the 
information leak was not a conscious attempt, but a stupidity of a public 
official, the problem was still there, but the trust was back again. The point is 
that there were no double agendas; lay everything on the table. I think that 
is what happened there . . . that is important, and this happened in 
Brabantse Woort, is that all of the opinions and the tricks and tips come to be 
on the table. nd that there are not hidden agendas or things kept secret, 
with which you later try to tackle someone. That happens a lot, mind you. 
(private respondent) 
Round 3: negotiating the Partnership Agreement 
Again, for this round, respondents mentioned factors such as sharing 
information, trying to come to solutions, speaking the same language and 
therefore the feeling of ‘we’ as contributing to trust build-up. 
thy? ccessible, open, no walls, no airs, humour. t one of the sessions, we 
had to finaliǌe the W, and it happened easily. It was not difficult anymore 
(things were settled). Dy perception was: there are people sitting around a 
table that want to do this together. I was there to help with the contract 
situation. I found an atmosphere there of a sort of homogenous 
determination: ‘We are going to do this!’ I noticed this. Interests were laid on 
the table and discussed. (public respondent) 
One public respondent mentioned the process of getting to know each other 
and being able to predict behaviour as a factor. He mentions this as a 
continuation of the trust build-up in the previous round. 
zou see that also if you can communicate well and you can make clear that 
your environment is asking for other things to come to a solution than what 
you can achieve from the business side. Then you have to grow towards each 
other . . . If you work together (notes in contrast to working separately), you 
have to at least be knowledgeable of the working methods of one party as it 
relates to the other. zou have to be knowledgeable but also have 
understanding. That is not there on the first day. ( private developer) can 
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get very angry at some point and say: ‘Why is it taking so long?’ nd you 
start explaining that the city works like this and can only work like this. zou 
have to know that of each other, you have to build experience. (public 
respondent) 
The second and the third clients came fast, even before the signing of the PA. 
Again, the demonstration of the ability to deliver and the confirmation of 
expectations built trust:  
So for the second time in a relatively short period, we asked the municipality: 
‘Hey, we are going to do things ahead of time, we can again house a client, 
will you work with us on this?’ They cooperated with us again. nd things 
began to roll, and in the meantime, there was third client (who is still there 
by the way) . . . the municipality let us see that it was serious, quick-witted 
and wanted a good partnership with private parties. zes, this was the basis 
of a good partnership. For the time that I was there, it always worked that 
way. (private respondent) 
Another private respondent emphasizes the capacities of the partners as an 
important factor, calling them ‘professional’ (private respondent). 
that I can remember, is a feeling that even though there were many 
problems with each other, that there was a professionalism about things and 
that this was very much dependent on the people working together, and that 
they were able to separate out, that this is a business problem that we are 
having and that this does not influence that we get along . . . that I 
remember is that Brabantse Woort never derailed. That people kept working 
together in spite of the fact that there were sometime big disagreements 
about how something should be dealt with. Trust, as I said, has a lot to do 
with who is ‘sitting at the table’ . . . The qualities of a professional are people 
that put their heads together to think things through. (private respondent) 
One important factor that was prevalent in this round was the trust between 
municipal staff. This was mentioned by all public respondents, except one 
(who commented to the contrary). In particular, several private sector 
respondents noted that this trust internally resulted in their public partners 
being able to move freely and to come to quick decisions, with support. This 
trust in people making the correct kinds of decisions in the absences of a 
control mechanism also reduced the perception of risk on the part of the 
partners. 
zou had direct relationship with the management and we also had trust 
from the Council. I always took part in all of the commissions. If one of my 
projects were being discussed, you were invited to join; the Councillor 
answered a few questions and then gave me the word. Then I answered as 
an administrator the questions of the Council Commission. Then, you went 
with the Commission to the other side of the street to have lunch and you 
talked a lot about content and what you were doing and the challenges that 
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you faced. It was the way we worked then . . . It was a very informal 
exchange of information at that time. (public respondent) 
This internal trust, in fact, contributed to the ability of the city’s team to 
move quickly on the projects and on building the properties in Rounds 2 and 
3. 
Round 4: implementation 
The implementation phase was a long period of working on project 
components and developing a working ethic. One of the systems put in place 
was checking the construction budgets submitted by the daughter building 
company of the developers to ensure that the mark-up was not more than 
agreed and that the service provided the appropriate level of quality 
required. This entailed using a costing expert hired by the NIB. One private 
respondent described this as a process of transparency, when one partner 
gave the ‘control’ over to another to apply checks and balances. This was a 
key factor in building trust, that expectations continued to be met and abuses 
did not occur. 
In the process, I experienced that the lead was momentarily given over to 
two parties (so the private parties relinquished the lead). So, the market 
parties brought something in, and at that moment, the city and EIB had the 
lead in the control. So they had the review done and brought this back to the 
partnership. So you saw ‘controlled’ trust. One party provided it, transparent 
and open for review and then the other party took the lead in control. It was 
then brought back into the WWW, into the group that made the decisions . . . In 
the management team, affairs were prepared, and decided and controlled 
for the SB. (private respondent) 
He then also reiterated that, over time, the BV built up an organizational 
culture of professionalism and ‘getting things done. He commented on the 
continuity of leadership, of the knowledge and understanding of the issues 
in the project.   
then you walk in there, then you feel in the meeting right away how things 
are going. zou notice it very quickly. I found it a pleasure; I came into this 
partnership and into this organiǌation and I noticed that a large number of 
interests from the past were translated into a positive attitude. So the 
successes and the less good affairs came back sometimes to the table, with 
jokes. It was a type of process (that demonstrated) how parties achieve 
collaboration. If there was a constraint or some kind of point, then (we deal 
with it rationally, coming to) the right decision together. (private 
respondent) 
He emphasized the desire to take on this culture of trust when coming into 
the organization, and the need to seek out the rules of engagement: 
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First you look at how things are going. Then you assess them. t a given 
moment, you learn the ‘rules’ of the partnership, what is normal and what is 
not normal. zou do not read this in the documents. If you read the contract, 
you read the principles and then you know all of the facts. But actually, these 
are lying on the shelf and you do not work with them. zou in fact adopt the 
rules of the engagement that are present within the parties, and you act 
accordingly, with your own trust, from the interest of Hendriks, and (for the 
project). gain, openness, and transparency. nd you speak with each other 
from your own interests and a common interest, and then look where the 
opportunities for solutions lie. (private respondent)  
One could argue that the partnership had reached a period in which the 
parties learn to speak the same language and had come to share the same 
values and norms, on a professional level.  
 
It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that both public and private 
respondents cited the development of the more personal part of the 
relationship as a key factor in building trust, also contributing to the 
development of a common language. Respondents describe an investment 
on the part of the developers in out-of-office celebratory gatherings and the 
development of more informal relations. One public respondent called this a 
‘smart corporate strategy’ (public respondent). There was some concern on 
the part of many respondents (both public and private) that this would now, 
in this day and age, be regarded as coming close to corruption. 
 
Again, trust was tested a number of times, but this does not seem to have 
influenced the results substantially. One private respondent mentioned a 
moment when a client approached the city and did not want to locate in 
Brabantse Poort. Agreeing to allow the client to locate in another location 
would have been an ignorance of the market segmentation policy and a real 
test of trust. The respondent admits that doing this would have put a ‘dent 
in trust’.  
hltimately, the municipality accepted the risk that the client (SsB) would 
walk away and we were successful in persuading the city from the outset 
that this would not happen. So we, in fact, got the trust that we would talk 
to the client in such a manner that this would not happen. te went to 
(Johan) the client and listened to what he wanted; at first he wanted 
absolutely nothing. In the end, it was a pleasure to work with him, but in the 
beginning they are brought in contact with someone that is not their primary 
choice. I think that they also trusted in us that if the SsB would really go that 
we, in the end, would have agreed to let them locate elsewhere. Because at 
the moment that you do not allow the client to located in your area, you do 
not serve any objective by letting him go to rnhem. I think that the 
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municipality also had the unspoken trust that we would not let it go so far 
that we would not come to an agreement with the SsB and that they would 
look elsewhere. Then you must have the trust that the other will actually 
serve your interest. nd they knew that we would do that. (private 
respondent) 
There were a few other incidences mentioned, but the respondents indicated 
‘it is about give and take, and in this instance it was a time of taking (on the 
part of the other partner)’ (private respondent). 
7.7 Conclusion 
As in the previous case study chapters, this section looks at the conclusions 
one can draw from the case analysis. 
7.7.1 Interaction 
When looking at this interaction, of note is that the municipality listed as one 
of its preconditions for entering into a partnership ‘a broad basis of trust 
between participating parties’ (PvA 1989). This implies that the city could or 
would not have entered into the relationship had some aspects of a trust 
relationship NOT been satisfied. There was an inclination to trust. 
 
In fact, the relationship was characterized as a ‘first love’ relationship. As one 
public respondent put it, ‘zes, there was trust, because it was the first 
time . . .’ (public respondent). She also mentioned that the city had never 
experienced this level of trust prior to this project, and never did again. It was 
the first time for all parties. For the city, it was the first time to enter into a 
PPP and to take a step away from the traditional ‘urban renewal’ approach 
in the Netherlands of the 1980s (public respondent). The developers and the 
bank had taken part in PPPs, but never on such a long-term, multifunctional 
project. This project was important to all parties, and there was a strong 
interdependence. 
 
Interviews revealed another view on the nature of the trust on the part of 
the municipality. One public respondent (others similar) mentioned that the 
municipality negotiated with naiveté and trust that bordered on a kind of 
‘blind faith’. The municipal managers put themselves in a position of 
vulnerability when it came to their private partners. This could have provided 
the private partners with the opportunity to take advantage and to act 
opportunistically, but most respondents did not perceive this to be the case, 
though a few mentioned this leading to minor problems in the project.  
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In contrast, most respondents mentioned that discussions were 
characterized by high transparency and openness (laying things on the table 
and taking the interests of the other into account, mentioned by all 
respondents). Others mentioned that this translated into a sense of mission 
and common purpose, and trust. Of note is that this type of vulnerability was 
present in the US case (for different reasons), and in both cases, the private 
partners chose not to take advantage of the vulnerability, not to act 
opportunistically.  
7.7.2 Dynamics of trust 
The trust figures reveal a strong growth in trust over the length of the project 
and PPP, a trust cycle. The most substantial growth of trust was in the 
partners at the centre of the partnership, whose interaction was the most 
intense. The overall assessments of trust and interviews confirm high levels 
of trust, particularly in the core team.  
 
Of interest is, when looking at the cross tabulation, that there is once again 
a link between ‘membership’ and high levels of trust. Similar to the Polish 
case (but not the US case), respondents gave higher trust scores to those 
from their own sector. This leads one to conclude that partners tend to trust 
‘their own people’ more in a partnership, maintaining strong links in their 
organizations. And that perhaps trust in a partner from another sector is 
often laced with some scepticism. 
7.7.3 Perceptions of outcomes 
Respondents perceived the outcomes of this project and partnership as 
positive, also stating that this project could not have been realized without 
the partnership (both public and private respondents). This is a strong 
statement on the value of the partnership. Outcomes occurred at key 
moments, for instance when the partners completed the one year of 
negotiating the LoI and felt satisfaction with the results, and next when the 
partners were able to attract the first client (early on) and the second not too 
long after. Another key outcome was when the partners were able to 
successfully negotiate all the details of the partnership agreement and 
implementation plan, then followed by the successful completion of the 
construction of the initial buildings. The project was now more secure and 
funds were coming in, and it was becoming an attractive and popular project. 
Partners concurred, with slight differences, on the nature of the outcomes.  
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Results of the questionnaire confirm this, also in particular the agreement on 
the part of the respondents that the project contributed to a high-quality 
neighbourhood. The partnership also contributed to the financial success of 
the partners, and the reputation of Nijmegen.  
7.7.4 Perceptions of risk 
As in the US case, there were certain circumstances at play from the 
beginning; the perception of risk was high. The economic recession, market 
conditions and the reputation of Nijmegen made for a highly risky and 
charged situation. The risks at the outset were external, political and 
market/demand risk. 
 
What were the coping strategies? To market the project strenuously – both 
partners did this. The first client came within three months of the start of 
talks, just two years before the signing of the contract. In fact, negotiations 
were occurring parallel to getting things done and the first building off the 
ground. Given the single purpose of responding to the client, the only 
alternative was to ‘just get going’. Prior to having a formal organizational 
relationship, teams came together (as in the US) to get the job done. This 
also gave the parties a chance to ‘test out’ the working relationship and to 
see if the promises made and expectations built would be met.  
 
The perceived project risks as mentioned by respondents in the interviews 
reflected again the interests of the parties. Negotiations revolved around 
project design, levels of quality, cost estimations of project components, 
exclusivity of the project to reduce potential competition, etc. and the 
different interests with regard to each. Of concern to the city were 
investments in infrastructure and the cost of land sale to the PPP, a 
government task and risk.  
 
This case in particular highlighted a perception of risk on the part of the city 
that its representatives in the BV were faced with a conflict of interest: in 
making decisions as members of the BV and as public officials protecting 
public interest. This came out in this case in particular. 
 
In addition, there was some question as to whether risks were evenly shared 
among partners, the perception of some of the public respondents were that 
this was not the case, the public sector having to shoulder more with less of 
the return. Of importance overall is that the perceptions of risk in the 
partnership remained relatively strong. 
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7.7.5 Factors of trust 
The results of the questionnaire revealed that the most important factors 
were (3) willingness to share information and resources (in line with the 
Polish and US cases), (5) I come to know and respect their capacities (in line 
with the US case). These two are knowledge bases of trust. 
 
Interviews, on the other hand, mentioned all the factors that came out of the 
questionnaire. Looking at the analysis in the previous section, it is, again, 
interesting to note that factors were mentioned in a particular sequence, 
over the rounds, and as the relationship developed. In fact, first mentioned 
were the calculus bases of trust (previous experience and reputation, for the 
most part), then knowledge bases of trust (openness and transparency, or 
said in another way, willingness to share information and resources, as well 
as predictability, and respect for capacities, the professionalism with which 
partners interacted/their ability to deliver). In the interviews dealing with the 
implementation of the project, much was said about how partners came to 
frame things in the same way (speak the same language) and how they ‘grew 
towards each other’, creating rules of engagement and forming a common 
organizational culture (sharing norms and values). Of all the cases in this 
research, one could conclude that there was evidence of identification-based 
trust, and that the factors contributed to creating trust were of a ‘higher 
order’, creating a stronger and resilient trust. 
 
The partners mention that this interaction involved working together and 
through obstacles, negotiating and settling difference, producing outcomes 
that were satisfactory for both parties. One of the key characteristics is the 
development of a process that governed how decisions were made. One can 
argue that this process of overcoming obstacles successfully led to the build-
up of trust. This is linked to creating predictability, to building respect for 
capacity and developing the norms of the relationship. 
7.7.6 Influence of trust on perceptions of outcomes and 
risk 
Influence of trust on outcomes 
The figure below show the sequencing of strategies – outcomes – trust build-
up – strategies. Again, the figure shows that trust building is a result of a 
strategy, (a behaviour) or an outcome. When trust is built, this will then lead 
to further strategies on the part of the partners. In this case, again a positive 
cycle of outcomes.  
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Figure ϳ-ϱ͗ /ŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚƌƵƐƚŽŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ͘ƵƚĐŚĐĂƐĞ 
 
 
In this case, respondents argued that it was the strength of the interaction, 
the ways of working and the trust that produced the outcomes of the project. 
Influence of trust on risk perceptions 
This case demonstrates a circumstance in which the trust built over time 
aided in reducing the perception of risk, but mostly political risk and certain 
aspects of market risk. As mentioned above, the city’s trust (naiveté or blind 
faith) influenced the perceptions of risk, to the point that it was willing to 
make itself even more vulnerable to the private sector.  
 
Of note, though, is that when trust was high, partners still had a strong 
perception of risk. One risk related to the management and negotiation of 
interests. Clashes of interests were apparent during negotiations, and 
partners continued to be aware of the tension, thought they found a way to 
deal with it. This ended up being more of an issue for the public sector in the 
Dutch case, as in joining a private company the public party had to find a way 
of balancing public and private interests in decision making. Trust was 
sufficient to help manage those interests.  
 
In the implementation phase, the small squabbles that arose related to the 
execution of their respective roles and their characteristics as public or 
private agents. This was evident when asking of the private partners: ‘Why 
are you not taking on more of the more social and less profit-oriented bits of 
the project (the more difficult portions)?’ Or, asking the City Council: ‘Why 
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don’t you take my interests into account when allocating the land?’ These 
issues did not break trust but tensions were still there.  
 
This case brings up an interesting point. The city was aware that it was ‘giving 
away too much’ and that as a result, the risks were not well shared. There 
was strong risk perception on the part of the city related to the land and 
infrastructure and the financing of this, and the burden this was to them. 
There was, also, an awareness on the part of city representatives that the 
private sector was acting opportunistically, gaining as many concessions as it 
could get. However, this was ‘transparent opportunism’.  
 
There was still high and growing trust between partners, in spite of the 
perception of the risks. Respondents report that the process of trust growth 
was dependent on the ability of individual partners to accept the 
characteristics of other partners (‘I understood that the private partners had 
to be opportunistic, this was their job’). In the partnership, each partner had 
a role to play and interests to protect and this was understood. One 
respondent from the Board indicated that the relationship was based on ‘tit 
for tat’, one time the private partner made a concession, one time the public 
sector did. This type of relationship can be likened to social exchange theory, 
where it is understood that partners trade off making themselves vulnerable 
to each other. 
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8 Empirical Conclusions 
8.1 The results71 
This chapter analyses the data per case study and compares these, guided by 
the research questions. 
 
Is there evidence of a trust cycle in partnerships and did trust have an 
influence on risks and outcomes as perceived by the partners? 
 
 What was the nature of outcomes and risk as perceived by the partners 
and other actors over the rounds of the partnership? 
 What were the dynamics of the growth of trust over time as perceived 
by the partners and other actors involved over the rounds of the 
partnership? 
 What important factors led to the growth of trust? 
 Did trust have an influence on risk and the outcomes achieved, and if so 
what kind? 
8.2 The trust cycle in the three case studies 
Was there evidence of a trust cycle in the three cases, and what where the 
dynamics of trust? The three figures show the changes in average trust as 
indicated by the respondents in the three cases (the Polish, the US and the 
Dutch case, respectively). The figures show, for the Polish case, highly 
dynamic and variable levels of trust in all parties, over the two periods of the 
partnership, the Urban Renewal Group Norway (URGN) and American Retail 
Systems (ARS) phases. This is in contrast to the two other figures, which show 
less variable, but consistently rising levels of trust in partners. There is 
evidence of trust cycles in all three cases, though one shows how trust can 
vary, rising and dipping.  
 
The results in the figures are fairly consistent with the overall assessment of 
trust from the questionnaire. In the US case, trust in Battery Park City 
Authority (BPCA) was 9.21 and 7.92 in Olympia and York (O & Y) (slightly 
lower than in the trust cycle figures). In the Dutch case, the results are very 
similar. In the figures: Hendriks 8.4, NIB 8.0, City 7.86, Heijmans 7.75, the 
overall assessment: Hendriks 8.40, NIB 8.00, City 8.14, Heijmans 7.86. 
Peripheral parties were rated lower. 
71 Please note that no respondents are cited by name, for reasons of anonymity. 
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The difference between the results of the trust cycles and of the overall 
assessments of trust in the Polish case were more of a surprise. In the figure: 
City Board/Negotiation Team/Supervisory Board (CB/NT/SB) from the city 
5.91. URGN 3.67 and ARS 5.36, whereas overall assessments were: CB/NT/SB 
6.79, URGN 6.71 and ARS 7.20, external parties lower. It is difficult to explain 
these differences. 
 
What is interesting to note in the three figures is the dynamics of average 
trust in the partners central to the partnership (the contractual parties). In 
both the US and Dutch cases, the highest levels of trust over time were 
attributed to the main partners (In the hS: the BPCA and O & Y; in the 
Eetherlands: the municipal representatives in the negotiations team and in 
the partnership company, as well as the three private consortium partners). 
These were the partners who interacted the most, in whom the most (time) 
was invested, and whose behaviour and competence were most important 
for the outcomes. External parties were less the focus of trust and were given 
lower average ratings.  
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In contrast, in the Polish case, the trust in the private partner was the most 
volatile, with public respondents indicating extreme changes in perceptions 
over time (hZ'E: rising in the second round during negotiations, and falling 
drastically in Round 3 when funds did not appear as promised, ZS: starting 
high during the tendering process and falling as expectations over time were 
not met). Of note is the fact that the trust in the CB/NT/SB was fairly constant 
throughout the process (although it dipped substantially at the end), but did 
not suffer from as much volatility as the others. Outsiders, such as the City 
Council and the local tenants, were perceived by many respondents as being 
difficult and obstructing the partnership. 
What was the nature of the deterioration in trust in the Polish case?  
The figures for both phases show a steep, but gradual decline. However, 
taking into account the time spent on the two partnerships (four and a half 
years on URGN versus under two years on ARS), one can conclude that the 
drop in trust in the ARS period was more abrupt than in the URGN period. As 
mentioned in the conclusions in the case chapter, the URGN partnership had 
time to develop ‘relational’ aspects, ARS had little time to do this. 
 
Looking at the nature of decline in trust in the case study and comparing this 
to the theory on the breakdown in trust as described by Lewicki and Bunker 
(1996), the loss of trust in the two phases appears to be in line with the 
theory.  
 
During the URGN phase, the loss was gradual. In the end, the feeling of loss 
and anger was extreme (figures show extreme dips in trust levels). After two 
years of interaction (negotiating) and two years of inaction (nothing concrete 
on the ground), the city was forced to reassess its perception of URGN. 
Respondents admitted questioning their original perceptions, at a certain 
point. The realization that the project was doomed took time, and the city 
based its decision to stay in the project the last two years on the word of 
URGN. The city gave URGN the benefit of the doubt. This was true also for 
URGN. When its intense efforts in the two years after negotiations to find 
funding were unsuccessful, the organization was disappointed in the attitude 
of the city. The perceptions of the tenants were also extreme, after the 
building of expectations. Their scores had a substantial influence on the 
figures. These types of perceptions, as described in the literature, are 
characteristic of trust based on knowledge. 
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With regard to ARS, initial trust was based on the developer’s reputation and 
the fact that it came with funds (thereby ensuring the continuity of the 
project and reducing the perception of risk on the part of the city). ARS’s 
initial trust in the city was based on what seemed to be solid promises of a 
fruitful project. It eroded from that point on. Looking at the table and taking 
into account the time in which the drop in trust occurred, the erosion in the 
ARS phase was quick in comparison to the previous phase. These perceptions 
are characteristic of trust based on calculus. 
 
Trust in ARS dipped, but trust in the city, in the Supervisory Board, dipped 
even more. From ARS’s perspective, the break in trust in the city was severe, 
characterized by high levels of anger and disappointment. This differs from 
what Lewicki and Bunker contend: they argue that in the first stage of trust 
build-up the reaction to a trust violation can be fairly inconsequential. This 
implies that the expectations that ARS built in a short time were substantial 
and the violation on the part of the city was perceived as extreme. The 
breakdown in trust is, perhaps, as Lewicki and Bunker also contend, linked to 
the nature and magnitude of the perceived violation.  
 
One can conclude that in the URGN phase, trust had reached a more resilient 
form and was harder to influence. One can also conclude, in the ARS phase, 
that trust was based on calculus, did not get beyond the initial level, and was 
less resilient. The experience of working together, though ‘unfinished 
business’, did not build trust. In addition, the nature and magnitude of the 
violation had a real influence on trust breakdown. 
 
The figures demonstrate, on one hand, the dynamics of the trust cycles in the 
three cases, with one case in which certain factors worked against the build-
up of trust. The difference in the factors that contributed to both the build-
up and breakdown of trust will be analysed in later sections. On the other 
hand, the figures show that trust in the central (contractual) partners is often 
the most important to respondents; this is the party with whom there is 
interdependence. In effect, a party will prioritize in whom to trust and in 
whom to invest the time to build trust. And when trust is broken in that 
central party (URGN and ARS periods), the break in trust is substantial.  
 
As stated in theory, this underlines that interdependence is an important 
condition for trust. Trust is important when it relates to partners upon which 
you depend for knowledge and resources. 
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Dimensions of trust 
The table below provides a quick view of the comparison of the assessment 
of the dimensions of trust in the partners in the three case studies. To 
simplify the results, the table includes trust in the central partners and the 
only responses to the dimensions that were perceived as most important. Of 
note was the fact that the three dimensions that were seen as most 
important were the same in all cases, leading on to conclude that the 
respondents in all three contexts had the same notion of trust. The most 
important were: 
 Under the heading of ‘goodwill’, the table included responses to ‘took 
interest of the collaboration into account when making a decision’ and 
‘had good intentions’ 
 Under the heading of ‘capable’: the table included responses to ‘was 
capable of completing project/obligations according to agreements 
made’.  
 
The table attempts to capture the nuances of the results. What is clear is that 
respondents in all case studies rated the goodwill of all partners as high 
(substantial or relatively substantial); the intentions of their partners were 
not in doubt. In the US and Dutch cases, partners were rated as being 
capable. In the Polish case, this capacity was put in question during the 
process of partnering. The ratings were not low, but merely average.  
 
  'ŽŽĚǁŝůů;нͿ EŽŐŽŽĚǁŝůů;-Ϳ   
Capable (+)  BPCA    very capable, substantial goodwill 
   Coopers and Eckstut    substantial goodwill, capable 
   O and Y    substantial goodwill, capable 
        
   City of Nijmegen    very capable, substantial goodwill 
   Heijmans    very capable, substantial goodwill 
   Hendriks    very capable, substantial goodwill 
   NIB    capable, relatively substantial goodwill 
Not capable 
(-)  URGN   
 substantial goodwill, capacity in 
question 
  
 City Board/ 
Negotiations 
Team 
   relatively substantial goodwill, capacity in question 
   ARS    relatively substantial goodwill, capacity in question 
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It is striking that the respondents were able to differentiate key dimensions 
of trust. This leads one to believe that both dimensions of trust are 
important, and that trust is a multidimensional concept.  
 
The Dutch case provided some interesting results. The questionnaire asked 
respondents to rate the dimensions of trust, in two periods: prior to and after 
joining the private company (BV). The research did not do this in the other 
cases. What was interesting was the change in the results. In all cases, the 
average levels of trust, in all three dimensions, improved over time, for all 
partners. This reflects the results in the trust cycle, and the increase in trust 
over time.  
 
Finally, contrary to the other cases, the respondents in the Dutch case gave 
notable responses to dimensions relating to the partners (capacity or 
intention) to meet their obligations. Respondents provided high scores, 
reflecting the perception that all the (core) partners were good to their word 
(would have delivered even without a contract) and able to deliver according 
to agreements. The ratings of these dimensions of trust reflect the 
perception of the respondents that the core partners would meet the 
expectations built (deliver with competence and without controls).  
8.3 Influence of trust on outcomes 
The results of the trust cycle figures are consistent with the perceptions of 
the outcomes of the interaction and of the project on the part of the 
respondents. The interviews revealed dissatisfaction in and regret with 
regard to the outcomes in the Polish case, and high levels of satisfaction on 
the part of the respondents in the US and Dutch cases. The table below gives 
you the respondents’ assessment of (different dimensions of) outcomes 
overall in the three cases.  
dĂďůĞϴ-ϭ͗WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŽǀĞƌĂůůin ĂůůĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ;ϭŚŝŐŚĞƐƚͿ 
KƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ WŽůĂŶĚ h^ E> 
1 -5 (1 highest) Mean 
I am satisfied with the results of the collaboration/project 3.93 1.33 1.75 
The goals of my organization were met by the partnership 3.64 1.47 1.63 
The partnership led to additional investments than would not 
have occurred if my organization had worked alone 3.38 1.79 1.63 
The collaboration created a number of innovative ideas, 
concepts and plans 2.86 1.57 2.00 
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The partnership resulted in the implementation of a project 
that added to the quality of life of the neighbourhood and 
city 2.82 1.13 1.25 
Working closely together led to improved cooperation 
between partners 3.13 1.60 1.88 
Working closely together led to improved coordination of 
project elements 3.08 1.64 1.86 
Working in partnership led to long processes of decision 
making and additional costs 2.58 3.13 4.38 
 
For both the US and Dutch cases, interviews with respondents also confirmed 
the results of the overall assessment of outcomes in the questionnaire, they 
stated satisfaction with the collaboration as a whole and with the fact that 
the project contributed to the improvements of the project area. In the 
Polish case, interviews indicated dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 
partnership, but an indication that the interaction did, in some cases, result 
in innovative ideas and that the project made some contribution to 
improving the area. Respondents agreed that this project and partnership 
was not given a ‘fair chance’.  
 
Is there a connection between perception of outcomes and the changes in 
trust at different points of the trust cycle? Each case study chapter charted 
and analysed the strategies of the partners over time, and the outcomes that 
these produced. The chapters also analysed, per case, whether the 
perception of outcomes in different rounds influenced the growth of trust. 
The figures are provided below to allow for comparison. 
 
The figures show the sequencing of the ‘strategy-outcome-trust-strategy’ 
process. The four figures show the strategies employed by partners in the 
partnerships for all three cases, the outcomes produced, and the 
contribution of this to trust build-up (and the trust cycle) or trust erosion and 
breakdown. This is followed by strategies as an outcome of trust. 
 
As indicated in the empirical chapters, both the US and Dutch cases show a 
cycle of strategies and positive outcomes, leading to the build-up of trust (as 
shown in the trust cycle figures), which then leads to strategies-positive 
outcomes (a positive cycle). The Polish case, however, as outlined in the case 
chapter, shows an initial satisfaction with outcomes, and then a series of 
strategies and outcomes that lead to trust breakdown, and to defensive 
strategies and less positive outcomes (a negative cycle).  
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Several important points emerge from the interviews, documents and 
empirical chapters. First, the strategies used in the initial rounds of the 
interaction (during negotiations in particular) are essential to the outcomes 
and to the build-up of trust. Partners must negotiate interests successfully 
and reach agreements that suit them all. It is their ability to do this that 
influences the perception of outcomes, trust and the subsequent strategies 
employed.  
 
Figure ϴ-Ϯ͗>ŝŶŬƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝes-ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ-ĂŶĚƚƌƵƐƚďƵŝůĚ-ƵƉ͕ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ 
 
 
Second, this must then be followed by the partners ‘delivering’ as promised. 
Producing the outcome as promised is essential to trust build-up. Trust will 
then influence the strategies of the partners and the outcomes, and will set 
in motion the cycle of trust building.  
 
In effect, something must happen (partners undertake a strategy and achieve 
an outcome) for trust to be built; this then affects behaviour (as an outcome 
trust), and partners undertake a strategy that then produces an outcome. A 
cycle of strategies – outcomes – trust – strategies . . .  
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The Dutch and US cases demonstrate that getting the project off the ground 
together, under serious pressure (partners are highly interdependent), not 
only tests the relationship, but when outcomes are positive (partners are 
able to deliver as expected), this leads to trust build-up. In both cases, in 
situations of substantial risk, partners worked together to get the buildings 
built, realizing that this was essential to the outcome of the project. It was 
this common understanding of the priorities, translated into strategies, that 
led to the outcomes realized and to trust build-up.  
 
The cases demonstrate that outcomes and trust are not simple mirror images 
of each other. If this was the case, trust would drop when outcomes are bad, 
and rise when outcomes are good. In contrast, the cases show that trust can 
continue to grow, also in the face of undesirable outcomes. All three cases 
demonstrate that when outcomes are less than desirable and trust is strong, 
partners give each other the ‘benefit of the doubt’. If outcomes continue to 
deteriorate, trust is put at risk. However, if partners manage to resolve issues 
and get outcomes back on track, trust is preserved and can continue to grow. 
One example is the US case, when O & Y’s finances were in trouble and the 
partners had to negotiate and agree on how to resolve this situation. The 
financial problems put the entire project in jeopardy, but parties were able 
to resolve the issue and trust continued to build. In the Dutch cases study, 
some of the negative outcomes during the project came from the City 
Council, whose members began, over time, to interfere and renege on 
several agreements. Of note is the fact that trust remained strong between 
contractual partners, but began to slide in the City Council. This leads one to 
conclude that when an external party causes negative outcomes, trust built 
will remain strong between partners that interact often, are interdependent 
and in whom trust is strong. Finally, in the URGN partnership, though 
outcomes were not forthcoming, the public sector gave URGN the benefit of 
the doubt and trust continued to grow. Until a time, when outcomes did not 
improve and trust reached its limit. 
 
In the Polish case, trust eroded between URGN and the city when partners 
did not deliver and expectations were not met. One could, in fact, argue that 
trust was detrimental, causing the partners to stay together longer than was 
wise. Outcomes appeared positive and trust was growing, but when funds 
did not appear, trust kept the partners together until waiting eroded trust 
and led to the trust breakdown. Respondents admitted to being blinded by 
the trust built, and the positive outcomes of previous rounds.  
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This leads one to conclude three things. (1) The outcomes achieved at the 
beginning (the quick wins) are essential, but they must be followed by 
concrete outputs (the partners delivering what they promised). (2) The initial 
success sets the positive cycle of trust building-strategies-outcomes in 
motion. Lack of follow up, on the other hand, will turn this into a negative 
cycle. (3) In addition, extreme urgency (perception of high risk) is a key driver 
in an interaction, and when dealt with well by the partners (partners succeed 
in delivering), can lead to the build-up of strong and resilient trust. Looking 
at the time taken in the US and Dutch cases, trust was built quickly. Urgency, 
and outcomes achieved, speed up trust build-up and build strong trust. 
Did trust build-up (or breakdown) influence project performance?  
There is an indication that trust led to improved performance of the projects. 
The results of the questionnaire demonstrate that the partners in the US and 
Dutch cases were satisfied with the collaboration and project, as well with 
the quality of the neighbourhood. The goals of their organization were met. 
The results in the US case were rated higher across the board. The interviews 
confirmed this and revealed that the nature of the interaction and trust 
contributed to this. 
 
As shown in the figures above, the cycle of strategies and trust build-up in 
the Dutch and US cases led to more collaborative interaction and 
cooperation on project execution. Interviews indicate that trust brought 
certainty into the relationship and helped partners to streamline the 
coordination of the project. Results of the questionnaire confirm this. 
 
Dutch and US respondents stated that, with trust, problems and conflicts 
were easier to resolve, negotiations went more smoothly. In the Dutch case, 
in particular, partners worked together to develop a procedure for making 
decisions. Coming to an agreement on how decisions would be made built 
trust, and influenced and facilitated the strategies used in the interaction. 
 
The Dutch case also demonstrates a situation in which additional investment 
was made that would not have occurred if the partners worked alone. 
Respondents cited a number of cases, for instance when dealing with the ice 
skating rink, the housing project the municipality set as a priority, as well as 
the losses taken by the city in servicing the land. Results of the questionnaire 
confirm this. The results for the US case were rated lower. Interviews 
revealed, however, that significant investment was made by O & Y that would 
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not have been made if the institution had been working alone, for instance 
in the Winter Garden. 
 
One other way of looking at this last point, is the fact that respondents 
mention the willingness to take risk and the taking of risk as the outcome of 
trust as important in both the US and Dutch cases. Respondents in the URGN 
phase of the Polish case also mention this. With trust built, partners exhibited 
risk-taking behaviour, which contributed to the outcomes achieved. 
 
In contrast, in the Polish case, there is no evidence that trust led to improved 
performance. There is some evidence, however, that the erosion of trust led 
to additional transaction costs, affecting project performance. In the ARS 
phase, in particular, the lack of trust brought about positional negotiations, 
partners protecting their own interests, difficult decision making, and delays 
in project execution. Essentially, the extra time allocated to this was a waste 
of resources that could have better been allocated to ‘getting the job done’. 
8.4 Perceptions of risk 
The figures below show the respondents’ perception of types of risks in each 
case, and the change in these perceptions over time. The research defined 
broad categories of risks: those external to the project (political and market), 
those internal to the project (project design risks, financial risks, contractual 
risks) as well as risks related to the relationship between partners (risk of 
opportunism, risks stemming from conflicting interests).  
 
Of the three cases, the Polish case provides the most variable perception of 
risks on the part of the respondents; the changes in perceptions can be linked 
to the two different phases of the PPPs. Of note was the minimal perception 
of market/demand risk on the part of the partners in the URGN period, until 
after the completion of the negotiations between partners and a period of 
attempting to find funds for the project (end of Round 3). This is also the 
moment that the perception of financial risk rose. The perception of 
demand/market risk dipped in the ARS period, up until the moment when 
the joint venture began to execute the project. This is also the period in which 
perceptions of key project risks (finance, design, contractual) increased. The 
other substantial risk was the risk from the resistance of the tenants, this 
dipped when both the city and URGN engaged with the tenants at the end of 
Round 1 and rose again when ARS took on the role of compensation and 
removal.  
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Did respondents mention risks of opportunistic behaviour? Interestingly 
enough, there was no mention of this type of risk in the URGN period, until 
the period when it was clear that, contrary to what was promised, funds were 
not available. This is in contrast to the ARS period, when the perception of 
this was substantial. Both partners cited examples of opportunism: the public 
sector perception was of ARS negotiating hard for its interests, with limited 
understanding of public interests; and ARS’s perception was of a rigid public 
sector, giving extreme ultimatums, with no understanding of what the 
private party was attempting to accomplish. 
 
In the US case, negotiations with the private partner started at the end of a 
recession and real estate crisis, as well as an initial failed attempt to get the 
project off the ground. Both the public and private sectors came to the initial 
negotiation table (SU) with a high perception of risk. The political risks were 
extremely high (the State Government was not convinced, the State and City 
were in conflict, the regulations governing the site were prohibitive, the 
media were critical). Market risk was also still substantial, developers were 
scared to touch the site. This political and demand/market risks dipped in the 
following rounds. Perceptions of internal risks (project-related risks: access 
to finance, contractual, project design) were also high. At the beginning of 
Round 5, these risks became more ‘real’ when the public and private partners 
committed to the project, perceptions of risks rose (note: the project kicked 
off prior to the signing of the lease agreement!). By the end of Round 5, the 
fall in the perception of risks is notable. Respondents reported almost 
negligible perceptions of risks as tenants were secured for the buildings and 
the project took off (Rounds 5-6). 
 
Possible risks from opportunism on the part of the partners received limited 
attention in the interviews in the US case; respondents mentioned, in 
contrast, the perception that both public and private partners were as good 
as their word and delivered as promised. Respondents did mention one 
incident of risk of opportunism, when O & Y was asked to report on its 
financial standing; this was found to be potentially lacking and the developer 
was asked to provide additional guarantees.  
 
In the Dutch case, the tender procedure (SU – Round 1) in the initial round 
also took place in the middle of a recession and real estate crisis. 
Respondents were clear on the perception of market/demand risks from the 
beginning; in fact, this was a key message of private respondents during 
initial discussions. It is interesting, however, that few respondents 
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mentioned other risks, except for a reference by several to the complexity of 
the project, and the perception of the public sector of the need for 
substantial financial public investment in infrastructure.  
 
Of note in this project is the rise in the perception of risk at the end of Round 
1 and several types of risk in the following rounds. The ‘consciousness’ of the 
range of risks began in all seriousness when negotiations began between 
partners; risks were ‘put on the table’. The perceptions of market/demand 
risks remained substantial for both public and private respondents over the 
rounds, and perceptions of financial risk. The most substantial risks to the 
public sector, in particular, were falling returns from land sales, against 
increasing costs in infrastructure; these became more substantial over the 
rounds of the project. These finances were on public budget, outside of the 
PPP, and the public members of the team became increasingly aware of 
these. The perception of other risks decreased over time, as the project was 
implemented.  
 
Respondents in this case cited perceptions of risk arising from the interaction 
between partners and their behaviour. For one they mentioned risks related 
to conflicts of interest between parties and the perception of an unfair 
spread of the risks among partners. One major conflict of interest stemmed 
from the pressure on the public parties to assume ‘two hats’: namely the 
difficulty of acting in the interest of the partnership (in the limited liability 
company) and in public interest at the same time. These risks were 
mentioned predominantly by (and by all of) the public respondents. 
8.5 The influence of trust on the perception of risk 
As mentioned above, Williamson (1993, 1996), from an economic 
perspective, argues that trust is simply risk taking; it simply involves 
calculating the costs and benefits of working together. This implies that risk 
and trust are in fact the same concept, variables that are mirror images of 
each other (Granovetter 1985, Coleman 1990, Furlong 1996). If this is so, 
looking at the results, one would then expect that in situations of high risk 
trust would go down (would be hard to hold on to). And that in situations of 
high trust, perceptions of risk would go down (risk was being managed by 
contract). But do the results of the research provide evidence that risk and 
trust are different variables? In the cases, when the risks were high, did trust 
remain high? In other words, when the context remained complex, volatile 
and uncertain, did trust continue to grow? Or the reverse: when trust was 
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high and growing, did partners still perceive risk as high, but were willing  to 
continue the relationship, taking more risks? 
 
What the risk figures reflect is that all three PPPs were instigated in the 
middle of a recession (in Poland, the post-communism shock treatment and 
transition to a market system, in the US and Dutch cases economic and real 
estate crises). Both the Polish and US cases started in a highly politically 
charged context. Figure 4 confirms that in these two cases, respondents 
perceived substantial political risk at the outset of the project, in the Dutch 
case this was less evident.  
 
Comparing the trust cycle figures with the risk figures per case, one can 
conclude the following. For the US case, the figure shows that as trust levels 
grew, the perception of risk fell. However, of note is that at the start up, this 
case was characterized by exceedingly high levels of risk, but also surprisingly 
high levels of trust. Partners trusted in the face of very high risk. In the face 
of this high risk, the partners interacted intensively to cope with this risk, and 
trust continued to grow; trust was also effective in reducing the perception 
of risk. As well, the one incident that challenged trust in the US case did 
nothing to jeopardize the growth of trust. In this case, one can conclude that 
trust and risk are different variables: in a highly charged and risky 
environment, trust was high and grew! 
 
In the Dutch case, though the perception of many risks diminished, those 
that remained (market, financial, conflict of interest) did nothing to diminish 
the levels of trust. Respondents reported a number of key obstacles that the 
partners were able to overcome and resolve (without reverting to the letter 
of the law). Interaction was intense between central partners to discuss and 
deal with these risks. Respondents also indicated that they never reverted to 
the contract; this remained on the shelf at all times. Therefore, though risks 
were present, trust continued to grow, also demonstrating that trust and risk 
are different variables. 
 
In the Polish case, initial trust also grew in the face of high risk. There were, 
however, limits to trust; in the end, it was not sufficient to offset the risk. 
Over time, the financial risks and the political risks from the tenants were 
perceived as so substantial that no level of trust was sufficient to maintain 
the URGN relationship. In interviews, public respondents cited having more 
of a problem with the competence dimension of trust (in URGN) than the 
goodwill dimension of trust. During the ARS period, both parties were highly 
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conscious of the risks of the project. Trust was not sufficient to compensate 
for the inability to negotiate these risks and to come to terms with the 
perceptions of opportunistic behaviour. This case demonstrates the limits of 
the influence of trust on the perception of risk, and that trust is hard to build 
when certain factors are not present. When certain factors are not in place, 
trust does not have the chance to become more resilient. When trust is low 
or lost, as in the ARS case, partners expended precious resources on 
protecting their interests, at the expense of the partnership. 
Risk-taking behaviour 
What was evident from the interviews, however, was that in all three cases 
the partners were willing to take risks in heavily uncertain and charged 
circumstances.  
 
Figure 8.2 on outcomes portrays the continued commitment of the partners 
to take risks (their strategies). This risk taking also, in turn, contributed to 
trust build-up.  
 
Both URGN and ARS displayed risk-taking behaviour in taking on such a 
project in an uncertain economic environment, and with volatile tenants. The 
local government also demonstrated the willingness to take risk in 
attempting to do the project. Risk-taking behaviour was evident without the 
existence of trust, at the outset of both the URGN and ARS cases. Interviews 
revealed that URGN continued to demonstrate willingness to take increasing 
amounts of risk as trust rose in Round 2 (the tenants began to accept the 
project and URGN). Over time, however, both ARS and the city demonstrated 
strong risk-adverse behaviour and positional negotiations; this is concurrent 
with trust falling slowly in all partners.  
 
In the US, the case is characterized by strong risk-taking behaviour on the 
part of both partners. The public authority took an extreme amount of risk 
to try to get this complex project off the ground in the face of past failures 
and political risk (SU). O & Y entered upon the scene, and faced with a failed 
project, huge political risk and US$ 200 million in debt, agreed to take on the 
financial risk of the BPCA and the construction of the Commercial Center: 
they also promised to secure the necessary revenues to make the buildings 
profitable and to pay back the public debt hanging over the BPCA. This 
behaviour continued in the rounds of the project and led to trust build-up. 
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In the Dutch case, there is also evidence of strong risk-taking behaviour on 
the part of the partners. Similar to the US case, project design and 
construction started after the signing of the Letter of Intent, but prior to the 
signing of the partnership agreement/the setup of the joint venture. In fact, 
by the end of Round 1, there was strong mutual dependence: partners 
realizing that ‘they were in this together’ and a willingness to forge ahead 
without legal backing. Respondents from the Dutch case reveal that the 
situation was similar; one example cited was the decision of the private 
sector to take over the construction of a non-profitable housing project, trust 
in the public partner (and support for public interest) was sufficient for the 
private party to take this risk. In effect, willingness to take additional risk also 
led to positive outcomes for the projects and to trust build-up.  
 
In effect, there is evidence of a ‘risk-taking cycle’: when risk is taken, and 
outcomes are good, trust is built, which leads to more risk taking. Willingness 
to take risk is, in fact, a factor that contributes to trust build-up. 
 
When looking at the strategies in Figure 8.2, the risk taking in both the US 
and Dutch cases was characterized by a ‘jointness’. Respondents mention 
that partners showed a willingness to take risks together. O & Y joined BPCA 
in difficult negotiations with the city; the partners in Nijmegen supported 
each other in decision making when approached by potential clients. In the 
Polish case, URGN also perceived this as its role, supporting the city in 
discussions with the tenants, but this role never crystallized in the execution 
of the project; interaction slowed to a halt. With ARS, the partnership was 
characterized more by the public sector attempting shift as much risk to the 
developer as possible; this was met with resistance and limited ‘jointness’. 
 
Finally, when looking at the risk figures, of note is the fact that after the initial 
round in the US and Dutch cases, political risk was of limited relevance, the 
focus was more on project-related risks. This is due to the fact that the public 
partner in both cases dealt with the political risk prior to getting involved in 
the partnership, leaving room for the partners to focus on the detailing and 
execution of the project. There were no political risks hanging over the 
project, leaving room for the partners to act quickly together to deliver. This 
is in contrast to the Polish case, where although the local government 
partner made great efforts to deal with the political risks stemming from the 
tenants and the press, this was not wholly successful.  
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This difference is important in looking at the links between risk and trust 
build-up. With no political diversions, partners were free to focus on project 
risks, to get to know each other and to get the work done. The interaction 
was intense and much was invested in making the project work, together. 
Trust was given the chance to build.  
 
The partners in all cases used organizational structures to protect themselves 
from political interference. In principle, all PPPs were set up to allow for 
autonomous decision making. Both the Polish and Dutch cases were set up 
as joint ventures, ‘autonomous’ development companies; the BPCA, with 
which O & Y contracted, was an autonomous public authority. Unfortunately, 
the Polish joint venture was less able to prevent political interference from 
the Local Council, tenants and press.  In fact, the consistent need for the 
public representatives to return to the Council for approval had a severe 
effect on the dynamics of decision making. The risks related to this were a 
serious impediment to trust build-up. 
 
In conclusion, political risk, when not managed, is a severe impediment to 
trust build-up; on the other hand, elements of ‘jointness’ (we are in this 
together!!), willingness to take risks and, if possible, to take risks together, 
are key to building stronger forms of trust. Building trust in a trust cycle is 
more evident when working together to deal with project-related risks (and 
getting the job done).  
8.6 Factors contributing to trust build-up 
The key factors of trust from the theory on trust are provided in the table 
below.  The table provides the responses from the questionnaire related to 
each factor, for each of the three cases. 
 
  <ĞǇƚƌƵƐƚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĨŽƌĞĂĐŚƌŽƵŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚĐǇĐůĞ WŽůĂŶĚ h^ E> 
  ϭ-ϯ;ϭŚŝŐŚĞƐƚͿ hZ'E Z^     
    Mean 
CalBase 
I must have sufficient information on the 
other party's reputation, qualifications 
and past performance record 
1.38 1.20 1.57 2 
CalBase 
I have to be confident that the penalties 
stipulated in the contract are sufficient to 
ensure the compliance of the other party 
2 2.00 1.86 2.63 
KnBase The other party must be willing to share information and resources 1.25 1.70 1.21 1.5 
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KnBase I must get to know them well enough that I am able to predict their behaviour 2 2.00 1.36 1.88 
KnBase On the basis of the interaction, I come to know and respect their capacities 1.75 1.70 1.21 1.5 
IdBase We must learn to 'speak the same language’ 1.25 1.50 1.57 1.75 
IdBase We must come to share the same values and norms 1.88 1.90 1.71 1.63 
 
The table shows some consistency: in all cases, the willingness of the other 
party to share information and resources was considered relevant (Polish 
case URGN period only). This factor (knowledge basis for trust) relates to the 
transparency and openness of the partners and the willingness of the 
partners to make themselves vulnerable to each other. Furthermore, the US 
and Dutch cases were consistent in their rating of the importance of coming 
to know and respect capacities. For the rest, the responses in the Polish case 
differ from the other two cases. It is interesting that there is consistency in 
the responses for both the URGN and ARS periods. Respondents perceived 
the importance of having information on the other party’s reputation, 
qualifications and past performance, as well as that the partners had to learn 
to speak the same language. The first is a more calculative basis of trust, the 
second a more identification basis of trust. The second relates more to the 
ability to frame concepts and ideas in a similar way, over time. 
 
What factors came out of the interviews? Do they confirm the results of the 
questionnaire and the factors found in the theory?  
8.6.1 Calculative bases of trust  
ZĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉĂƐƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ: this factor was mentioned 
in all three cases as being important for initial trust build-up. As mentioned 
before, it was clearly of more importance for the local government in Poland, 
simply because it was dealing with foreign developers and investors.  
 
Of interest is that this factor relates, in these cases, to the reputation, 
qualifications and past performance of the ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ! Only in 
the Dutch case did a respondent mention that past performance of the public 
sector in projects could influence the interest of the private sector to work in 
a city and with a local government (and initial trust). In all cases, the public 
partner verified the financial standing of the private partner as well as the 
past performance on projects. In the Netherlands, the local government 
team went so far as to visit past projects. 
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In the US case in particular, the public respondents mentioned O & Y’s 
reputation for being honourable as a factor of trust. O & Y’s reputation for 
being trustworthy was a key factor of initial trust. The results of the 
questionnaire confirm that this. 
 
^ƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƉĞŶĂůƚŝĞƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ͗ the existence of the 
letter of the law was only of importance in the Polish case, but as a negative 
factor of trust. This negative influence of this deterrence factor of trust is 
mentioned in the theory and the results confirm that focus on penalties only 
serve to undermine trust. In both the URGN and ARS periods, private 
respondents mentioned the tendency of the CB/NT to stick rigidly (1) to 
regulations during the URGN period and (2) to the contract in the ARS period, 
to the detriment of the project. This did not build the trust of the private 
partners in the public sector, and demonstrated the limits of trust (the public 
sector’s fear of opportunistic behaviour and lack of understanding of the 
interests and needs of the partner showed it had minimal trust). 
 
Again, public respondents mentioned the weakness of the contract during 
the URGN period, in stipulating deliverables and deadlines, and mentioned 
that the original contract was a mistake on their part. This demonstrates that 
contractual aspects were an important factor, but mostly as a document to 
handle cases of conflict or disruption risk. In situations when trust is breaking 
down, a contract has to take the place of trust and has to be used to govern 
relations that are disintegrating. 
 
The perception of the CB/NT related to ARS was that the private partner 
would not comply without some kind of control. This was also the case when 
the partners worked together in the renovation company STR. Interestingly 
enough, the terms of the contract seemed to be a condition for trust build-
up, but acted as a deterrent as well. This confirms the theory on the use of 
deterrents to build trust (Macaulay 1963, Sitkin and Roth 1993). This 
underlines that there have to be other factors present to build trust, besides 
penalties in a contract. 
 
In the other two cases, the penalties in the contract took on less importance. 
The partners in both the US and Dutch cases had the projects and partnership 
well underway prior to having a binding contract. The lawyers in both cases 
did mention the importance of certain clauses, penalties and incentives, but 
in fact, in both cases, the perception was that the existence of contracts was 
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not a necessary factor of trust.  In fact, one could argue that working 
successfully without a contract was a more important factor of building trust. 
8.6.2 Knowledge bases of trust: trust that is built during 
the interaction and as partners get to know each 
other 
tŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĨŽĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͗ In all cases, this factor of trust was 
very important; this came out of the results of the questionnaire. The theory 
presumes that partners interacting are open and upfront with information 
and by making (confidential) information available make themselves 
vulnerable to each other. Partners also make resources (financial, human, 
etc.) available to ensure a partnership gets underway, thereby allowing the 
other partner to share in and benefit from the investment. In social exchange 
theory, the sharing is voluntary, and when the benefit is returned and no 
opportunism occurs, trust is built. 
 
In the Polish case, it was URGN’s attitude and openness that built trust, and 
the organizations’ willingness to invest and share resources in the project. 
Internally, URGN staff also mentioned this aspect, commenting on the 
investment in their professional development. Both URGN and the CB/NT 
were upfront and clear about their intentions and objectives. Perhaps the 
tendency of ARS to change tact and to make the city wonder if the 
organization was withholding information is a clear negative factor of trust. 
 
This was the case in the other two projects. In the Dutch case, the private 
sector, in fact, set openness and transparency in the negotiations as the rule 
of the game, as is said in the Netherlands ‘putting everything on the table’. 
In both the US and Dutch cases, the urgency at the beginning and the very 
fact of having to work on the first buildings at an accelerated speed, left little 
time for holding back. One public respondent mentioned this, stating, that 
everything had to go on the table, there was no other choice. This was an 
important factor of trust. 
 
<ŶŽǁŝŶŐ ǇŽƵƌ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ǁĞůů ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ƚŽ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ͗ This is an 
interesting factor as it presupposes that by getting to know someone, and 
through the interaction and the repetition of (positive) behaviour, a partner 
can come to predict behaviour, and trusting in that behaviour, can make 
decisions with confidence. In fact, this can also be a negative factor of trust, 
if the repeated behaviour is negative. It can lead a partner to anticipate 
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negative behaviour, and as this is reinforced, to have to invest additional 
resources to offset the opportunism displayed.  
 
In all three cases, by working together closely, the partners got to know each 
other and developed expectations related to each other. These remained 
positive expectations in two of the cases and partners were able to continue 
to predict positive behaviour. However, in the Polish case, after initial 
expectations were built in the URGN period, when funds did not appear 
public respondents began to question their assessment of URGN, how well 
they knew the organization and were able to predict its behaviour. One can 
conclude for the URGN period that it is at this level of trust and related to 
this factor of trust that trust eroded and reached its limits. Trust never got 
beyond this level. 
 
Related to ARS and the local government as partners, this factor was also a 
negative factor of trust. Public respondents cited the chaotic and constant 
change of tact on the part of ARS as leading to a breakdown of trust. As they 
got to know ARS, members of the CB/NT had difficulties in being able to 
predict behaviour at all. In the long run, the unpredictability of the partners 
became what was predicable. In the case of ARS, staff came to be able to 
predict the behaviour of the city as they got to know the various officials; it 
was the consistency of the city in pushing ARS into unacceptable negotiation 
positions that negatively influenced trust. This reinforcement of behaviour 
led to an adversarial relationship. Initial trust was also eroded at this point. 
 
Respondents in the US case mentioned this factor in a number of different 
ways. For one, the very fact that O & Y never took advantage of the 
vulnerable position in which the BPCA found itself was important. Over time, 
the behaviour of O & Y reinforced the original reputation of the organization 
and its leader of being entirely honourable. The ability to be able to predict 
behaviour provided assurances when making decisions. In addition, public 
and private respondents mention the consistency of behaviour of the BPCA 
as a key factor of trust. The developers, including O & Y, were clear on where 
they stood with the BPCA. 
 
In the Dutch case, getting things done together created predictability. 
 
One respondent (US case) mentioned an interesting set of factors that link 
this factor to the next. He mentioned that interaction created predictability, 
but with positive expectations also reinforced built respect. This would then 
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lead to expectations of consistent, predictable and competent behaviour of 
the partner, and with this reinforced, this would underline the predictability 
and respect. This respondent perceived this as present in the relationship 
between the BPCA and O & Y. 
 
KŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ͕/ĐŽŵĞƚŽŬŶŽǁĂŶĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ͗Though 
there was some initial respect for the partners’ capacities in the Polish case, 
this factor was not prevalent over the longer term. Clearly, the ways both the 
URGN and the ARS relationships with the local government ended, meant 
that none of the partners ever got the chance to have this factor of trust be 
of relevance. 
 
In the other two cases, however, partners came to respect each other’s 
capacities and it was an important factor of trust. For one, in both the US and 
the Dutch case, the partners were thrown together and came to respect and 
understand the roles that each had to play. In both cases, partners delivered 
under serious pressure. In the Dutch case, private respondents expressed 
particular respect for their public counterparts, and their ability to deliver 
under difficult and intense circumstances. Perhaps this was a change in the 
typical perception of the public sector! 
 
Respondents from both cases mention the importance of having ‘good 
people’ to do the job in both sectors. This points to the need for a particular 
skill set. In both cases, it was a private respondent that mentioned public 
performance. Staff of O & Y mentioned the importance of having ‘good 
people’. In the Dutch case, one private respondent underlined the 
professionalism of the entire group, public and private, and the fact that the 
project ‘never derailed’ because of the skill set that the group had. He went 
so far as to point out that not every municipality has professionals of that 
sort.  
8.6.3 Identification bases of trust: when partners get to 
know each other so well that they begin to identify 
with each other. 
DƵƐƚůĞĂƌŶƚŽƐƉĞĂŬƚŚĞƐĂŵĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ: This refers to the need for partners 
to come to terms with the ‘framing’ of ideas used in the interaction. In fact, 
it is clear that, though rated as important, this was not a factor of trust 
present in Poland, and a point of frustration for the respondents in the case. 
Whereas the ability to frame interests and priorities in a similar way and 
negotiate these using a common language were important factors 
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mentioned in both the US and Dutch cases, the relationship in Poland never 
reached that level.  
 
As is mentioned in the theory, relationships that reach this level of trust are 
often characterized by personal relations between partners, and a common 
language built out of years of working together. In both the US and Dutch 
cases, relations between partners were longstanding and became personal. 
A respondent in the Dutch case mentions the joking and the teasing of 
partners related to past mistakes as part of the working culture, a use of 
common phraseology. 
 
^ŚĂƌĞĚŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ: this is seen a factor of trust that is the basis of the 
strongest form of trust. This presupposes that partners have interacted so 
intensely that they have gotten to know and assimilate the norms and values 
of the other partners.  
 
Achieving the assimilation of a partner’s norms and values is difficult, 
particularly when partners are from public and private organizations. This 
presumes that partners integrate norms and values into working methods 
and that they become a pervasive part of the culture of the PPP. This may be 
a key factor of trust, but in a Public-Private Partnership, how far should 
partners go? One has to ask, is it, for instance, a good thing to have the public 
sector take on a profit-making motive as one of its core values? Or is the 
public partner driven by other values that are specifically important to 
retain? 
 
On the surface, there is some indication of this factor in the fact that 
respondents in the Dutch and US cases worked with the perception of a 
‘common vision or purpose’ or a strong sense of ‘we’ (we are in this 
together!). However, respondents in the Dutch case, in particular, indicated 
that one of the key challenges in the interaction over time was negotiating 
interests; the interests stemmed from strongly held norms and values . . . 
that were different.  
 
The Dutch case does provide the most evidence of shared norms and values, 
but one could argue that these were shared norms and values built as a result 
of the interaction, so norms and values of the partnership itself. For instance, 
each sector came to the partnership with its own norms related to how 
decisions were made; in the partnership, partners had to work out new 
norms for decision making that worked for both parties. Decisions were 
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embedded in the organizational structure and in the process. Respondents 
saw this approach to decision making in the interaction as an important 
factors of trust. Again, in contrast to the other cases, the Dutch partners had 
a longer period to develop shared norms and values. 
8.7 Possible other factors of trust? 
8.7.1 Coping strategies 
Trust growth in the cases was also related to the ability of partners do deal 
with risks and to overcome a series of ‘normal’ project-related obstacles. The 
strategies used to deal with these are, in fact, factors of trust. The cases 
revealed that these coping strategies had an influence on trust levels. Trust 
also influenced the strategies used. There were marked differences in the 
manner in which parties in a high-trust relationship dealt with the perception 
of risk in comparison to when the trust levels were falling and in question.  
 
One could categorize the risks/obstacles from the cases as: 
1. External and internal risks: these were the risks mentioned in the cases 
that partners had to deal with to get the project off the ground.  
2. Perception of conflicting interests: these related to the fact that 
partners often had interests that did not coincide, what they chose to 
do with these interests is evident in the strategies or behaviour 
exhibited (see point below). 
3. The behaviour of the other party: this could be positive or negative 
behaviour. In this case, the focus is on negative behaviour, which might 
range from opportunism, arrogance and rigidity to withholding 
information (whether opportunistically or not). 
4. The fact that partners sometimes made a mistake, may it be due to lack 
of experience or a simple miscalculation. 
5. A positive obstacle, such as the need to speed up the project, which 
tested the relationship. 
6. A combination of the factors above that converged to make the 
relationship impossible. 
 
The table below categorizes the types of risk and obstacles and the reactions 
found in the three cases.  
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dǇƉĞŽĨŽďƐƚĂĐůĞ ZĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ;ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨƚƌƵƐƚͿ 
External (political, 
market) and internal 
project risks 
 Partners interacted to discuss and negotiate on risk, invested 
resources to deal with risks (US and NL) 
 In some cases, partners (who were not always responsible 
for risk) invested extra resources to help mitigate risks 
(Poland/URGN, US, NL) 
Perception of conflicting 
interests  
 Positional negotiations, other machinations (Poland: 
ARS/CB/NT) 
 Lay interests on table, listen, find solutions (US/NL) 
(Negative) behaviour 
 (Risk of ) 
opportunistic 
behaviour 
 Arrogance, etc. 
 Rigidity, inflexibility 
in negotiations 
 Lack of experience, 
professionalism 
 Withholding 
information 
 
 Rigidity, checking all details (Poland, ARS and CB/NT) 
 Wariness (Poland, ARS and CB/NT) 
 Positional negotiations (Poland, ARS and CB/NT) 
 Use of extra resources to check on performance (Poland, ARS 
and CB/NT) 
 Wariness, checking (Poland, ARS and CB/NT) 
Simple mistakes due to 
lack of experience or 
miscalculation: i.e. 
URGN or public official 
in Nijmegen 
 (Try to) deal with it (NL and Poland/URGN) 
 Forgive (NL) or abort relationship (Poland/URGN) 
The need to speed up 
the project to 
counteract risk, 
upheaval 
 Wholehearted commitment to making the project work, all 
parties work in accelerated manner, bringing resources 
together (US and NL) 
 Both parties continue to negotiate in an adversarial manner 
(Poland, ARS and CB/NT) 
Combination of factors 
that make a relationship 
difficult: partners revert 
to opportunistic 
behaviour 
Abort relationship (Poland) 
 
The types of reactions found in the cases range from the typical professional 
or management strategies necessary to execute a project (interact, 
negotiate, find solutions) to commitment and investment of time and 
resources that are over and above the call of duty (URGN’s time with the 
tenants, training Polish staff, etc., NL and the US). In the US and Dutch cases 
there is strong evidence of the willingness to take more risk to deal with 
obstacles; both cases are characterized by strong trust. They also involve 
more positional or wary reactions that provide an indication that trust is 
being tested (both the city and ARS in Poland).  
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In fact, in each situation, partners made a decision on how to act, and this 
influenced the interaction, trust and outcomes. 
8.7.2 Management strategies 
The previous section focused on ´coping´ strategies related to obstacles and 
risks. The focus was more on negative aspects of the relationship. However, 
many of the strategies that emerged were, in fact, management strategies. 
All three cases highlighted that partners used management strategies and 
that these were, in fact, factors of trust. These management strategies can 
be organized in the following categories: 
 
1. KƉĞŶŶĞƐƐͬǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶͬŝĚĞĂƐ͗ this factor was used 
and tested in the research, and has proven to be one of the most 
relevant factors for trust build-up. However, it is also an aspect of 
management, and can be unpacked further. In the cases, respondents 
referred to behavioural characteristics of the partners such as 
optimism/a vision of the future, open communication, being upfront or 
fully transparent regarding intentions/objectives, and sharing of reliable 
information in a timely manner. 
2. ^ŬŝůůƐĞƚ͗ respondents also mentioned skills such as leadership, 
communication skills, project development and management skills, 
´getting things done´, and other interpersonal skills to deal with 
partners. 
3. ĂƌĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶͬǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞƉŽǁĞƌ͗ respondents also 
mentioned key attributes and strategies such as the tendency to 
consult and canvas opinions, to listen to ideas, to take ideas into 
account when making decisions, to spend time on exchanging views, 
and to share or transfer skills. 
 
The fact that these aspects emerged from the interviews underlines the fact 
that there are a series of complex factors that lead to trust build-up. There is 
a body of work looking at management strategies as factors of trust 
(Edelenbos and Klijn 2009, Steijn et al. 2011); however, it is important to 
explore further the links of management strategies to trust. 
 
The following chapter provides the final conclusions and areas of future 
research. 
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9 Conclusions and further research 
9.1  Conclusions 
This research resulted in some key findings. Empirically, the research was 
able to demonstrate that in all cases there was evidence of a trust cycle: in 
two cases, trust building over time, and in one case, trust dynamic, growing 
and declining, then growing and declining again. In two cases, there was also 
evidence that strategies employed and outcomes achieved contributed to 
trust, and trust, in turn, contributed to the performance of the projects and 
the PPP. On the other hand, the research also was able to identify, in the 
Polish case, those strategies employed and outcomes achieved, as well as 
key factors that led to the deterioration of trust, and ultimately to outcomes 
that were less than desired. The deterioration of trust was slow, but once 
gone, it was gone. Trust can be good in mediating an interaction, in paving 
the way for cooperation and increasing the amount of investments. Trust 
breakdown, on the other hand, can hamper an interaction substantially, and 
cause defensive behaviour. 
 
The results of the analysis show that trust was consistently higher among 
partners that interacted frequently and intensely and were essential for the 
realization of a project (all cases studies). This shows that when interaction 
is frequent, and partners are dependent on each other for outcomes, 
building trust is important. If built, trust is highest in these types of partners. 
Partners will, in fact, expend additional resources to ensure that 
relationships are maintained. Trust has a focus. 
 
The research revealed that in ‘high-trust’ situations, partners reverted to 
strategies that are more effective in coping with risks and in bringing about 
outcomes that benefit the partnership. Partners are also more willing to take 
greater risk, for instance to increase the interaction and to invest additional 
resources to ensure that obstacles are overcome. In contrast, in the case of 
low or declining trust, partners reverted to negative coping strategies, 
opportunistic behaviour, and the investment of resources to protect 
themselves against the opportunism of the other partner (less in getting the 
job done). 
 
Of note in all three cases (URGN phase in Poland), was that trust was 
perceived by some of the respondents as approaching ‘blind faith’. One could 
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argue that blind faith in not rational, and therefore not advisable, as it keeps 
partners in a relationship too long, past the point that is wise. This was true 
in Poland. However, the research also revealed that this type of trust was 
necessary to deal with the urgency being faced by the partners. The risks 
being faced (post-communist transitions, economic recessions), were so 
substantial that this type of trust (a leap of faith) was needed to take on the 
risks (the case in both the Dutch and US cases). One can argue that had the 
partners not met expectations in their interactions, over the longer term, 
trust would have declined and the disappointment would have been severe. 
 
The cases demonstrate that outcomes and trust are not simple mirror images 
of each other (trust rising when positive outcomes are achieved, and falling 
when outcomes are negative). In other words, trust remained strong in the 
face of negative outcomes. When trust is strong, partners give each other the 
‘benefit of the doubt’; this occurred in all case studies. Partners must then 
resolve the issue, and outcomes have to improve for trust to be maintained 
over the longer term. The Polish case showed how trust deteriorates if 
outcomes do not improve. 
 
Trust does have its limits. The research revealed that there are circumstance 
when risks are perceived as so extensive, particularly risks external to the 
project (political risks), that partners revert to opportunistic behaviour and 
exit the relationship. This was a rational decision, but broke the moral code 
and caused a break in trust. This was the case in the URGN and the ARS 
phases of the Polish case.  
 
The analysis of urban regeneration partnerships positioned the interaction 
between the core partners in a complex network, also implying a process of 
complex decision making. In fact, one could argue that decision making 
between partners was never really ‘free and autonomous’, no matter the 
autonomy of the organization (example all cases). Decisions were often 
hampered by the City Council (Poland and the Netherlands, at a certain 
point) or the community (Poland and the US). The cases demonstrated how 
important it is to engage the community and to build the trust of external 
parties, and how potentially damaging political risk, if not managed well, can 
be to a partnership.  
 
The research also argues, contrary to Williamson’s contention, that risk and 
trust are not simple mirror images of each other. The cases reveal that even 
in situations of high risk, it is possible to build trust, or that trust will remain 
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strong even in conditions of high risk. In fact, partners are willing to take 
more risk and the act of engaging in more risk taking appears to be a key 
factor of trust.  
 
Using a deductive approach, the research was also able to demonstrate that 
trust building is dependent on certain key factors. Factors taken from theory 
were present and cited by respondents. Some factors appeared to be more 
relevant than others: cases revealed higher results for the knowledge basis 
of trust: the sharing of information and resources, in particular, but also 
predictability and respect for capacity. The research also revealed the factors 
that contributed to the decline in trust, such as the withholding of 
information or predictability (getting to know your partner and being able to 
predict negative behaviour). This brings one to conclude that while these 
factors are key to trust build-up, the opposite or negative form of these 
factors (partners withhold information, for instance), leads to the erosion of 
trust.  
 
With regard to factors, it is interesting to note that the Dutch case is the one 
case that can be characterized by identification bases of trust; this came out 
of a long-term relationship with interaction over a 25-year (plus) period, 
confirming that is takes time and intense interaction to build and maintain 
trust. Though trust was high in the US case, these factors were less present, 
perhaps because the relationship was less lengthy. 
 
On the other hand, in the Polish case, the analysis of factors confirmed that 
knowledge-based factors in the Polish case were more negative factors of 
trust, i.e. that the predictability from getting to know each other (and 
expecting the worst), had a negative influence on trust. In the Polish 
partnership, partners never had the time to ‘repair’ trust and to reach the 
level of trust in which they took on a common identity. 
 
Taking a more inductive approach, the research also revealed other factors 
of trust not taken up in this research. For one, the willingness to take risk (or 
more precisely, risk-taking behaviour as an outcome of trust) was a key factor 
of trust in all cases. The partners (in the US, the Netherlands, but also in 
Poland) demonstrated their willingness by taking risks in the face of 
substantial risks (recession, market insecurity, etc.), and this was key to trust 
build-up. This was an important finding that confirmed discussions currently 
ongoing in the literature (Barney and Hansen 1994, Madhok 1995). 
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In addition, the outcomes of the interaction between partners are also 
factors contributing to trust build-up or breakdown. The concrete results of 
the interaction or the product that a partner has delivered may build trust, 
as may the behaviour (or strategies) of a partner.  
 
This finding underlines the fact that trust building is an ‘iterative’ and cyclical 
process; this is true for trust but also for the perceptions of risk and 
outcomes. Strategies that result in positive outcomes result in trust build-up. 
As trust builds, so does the willingness to take risk. Willingness to take risk 
(the actual taking of risk) is a factor of trust. When there is deterioration in 
the outcomes over a longer period and the perception is negative, trust 
declines. As trust declines, so does the willingness to take risk. Trust building 
is not a linear process, but is affected by additional factors, such as risk taking 
and outcomes.  
 
This research also discovered relevant factors that certain authors have 
already started to explore (Steijn et al. 2011). For one, the cases revealed 
that the type of organization set up for the execution of the partnership 
influences trust (the organizational setup also influences how decisions are 
made). The cases revealed that a ‘truly’ autonomous organizational structure 
that provides partners with the opportunity to focus on project build out, 
without political interference, is crucial to trust build-up. This implies dealing 
with and limiting the risks from the City Council, community or the press, 
namely political risk.  
 
The cases also revealed the relevance of certain management strategies as 
important for trust build-up (Klijn et al. 1995, Steijn et al. 2011). Many of 
these could be categorized under I come to know and respect their capacities. 
However, there is a need to unpack this factor. In the Polish and Dutch cases, 
for instance, respondents mentioned what is termed here as ‘care and 
concern’ as well as willingness to share power as key factors. Both of these 
can be broken down further into more specific management strategies. One 
respondent in the Dutch case underlined that fact that establishing the rules 
of the game on how decisions are made was a key factor of trust, also a 
management strategy. Respondents in other cases cited certain skill sets 
(visioning, communication skills) as factors of building trust. This implies that 
managers can consciously develop skill sets with which to build trust. 
 
Finally, it is clear that trust is a complex phenomenon. The research argued 
that trust has a role in facilitating an interaction process and is essential in 
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long-term, interdependent relationships. The research attempted to 
categorize factors and to link them to phases in the trust cycle. Explaining 
how trust is built is, however, more complex and related to more factors than 
this research was able to identify and analyse. One of the gaps in the study 
related to achieving greater clarity on the range of factors that lead to trust 
build-up; this points to the need for further research. 
 
Trust takes time to build, however the initial strategies used by the partners 
are essential to build initial trust, and the success in building trust at the 
outset is essential for the remainder of the working relationship. Without 
getting through this initial step and meeting expectations, stronger levels of 
trust cannot be achieved. In addition, it is clear that when risks are high and 
outcome are less than desirable, trust can continue to build, but trust has to 
be strong enough to withstand the test. Lastly, it is difficult to achieve trust 
levels based on identification (shared norms and values, speaking the same 
language). PPPs rarely reach that level and that strength of trust.  
 
&ŝŶĂůǁŽƌĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ 
This research has contributed to the development of empirical evidence on 
the growth of trust in partnerships through the in-depth analysis of a series 
of case studies. In addition, it has taken a step to further the theory on trust, 
but also the theory on the relations between trust, risk and outcomes. Where 
there have been limits to the concept of trust, this research has been able to 
deepen and expand on the existing literature and study of trust. 
 
To date, there has been no research of this kind on trust, risk and outcomes 
in Wublic-Wrivate Wartnerships. Most of the research into interorganizational 
trust has focused on trust in private joint ventures and strategic alliances 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Barney and Hansen 1994, Madhok 1995, Zaheer 
et al. 1998, Bovaird 2004) and not on the relations between the public and 
private sector. Considering the substantial move in many countries to use 
Public-Private Partnerships as a way to achieve key objectives in 
development, and the ůĂĐŬ of trust that often exists between partners at the 
outset of the interaction, this research takes a closer look at the concept of 
trust, its dimensions and the key factors of trust development. This research 
has implications for practice. 
 
A key value of this research is that it provides an in-depth analysis of trust 
over time, and has been able to chart the dynamics of trust in a trust cycle, 
again, over time. Little research has looked deeply into trust growth or 
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decline over time; thus this research contributes to the body of research on 
trust and on PPPs. 
 
The current literature on trust covers an extensive debate on the nature of 
trust and its antecedents (Barney and Hansen 1994, McAllister 1995, Lewicki 
and Bunker 1996, Rousseau et al. 1998) and on whether trust is a dependant 
or independent variable. Based on a scan of the literature, this research set 
up a conceptual framework to test this. It expanded on the theoretical trust 
cycle model of Lewicki and Bunker, analysed in detail the factors (the 
antecedents) that led to trust build-up as well as the outcomes resulting from 
that trust, linking these to the phases of the trust cycle. The theory and the 
model used were operationalized and tested in this research.  
 
Finally, the objective of this research was to gain insight into trust in three 
cases in an international context and to be able to add value to the concept 
of trust. This research looked at three different cases in three different 
countries and contexts, and chose in its design to take an in-depth look at 
trust over time. The research applied the theoretical model in different 
contexts and the empirical evidence was able to demonstrate that trust was 
important in all three partnerships, in spite of the context. 
9.2  Further research 
The research has shown that further research is necessary in the area of 
factors that contribute to trust build-up. It is clear that a complex set of 
factors contributes to the growth or decline of trust. It would be interesting 
to explore further aspects of management strategies and organizational 
forms and their links to trust build-up in PPPs, to isolate further the causal 
relations. 
 
Looking at the links between trust and risk, it would be of value to look at the 
different levels of trust and their influences on perceptions of different types 
of risk. For instance, what levels of trust (weak, medium or strong) have an 
influence on different types of risk, over time? This research looked briefly at 
this, but was unable to comment conclusively. 
 
In addition, there is a body of literature on the influence of trust on 
outcomes, but little on Public-Private Partnerships. It would be of value to 
look more closely at the nature of trust build-up in PPPs and its influence on 
the outcomes of the interaction.  
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List of interviews per case 
Interviews %RJXVáDZD3URMHFW6]F]HFLQ3RODQG 
hZ'EƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
1. Mr. Piotr Mync, Vice Mayor, Szczecin municipality, member of the City 
Board, interviewed 24 January 2007 
2. Ms. Hanna Sokulska, Director of legal counsel bureau, Szczecin 
municipality, member of the negotiation team, interviewed 20 
November 2006 
3. Prof. Leon Dorozik, Professor University of Szczecin, consultant, member 
of the public team, interviewed 16 January 2007 and 19 January 2007 
4. Mr. Zbigniew Becker, Assistant to Mayor, member of the public team, 
interviewed 23 October 2006 and various in January 2007 
5. Mr. Hans v.d. Sanden, UNDP consultant, member of the public team, 
interviewed 16 November 2006 and 21 January 2007 
6. Mr. Gert A Gundersen, URGN founder and representative, interviewed 
24 January 2007 
7. Mr. Marek Wroblewki, member of the URGN team in Poland, 
interviewed 24 November 2006 and 26 January 2007 
8. Mr. Sylvester Lechiski, tenant, member of Secesja, interviewed 18 and 19 
January 2007 
9. Mr. Henry Pitlik, tenant, Board of Secesja, interviewed 2 February 2007 
 
Z^ƉĞƌŝŽĚ 
1. Mr. Piotr Mync, Vice Mayor, Szczecin municipality, member of the City 
Board, interviewed 24 January 2007 
2. Ms. Hanna Sokulska, Director of legal counsel bureau, Szczecin 
municipality, member of the negotiation team, interviewed 10 
November 2006 
3. Mr. Piotr Lewandowksi, City Councillor, interviewed January 2007 
4. Prof. Leon Dorozik, Professor University of Szczecin, consultant, member 
of Board of STR interviewed 16 January 2007 and 19 January 2007 
5. Mr. Hans v.d. Sanden, member of the public team, interviewed 16 
November 2006 and 21 January 2007 
6. Mr. Zbigniew Becker, VP and Technical Director at STR, member of the 
public team, interviewed 23 October 2006 and various in January 2007 
7. Mr. Stuart Gross, President of STR from ARS, interviewed 15 December 
2006 
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8. Mr. Henry McGovern, President of ARS, interviewed May 2005 and 20 
January 2007 
9. Mr. Andrzej Luzcewski, member of the private team, interviewed January 
2007 
10. Mr. Zbigniew Paszkowski, architect working for ARS, interviewed 16 
January 2007 
11. Mr. Pawel Misztal, member of the private team, legal counsel, 
interviewed 23 January 2007 
12. Mr. Izolda Zurdzinska, member of the private team, translator, 
interviewed 28 January 2007 
13. Mr. Sylverster Lechiski, tenant, City Councillor, interviewed 18 and 19 
January 2007 
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Interviews Battery Park City project, New York City 
Wublic 
1. Ms. Amanda Burden, phone interview, 19 August 1994 
2. Mr. Charles J. Urstadt, Urstadt Biddle and Properties, Chairman of BPCA 
5 August, 1968 to 5 January 1979, interviewed 22 August 2007, 11 
January 2008 
3. Mr. Richard Kahan: Urban Land Assembly. Chairman of BPCA, 5 January 
1979 – 1 January 1984. Interviewed 11 August 1995, 14 August 2007, and 
4 January 2008 
4. Mr. Paul Dickstein, interviewed 23 August 2007 
5. Mr. Barry Light: former President /CEO BPCA under R. Kahan, 1980-1984, 
interviewed 11 January 2009 
6. Mr. Larry Graham, Executive Vice President Brookfield, former CFO BPCA 
under R. Kahan, interviewed 5 January 2009 
7. Mr. Bill Donohoe: Senior Vice President BPCA 1981-1986, interviewed 3 
January 2008, 8 January 2010 
8. Mr. Carl Weisbrod, Trinity Wall Street, Executive Director CPC 1980-
1987, interviewed 2 January 2008 
9. Mr. Tom Koszlowski, BPCA, interviewed 9 and 12 August 1994, 19 
December 2008 
10. Mr. John Spires, Exec. VP in charge of Construction, Design and 
Engineering BPCA 1983-1989, interviewed 13 January 2009 
11. Mr. Meyer (Sandy) Frucher: President/CEO of BPCA 1984-1988, 
interviewed 10 August 1994, 20 and 21 August 2007, 7 January 2008 
12. Mr Robert Serpico, CFO BPCA 1986-2008, interviewed 9 and 12 August 
1994, and 8 January 2008 
13. Ms. Sandy Altman, BPCA general counsel, interviewed 8 January 2008 
14. Ms. Sydney Druckman, Director Special Projects BPCA, interviewed 8 
January 2008 
15. Ms. Lois Mazzetelli, SOM, worked at the CPC, interviewed 13 August 
2008, 8 January 2009 
Wrivate 
1. Mr. Bob Douglass, Mill Bank Tweed Hadley, Under Rockefeller and 
member of DLMA, interviewed 14 August 2008  
2. Mr. Alex Cooper, former principle of Cooper and Eckstut, interviewed 3 
January 2008 
3. Mr. David McGregor, Managing Director, Robertson Cooper and 
Partners, member of the Cooper and Eckstut team, interviewed August 
1994, 2 January 2008 
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4. Mr. Michael Dennis, Azure Development, Exec. VP Olympia and York 
1980-1987, interviewed 10 January 2008 
5. Mr. Tony Coombes, Senior Olympia and York, interviewed 19 August 
2008, 9 October 2009, 8 January 2010 
6. Mr. John Zucotti, Brookfield, interviewed 8 January 2008 
7. Ms. Tessa Huxley, Exec. Dir. Battery Parks Conservancy, interviewed 9 
January 2008, 2 August 2009 
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Interviews Brabantse Poort project, Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands 
 Public 
1. Carel Sweens, City of Nijmegen, (former) Chef Onroerend Goed, 
interviewed 22 July 2012 
2. Dorine Gebbink, City of Nijmegen, (former) Secretary Project Bureau, 
Urban Development and Housing, interviewed 27 March 2013 
3. Dick Keijzer, City of Nijmegen, (former) Head Department of Urban 
Planning, interviewed 17 April 2013 
4. Kees de Ruwe, City of Nijmegen, (former) Head General Affairs and 
Planning of the Department of Urban development, interviewed 15 
May 2013 
5. Constance Boogers, City of Nijmegen, formerly planner with the city, 
currently Head of Development, IT department, interviewed 8 July 2013 
6. Jean Buskens, City of Nijmegen, (former) Municipal Project Leader, 
Brabantse Poort, interviewed 23 August 2013 
7. Paul Goedknegt, City of Nijmegen, Planner, interviewed 29 August 2013 
  
 Private 
1. Stefan Schuwer, (former) Project Leader, Brabantse Poort BV, Heijmans 
Projectum, interviewed 16 May 2013 
2. Leo Groen, (former) Legal counsel on the project, NIB, interviewed 22 
July 2013 
3. Jan de Vroe, (former) member of the Board of the partnership 
company, representative from NIB, interviewed 31 October 2013 
4. Lamber Hendriks, General Director, Hendriks Construction and 
Development, interviewed 3 November 2013 
5. Johan Bombach, Director Project Development, Hendriks Construction 
and Development, interviewed 3 November 2013 
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Key documents per case 
Bogusáawa Street documents 
 Henry Butcher & Co. Report (on behalf of EBRD), Urban Regeneration 
City Blocks 21 and 22, Szczecin, Poland, August 1994 
 Contract between City of Szczecin and URGN on the renovation of Blocks 
21 and 22, 10 November 1993 
 Annex to the contract between City of Szczecin and URGN on the 
renovation of Blocks 21 and 22, 20 April 1995 
 Two preliminary proposal for the renovation of Blocks 21 and 22 (CivilEng 
and ARS), January 1997 
 Correspondence between ARS and the City of Szczecin: in the period of 
January 1997 – November 1999 
 Minutes of meetings between ARS and the City of Szczecin: in the period 
of January 1997 – November 1999 
 Gazetta Wyborcza (Electoral Gazette), 10 October 1996, 23 December 
1997, 21 February 1998 
 GųŽƐ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ (Voice of Szczecin), 18 July 1996, 10 October 1996, 16 
October 1996, 21 February 1998 
 Kurier ^ǌĐǌĞĐŝŷƐŬŝ (Courier of Szczecin), 10 October 1996, 16 October 
1996, 23 May 1997, 29 December 1997, 21 February 1998 
 
WůĞĂƐĞ ŶŽƚĞ͗ The research accessed and analysed close to 100 project 
documents. The most important documents, also referred to in the case 
study text, are listed here. Should it be necessary, the full list of documents 
can be made available.  
BPCA documents: 
 Bond Issue for Battery Park City Authority, 1986. Special Obligation 
Revenue Bonds, 1 August  
 Bond Issue for Battery Park City Authority, 1972. Moral Obligation Bonds, 
1 May 1 
 Battery Park City Draft Summary Report and 1979 Master Plan, 
Alexander Cooper Associates, October 1979 (complete) 
 Battery Park City Authority, 1979. Demorandum of hnderstanding 
between the EzS, EzC, hDC and BWC, 8 November 
 Gill, B. 1990. ‘The Sky Line: Battery Park City’ in The Eew zorker, 20 
August 20 
 NYS General Laws, 1968. ch. 343 
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 Wrogressive rchitecture, 1996. ‘Back to the Waterfront: Chaos or 
Control?’, 47:8, pp. 128 -139 
 Transcript of Urban Land Institute Presentation, 1985. World Financial 
Center, 22 May 22 
 Transcript of speech by Sandy Frucher, 1990. BPCA and O & Y History, 3 
July 3 
 Transcript ASREC presentation by Sandy Frucher, 1986. Public-Private 
Partnership, 11 June 
 Frucher, S., 1990. Unpublished paper: Public-Private Partnership: the key 
to development. American Bar Association.  
 Eew zork Times, 1985. ‘At last, Shearson makes it move’, 19 October 
 
A list of additional documents is available upon request. 
Brabantse Poort government documents 
 Gebbink, Advice to council on representation of the city in the temporary 
BV, 4 October 1990 
 Intentieovereenkomst, December 1990 
 Kantorenmarktonderǌoek, Nijmegen, June 1993 
 Memorandum Gemeente Nijmegen, Selectie Procedure, 10 November 
1989 
 Wlan van anpak Stedelijke Ontwikkelingsǌone, Gemeente Nijmegen 
Raadsbijeenkomst, December 1988 
 Zechtsvorm Wroject Brabantse, VB Belastingadviseurs, December 1990 
 Regeerakkoord, 1986 
 Samenwerkingsovereenkomst, Centrumgebied van Brabantse Poort te 
Nijmegen, October 1991 
 Stem en tinstverdelings-overeenkomst, January 1992 
 Sweens (1996) 1e aanzet Artikel Privatiseren (notes for the development 
of an article) 
 Sweens (1996), 2e aanzet Artikel Privatiseren (notes for the development 
of an article) 
 The Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning (1981). The Dain 
Characteristics of the >and hse Wolicy in the Eetherland, The Hague 
 The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment (1987). 
The Zules of Whysical Wlanning 198ϲ, The Hague 
 Toelichting Wlan Brabantse Woort, Gemeente Nijmegen, July 1989 
 hitwerking anpak Stedelijke Ontwikkelingsǌone’s, Gemeente Nijmegen, 
Dienst Ondersteuning en Coordinatie Project Bureau, April 1989 
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 Prikarts, correspondence contributing to Artikel Privatisering, 25 
November 1996 
 Schuwer, correspondence contributing to Artikel Privatisering, 22 
November 1996 
 Specifiek Kader voor de Verbonden Partij Brabantse Poort Nijmegen BV, 
Gemeente Nijmegen, 13 October 2011 
 
A list of additional documents is available upon request. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Example of a questionnaire 
The Battery Park City project: survey on risk and trust in 
Public-Private Partnerships 
 
This questionnaire is being administered as part of a research at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, on elements of risk and trust in the 
setup and execution of Public-Private Partnerships in large inner-city 
projects. This questionnaire focuses on the Battery Park City project and your 
perceptions of the level and nature of trust between the parties involved. 
You will be asked to respond to questions on the trust between parties, the 
basis of trust and the factors that contribute to the build-up/breakdown of 
trust. The questionnaire also asks you to give your assessment of the 
outcomes of the project.  
 
We very much appreciate the effort you are making to fill in the 
questionnaire and respond to our questions. We value your contribution to 
the outcome of the research. Should you have more questions, please feel 
free to contact: 
 
Ms. C. Pennink, MA, RA: email: pennink@ihs.nl 
 
Please provide us with some background information, by filling in the 
following information. Please note that all responses will be treated as 
confidential. 
 
Name: 
 
For which organization do you/did you work during your involvement in the 
Battery Park City project? 
 
 
What type of organization is/was it? 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
 Private firm 
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 Non-profit organization 
 Voluntary organization 
 Other, please describe 
 
 
 
Please briefly describe your position within the organization: 
 
 
 
Please briefly describe the role you play(ed) in the Battery Park City project, 
and the timing of your involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, please turn to the next page and either tick (¥) or fill in (Ŷthe 
appropriate box
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Question ϭ͗tŚŝĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐďĞƐƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐǇŽƵƌƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ͍ 
 I have been following/followed the project from a distance (have been 
keeping up to date with the project) 
 At certain times during the project, I was asked to 
contribute/contributed my thoughts to the project 
 I have been participating/participated actively in the project 
 I am/was part of the management of the project 
 
Question Ϯ͗ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ 
Could you answer the following questions concerning the nature of the 
partnership? 
 
There were organizational strategies employed to 
manage and regulate the cooperation between the 
public and private sectors 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
Financial risks were divided and shared between 
the public and private partners 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
There was coordination of activities between the 
public and private parties 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Any comments: 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
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Question ϳ͗ƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ 
Please indicate in the following table your perception of the outcomes of the 
partnership 
Outcomes WůĞĂƐĞƚŝĐŬŽŶĞ ŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ 
I am satisfied with the 
results of the 
collaboration/project 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
The goals of my 
organization were met by 
the partnership 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
The partnership led to 
additional investments 
than would not have 
occurred if my 
organization had worked 
alone 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
The collaboration created 
a number of innovative 
ideas, concepts and plans 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
The partnership resulted 
in the implementation of 
a project that added to 
the quality of life of the 
neighbourhood and city 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Working closely together 
led to improved 
cooperation between 
partners 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Working closely together 
led to improved 
coordination of project 
elements 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
Working in partnership 
led to long processes of 
decision making and 
additional costs 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 No opinion 
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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Question ϴ͗ŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚƌƵƐƚůĞǀĞůƐŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ 
Here we ask you to tell us how much the level of trust in different partners in the 
project changed ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨǇŽƵƌŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ͘ The figures below show four 
phases (taken from the phasing at the beginning of the questionnaire). We ask you 
to measure the level of trust per phase. /ŶĞĂĐŚĐŽůƵŵŶ͕ƉůĞĂƐĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ͕ďǇƉůĂĐŝŶŐ
ĂƚŝĐŬŵĂƌŬ͕ǇŽƵƌ ůĞǀĞůŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ͘dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨŝŐƵƌĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ͘Each figure 
deals with a different partner. Note: please skip the actors you feel are not relevant 
for you. 
 
Example 
 
 
dŚĞƐĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĨƌŽŵϭϵϳϵ to ϭϵϵϰ 
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ’94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
¥7
¥8
¥9
¥10
Change in your level of trust in
_________(name of organisation)_________
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Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
the State of New York: the Governor’s Office
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
The NY and NJ Port Authority
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Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
the City of New York: the City Planning Commission
 
 
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park City 
evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
the City of New York: the Mayor’s Office
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Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
the Battery Park City Authority
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
BPCA Architects: Cooper and Eckstut
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Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in 
the Downtown Lower Manhattan Association
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in
Olympia and York, commercial developers 
ϰϭϮ | P a g e  
 
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 445
 
 
 
 
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in
Lefrak and Fisher, residential developers 
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in
Public Arts Advisory Committee
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Thank you very much for your time, input and patience.  
Carley Pennink 
 
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ‘94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in
Battery Park City Parks Corporation
Bridging a market 
dip, community 
presence
Battery Park 
City evolves
Building Battery 
Park City
Recharging 
Battery Park 
City
Periods
Level of trust
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
’88 – ’94’84 – ‘88’82 – ‘84’79 – ‘82
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Change in your level of trust in
Other, __________________________________
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Annex 2: The Battery Park City 1969 and 1979 
Programmes 
1969 
 600,000 m2 of commercial space at the base of the site 
 Seven large residential complexes, 14,000 housing units and a mixture 
of subsidized and market spaces 
 27,000 m2 of shopping centre on the eastern edge of the site 
 Circulation system that called for the separation of pedestrian traffic 
from vehicular traffic through the use of pedestrian bridges 
 Most uses stacked for higher density on the site, extensive layered 
parking facilities, public spaces on multiple levels, upper decks for 
parking spaces 
1979 
The revised Master Plan of 1979 was developed to reflect the elements that 
were most desirable in New York City.  These elements were represented in 
eight basic principles: 
 
 Principle 1: Battery Park should not be a new town within a city but 
should be part of Manhattan 
 Principle 2: The layout and orientation of Battery Park City should be an 
extension of Lower Manhattan’s streets and blocks 
 Principle 3: Battery Park City should focus on the development of its 
waterfront and maximize the open spaces for use by tenants and the 
rest of the public 
 Principle 4: The design of the site should take on a sympathetic, 
understandable form 
 Principle 5: Circulation at Battery Park City should re-emphasize the 
ground level. 
 Principle 6: Battery Park City should reproduce what is best about NYC 
neighbourhoods  
 Principle 7: Relocate the new Commercial Centre to the focal point of 
the site (the centre) and develop it first 
 Principle 8: Land use and development controls should be flexible 
enough to allow for adjustments to future market requirements 
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General: 
 Block size: standard 200 by 400 ft, block dimensions suited the size of 
smaller brownstones, large buildings and could be developed by small 
and large developers alike 
 Four major streets: two (north-south) with major residential, shopping, 
community facilities and entertainment and two (east-west) either side 
of the Commercial Centre (just continuation of streets either side WTC, 
for easier vehicular circulation). All other streets private and dead end 
 In those areas that are very busy (conflict of pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic), pedestrian walkways were allowed. This would occur by the 
WFC where the volume of pedestrians is so great and West Street 
borders the site 
 Parking only provided on a project by project basis and in very limited 
quantities 
 70% of total site allocated to open spaces 
a. 19.25%: streets 
b. 30.25%: public open spaces, i.e. parks, esplanades, playgrounds 
c. 20.5%: private open spaces, i.e. buildings, courtyards and resident 
parks 
Specific 
 6 million ft2 office space in four buildings 
 280,000 ft2 commercial and retail space, various public spaces 
 3,912 residential units, mixture of market rental and sale 
(condominium), approximately 50-50, phase I (southern area) 
 7,500 residential units, phase II (northern area of the site) 
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Annex 3: Bond Issue 1972: Powers of the Battery Park 
City Authority: 
 A Public Benefit Corporation of the State of New York with powers to 
enable it to finance, construct and operate a planned city community 
project; legally formed as ‘a body corporate and politic’, with a board 
of three members appointed by the governor of the state and an 
executive staff of five (Chairman, Treasurer, Architect/Engineer, 
Property Manager and General Council). 
 External consultants to the Authority included: financial, bond, lease, 
accountants, engineering and real estate (marketing). 
 The BPCA had the right to issue bonds not exceeding US$ 300 million, 
the bonds were exempt from federal, state and local income taxes. 
 The Authority was expected to obtain its revenues principally from the 
sublease of parcels in the project area to developers; the conditions of 
the sublease were that the developers undertake the construction of 
the commercial and residential structures at their own expense. 
 Expenditures of the BPCA were: the debt service on the bonds, 
administrative and maintenance expenses, rent payable for the lease of 
land. Operation and management of the project and subleases were 
crucial to the Authority’s capacity to cover these expenditures. 
 Feasibility studies were required to demonstrate the viability of the 
project (attached as part of the bond issue). 
 Low- and middle-income residential portions of the project to be 
subsidized by a number of federal, state and municipal programmes. 
 Construction and maintenance obligations included the relocation of 
existing tenants, demolition of the existing structures, construction of 
public and private services and utilities; all utilities were to be 
completed in 11 years.  
 In the first five years, the BPCA was to have contracted with developers 
to begin construction of improvements, at least 1,000 residential units 
should be in construction. 
List of key responsibilities: 
 To borrow money and issue negotiable bonds, notes and other 
obligations, to provide for the rights of the holders thereof. 
 To acquire, lease, hold, mortgage and dispose of real property and 
personal property for its corporate use. 
 To construct, improve, enlarge, operate and maintain the ‘Project’. 
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 To make by-laws for the management and regulations of its affairs and 
for the regulation of the project (subject to the agreement of the bond 
holders). 
 To make contracts and execute all necessary or convenient 
instruments, including leases and subleases. 
 To accept grants, loans and ‘contributions’ from the Federal, State and 
city government or any other agency thereof. 
 To fix, establish, and collect rates, rentals, fees and other charges for 
the use of the project (subject to agreement of the bondholders). 
 
Existence of the Authority to continue until terminated by law (the length of 
the Project) but not so long as bonds, notes and other obligations are 
outstanding, unless adequate provisions have been made for payment. 
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Profile Carley Pennink 
 
^Ϯ͘ϬdŽŽůŬŝƚ 
2016-2017, in the Netherlands and Uganda, Project Coordinator / key author 
Production of set of guidelines and tools to guide local government in the 
development and execution of city development strategies, with testing in the 
field, interactive website. 
 
dŽǁŶWůĂŶŶŝŶŐĨŽƌ'ƌĞĞŶĂŶĚ^ŵĂƌƚŝƚŝĞƐ/ŶƌŵĞŶŝĂ 
2015-2016 in Armenia and the Netherlands, as Team Leader 
Led development of capacity-building programme that focused on training of 
government staff in strategic approaches to green and smart cities. 
Development based on needs assessment within the university and in local 
government, training of staff in key concepts, and in interactive adult learning 
approaches, as well as partnering on development of short training courses 
and Master’s level courses. Staff travelled to the Netherlands to discuss 
implementation issues with practitioners and to develop case material. 
 
^ŵĂƌƚŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ 
2015, India and the Netherlands 
Assessment of capacity needs in India, development of Smart Cities Course 
sandwich course for the Indian market: focus on strategic approaches to 
issues faced in the Indian context. 
 
'ŽŽĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐ͗ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ 
2014, in Tbilisi Georgia, Team Leader 
 Training needs assessment: assessment of the capacity gaps in local 
government in Georgia related to good governance and participation in 
strategic planning, development of training strategy, 
 Development and execution of a five-day course on good governance and 
participation in city development strategy processes (case study Tbilisi), 
 Training of IPR staff in adult learning and adult training, support to the IPR 
in developing two three-day courses on the same topic, 
 Guidance in the development of a marketing and communication 
strategy, keynote speech at seminar to disseminate output of the project. 
 
dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽŶŝƚǇĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ 
ϰϭϵ | P a g e  
 
512761-L-bw-pennink
Processed on: 21-8-2017 PDF page: 452
2014, in the Netherlands and Romania, Team Leader 
Led group of trainers in the development of a training manual and materials 
City Development Strategies. Output: generic materials to guide local 
governments in the execution of a CDS process.  
 
ƌĞWWWƐZ>>zƉƌŽ-ƉŽŽƌĂŶĚŐĞŶĚĞƌƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ͍ 
2013, in the Netherlands and Kampala, Uganda, course manager and principle 
trainer 
Led group of local government officials from East Africa through a PPP 
business planning exercise, and during each step, an assessment of the pro-
poor and gender-sensitive criteria used to make decisions on the nature and 
structure of the PPP.  
 
ĂƉĂĐŝƚǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨŽĨzĞƌĞǀĂŶŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůĂŶĚDƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ 
2010 -2011, two phases in Yerevan, Armenia 
Capacity needs assessment of local government in Yerevan. Development of 
capacity building strategy and programme for staff on urban management, 
good governance, and on management of urban infrastructure and services 
and PPPs. 
 
ŝƚǇĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ͕dďŝůŝƐŝ͕'ĞŽƌŐŝĂ 
2010-2011, in Tbilisi, Georgia, Project Leader 
Led a team of consultants and trainers during the execution of the city profile, 
the development of the city development strategy and public meetings in the 
city of Tbilisi. Provision of facilitation and capacity-building services based on 
needs assessed during execution of activities. 
 
DĂƐƚĞƌůĂƐƐŝŶ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĐƚŝŽŶWůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝŶĨĂǀĞůĂƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐŝŶ^ĆŽWĂƵůŽ 
2010, São Paulo, Brazil, Trainer 
Request from SEHAB, the municipal social housing secretariat of São Paulo, 
for on-the-job training for staff. Focus on approaches that achieved 
implementation and integration with other service providers. Work on 
integrated and Participatory Action Planning for Cabuçu de Cima Water Basin 
 
ĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƵŝůĚŝŶŐĨŽƌŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƵĚŝƚŝŶŐ 
2010, in the Netherlands, for the government of Indonesia, Capacity Building 
specialist 
Execution of training of trainers for a group of Indonesian government 
professionals working with environmental auditing, aid in the establishment 
of training priorities, and development of a training strategy and programmes. 
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dďŝůŝƐŝŐŐůŽŵĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŐĞŶĐǇ;dͿ^ƚƵĚǇŽĨDĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶ
ŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ 
2010, in the Netherlands, Project Leader 
Led team that provided support to TADA, the new Tbilisi metropolitan agency. 
Staff travelled to Europe to study the issues faced by studied European 
Metropolitan Agencies, and to assess the applicability of lessons learned to 
their own situation. 
 
^ŚĞůƚĞƌƌĂŶĐŚ>ĂŶĚĂŶĚ,ŽƵƐŝŶŐWŽůŝĐǇWĂƉĞƌƐ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇWĂƉĞƌĂŶĚ
WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ 
2009-2010, the Netherlands and Kenya, Team Leader, Programme document 
Production Land and Housing Policy and Programme documents for the 
Shelter Branch of UN-Habitat. Production of two policy papers, one for the 
Housing Policy Section, another for the Land, Tenure and Property 
Administration Section of the Shelter Branch, followed by the creation of n 
overall strategy and programme document. 
 
/ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚWƵďůŝĐ-WƌŝǀĂƚĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐŝŶ
/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ͘ 
2007-2008, in the Netherlands and Indonesia, Team Leader 
Special request to facilitate three regional governments in Indonesia on 
production of PPP business plans and execution of works. Assessments of 
needs, training and follow-up TA services in the development and execution 
of PPP transactions; for three regional projects. 
 
dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĨŽƌƐŝĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶŬƐƚĂĨĨŝŶ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ
WƵďůŝĐ-WƌŝǀĂƚĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ 
2007, in Manila, Philippines, Training design expert, trainer 
Support to the ADB in thinking through issues faced in stakeholder 
management during execution of PPPs. Needs assessment, course 
development and training delivery. Follo- up feedback on ADB PPP Position 
Paper. 
 
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ^ƉĂƚŝĂůWůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝŶ<ŽƐŽǀŽWƌŽũĞĐƚ͕ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞhE-,ĂďŝƚĂƚhƌďĂŶ
DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚWůĂŶŶŝŶŐWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ 
2002-2006, in the Netherlands and Kosovo, Institutional 
expert/advisor/trainer 
 Proposal for and execution of institutional development plan,  
 Follow-up support on setting strategies for staff development, 
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 Capacity-building needs assessment, design and execution of capacity-
building programmes, on-the-job training during development of Kosovo-
wide strategic plan, 
 Consensus building, facilitation of public meetings, 
 Coordination of activities with inter-ministerial groups and civil society. 
 
WĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇDĂƉƉŝŶŐǁĂƐƐĂ ͬŝƚǇĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ^trategies 
2003-2004, in Awassa, Ethiopia, Team Leader, consultant 
Mapping of participatory processes, capacity gap assessment, stakeholder 
consultations, training and support to partners (COs, GOs and NGOs) in the 
development of a City Development Strategy. 
 
ĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ>ŽĐĂů 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶĨƌŝĐĂWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ 
2002-2003, Netherlands and Sub-Saharan Africa, Capacity building specialist, 
decentralization expert 
Capacity-building strategy and programme design, content design, material 
development (module 1: overview of Decentralization in SSA), design, 
execution base module on decentralization. 
 
hƌďĂŶDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ 
2001, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Institutional/capacity building advisor, trainer 
Support, advice and capacity building on new approaches to planning, 
participation in planning, new roles for planning department, advisory work 
on organizational change. 
 
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůhƌďĂŶDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶWŽůĂŶĚ 
2002-2007, the Netherlands and Poland, Institutional and management 
expert, capacity-building expert 
 Advisor, setup/staffing of the centre, on-the-job training of staff, 
 Business plans and management plans, 
 Assessment of capacity-building needs of local government organizations, 
 Developing training strategies and guidance in training provision. 
 
ĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ>ŽĐĂůŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ 
2002, Philippines and the Netherlands, capacity-building specialist 
Training needs assessment, training strategy and programme development, 
training of trainers. 
 
ƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶZŽŵĂŶŝĂ 
2003-2006, Romania (three municipalities), Project Leader 
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 Capacity building of local governments; support to institutional strategies 
to execute organizational change, 
 Training in public sector reforms and performance measurement in public 
services, 
 TA in execution of programmes in local governments in Romania, TA in set 
up of partnerships, 
 Facilitation of consensus-building activities. 
 
ZŽŵĂŶŝĂŶWƵďůŝĐĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ 
1999-2001, Romania (country wide), Project Leader capacity-building 
component 
 Capacity-building support to the eight National and Regional Training 
Centres, 
 Creation of internal institutional development plans and training 
strategies, 
 Development of national policy for training in Romania and strategy to 
guide implementation of institutional change, 
 Needs assessment within local governments, 
 Training strategy and programme development, 
 Guidance in the execution of training services. 
 
/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĨŽƌhƌďĂŶDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ZŽŵĂŶŝĂ
ϭϵϵϳ-ϮϬϬϬ͕ZŽŵDĂƚƌĂϵϲͬϬϱ 
1998-2000, Romania (country wide) and the Netherlands, Institutional 
development specialist, manager PPP component 
 Support to development of staff capacity, advisor in institutional 
development activities (policy and strategies). Execution of training of 
trainers, programme design, as well as support to local government 
capacity development in PPPs. 
 
ŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐĨŽƌWƵďůŝĐ-WƌŝǀĂƚĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐŝŶ>ŽĐĂů
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚZKͬϵϴͬϴϯϱϰϵͬ 
1999-2001, City of Cluj Napoca, Romania, Team Leader and Consultant 
 Support in development of Local Economic Development strategy for City 
of Cluj Napoca, Romania,  
 Strategy to determine investment priorities for local government and 
guidelines for attracting private sector participation, 
 Facilitation stakeholder consensus building, 
 Capacity building of local government staff. 
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^ƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌhƌďĂŶĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͕ĞůĂƌƵƐ 
1998, in Minsk, Belarus, Training Specialist 
Development capacity in Strategic Planning with local training counterpart. 
Support in development of strategy to build staff capacity. 
 
ŐǇƉƚZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐWƌŽũĞĐƚŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐŝŶŐ͕ƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚ
WůĂŶŶŝŶŐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞŶƚƌĞ;,WZͿŝŶĂŝƌŽ 
1998, in Egypt as consultant and training expert 
Execution of training of trainers, work with counterpart staff on training 
methods development, follow-up advisory services in curriculum 
development. 
 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂů/,^ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ 
1994 - present 
 Urban Management 
 Action and Strategic Planning  
 City Development Strategies 
 Green and Smart Cities 
 Urban Governance, Policy and Planning 
 Leveraging Public and Private Opportunities in City Regeneration 
 Management of Public-Private Partnerships 
 Public and Private Finance of Urban Development  
 Capacity Building and Human Resource Development,  
 Inner City Development in Transitional Economies (ICDTE) 
WƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
Pennink, C., 2017. ‘Building Trust in Complex Urban Regeneration 
Partnerships’. In: M.P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), hrban 'overnance in Complex 
nvironments (Rugby: Practical Action Publishing). 
Pennink, C., S. Welsh and N. Browne (eds.). IHS Thesis Series (2ϬϬ7-2Ϭ1ϰ), 
yearly publication of Master’s Theses, Master in Urban Management and 
Development (Rotterdam: IHS Publication). 
Racoviceanu, S., C. Pennink, S. Welsh and N. Browne (eds.). Building 
Operational Capacity for Decentraliǌed 'overnment in Zomania (2005), 
Publication developed as part of the Dutch Government sponsored project 
Building Operational Capacity for Decentralized Government in Romania 
(Bucharest). 
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Van den Dool, L., C. Pennink, H. Daemen and A. Gianoli (2005). ‘Local 
Government Reform in Poland: An Exploratory Study’. In: >ocal 'overnment 
Zeform in Woland (Rotterdam: IHS Publication). 
Pennink, C. (2005). ffectiveness in International ducation: Yuality or 
Yuantity? Paper presented at the European Workshop on Mid-Career Public 
Management Development, 16-18 November 2005, University of 
Birmingham, UK. 
Pennink, C. B. (2004). ‘Partnerships for Better Cities: Measuring Costs and 
Benefits in a Multi-Actor Approach’. Chapter 7 in: Danagement si 
'uvernanta hrbana (Urban Management and Governance) (UNDP 
Moldova). 
Pennink, C. (2003). ‘Overview of Decentralization Policies and Practices in sub 
Saharan Africa: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward’. Module A of 
Decentraliǌation and >ocal 'overnment in Sub-Saharan frica as part of the 
Decentralization and Local Government in Africa Programme of the World 
Bank (Rotterdam: Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies). 
Pennink, C. and J. van Etten (2002). Training of Trainers on Decentraliǌation 
and >ocal mpowerment: Warticipants’ Handbook (Rotterdam: Institute for 
Housing and Urban Development Studies/IHS). 
Pennink, C., R. Dauskardt and F. Davidson (2002). ‘Urban Policies and 
Strategies in a Global Context’. In: IHS hrban Forum, vol. 1(1): 131-153. 
Pennink, C. and J. van Etten (2002). Training of Trainers on Decentraliǌation 
and >ocal mpowerment: Trainers 'uide (Rotterdam: Institute for Housing 
and Urban Development Studies/IHS). 
Co-editor (2002), IHS hrban Forum, IHS Scientific Journal Series (Rotterdam). 
Davidson, F. and C. Pennink (2001). ‘From Fire-Fighting to Fire Lighting: 
International Experience in Capacity Building, and Its Relevance for Ethiopia’. 
In: F. Davidson and C. Pennink (eds.). Eational Seminar on hrban/Dunicipal 
Capacity Building (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IHS/ GTZ/UDSS). 
Pennink, C., R. Dauskardt and F. Davidson (2001). ‘Urban Policies and 
Strategies in a Global Context: Key Issues, Elements and Lessons’. In: F. 
Davidson and C. Pennink (eds.). Eational Seminar on hrban/Dunicipal 
Capacity Building (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IHS/ GTZ/UDSS). 
Pennink C. B. and M. Vrabete (2001).  Wroject from Cluj Eapoca: Continuous 
Training Systems for Wublic Wrivate Wartnerships in >ocal conomic 
Development. Paper for dissemination seminar, 16-17 March 2001. 
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Pennink C. B. (2001). Strategies for >ocal conomic Development in Cluj-
Eapoca’s Inner City, Ideas for Today and Tomorrow: How to 'et Such a 
Wrocess 'oing and Keep It 'oing. Presentation at seminar ‘Continuous 
Training Systems for Public Private Partnerships in Local Economic 
Development’, 16-17 March 2001. 
Pennink, C. (2000). ‘Training Needs Assessment for Local Government in 
Romania’. In: Dialogue, Newsletter of the Romanian Ministry of Civil Service 
(May 2000). 
Pennink, C. (2000). From Datra to Whare: Building on Datra Initiatives for 
Training in Zomania. Presentation paper at seminar: ‘Strengthening the 
Training Capacity for Urban Management in Romania’. Bucharest, Romania, 
24 March 2000.  
Pennink, C. Institutions for Wartnerships in Competitive Cities: Wrocesses for 
Determining Zoles and Zesponsibilities in the Dulti-ctor pproach. 
Presentation paper at: ‘Partnerships for Competitive Cities Seminar’. Sinaia, 
Romania, 18-19 September 1998.  
Pennink, C. (1997). Presentation ‘Urban Renewal in the Netherlands’. In: N. 
A. Bongwa, K. Z. Stachowiak and M. R. Brown (eds.). Conference Zeport for 
the International Conference on hrban Zenewal and Housing Zehabilitation, 
Conference, 22-24 May 1997 (Szczecin, Poland: USAID). 
Pennink, C. B. (1997). Wartnerships:  siew of Issues and Werspectives through 
the Brabantse Woort (Rotterdam: IHS Occasional Paper). 
Pennink, C. B. (1997). Factors and Issues in hrban Danagement. Paper, 
presented in Hanoi, Vietnam. 
Pennink, C. B. (1997). ‘Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Land 
Development, the Case of Brabantse Poort’. In: Banking on Cities: the hse of 
Dunicipal ssets for hrban Development Finance (Rotterdam/Szczecin: The 
Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies and Technical 
University of Szczecin). 
Pennink, C. (1996). ‘Report on Habitat Activities in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’. In: 
The tork of the Eetherlands Habitat Forum with Community Based Wrojects.  
Language editor (1996). M. P. van Dijk and R. Rabelotti (eds.). nterprise 
Clusters and Eetworks in Developing Countries (London: Frank Cass and Co, 
Ltd.). 
Translation and editing of paper (1995). Wrovincies Bedrijven Wreventie. 
Environmental policies at the provincial level in the Netherlands (1995). 
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Pennink, C. (1994). Unpublished paper: The Decentraliǌation of lectrical 
Distribution in Woland. Presentation at Seminar: ‘34th European Congress of 
the Regional Science Association’. Groningen, the Netherlands, 23-26 August 
1994.  
Pennink, C. (1993). lectrical Distribution, the Case Study of aklad 
nergetycǌny Sǌcǌecin, Woland. Final Master’s thesis at the Urban 
Management Centre, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.  
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Carley Pennink is the Head of International Projects and Advisory 
Services at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development 
Studies, of the Erasmus University Rotterdam.
She worked for the first ten years of her career as an architect 
and planner in the field of urban/social housing development. 
She has extensive experience working in the field; from 1982 to 
1993, she worked as a project manager on multiple multi-actor 
and multifunctional urban regeneration projects.
Ms Pennink has been employed at IHS since 1994. She teaches, 
performs research and provides advisory services on issues 
faced in the setup of Public-Private Partnerships in infrastructure 
and services, as well as in complex urban regeneration projects 
in developing and emerging economies. 
She specializes in aspects of institutional development and 
organizational change. Additionally, Ms Pennink focuses on 
the governance aspects of citywide strategic processes. She has 
managed teams working on integrated, strategic planning 
processes that incorporate community-based and participatory 
approaches. She is also an expert on capacity building, training 
and human resource development, and has led many institu-
tional development projects in Africa, Asia and Central and 
Eastern Europe.
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